Ram Dhari vs Punjab State

A.S. Bains, J.

Ram Dhari petitioner was appointed as accountant by the Chariman, Market Committee, Karnal. It is averred by the petitioner that he was asked to explain the embezzlement of Rs. 5141.02 vide letter dated 21st June, 1958, followed by another letter dated 27th June, 1958, by which he was suspended and directed to hand over the charge of his office to Shri Sharda Nand, Clerk cumInspector, Market Committee, Karnal. A chargesheet (annexure `A'') was framed on 8th August, 1958, but as averred by the petitioner it was not received by him. Similarly another letter dated 20th August, 1958, was issued calling upon the petitioner to show cause as to why he should not be dismissed from service. It is alleged that this letter was received by the Clerk of Shri Raghu Nath Sahai Jain, Advocate with whom the petitioner was not keeping any contact and as such the letters and chargesheet never reached him. Subsequently, the petitioner was dismissed from the service of the Committee and was dismissal, the petitioner filed an appeal before the General Assistant, Karnal, who vide his order dated 20th July, 1960 accepted the appeal and remanded the case to the Committee with a direction to decide it afresh after giving opportunity to the petitioner. Accordingly, the chargesheet (annexure `C'') was again served on 5th October, 1961, on the petitioner, who submitted his reply thereto. A subcommittee consisting of Chairman and two other Members was constituted by the Market Committee to enquire into the matter. They subcommittee after considering the reply of the petitioner submitted its reports Annexure `E'' that no ground is made out to alter the earlier order passed by the Market Committee and it confirmed the dismissal order of the petitioner. Aggrieved by this order the petitioner appealed to the Chairman, State Agricultural Marketing Board, Patiala. The Chairman heard the appeal at Karnal and after hearing the petitioner filed a representation before the State Agricultural Marketing Board, Punjab, Patiala. As there was no such provision under the statute, i.e. the Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961 (hereinafter briefly called `the Act'') for hearing of representation by the Board, the same was filed. The petitioner then filed revision petition under section 42 of the Act against his order of dismissal before the State Government but the same was dismissed in limine, on Ist January, 1966 (Annexure `J''). It is these circumstances that the present writ petition has been filed.

Mr. Jain, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has made the following contentions :

(1) that the Chairman, Marketing Board had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal as no power vested in it under the Act ;

(2) that the order of the Chairman, Marketing Board is bad in law as it does not deal with any of the allegations in the chargesheet ;

(3) that the petitioner was not afforded an adequate opportunity by the subcommittee to defend his case after it was remanded by the General Assistant.

(4) that the subcommittee, which was constituted only to make a report to the Committee, had no jurisdiction to order the dismissal of the petitioner and that it was the Market Committee which was competent to pass such an order ;

(5) that the procedure for departmental enquiry is not followed in this case ;

(6) that the order of dismissal could not be passed with retrospective effect ; and

(7) that no hearing was given to the petitioner by the revising authority while dismissing in limine his petition under section 42 of the Act.

I have carefully gone through the record, the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner and the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the respondents.

So far as the first and second contentions are concerned, I find no merit in these as the petitioner himself filed the appeal before the chairman and in the Act also there is no specific provisions as to before whom the appeal is to be filed. In this view of the matter, the Board sought the legal opinion. In fact, no appeal was legally competent. Even then, by virtue of the powers under section 33(4)(i) of the Act, the Chairman had gone to the spot and after hearing the petitioner the Market Committee and going through the record he dismissed the appeal of the petitioner. The petitioner could, if he so choose, file an appeal to the commissioner, which remedy he never availed of. Para 17(a) of the written statement filed on behalf of respondent Nos. 3 and 4 is as under :

"17(a) The petitioner had himself preferred the appeal to the Chairman, although legally no appeal was competent. The Chairman of the Board could, however, afford relief to the petitioner by virtue of powers under section 33(4)(i) of the Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets Rules, 1961. Since he found that the charges were fully proved against the petitioner, no such relief was given. It is, however, submitted that the petitioner did not choose to pursue the appropriate remedy available in law. He could file an appeal to the Commissioner according to rules which remedy he never availed. The entire proceedings pursued by him are misconceived and dilatory in nature."

