Ram Ditta Singh vs The Deputy Commissioner Ferozepore and others

Mehar Singh, C.J.—The appellant, Ram Ditta Singh, was elected Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat Kishanpura Kalan in tehesil Zira of Ferozepore District in December 1963. In paragraph 10 of the affidavit of the Deputy Commissioner of Ferozepore, respondent 1, filed to the petition of the appellant under Article 226 of the Constitution, it is stated that the Block Development and Panchayat Officer of Dbaramkot made enquiries regarding the irregularities committed by the appellant and submitted his report and that the enquiry was made under the orders of the Sub Divisional Officer (Civil) at Zira. A show cause notice was given to the appellant by the Block Development and Panchayat Officer, respondent 2, referring to certain allegations against him and asking him to explain why recommendation be not made to respondent 1 for his suspension. After that respondent 1 served a notice under sub section (1) of section 102 of the Punjab Gram Panchayat Act, 1952 (Punjab Act 4 of 1953) calling upon the appellant to sent his explanation, within a period stated, with regard to the allegations made against him in that notice. The appellant gave his explanation, but respondent 1 not being satisfied with that explanation proceeded, by an order of May 16, 1967, copy Annexure ''D'', to suspend the appellant from the office of Sarpanch under sub-section (1) of section 102 of the Act. The appellant was required to band over the money and property of the Gram Panchayat and the books of the Panchayat within a week and also to make a deposit of certain excess of cash said to be in his hands pertaining to the funds of the Gram Panchayat with interest at the rate of 7 per cent per annum, and then the order says that he is also required to send his explanation to the Block Development and Panchayat Officer, Ferozepore, within a fortnight of the receipt of this Order failing which it will be presumed that he has none to offer and action will be taken against him according to the merits of the case u/s 102(2)(3) of the Gram Panchayat Act 1952.. "It is this order of respondent 1 the legality of which was challenged by the appellant in his petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.

The learned Single Judge in his order of September 29, 1967, has dismissed the petition of the appellant on the one main ground that be still has an opportunity, during the course of the enquiry, to show cause against the allegations against him and to demonstrate their falsity. This is an appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order of the learned Single Judge.

In the Act, sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 102 read-

(1) The Deputy Commissioner may, during the course of an enquiry, suspend a Panch for any of the reasons for which he can be removed, and debar him from taking part in any act or proceedings of the said body during that period and order him to hand over the records, money or any property of the said body to the person authorised in this behalf.

(2) Government may, after such enquiry as it may deem fit, remove any Panch (then appear a number of grounds on the basis of which such removal can be made).

Respondent 1, while suspending the appellant, acted under sub-section (1), but his return to the petition of the appellant does not show that under sub-section (2) the Government has started any enquiry against the appellant. There are no two enquiries, one under sub-section (1) and another under sub section (2). Both the sub sections have to be read together and the plain meaning of the same is that when an enquiry is ordered to be started by the Government under sub-section (2), it is during the course of that enquiry that the Deputy Commissioner has the power to suspend a Panch under sub-section (1). If there is no enquiry ordered or started by the Government under sub-section (2), the power under sub-section (1) in the Deputy Commissioner does not become operative. The two sub-sections cannot be read in this way that there is some enquiry, apart from that under sub-section (2), during the course of which a Deputy Commissioner can suspend a Panch under sub-section (1). The language of sub-section (1) does not justify any such meaning. Sub sections (1) and (2) do not envisage two enquiries, one for the purposes of suspension alone, and another by the Government for the purposes of removal. Merely because the provisions of sub-section (1) precede the provisions of sub section (2) giving power to the Government to hold or start an enquiry against a Panch, the provisions of the former sub section cannot be read to provide for an enquiry independent and separate from that envisaged in sub-section (2). If sub section (2) were sub-section (1) and sub-section (1) were sub-section (2), the result would be as I have already indicated, and merely because sub-section (1) comes first, it does not mean that it refers to an enquiry other than an enquiry under sub-section (2). The two sub-sections, as I have already said, have to be read together, and the obvious consequence is that it is only when the Government has ordered or started an enquiry under sub-section (2) against a Panch, that the Deputy Commissioner concerned has the power under sub-section (1) to suspend that Panch. He cannot suspend him in consequence of an enquiry not ordered or started by the Government under sub-section (2). The Legislature has designedly framed the two sub-sections in the manner in which the same are, leaving the power to order or start an enquiry against a Panch with the Government alone. The reason is obvious, for a Panch is member of an elected local body and a representative of his constituency so far as that elected body is concerned, and the Legislature did not intend to leave inter ference with such elected bodies in the bands of local officers by way of starting enquiries against the elected members such local bodies. The power of suspension was previously with the Director of Panchayats and it is only the recent amendment that has given the same to a Deputy Commissioner, but that is only after the Government has taken the more serious decision of interfering with the tenure of an elected member of a Panchayat for irregularities or breaches referred to in sub section (2) of section 102. The initial step that has to be taken to order or to start an enquiry has been confined by the Legislature only to the Government at the highest level, and this has been done as a matter of sound policy so as to obviate interference with such elected institutions in the State at the lower levels. There may be some preliminary enquiry or looking into the affairs of a Panchayat by the Government for the purpose of making up its mind to order or start an enquiry under sub-section (2), and it is only when it thus makes up its mind to act under that sub-section that an order by a Deputy Commissioner under sub-section (1) may follow, but such a preliminary enquiry does not give power to a Deputy Commissioner to act under sub-section (1) without there being an order by the Government for an enquiry under sub section (2). In this case, as is clear from the return of respondent 1, the enquiry was only by respondent 2, the Block Development and Panchayat Officer, ordered by the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil) and not by the Government under sub-section (2). The Learned Counsel appearing for the respondents contends that in his petition the appellant never raised this point in this form, but what the appellant did clearly say was that the order of suspension made by respondent 1 against him is without jurisdiction, and that covers this that it is an order made without there being first an order of Government starting an enquiry against him according to sub-section 2.

In the circumstances, the suspension of the appellant under sub-section (1) of section 102 by respondent 1 is without jurisdiction and beyond his power. As pointed out, the stage for the exercise of his powers under sub-section (1) has never arisen. Consequently, the appeal is accepted, the order of the learned Single Judge is reversed, and the impugned order, dated May 16, 1967, of respondent 1, the Deputy Commissioner of Ferozepore, is thus quashed. In this appeal, respondent 1 will bear the costs of the appellant, counsel''s fee being Rs. 100/-.

R.S. Narula, J.

I agree.