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Judgment
S.S. Chauhan, J.—The present petition has been filed for quashing the orders dated 07.10.1974, 18.08.1977 and 22.10.1980.
The facts in brief in regard to present petition are that the petitioner was appointed as Cooperative Supervisor under opposite party No. 1 in 1960 and worked there till 1965. In July 1965 the petitioner was appointed and posted as Secretary-cum-Manager of Kshetriya Sahkari Samiti Ltd., Pachhpurwa (for short "the Society"). Salary of the petitioner was paid from the office of opposite party No. 1 till 2.1.1969. Thereafter the petitioner became Secretary of opposite party No. 2 by means of resolution passed in the meeting of the Board of Directors of the Society on 15.6.1970. Opposite party No. 2 is a Society registered under the Cooperative Societies Act, 1965 and the Rules framed thereunder. The General Body elected Board of Directors on 3.1.1972. The petitioner was appointed Secretary subject to approval of the Registrar by means of resolution dated 15.6.1970. It is stated that several complaints were got instituted against the petitioner at the instance of the then Block Development Officer, Kamla Prasad Singh but the said complaints were withdrawn subsequently. In the year 1970, a charge sheet was issued containing the charges against the petitioner. The said charge sheet was returned back by the petitioner stating that the charge sheet may be sent through the Chairman of the Society but the charge sheet was sent to the Assistant Registrar for action. The District Assistant Registrar inspected the Society on 12/13.09.1970 but no shortage or anything of the like nature was found. Charge sheet was issued against the petitioner on 23.1.1971. A letter was written by Kamla Prasad Singh, the then Block Development Officer against the petitioner on 27.1.1971 that arbitration files have been removed by the petitioner. The Chairman of the Society in reply to the letter dated 27.1.1971 and the charge sheet dated 23.1.1971 wrote a letter to the Assistant Registrar drawing his attention to the circular issued by the Registrar which prohibited any other officer to take action against the petitioner except the Board of Directors of the Society. Thereafter an FIR was lodged against the Petitioner on 21/22.10.1971 at Police Station - Pachhpurwa. The police submitted a final report.
It is thereafter that a fresh charge sheet dated 29.10.1971 was issued against the petitioner and the Chairman of the Society. Several irregularities were alleged against the Society and the validity of the election of Board of Directors was also questioned. On the basis of the aforesaid charge sheet, the Assistant Registrar wrote a letter on 1.11.1971 along with another charge sheet recommending annulment of the resolution dated 30.11.1969. The Board of Directors/ Sanchalak Mandal of the Society filed a Writ Petition No. 3717 of 1971 at Allahabad which was admitted and interim order was granted. As s consequence of the grant of interim order, the then Assistant Registrar recommended to the Provincial Cooperative Union for transfer of the petitioner to the Cooperative Bank Balrampur by letter dated 17.11.1972. Thereafter the Society also passed a resolution and sent it to the Hon''ble Minister of Cooperative Societies and the Registrar, Cooperative Societies making complaint against the Assistant Registrar that he was illegally interfering with the affairs of the Society. The Deputy Registrar, Cooperative Societies was deputed to make an enquiry into the matter by means of letter dated 14.1.1972. The aforesaid enquiry annoyed the opposite parties too much and thereafter the Assistant Registrar managed the transfer of the petitioner and opposite party No. 1 issued an order of transfer dated 17.1.1972 to Cooperative Bank, Balrampur. The Registrar issued a circular on 18.3.1972 modifying the earlier circular dated 20.12.1968 to the extent that services of all the employees like the petitioner and others working in the Society will remain under the administrative control of the Society.
