Ram Gopal Waghdhare vs Sudhir Ram Waghdhare and Others

R.P. Desai, J.—The Petitioner had filed the Suit being S.C. Suit No. 3829 of 1996 against Respondents Nos. 1 to 5 for permanent injunction restraining them from residing in the suit flat. In the said suit the Petitioner took out Notice of Motion being Notice of Motion No. 3493 of 1996 and sought an injunction against the Respondents restraining them from staying in the suit flat and conducting the business of agency of Passport and Visa in the suit flat. The said Notice of Motion came to be decided on 13.12.1996. The City Court ordered that pending the hearing and final disposal of the Suit the respondents are restrained by an order of injunction from residing and/or from remaining in the suit premises i.e. Flat No. 23, Bhaveshwar Vijay Coop. Housing Society, Rafi Ahmed Kidwani Road, Mumbai 400031. It was further ordered that pending the hearing and final disposal of the Suit the respondents are restrained from interfering with or disturbing the Petitioners peaceful use, occupation and enjoyment of the suit premises. Considering the nature of injunction granted in favour of the petitioner and the fact that the respondents had been residing in the suit flat for a substantial long time, the order was stayed upto 31st January, 1997 to enable the respondents to make arrangement to move out of the suit premises.

Against the said order the Respondents carried an Appeal being Appeal from Order No. 96 of 1997. On 5.5.1997 the High Court dismissed the Appeal from Order. The relevant observation of the High Court are as under:

Heard learned Counsel for the parties.

The Appellant is not able to make out any case to show that he has any right to reside in the suit premises with his father. The Court has found that the appellant/defendant has not conducted himself properly in the suit premises and has made the life of the Respondent miserable and on the other hand it is the case of the appellant in his affidavit-in-reply that his father is a psychic case. Hence I find that the impugned order does not call for any interference.

At that time the learned Advocate for the Respondents prayed that some time may be given to the Respondents to vacate the premises. The Court observed that the time can be granted only on the condition that the Respondents give undertaking to the Court by filing an affidavit to the effect that they will vacate the suit premises on or before 31.12.1997. The Court also observed that they can be permitted to reside in the suit premises till 31.12.1997 and that undertaking was to be given on or before 7.5.1997 by filing an affidavit in the Court. The Court further observed that in case no undertaking is given the request of the Respondents stood rejected. Appeal accordingly stood disposed of.

The Respondents however did not give the undertaking. Consequently they were required to vacate the suit premises as per the order of the High Court. They did not do so. They continued to reside in the suit premises till 31.12.1997 that being the last date till which the respondents could continue to reside in the suit premises under the order of the High Court, provided undertaking was filed before 7.5.1997.

The Petitioner, therefore, filed the present Contempt Petition on 2.9.1997 praying that the Respondents punished in accordance with law for wilfully flouting the order of City Civil Court in Notice of Motion No. 3493 of 1996 dated 13.12.1996. On this Petition Rule was issued by the High Court on 29.9.1997 and the Rule was made returnable in six weeks. Thereafter time and again the matter was adjourned. On 11.8.1998 when this matter reached hearing before this Court Respondent No. 2 was present in person and she requested that time be given as she wanted to engage the services of a lawyer. This Court adjourned the matter to 18.8.1998 to enable her to engage a lawyer. There after on 18.8.1998. 12.9.1998, 22.9.1998 and 29.9.1998 the matter appeared on board and was adjourned. Though sufficient accommodation was given to the respondents, no affidavit in reply came to be filed on behalf of respondents Nos. 1 and 2. As of today there is no affidavit on record filed by respondents Nos. 1 and 2 refuting averments made in the Petition. Belatedly affidavit on behalf of respondents Nos. 3 and 4 came to be tendered in Court by the learned Counsel appearing for Respondents Nos. 3 and 4.

I have heard at length the learned Counsel for the petitioner and Respondents. Since this is a dispute between father and son this Court on number of occasions suggested to the parties that some settlement should be arrived at. The matter was adjourned time and again so as to enable the parties to either settle the matter or for the respondents to purge the contempt by vacating the suit premises. However, the Respondents are adamant and therefore the law has to take its own course.