This is not controverted by the petitioner by way of replication or an additional affidavit.

As regards the third contention, the petitioner was given full opportunity by the Committee to defend himself. He had submitted a detailed reply. He was given an opportunity to inspect the records. A subcommittee was appointed which enquired into the matter. The learned counsel for the petitioner could not show me as to how any provision of the Act or the rules made thereunder has been violated.

Regarding the fourth contention, it is true that the Market Committee alone is the punishing authority of the petitioner. Section 20(2) of the Act is in the following terms :

"20(2) A Committee may, with the previous approval of the Secretary of the Board, employ such other officers or servants as may be necessary for the management of the market and may pay such officers and servants salaries as fixed by the Board for different cadres and shall have power to control and punish them.

Provided that where the basic pay of an employee is less than eighty rupees the previous approval of the Secretary of the Board for the appointment will not be necessary;

Provided further that if after examining the records obtained from the Committee or otherwise the Board is satisfied that any officer or servant of the Committee is negligent in the discharge of his duties, the Committee shall on the requirement of the Board suspend or otherwise punish him, and if the Board is satisfied that he is unfit for employment the Committee shall dismiss him or terminate his services."

It is clear from this provision that the Market Committee is the punishing authority. In this case, although the enquiry was held by the sub committee of which the Chairman was the member but the final order was passed by the Market Committee. In this regard, sub paras (d) and (e) of para 17 of the written statement filed on behalf of respondents Nos. 3 and 4 may be referred to, which read as under :

"17 (d) The subcommittee had merely submitted a report and the Committee by a separate resolution accepted the report of the subcommittee.

17 (e) The enquiry is according to rules and there has been no violation of any principles of natural justice."

This averment in the written statement is not denied by the petitioner by way of an additional affidavit or replication. So I have to take it as correct. Hence I find that the resolution was validly passed by the committee, which was competent authority to inflict the punishment under the above quoted provision.

As regard the fifth contention, I find no force in it either. Departmental proceedings are not applicable in the case of statutory bodies. In the case of statutory bodies, the procedure as laid down in that particular statute or rules made thereunder is to be followed. The learned counsel for the petitioner could not point out breach of any provision of the Act or the rules made thereunder.

Regarding the sixth contention, the petitioner was suspended after he was served with the show cause notice in the year 1958. It is not clear as to from which date he was dismissed nor has he himself mentioned in the petition or in his affidavit the date from which he was dismissed. If he was dismissed with retrospective effect, he could file a civil suit instead of involving extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.

So far as the last contention is concerned it is pertinent to reproduce section 42 of the Act which is in the following terms :

"42. Notwithstanding anything contained in the Act, the State Government shall have the power of reversing or modifying any order of the Board or any of its officers passed or purporting to have been passed under this Act, if it considers it to be not in accordance with this Act or the rules or byelaws made thereunder."

The power of revision under section 42 of the Act does not require any hearing of the petitioner. This provision is made only for a limited purpose. The power is given to the State Government to reverse or modify any order of the Board or any of its officers if it considers it to be not in accordance with the Act or the rules or byelaws made thereunder. The learned counsel could not specifically point out as to how any of the impugned orders is against the provisions of Act or the rules or byelaws made thereunder nor could he point any breach of the provisions of the Act or any rule or byelaws made thereunder. Hence, I find no merit in this contention also. Moreover, the Board has not passed any order in this case. It is the Market Committee Karnal, which has passed the order of dismissal of the petitioner. The order of the Market Committee is not revisable as such by the State Government. Section 2 (b) of the Act defines "Board" as under :

"2(b) "Board" means the Punjab State Agricultural Marketing Board or the Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board established under the Act for the State of Punjab or the State of Haryana and includes the Administrator of the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh functioning as the Board for the transferred territory and the Administrator of the Union Territory of Chandigarh functioning as the Board for the Union Territory of Chandigarh."

The Market Committee is not included in the definition of " Board". Hence I hold that no revision lies against the order of the Market Committee. No other point is urged.

In this view of the matter, the petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel''s fee Rs. 250/.