Opposite party No. 1 thereafter passed another order of transfer on 30.12.1972 transferring the petitioner to the Cooperative Bank, Barabanki. The Society did not relieve the petitioner and he continued to work there as a permanent employee. The Society passed a resolution on 9.10.1974 to the effect that the petitioner could not be relieved from the post of Secretary. The Deputy Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Faizabad asked the Society through letter dated 29.9.1974 to suspend the petitioner. After receipt of the said letter, the petitioner was directed to submit his explanation which he did and the Society after examining the same came to the conclusion that there was no ground to suspend the petitioner. This resolution was passed on 09.10.1974.
The Society received another letter dated 13.9.1974 by means of which the Society was asked to relieve the petitioner as desired by the Registrar, Cooperative Societies. The letter further mentioned that in case the charge was not taken by the Assistant Registrar from the petitioner, his services would be terminated after giving one month''s notice. On 16.10.1974, a letter dated 7.10.1974 from the office of the President, Provincial Cooperative Union was received placing the petitioner under suspension from the post of Secretary of the Society. Thereafter Inspector Cooperative Society Group-II came to the office of the Society on 21.10.1974 and sealed the entire office of the Society purporting to be acting under the orders of the Assistant Registrar. The audit of the Society was going on by one month by the Audit Organization of the Cooperative and Panchayat Raj Departments. Records of the auditors were sealed as well by the said Inspector. Thereafter the Society filed Writ Petition No. 1347 of 1974 before this Court and this Court was pleased to pass an interim order on 30.10.1974 restraining the opposite parties from proceeding further in the matter till further orders of this Court.
Thereafter Sri Chandra Mani Singh, Assistant Registrar, appointed Sri Ram Bhawan Yadav as Receiver of the Society by order dated 18.8.1977 on the plea that fresh elections were not held and term of the Board of Directors had expired ignoring the fact that fresh election of the Board of Directors had already been held on 27.11.1976 according to bye-laws of the Society. Sri Ram Bhawan Yadav acting as Administrator of the Society moved an application in this Hon''ble Court stating that the Society did not want to press the writ petition and the same be dismissed as not pressed and the writ petition was accordingly dismissed on 3.2.1978. This fact came to the knowledge of the Society. The Society moved a review application through Ram Lal Shukla, the elected President of the Society on 27.11.1976 for recalling the order dismissing the writ petition as not pressed. The said review application was registered as Review Application No. 25 (W) of 1978 and is pending but the service could not be effected on the opposite parties.
In the meantime, the petitioner also filed a contempt petition against Chandra Mani Singh but the same was dismissed on 8.8.1980 vide Criminal Misc. Case No. 1780 (C) 1977. Ram Bhawan Yadav acting as Administrator of the Society took possession of the office of the Society on 5.2.1978 and also took possession of the residence of the petitioner by force. The petitioner was not present on 5.2.1978 and after his return he lodged a report on 6.2.1978 at Police Station Balrampur.
On 13.7.1978, the petitioner received a charge sheet dated 1.7.1978 under the signature of Chandra Mani Singh, Assistant Registrar, acting President of the District Federal Authority describing the petitioner as Supervisor. On 24.7.1978, the petitioner sent an application to the Assistant Registrar/ President of the District Committee requesting him to inspect certain records. The petitioner was directed to inspect the records in the office of the Assistant Registrar on 22.8.1978 at 10:00 A.M. but this intimation was received by the petitioner on 26.8.1978 and he accordingly informed the Assistant Registrar on 31.8.1978 and prayed for another date. The District Assistant Registrar by his letter dated 6.9.1978 fixed 19.9.1978 for inspection of documents. On 19.9.1978, the petitioner was given only partial records to be inspected and he immediately gave it in writing that complete record was not made available to him and enumerated the records that were made available to him for inspection. On 29.9.1978, the petitioner sent another application for inspection of the records. The application was not replied with and the said documents referred in this application were never provided to him for inspection. The Deputy Registrar, Faizabad by means of letter dated 10.3.1978 appointed the Assistant Registrar, Gonda as Enquiry Officer. Subsequently, the Deputy Registrar by means of letter dated 20.3.1978 appointed Sati Prasad Misra A.D.C.O. Balrampur as Enquiry Officer. The petitioner submitted reply to the charge sheet on 17.2.1979 and also preferred an application on 24.3.1979 questioning authority of opposite party No. 1. No enquiry was held in the presence of the petitioner nor any date, time or place was fixed for holding enquiry. The Secretary of opposite party No. 1 sent a show cause notice on 4.10.1979 to the petitioner proposing the punishment of removal from service. In reply to the show cause notice, the petitioner submitted an application on 14.10.1979 demanding copies of the report of the Enquiry Officer and the evidence relied upon against the petitioner. Without replying to his application dated 14.10.1979, the petitioner was required to appear before the Sub Committee on 15.9.1980 and he accordingly appeared before the Sub Committee on the said date he submitted an application demanding copies of the enquiry report and the evidence. On 24.11.1980, the petitioner received an order dated 22.10.1980 by post dismissing the petitioner''s services imposing recovery of Rs. 26,769.93 with no payment of salary except the suspension allowance during the period of suspension. The aforesaid order was impugned in the present writ petition and this writ petition was allowed by means of judgment and order dated 1.4.1992.
