RAM DEV vs D.N.PANDEY

-PREVIOUSLY a substitution application was moved by heirs of complainant as the complainant had died. That substitution application was opposed and by order dated 2nd December, 1999 the same was allowed. After passing of the above order, learned Counsel for the opposite party moved an application mentioning therein that on two points no decision has been given in the order dated 2.12.1999.

LEARNED Counsel for the opposite party as well as learned Counsel for the complainant were heard. The first point raised and argued by the learned Counsel for the opposite party is that there is no provision under Consumer Protection Act for substitution of legal representatives. No doubt there is no express provision in the Consumer Protection Act for substituting the legal representatives or heirs of a deceased party, but it does not mean that the State Commission does not possess any authentic powers to implead a heir or legal representative of a party who has died mid-way. If a cause of action survives and the suit or proceeding can be continued by his heir or legal representative, then he can be permitted to continue the proceedings by substituting his name in place of deceased party. There is no specific bar held in adopting this course of action. We have to be guided by the principles of natural justice and the objective with which the Consumer Protection Act has been passed is to be kept in consideration and that objective cannot be achieved if a pending litigation is terminated mid-way on the death of a party. In the present case the cause of action survives as the complainant and the compensation which has been claimed by the complainant has to be seen in the light of the facts on record. Thus the Consumer Protection Act which has been passed to protect the interests of the consumers is to be advanced further and for that reason the substitution application can be allowed and the legal heirs can be substituted in place of the deceased party. Hence this objection has no force and is rejected.

Learned Counsel for the opposite party has further argued that the complaint shall be deemed to have been abetted as the substitution application has not been moved by the legal representative or heir within the period of limitation allowed for filing such applications under Article 120 of the Limitation Act. In the present case the Limitation Act does not apply to the proceedings under this Act after amendment is made in the year 1983. Moreover there is no period prescribed for moving such an application under the Consumer Protection Act. Provisions of Limitation Act cannot be imported in these proceedings unless they have been specifically applied. We have to go by the principles of natural justice and this Act, being for the protection of the consumers, the State Commission cannot direct for dismissal of the application for substitution on the ground that the suit stands abetted because the application for substitution was not moved within the limitation as prescribed under the Limitation Act. As already pointed out in the order dated 2nd December, 1999 that in view of the decision of National Commission in the case of M/s. Cosmopolitan Hospital & Ors. v. Smt. Vasantha P. Nair & Ors., I (1992) CPJ 302 (NC)=1992 (1) CPR 820 (NC), that the legal representative of a deceased, by operation of law, gets clothed with the rights, status, personalities of the deceased for the purpose of enforcing the cause of action which has devolved on him. Thus we find that this argument has also no force and the application for recall of the order dated 2.12.1999 is dismissed.

A perusal of the file goes to show that the original complaint is not on record. Let a copy of the original complaint and an amended copy of the complaint be filed by the complainant by the end of April, 2000. Put up on 10.5.2000 for final arguments. Application dismissed.