Shri Naphade, the learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner contended that this is a gross case of Contempt of Court and this Court should show no leniency to the respondents. He pointed out that on 13.12.1996 the City Civil Court gave time to the respondents to reside in the suit premises till 31.1.1997. Thereafter the appeal carried by the respondents against the said order was dismissed. The High Court permitted the respondents to reside in the suit premises till 31.12.1997, in case they filed an undertaking that they would vacate the suit premises. Undertaking was to be filed on or before 7.5.1997, but the Respondents did not file the undertaking and continued to occupy the suit premises in flagrant violation of order of the City Civil Court and showed utter disrespect to the High Court, Shri Naphade, further contended that in the facts and circumstances of the case, therefore, this Court should take stern action as it is the dignity of the Court which is at stake and it should be preserved at any cost. Mr. Naphade also contended that the respondents have not even cared to file a reply to the Contempt Petition which indicates the scant respect they have for the Courts orders. The Respondents do not deserve any sympathy.

Mr. Apte, the learned Counsel for the Respondents on the other hand contended that the essence of the action under the Contempt of Courts Act is wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of Court. In this connection he drew my attention to the definition of civil contempt as appearing in Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. It reads thus:

"civil contempt" means wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ to other process of a Court or wilful breach of undertaking given to a Court; He stated that the averments in the petition do not make out any case of wilful disobedience to the order of the Court, According to him, the Respondents could not comply with the order of the City Civil Court because of situation beyond their control as no other accommodation is available to them. Because of their dire financial circumstances they could not arrange for any other accommodation. Secondly Mr. Apte contended that in as much as there is a remedy available under the Code of Civil Procedure under Order 39 Rule 2(A) which deals with consequences of breach of injunction order, the correct remedy for the petitioner would have been to move an application under the said provision and resort to the provisions of Contempt of Courts Act was not proper. Relying on several judgment he contended that even in the facts of the present case this Court should not use its powers under the Contempt of Courts Act, as the Petitioner has not availed of the remedy available under the Civil Procedure Code. He firstly relied upon V.S. Murty and Others Vs. Deputy Chief Accounts Officer and Others, where the Karnataka High Court was considering the provisions of Order 39 Rules 1, 2 and 2-A and the maintainability of the petitions under the Contempt of Courts Act. The observation of the Karnataka High Court are as follows:

In cases of disobedience or breach of injunction order issued temporarily during the pendency of a suit, either under Rule 1 or 2 of Order 39, C.P.C., it is inexpedient to invoke and exercise contempt jurisdiction. In such cases, action is contemplated by the very Court which issues the injunction order under Rule 2-A of Order 39, C.P.C. it contemplates the forfeiture of property as also putting of the person who commits breach into Civil prison for a period not exceeding three months. The provision thereunder is obviously based on the principle of Contempt of Court. That being so, the general provisions made under the Contempt of Courts Act cannot be invoked by the decree holder, for forcing the party to obey the injunction order.

It is a well settled principle of law that when there is special law and general law, the provisions of the special law prevail over the general law and when special procedure and special provisions is contained in the C.P.C. itself under Order 39 Rule 21 for taking action for the disobedience of an order of injunction, the general law of Contempt of Court cannot be invoked.

Mr. Apte contended that the ratio of this Judgment applied to the facts of the present case. The provision of special law should prevail over the provisions of general law and therefore, as the Petitioner has not resorted to the provisions of Order 39 Rule 2-A of C.P.C. no action under the Contempt of Courts Act should be taken against the respondents. Mr. Apte then relied on the judgment in the case of Bimal Chandra Sen Vs. Kamla Mathur and Another, where the Delhi High Court was also considering the same provisions. The Delhi High Court came to the conclusion that since for disobedience of an order a party can be punished under Order 39 Rule 2A and since an appeal lies therefrom the High Court should not take upon itself the task of punishing a litigant. The Delhi High Court observed that the Civil Procedure Code does not contemplate this. It expressly provides for grant of injunction and the punishment for their disobedience, and there are provisions of appeal and it would amount to bypassing the said provisions of appeals. In this context the Delhi High Court observed as under:

There is another good reason why this application must fail. The plaintiff wants us in the High Court to try both wife and husband for contempt. Suppose we do. It will lead to startling results. The order of injunction was made by the subordinate Judge under Order 39, C.P.C. From his order appeal lay to the Court of the Senior Subordinate Judge. Appeals were actually filed in that Court and were heard and dismissed by the Senior Subordinate Judge. For disobedience the wife can be punished under Rule 2-A of Order 39 by the Subordinate Judge. An appeal lies from his order under that rule. An order under Rule 1, Rule 2 and Rule 2. of Order 39 has been made expressly appealable under Order 43, Rule 1(r). All these appeals in the present case will lie to the Senior Subordinate Judge, the valuation of the suit being Rs. 200/- for purpose of Court fee and jurisdiction as fixed by the plaintiff. It would be anomalous to hold that the High Court can punish for contempt under the Act or Constitution committed of the Sub-Judge''s order.

The Civil Procedure does not contemplate this. It expressly provides for grant of injunctions and the punishment for their disobedience. Appeals lie against grant of injunctions. Appeals lie against punishment. Appeal lies against the order to punish or refusing to punish for disobedience. The High Court does not come into the picture at all. It is neither a case of civil contempt nor criminal contempt under the Act. It is a plain case falling within the four corners of Order 39 of the C.P.C. To hold that the High Court has power to punish will be to hold that the subordinate Judge has the power to grant injunction, but the High Court has the power to punish for the disobedience of his order under Sections 10 and 12 for civil and criminal contempt because aiding and abetting is alleged.

Mr. Apte relied on judgment in the case of Smt. Indu Tewari Vs. Ram Bahadur Chaudhari and Others, , in this case also the Allahabad High Court was dealing with the similar argument. The Allahabad High Court observed that:

A person who has got an effective alternative remedy of the nature specified under Order 39, Rule 2-A or under Order 21, Rule 32, C.P.C. should not be permitted to skip over that remedy and take resort to initiate proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act. It would not be a proper exercise of discretion on the part of the High Court to exercise its jurisdiction under the Contempt of Courts Act when such an effective and alternative remedy is available to any person. Mr. Apte also referred to unreported Judgment of Bombay High Court in the case of S. Anthony v. K.P. Mohammed Contempt Appeal No. 1 of 1984 In Contempt Petition No. 81 of 1983 in Appeal from Order No. 680 of 1983 in Suit No. 6446 of 1981, delivered by Sawant and Guttaal, JJ. on 9th June, 1987, wherein it is observed that every violation of Court''s Order need not be punished. It is only such violations which directly bring into the question the Court''s honour and dignity that warrant such drastic actions.

In the light of these Judgment Mr. Apte has contended that the facts of the present case do not warrant action under the summary procedure contemplated under the Contempt of Courts Act. He contended that in the petition no case of wilful disobedience is made out. The respondents have not vacated the suit premises because of bad financial circumstances and therefore, this Court may take a kindly view of the matter.

Dealing with these submissions, Mr. Naphade has drawn my attention to the Judgment of Bombay High Court, in Chandrakant Ganpat Shelar and Ors. v. Sophy Keely Hill Garange High School, Bombay and Ors. 1987 Mh.L.J. 1012 : 1988 Mh.L.R. 277. In that case there was a contempt of orders passed by the School Tribunal constituted under the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977. A contention was raised that since in the Maharashtra Employees of Private School (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1997 a provision for penalising the management for failure to comply with the Tribunal''s directions is there no proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act can be initiated for defiance of the order passed by the School Tribunals. While rejecting this argument the Bombay High Court observed as under:

In the first instance, the provisions of Section 13 of the Act show that a prosecution has to be launched for failure on the part of the management to comply with the directions issued by the Tribunal, if the management is convicted, the only punishment that can be awarded to the management is a fine which may extend to one thousand rupees for the first offence, and to two thousand rupees for the second and subsequent offences. As has happened in the present case, the direction of the Tribunal to reinstate the petitioners cannot be enforced through the modalities of the said provisions of Section 13. It is, therefore, clear that the Act is riot a Code by itself to ensure compliance with the directions given by the Tribunal. What is more, neither the provisions of the said Act nor the provisions of general law, including the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, exclude the operation of the Contempt of Courts Act in such cases, it is well settled that the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act are in addition to the provisions contained in any law for the enforcement of the orders and directions given by the Courts. Apart from the fact that the provisions of the Act do not exclude the operation of the Contempt of Courts Act, the law is to the contrary, namely that the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act are in addition to the provisions of special statute even if such a statute provides for punishment for Contempt of Courts. Section 22 of the Contempt of Courts Act makes this position very clear, when it states that the provisions of the Act shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, the provisions of any other law relating to the Contempt of Courts. If this is so even where a special law makes provision for Contempt of Courts, it is difficult to appreciate the contention that when a statute like the present one does not make provision for Contempt of Courts, but merely provides for prosecution of the offender the exclusion of the Contempt of Courts Act should be read in it. This being the position in law, all that we have to find out is whether the respondents are guilty of the Contempt of Courts within the meaning of the Contempt of Courts Act. Mr. Naphade, therefore, contended that assuming that in the Civil Procedure Code elaborate procedure and machinery is provided that would put no fetters on the powers of the High Court to take action under the Contempt of Courts Act. Mr. Apte tried to distinguish this judgment by contending that the High Court in the said Judgment has observed that the said Act is not a code by itself to ensure compliance with the direction given by the Tribunal whereas in Civil Procedure Code such a provision exists. In this connection Mr. Naphade has rightly contended that this distinction is noted by the High Court in the case of Chandrakant (supra) and after adverting to it the Bombay High Court has observed that neither the provisions of the said Act nor the provisions of General Law including the Contempt of Courts Act exclude the operation of the Contempt of Courts Act in such cases. He contended that it is well settled law that exclusion of provisions of any law cannot be inferred by implication but has to be explicitly stated in as much as there is no provision which excludes the operation of the Contempt of Courts Act to the cases of breach of an injunction order such exclusion cannot be inferred by implication. It cannot be argued that this Court is powerless to deal with a case where an injunction order is flouted with impunity. Mr. Naphade, drew my attention to Article 215 of the Constitution of India and contended that the Constitution has empowered the High Court to punish a person for Contempt of its order and no restrain can be placed on this power if the circumstances demand its exercise. He referred to Section 22 of the Contempt of Courts Act, which reads as under:

Act to be in addition to, and not in derogation of, other laws relating to Contempt - The provisions of this Act shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, the provisions of any other law relating to Contempt of Courts. He stated that Section 22 makes it very clear that the Contempt of Courts Act is in addition to, and not in derogation of other laws relating to contempt. Mr. Naphade contended that merely because the order is executable it cannot be said that resort to Contempt of Courts Act cannot be taken. It must depend on facts of each case. According to him, in the case like the present case where it is apparent that the contemners have taken advantage of the time granted to them by the Court, and have continued to flout the orders of Court in order to preserve the dignity and honour of the Court, the Court must take a stern action. He also stated that the argument of Mr. Apte, that this is not a case of wilful disobedience is baseless. In the Petition it is categorically stated that the respondents were given time to file undertaking by the High Court to vacate the suit premises on or before 7.5.1997 however they did not give the undertaking and flouted the order passed by the City Civil Court and the High Court. In any event there is no affidavit in reply filed by the Respondents refuting the averments made in the Petition, and therefore, no leniency should be shown to the respondents.

Before dealing with the rival contentions at this stage it is necessary to refer to the affidavits which are filed in this Court for the first time when the matter reached final hearing. One affidavit is filed by Respondent No. 3, Sunil Sudhir Waghdhare and the other is filed by Smt. Vinita Sunil Waghdhare, Respondent No. 4. In the affidavit filed by Respondent No. 3 it is contended that a wrong procedure is adopted by the Petitioner by filing the Petition under the Contempt of Courts Act. It is stated that Respondent No. 3 has not committed Contempt of Court. According to respondent No. 3 the Petitioner is having various other properties. It is averred that his father i.e. Respondent No. 1 herein was an electrical contractor at Uran in 1962 and had earned money to the tune of Rs. 3 to Rs. 4 lakhs and contributed money to purchase the suit premises and even maintained the Petitioner. It is stated that the Petitioner wants to dispose of the suit premises and the allegations made by the Petitioner are false, frivolous and concocted. It is also contended that no opportunity was given to the respondents to give any evidence before the order was passed and therefore, the Petition deserves to be dismissed.

