Ram Bhagat alias Bhagat Ram and Others vs The Financial Commissioner and Others

V.K. Bali, J.—Petitioner Bhagat Ram and others seek a writ in the nature of Certiorari so as to quash orders dated December 21, 1979 passed by Financial Commissioner Haryana vide which the revision petition preferred by Chhelu, who died during the pendency of revision petition and survived by the petitioners, against the orders dated August 10, 1971 passed by Collector was dismissed primarily on account of limitation.

The brief facts of the case reveal that Banwari, the tenant under Chhelu filed an application for grant of proprietory rights before the Assistant Collector Ist Grade, Dadri on December 10, 1968. The land under tenancy of Banwari was 17 3 acres and the same is comprised in Khasra Nos. 49 and 60 The Assistant Collector granted tht proprietory rights to Banwari vide his order dated July 13, 1970. The appeal carried against the aforesaid order by the landowner did not find favour with the said authority and was accordingly dismissed on August 10, 1971, thus, constraining the petitioner to file revision petition before the Commissioner who vide his orders dated May 4, 1973 held that the revision petition was not competent and it should have been filed before the Financial Commissioner. The petitioner, thereafter filed a Revision Petition before the Financial Commissioner which, as referred to above, was dismissed on December 21, 1979. It requires to be mentioned here that against the orders passed by the Collector dated August 10, 1971, the petitioners filed a revision petition before the Commissioner on January 25, 1973, i. e. after about one year and six months from the date of passing of order by the Collector. No application was given before the Commissioner for condonation of delay. It is no doubt true that even though no period of limitation is expressly prescribed for preferring a revision petition yet the Financial Commissioner can refuse to entertain the revision petition after 90 days, the period assigned for an appeal, unless some plausible and satisfactory cause of delay is shown. The party seeking condonation has to explain the cause of delay. It is clearly made out from the records of this case that the petitioner applied for certified copy of order passed by the Collector on August 27, 1971 and the same was prepared on September 13, 1971 and yet the revision petition before the Commissioner was filed on January 25, 1973. The learned Financial Commissioner while dealing with the question of delay, in my view, rightly held that period spent before Commissioner could have been condoned if the mistake of choosing a wrong forum was on account of bona fide mistake but inasmuch as even before the Commissioner, the revision petition was preferred after a year and half, there was no question to condone the delay.

After going through the petition and the grounds as spelled out therein seeking setting aside of the impugned orders I find that the learned Financial Commissioner after appraising the question of delay rightly rejected the revision petition preferred before him after such long delay for which there was no worthwhile explanation coming forth I find no substance in this petition and dismiss the same.

JUDGMENT DATED 29TH JULY, 1992

This case was heard on 28th July, 1992, and judgment was dictated in Court. However, before it could be prepared and signed by me Mr. R. S Mittal, the learned Senior Advocate representing the petitioner, has appeared and addressed the Court. Normally such course is not open after the judgment has been pronounced yet in the interest of justice as also for the reasons that I have not signed the judgment I have heard him.

Two fold contention has been raised by Mr. Mittal one that there is no period of limitation prescribed for filing a revision before the Financial Commissioner, second, that the" learned Financial Commissioner did not deal with the ''sufficient cause'' praying condonation of. delay even though an affidavit showing ''sufficient cause'' was filed before the Financial Commissioner and the same was pressed into service at the time of arguments. After hearing the learned counsel I find no substance in either of the points raised by him. It is true that a specific period of limitation has not been provided but that does not mean that it is the choice of a litisant to file vrevision as and when it might suit him. The practice established and followed over years is that the revisions are filed within ninety days. If in filing the revision it has taken a title more time to a litigant than ninety days, the matter cannot be viewed seriously and normally the case should be adjudicated on merits by ignoring few days delay beyond ninety days, a sufficient cause has to be shown If contention of Mr, Mittal is accepted then in that case stale matters which have not only assumed finality but have reached such leng/''hs where rights of third parties have also intervened would be easily reopened resulting into flood gates of litigation. Even, though therefore, there be no limitation as such for filing a revision before the Financial Commissioner, the same has to be filed reasonable time. In the present case the revision before even the Commission r was filed after 1(1/2) years. The only sufficient cause pleaded in the application filed u/s 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay was that Chhelu, the revision petitioner, was an old man of 84 years and remained confined to bed for about one vear ending. January, 1973 due to long illness. Admittedly, even the aforesaid'' assertion, which is totally vague, has not been supported by any medical certificate. Even the month and the year when Chhelu fell sick has not been specified. So much so, even the ailment that forced confinement of Chhelu to bed has not been mentioned That being so, there was no sufficient cause pleaded or even prima facie proved. The Financial Commissioner thus rightly did not con done the delay. The mere fact that the Financial Commissioner has not dealt with the grounds pleading sufficient cause is in itself not enough to set aside the impugned orders. If there was really a substantial plea and sufficient cause was reaily made out, entirely different considerations would have prevailed.

For the reasons aforesaid, this petition is dismissed with no order as to costs.