Against the aforesaid judgment, an SLP was preferred before the Hon''ble Supreme Court and the Hon''ble Supreme Court vide judgment and order dated 27th October, 1994 allowed the SLP and set aside the judgment of this Court with the direction to the High Court to proceed afresh and decide the case on other points as the writ petition was allowed only on the ground that copy of the enquiry report was not supplied to the petitioner.
Submission of learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the enquiry was not held in accordance with law neither the petitioner was permitted to inspect full documents which were relied upon in support of the charges. He also submits that no date, time or place for holding enquiry was fixed and only on the basis of reply submitted by the petitioner, the enquiry report was submitted. The petitioner was not under the administrative control of opposite party No. 1 or the District Assistant Registrar and so, the entire exercise at the behest of these authorities was without authority of law and they were not authorised to proceed against the petitioner. The dismissal order was the malice of the District Assistant Registrar, who made it a prestige point to get the petitioner transferred and when they could not succeed, then they proceeded to take over the Society and ultimately they appointed Administrator and the Administrator by playing fraud upon this Court got the writ petition withdrawn in which further proceedings against the Society were stayed and on the basis of fraud committed by the opposite parties, they proceeded to initiate proceedings against the petitioner. Disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner were not otherwise permissible under law since the petitioner was under the administrative control of opposite party No. 2. In support of his contention, learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon decisions rendered in the cases of Kamla Charan Misra v. State of U.P. and Ors. 2009 (27) LCD 130, Radhey Kant Khare v. U.P. Cooperative Sugar Factories Federation Ltd. 2003 (21) LCD 610, Suresh Chandra Srivastava v. State of U.P. and Ors. 2008 (26) LCD 461 and Uma Shanker Yadav v. Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Lucknow and Ors. (CM Writ Petition No. 2391 of 1990 decided on May 11, 1992).
Learned Counsel for the opposite parties, on the other hand, has submitted that the petitioner was the employee of opposite party No. 1. He was only on deputation with opposite party No. 2 and the deputation could have been cancelled at any time and, therefore, it was within the domain of opposite party No. 1 to transfer the petitioner and the petitioner should have abided by the transfer order. In the disciplinary proceedings all the charges were proved against the petitioner. He was given proper opportunity in accordance with law and, therefore, no interference is required by this Court in the dismissal order.
I have heard learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the record.
From the record of the writ petition, it is evident that the circular dated 20.12.1968 goes to indicate that Cooperative Supervisors who were working in the Societies and whose salaries were being paid by the Society were put under the administrative control of the Societies and this circular was issued in view of the various orders passed by the High Court as well as considering the fact that when the Societies were making payment, it was their right to supervise and take disciplinary action against the Supervisors working there. So the first point as argued by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the administrative control of the petitioner after 2.1.1969 was with the Board of Directors of the Society and, therefore, there was no power vested with opposite party No. 1 to proceed in the matter or to take action against the petitioner and pass a suspension order and thereafter pass the dismissal order is correct.