Firstly, whether the Petitioner has any other properties or not is not relevant for the purpose of the present petition. This Court is today concerned only with one question whether the Respondents have committed Contempt of the City Court''s Order and also the High Courts Order, and therefore assuming the petitioner has any other properties, in my opinion the said fact is wholly irrelevant to the present petition. Secondly there is an admission in this affidavit that Respondent No. 1 was an electrical Contractor and had contributed an amount of Rs. 3/4 lakhs for the purchase of the suit premises. This runs counter to the argument of the learned Counsel for Respondent No. 1 that Respondent No. 1 is in bad financial circumstances. Therefore, I have no doubt in my mind that the Respondents have not come to the Court with clean hands. They have not disclosed the truth, respondent No. 1 trying to invoke the sympathy of this Court by saying that on account of financial stringency he is unable to make arrangement for alternate accommodation. A similar affidavit is failed by Smt. Vinita Sunil Waghdhare, Respondent No. 4. Similar contentions are raised in the said affidavit. In the affidavit, Respondent No. 4 Smt. Vinita Section Waghdhare states as under:

I was not in Bombay when appeal was preferred by the Respondents Nos. 1 and 2. I say that I was not in the suit premises, when time was sought in Appeal Court. I say that the Petitioner knowing fully well that I was not in the suit premises made these false allegations against me, I am not aware as to whether time was granted upto 31st December, 1997. I am not aware about the undertaking since I was not in the suit premises. I have not flouted any order of the City Civil Court, I am not aware as to whether any appeal was preferred against order dated 5.5.97. It is inconceivable that respondent No. 4 would not knew what order was passed on the appeal from order by the High Court when she is a party to the same and is residing in the premises with the family. Surely at least the other members must have communicated it to her. The affidavit appears to contain utter falsehood.

Having gone through the relevant judgments cited by Shri Apte to canvass the submission that when under Order 39, Rule 2(A) an alternative remedy is provided to deal with the breach of an injunction order summary procedure provided under the Contempt of Courts Act should not be resorted to, I am unable to come to a conclusion that any of the said Judgment put fetters on the High Courts power or in any way limit the powers of the High Court to punish a person for breach of an injunction order. No such affirmative proposition is laid down in any of these judgments. To say that resort cannot be had to the provisions of Contempt of Courts Act in case of a breach of an injunction order is to ignore or set at nought, Section 22 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 which says that the provisions of this Act shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, the provisions of any other law relating to Contempt of Courts. In fact that is what the judgment in Chandrakant Shelar''s case (supra) lays down. It is true that not in all cases would the High Court exercise its powers under the Contempt of Courts Act to deal with the breach of an injunction order. But there may be cases where exercise of the said powers would be warranted. It would obviously depend on the facts of each case. It cannot be the intention of the legislature to say that in a gross case of contempt of an injunction order the High Court would be powerless to take action for contempt. In my opinion in the case on hand the Respondents have shown gross disregard for the order of the City Civil Court and also shown disrespect to the orders of the High Court.

The City Civil Court by its order dated 13.12.1996 gave time to the Respondents to reside in the suit premises till 31.12.1997. This time was given considering the fact that the Respondents were staying in the suit premises for a substantially long time and also to enable them to make their arrangement. The Respondents carried an appeal to the High Court. The High Court found no merits in the appeal and disposed of the appeal. The High Court however granted time to the Respondents to vacate the suit premises. They were permitted to reside in the suit premises till 31.12.1997, provided they give undertaking on or before 7.5.1997 by filing an affidavit in the Court. The Respondents did not care to file an undertaking and in breach of the High Courts Order they continued to stay in the suit premises till 31.12.1997 and even beyond that. Therefore, they have also shown disrespect to the High Court''s Order. Ultimately the Petitioner had to file the present Contempt Petition on 1.9.1997. Rule was granted by the High Court on 29.9.1997. It was made returnable in six weeks. Respondents did not care to file any affidavit in reply refuting the allegations made in the Petition, which shows utter callous and disrespectful attitude of the Respondents. As of today the allegations in the Petition remain uncontroverted. Belatedly affidavit came to be filed by Respondents Nos. 4 and 5 in the Court today. Those affidavits do not make a happy reading.

