High Courts

Ram Dhari vs State of Haryana

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 19 April 1995 · Citation: (1995) 2 RCR(Criminal) 564

HON’BLE JUDGES
V.S.Aggarwal, J
CASE NUMBER
Criminal Miscellaneous No. 15696-M of 1993
Ask AI about this case

AI Structured Summary

Not yet generated for this judgment

No AI summary yet

Generate an eight-section analysis of this judgment — facts, issues, reasoning, ratio and a plain-language gist.

Judgment

9 paragraphs · 610 words

V.S. Aggarwal, J.

1.

Petitioner Ram Dhari alongwith his wife and son were held guilty by the learned Sessions Judge, Karnal for offence punishable under Sections 302/34 Indian Penal Code. It had been alleged that the petitioner alongwith his coaccused sprinkled kerosene oil on his daughterinlaw. They set her on fire. As a result of the extensive burns, Krishana, the daughter inlaw died. The petitioner and others were aggrieved against Smt. Krishana deceased for not having brought sufficient dowry. They had treated her with cruelty. The petitioner was arrested on 31st August, 1983.

2.

Ram Dhari petitioner has filed the present petition under Section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure read with Articles 226/227 of the Indian Constitution for quashing the impugned orders dated 20.5.1993 and 18.8.1993 declined premature release of the petitioner.

3.

The petition has been opposed by the respondents.

4.

Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that his client has already undergone ten years, seven months and twenty days sentence on the date the petition was filed (including undertrial period). He has also earned five years, ten months and ten days remissions of good conduct and, thus, he is entitled to premature release as such. The attention of the Court has been drawn towards the instructions of the Government of Haryana dated 4th February, 1993. In view of the learned counsel for the petitioner, the case of Ram Dhari would fall under para 2(b) of the said instructions. The relevant instructions are reproduced below for the sake of convenience :

"(a) Convicts whose death sentence has been commuted to life imprisonment and convicts who have been imprisoned for life for having committed a heinous crime, such as, murder with wrongful confinement for extortion/robbery, murder with rape, murder while undergoing life sentence, murder with dacoity murder under T.P. Act, 1987, murder with untouchability (Offences) Act, 1955, murder in connection with dowry, bride burning, murder of a child under the age of 14 years, murder of handicapped or pregnant woman or murder after abduction or kidnapping, murder on professional/hired basis, murder exhibiting brutality such as cutting the body as evident from judgment of sentence, persistent bad conduct in the prison and those who cannot for same definite reasonable prematurely released without danger to public safety, or convicts who have been imprisoned for life under Section 120B of I.P.C. or life convicts who have imprisoned for life second time under any offence. Their cases may be considered after completion of 14 years actual sentence including undertrial period and after earning at least 6 years remission.

(b) Adults life convicts who have been imprisoned for life but whose cases are not covered under (a) above and who have committed crime which are not considered henious as mentioned in clause (a) above. Their cases may be considered after completion of ten years of actual sentence including undertrial period, provided that the total period of such sentence including remissions is not less than 14 years."

5.

It is obvious from the instructions referred to above, that the petitioner''s case would fall under paragraph 2(a) of the instructions reproduced above. The facts have already been mentioned and there is no doubt that it was a case of bride burning or in other words murder in connection with dowry. Consequently, the petitioner''s case was rightly rejected; to be considered after he had undergone 14 years actual sentence including under trial period. In that view of the matter, there is no legal infirmity in the order passed by the respondents rejecting the claim of the petitioner for premature release before 14 years actual sentence.

6.

For these reasons, petition being without any merit, fails and is dismissed.