Appointment of the petitioner was approved on the basis of resolution passed by the Board of Directors w.e.f. 2.1.1969 which was approved by the Registrar on 20.06.1970. The petitioner was thereafter made permanent Secretary of the Society by means of resolution dated 15.7.1972 which was rectified by the General Body of the Society on 21.1.1973. The petitioner after issuance of the last charge sheet dated 1.7.1978 by Chandra Mani Singh, Assistant Registrar, acting as President of the District Federal Authority on the said date was not empowered to proceed against the petitioner as the Administrator appointed by Chandra Mani Singh played fraud upon this Court by getting the Writ Petition No. 1347 of 1974 dismissed as withdrawn in the capacity of the Administrator without serving upon the Management of the Society or the Chairman of the Society any notice for withdrawing the said writ petition. The Administrator was appointed arbitrarily. The application for recalling the said order is still pending and has not been decided, therefore, the authority of the Administrator to proceed in the matter and to take action against the petitioner does not appear to be proper on account of the fact that the order withdrawing the writ petition has not become final and is subjudice before this Court. It is to be noted that when the opposite parties could not succeed earlier by proceeding against the petitioner when they issued charge sheet in May 1970 and then charges were framed on 23.1.1971 and FIR was also lodged against the petitioner by the Assistant Registrar on 22.10.1971 in which the police submitted final report, then fresh charge sheet was issued on 29.10.1971 on the Chairman of the Society and the petitioner but a resolution was passed for absorbing the services of the petitioner in the Society. The Assistant Registrar recommended for annulment of the resolution dated 30.11.1969. The Committee of Management filed Writ Petition No. 3717 of 1971 and an interim order was passed restraining the opposite parties from proceeding any further. After this restraint order, there was no power or authority vested with the District Assistant Registrar to appoint Administrator by superseding the Committee of Management and proceed against the petitioner by issuing fresh charge sheet. It all seems that it was a malafide action on the part of the opposite parties as they have taken as a challenge with the Society to see that the petitioner was removed from service as he had not been relieved in spite of direction of the District Assistant Registrar. Action of the opposite parties on the face of it is malafide and, therefore, the order of dismissal cannot be sustained on this ground as well.
The next point which has been argued by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner was not permitted to inspect the documents which were demanded by him. He sent an application on 24.7.1978 demanding from the District Assistant Registrar to allow him to inspect the records. Thereafter on 19.9.1978, he wrote a letter that he has been permitted to inspect certain documents but complete documents have not been provided to him. A list of said documents was also provided which were inspected but he assured the authority to file the interim reply on the basis of aforesaid inspection. He again wrote a letter on 29.9.1978 specifying the documents which were required to be inspected for filing effective reply. He also indicated that in his absence lock of office of the Society was broken and his house was also searched after breaking open the lock and all the documents were taken away by the opposite parties and he, therefore, stated that the aforesaid documents which are alleged to be forged may be allowed to be inspected. Thereafter he submitted an interim reply and on the basis of the aforesaid interim reply the enquiry report was submitted although on page No. 70 of the paper book it has been specifically indicated in the interim reply that he would like to cross examine the witness and he also asked that he may be permitted to adduce the then Auditor and his report and the available cheques in the bank along with the request that he would like to be personally heard. It is stated that thereafter the petitioner was not heard and no date, time or place for holding enquiry was fixed. The petitioner replied to the show cause notice but he also demanded copy of the enquiry report under his own understanding that he cannot file effective reply to the show cause notice unless copy of the enquiry report was given to him. He personally demanded copy of the enquiry report but the copy of the enquiry report was never supplied to him. So by the time he could file reply to the show cause notice, dismissal order dated 22.10.1980 was passed against him. The aforesaid order does not indicate as to in what manner the decision has been taken by the Committee of Management and how the charges have been found to be proved against the petitioner. The aforesaid order appears to be purportedly bad in law and having been passed in utter violation of principles of natural justice. The opposite parties were obliged to fix date, time and place for holding enquiry and inform the petitioner accordingly but nothing was done. So, the dismissal order cannot be sustained on this score. Law in regard to holding of enquiry and giving of opportunity has succinctly been laid down in various cases from time to time in order to appreciate the controversy. The law as propounded by this Court in this regard is as under:
In the case of Kamla Charan Misra (supra), this Court has held as under:
In view of the settled proposition of law, since the impugned order of punishment does not disclose the material evidence on record and has been passed without assigning reasons, it is violative of principles of natural justice, hence hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
The submission of the learned Standing Counsel that it is not necessary to assign reason does not seem to be sustainable in view of the settled provisions of law (supra). At the face of record, from the impugned order, it may not be gathered as to what were the evidence on record which had persuaded the disciplinary authority to pass the impugned order of punishment.