Respondent No. 3 in the affidavit stated that Respondent No. 1 had contributed Rs. 3/4 lakhs for the purchase of the suit premises, therefore, the story that the Respondents are unable to make alternative arrangement on account of lack of money is not true. According to Respondent No. 3, no opportunity was given to the Respondents to give evidence before the order was passed. It is not open for the Respondents to take up this contention now because appeal carried from the said order was disposed of by the High Court by saying that no interference was called for. The said contention could only have been taken in that appeal. Respondent No. 4 has gone to the extent of saying that she was not aware whether time was granted upto 31.12.1997. It is inconceivable that Respondent No. 4 would not know what was the order passed by the High Court in Appeal from Order No. 212 of 1997 when she was a party to the Appeal. In the facts of the case, therefore, I am convinced that the order of the City Civil Court is flouted with impunity. Scant respect is shown to the High Court''s Order. Suit premises are occupied till date without giving any undertaking as directed by the High Court in its Order dated 5.5.1997. As regards the argument that no case of wilful disobedience is made out, it is averred in the Petition that Respondents have flouted the order passed by the City Civil Court as well as the Order of the High Court. It is also stated that even after the order passed by the High Court on 5.5.1997 the harassment has reached to a maximum and the petitioner as well as his wife are subjected to humiliation every day by Respondents Nos. 1 to 5. Wilful disobedience is implicit in the averments of the Petition. In the facts of the case, therefore, I am of the opinion that the Respondents have to be dealt with firmly. Sufficient time was given to the Respondents to purge themselves of contempt but their approach is adamant. They refused to see reason. As far as the case that Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 have no money to make arrangement for alternative arrangement is concerned, it may be stated that not only that Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 seem to be sufficiently well off but respondent No. 3 the son and the Respondent No. 4 daughter-in-law are staying at BIT Chawl, Bombay Central, Bombay. In their affidavit they have stated that they are not residing in the suit premises since February, 1997, therefore, it is quite possible for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 to stay with Respondents Nos. 3 and 4. In this view of the matter I have no hesitation in coming to a conclusion that Respondents Nos. 1 to 4 are guilty of contempt of the City Civil Court Orders dated 13.12.1996 and also the High Court Order dated 5.5.1.997.

The learned Counsel Mr. Naidu, for the Respondents, states at this stage that Respondents Nos. 3 and 4 are not staying in the suit premises but they are staying at BIT Chawl No. 32, Bombay as on today. Respondent No. 3 is present in the Court, when asked he confirmed that he is staying at BIT Chawl, Room No. 16, Bombay as on today. The Respondents Nos. 3 and 4 have tendered apology to this Court in their affidavit and the learned Counsel appearing for them also tendered apology on their behalf in the Court today. In view of the fact that the Respondents Nos. 3 and 4 are no longer staying in the suit premises and in view of the fact they have tendered apology I accept the said apology as being bona fide and discharge the contempt notice issued against them. It is however made clear that in view of the statement made by the learned Counsel appearing for Respondents Nos. 3 and 4 that Respondents Nos. 3 and 4 have vacated the suit, premises no action is being taken against them. So far as the Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 are concerned they are still in suit premises in violation of the order of City Civil Court and the High Court I therefore, propose to pass the following order:

ORDER

Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 are found guilty of having committed contempt of the order of the City Civil Court dated 13.12.1996 passed on Notice of Motion No. 3493 of 1996 in S.C. Suit No. 3829 of 1996 and the High Courts order dated 5.5.1997 passed on Appeal from Order No. 96 of 1997, Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 are therefore, sentenced to suffer simple imprisonment for a period of one month each and to pay a fine of Rs. 2000/- each.

Respondents Nos. 3 and 4 are also found guilty of contempt however in view of the apology tendered by them and in view of the affidavit filed by them that they are not staying in the suit premises the contempt notice against them is discharged.

Contempt Notice issued against respondent No. 5 is discharged.

The order of sentence of Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 shall remain suspended for a period of eight months from today on the request of the learned Counsel for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2. After the period of eight months the suspension shall automatically be lifted and the order of sentence shall operate from that date.

At this stage Mr. Naphade prays that the Respondents No. 1 and 2 should file an affidavit slating that they have removed themselves from the suit premises on the date mentioned in the said affidavit and they undertake that they will not enter into the suit premises. The request is reasonable. Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 shall file an affidavit to this effect within the said stipulated period of eight months.

The Contempt Petition is disposed of in the aforesaid term.

Certified copy expedited.