In the case of Radhey Kant Khare (Supra), this Court has held as under:
In a Division bench of this Court in Subhash Chandra Sharma v. U.P. Co-operative Spinning Mills 2000 (1) UPLBEC 541, in which one of us (Hon''ble M. Katju, J.) was a member, this law has been laid down. The law is as follows:
After a charge sheet is given to the employee an oral enquiry is a must, whether the employee requests for it or not. Hence a notice should be issued to him indicating him the date, time and place of the enquiry. On that date the oral and documentary evidence against the employee should first be led in his presence vide Associated Cement Co. Ltd. Vs. The Workmen and Another, Ordinarily, if the employee is examined first it is illegal vide Anand Joshi v. MSFC 1991 LIC 1666 Bom. , S.D. Sharma v. Trade Fair Authority of India 1985 (II) LLJ 193, Central Railway Vs. Raghubir Saran, No doubt in certain exceptional cases the employee may be asked to lead evidence first, vide Employers of Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. Ltd. Vs. Their Workmen, but ordinarily the rule is that first the employer must adduce his evidence. The reason for this principle is that the charge sheeted employee should not only know the charges against him but should also know the evidence against him so that he can properly reply to the same. Where no witnesses were examined and no exhibit or record is made but straightaway the employee was asked to produce his evidence and documents in support of his case it is illegal vide P.C. Tohomas v. Mutholi Co-operative Society Ltd. 1978 LIC 1428 Meenglas Tea Estate Vs. Its Workmen,
In Meenglas Tea Estate Vs. Its Workmen, the Supreme Court observed "It is an elementary principle that a person who is required to answer the charge must know not only the accusation but also the testimony by which the accusation is supported. He must be given a fair chance to hear the evidence in support of the charge and to put such relevant questions by way of cross-examination as he desires. Then he must be given a chance to rebut the evidence led against him. This is the barest requirement of an enquiry of this character and this requirement must be substantially fulfilled if the result of the enquiry can be accepted.
In S.C. Girotra Vs. United Commercial Bank (UCO Bank) and Others, the Supreme Court set aside the dismissal order which was passed without giving the employee an opportunity of cross examination. In State of Uttar Pradesh and Another Vs. Sri C.S. Sharma, the Supreme Court held that omission to give opportunity to an employee to produce his witnesses and lead evidence in his defence vitiates the proceedings. The Court also held that in the enquiry the witnesses have to be examined in support of the allegations and opportunity has to be given to the delinquent to cross examine those witnesses and to lead evidence in his defence. In The Punjab National Bank Ltd. Vs. Its Workmen, (vide paragraph 66) the Supreme Court held that in such enquiries evidence must be recorded in presence of the charge sheeted employee and he must be given opportunity to rebut such evidence.
In the case of Suresh Chandra Srivastava (supra), this Court has held as under:
From the perusal of the judgments relied upon by the petitioner''s counsel (supra), it is evident that according to the law settled by Hon''ble Apex Court, it is always incumbent upon the Enquiry Officer to record oral evidence with liberty to the delinquent employee to cross-examine such witnesses. After the evidence adduced by the Department to prove the charges, it is also necessary that the delinquent employee be given the opportunity to lead evidence in defence. In the case of Radhey Kant Khare (supra) after considering various pronouncements of Hon''ble the Apex Court and this Court, a Division Bench of this Court has held that after charge sheet is given to an employee, oral enquiry is must. It is immaterial whether the employee makes request for it or not. Meaning thereby, whether an employee submits reply to the charge sheet or not, or even if an employee submits reply to the charge sheet, it is always incumbent upon the Enquiry Officer to record oral evidence in the presence of the delinquent employee. In case, the charged employee is not present or does not cooperate with the enquiry proceedings, even then it is necessary for the Enquiry Officer to record the statement of the witnesses orally by proceeding ex parte.
In the case of Uma Shanker Yadav (supra), this Court has held as under:
The impugned order states that the enquiry report was sent by the Enquiry Officer by his letter dated 16-1-1989 which was received in the office of the Deputy Registrar on 21-1-1989. It is not clear whether this enquiry was a regular enquiry or a preliminary enquiry. Even assuming that it was a regular enquiry, it was necessary that the notice of the enquiry should have been sent to the petitioner. In my opinion, even if the accused employee does not send his reply to the charge-sheet, the Enquiry Officer is not absolved from his duty to send a notice to the accused informing him about the date, time and place of the enquiry. In paragraph 12 of the writ petition there is a clear averment that the petitioner was not informed about any date of holding of the enquiry. In paragraph 13 it is stated that without holding any enquiry, or providing any opportunity of being heard, the petitioner was dismissed.
It appears that the respondents were under a misconception about the law that if an accused employee does not reply to the charge-sheet then he need not be given opportunity of hearing in the enquiry. In my opinion, even if it is correct that the petitioner did not submit any reply to the charge-sheet, it was incumbent on the Enquiry Officer to have sent a notice to the petitioner informing him about the date, time and place of the enquiry, so that the petitioner could produce his witnesses, and cross examine the witnesses against him. Since this was not done, the Rules of natural justice have been violated.
So far the question of supply of relevant documents and inspection of the documents are concerned, the Apex Court has ruled that where the employee has not been able to file effective reply on account of non-supply of the documents or non-inspection of the documents and he has also indicated the said fact, then the dismissal order in such circumstances cannot be sustained and if the employee has been precluded from filing the effective reply and has been prejudiced then the dismissal order cannot be sustained. In the case of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad, Vs. Karunakar, etc. etc., the Apex Court has held as under:
It is settled law that the disciplinary authority, by whatever name called, has power and jurisdiction to inquire into the misconduct by himself or by his delegate and to impose the penalty for proved misconduct of a delinquent. It is a condition precedent that the charge-sheet, statement of facts in support thereof and the record, if any, need to be supplied to the delinquent. The record, if bulky and not having been supplied, an opportunity for inspection and to have copies thereof at his expenses, be given as per rules, regulations or standing orders. The delinquent must be given reasonable opportunity to submit his written statement. In case he denies the charges and claims for inquiry, disciplinary authority or the enquiry officer, if appointed, shall conduct the inquiry. The department should examine the witness or prove the documents to establish the charge of the imputed misconduct. The delinquent shall be given an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, if he so desires to examine himself and to examine his witnesses in rebuttal. After giving an opportunity of being heard the enquiry officer should consider the entire records and the evidence and should submit his report to the disciplinary authority with reasons and findings or conclusions in support of the proof or disproof of each of the charge or charges, as the case may be. He shall transmit the record of inquiry and his report to the disciplinary authority.
Similar view has been expressed by this Court in the judgment rendered in the case of Avadhesh Kumar Rastogi v. State of U.P. and Ors. 2004 (22) LCD 1 that notice should be issued to the delinquent indicating date, time and place of enquiry and since the order was lacking with in that respect, the same was quashed by this Court.
Similar view has been expressed in one of the decisions rendered by me in the case of Mohd. Abbas v. Settlement Officer, Consolidation, Gonda and Anr. 2007 (25) LCD 906.
Same view has been reiterated in the judgments rendered in the cases of Ambika Prasad Srivastava v. State Public Services Tribunal, Lucknow and Ors. 2004 (22) LCD 770, Nanhey Lal Gupta v. U.P. Upbhogta Sahkari Sangh Limited and Anr. (2007) 2 UPLBEC 1510, Asha Ram Verma and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors. (2003) 2 UPLBEC 1726 (Full Bench), State of U.P. Vs. Shatrughan Lal and Another, Town Area Committee, Jalalabad Vs. Jagdish Prasad and Others, Managing Director, Uttar Pradesh Warehousing Corporation and Another Vs. Vijay Narayan Vajpayee, Avtar Singh v. State of U.P. and Anr. 1989 (7) LCD 199, Jagdish Prasad Singh v. State of U.P. and Ors. 1990 (8) LCD 486 , Ministry of Finance and Another Vs. S.B. Ramesh, S.N. Pandey v. State of U.P. and Ors. 1999 (17) LCD-33 , The Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others Vs. A. Venkata Rayudu, State of Uttaranchal and Others Vs. Kharak Singh, and Roop Singh Negi Vs. Punjab National Bank and Others,
In the case of Roop Singh Negi (supra) it has been held that mere production of documents is not enough and the contents of documentary evidence are required to be proved by the examining witness.
The Society runs under its control. The petitioner was there and from there the petitioner was receiving his salary. At no point of time any shortcoming was found against the petitioner nor any indiscipline was found on the part of the petitioner. It was only as a consequence of the malice of the District Assistant Registrar that the petitioner was put to so much of agony, torture and harassment and thereby drawn to such a long litigation and thereby proceeded to pass the said baseless and illegal dismissal order.
The dismissal order from the above set of facts cannot be termed to be a valid order as the petitioner has persistently demanded the documents which were not supplied to him and which prevented him from filing effective reply as the entire documents have been taken away by the opposite parties by breaking open the locks of the office of the Society and house of the petitioner and so, they were under legal obligation to provide inspection of all the documents.
Looking to the hostility on the part of the opposite parties in proceeding against the petitioner, it can be understood that they wanted to prove the charges at any cost and oust the petitioner from service irrespective of their authority to proceed in the matter and also to provide adequate opportunity to the petitioner. The petitioner has specifically indicated the documents, which were demanded by him by means of letter dated 29.9.1978 but these documents were never provided to the petitioner which could prove his innocence in regard to the charges levelled against him. On the consideration of above law and facts indicated hereinabove, the dismissal order cannot be sustained in law.
Since the matter is dragging on for the last 30 years and the petitioner has retired, no useful purpose will be served by relegating the petitioner for a fresh enquiry. Looking to the fact that the petitioner has retired long back, this litigation may be put to an end by ordering 50% back wages to be paid to the petitioner. Division Bench of this Court in the case of Avadesh Kumar Rastogi (supra) has held as under:
As informed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner through supplementary-affidavit bearing civil misc. application No. 3655 (W) of 2002 that the petitioner has already retired from service, therefore, there is no point in discussing as to whether fresh inquiry under the relevant disciplinary rules should be held or should not be held.
The writ petition is allowed. A writ of certiorari is issued quashing the dismissal order dated 22.10.1980. The petitioner shall be entitled to 50% back wages and other benefits as permissible under law.