High CourtsSingle Bench

Ram Katahur Singh & Ors vs State Of Madhya Pradesh

Madhya Pradesh High Court · Decided on 26 July 2018 · Citation: (2018) 07 MP CK 0255

HON’BLE JUDGES
Anjuli Palo, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 374(2) · Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Section 34, 301, 302, 304B · Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 113B
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Criminal Appeal No. No. 1510 OF 1998
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Judgment

95 paragraphs · 2,002 words

This appeal has been preferred by the accused/appellants under Section 374(2) of Cr.P.C. being aggrieved by the judgment dated 09.07.1998 passed

by the Session Judge, Satna in Sessions Trial No. 93/1996 whereby the appellants have been convicted under Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code.

Appellant No. 1 has been sentenced to undergo RI for 10 years and fine of Rs. 1,000/- and Appellants No. 2 to 5 have been sentenced to undergo RI

for 7 years and fine of Rs. 200/with default stipulations.Â

2.

In brief, the prosecution case is that the marriage between appellant No. 1 and deceased Dayawati was solemnized 4-5 years prior to the incident.

After marriage, the appellants demanded a motor cycle and gold ornaments (10 gms) from the deceased as dowry. On nonfulfillment of their dowry

demand, they used to harass the deceased. Further, the deceased wanted to continue her studies from her maternal home but the appellants were

against her. Appellants used to subject her to cruelty. She complained about their behaviour to her parents.

3.

On 17.02.1996, Abhay Raj Singh (PW-12) brother of the deceased went to the house of the appellants to take the deceased with him to her

maternal house. Appellants refused to send the deceased with her brother. Thereafter, on the same day, the deceased died at her matrimonial house in

unnatural circumstances i.e. by burning. Â Merg intimation was registered at Police Chowki Kotar, Rampur Baghelan, District Satna on the report of

appellant No. 1. After investigation, police found the involvement of appellants with the crime, hence offence under Section 304-B and 302 of IPC

was registered against them and charge-sheet was filed before the concerned Court.

4.

After committal of the case, learned trial Court framed charges under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC; in alternate Sections 304-B and 301

of IPC were framed against all the appellants. They abjured guilt and pleaded innocence.

5.

Some defence witnesses were examined by the appellants to establish their defence that at the time to incident, deceased was alone at her

matrimonial house. The appellants were working at their field.

6.

After considering the evidence on record, the learned trial Court held the appellants guilty for committing for committing offence under Section 304-

B of IPC and were convicted and sentenced as mentioned above in paragraph 1 of this judgment.

7.

Appellants have challenged the aforesaid conviction and sentence on the ground that they were falsely implicated by the maternal family members

of the deceased. They were present at the time of funeral of the deceased but they had not said anything about the harassment. After three days of

the incident, they have stated that the deceased was ill-treated and harassed by the appellants. This fact was ignored by the trial Court. The

prosecution witnesses have also stated that there was no settlement of dowry at the time of marriage. Hence, no demand was made by the appellants

even after two years. Further, that the appellants contended that no report has been alleged by the family members of the deceased, prosecution did

not examine the neighbour witnesses to establish their case beyond reasonable doubt. On the aforesaid grounds, the appellants prayed to set aside the

impugned and they be acquitted from the charge levelled against them.

8.

Heard learned counsel for the parties at length. Perused the record.

9.

Learned Panel Lawyer appearing for the respondent/State has vehemently opposed the prayer of the appellants.

10.

After considering the entire evidence on record, this Court finds from the evidence of Dr. V.G.Hinduja (PW-15), it is duly established that the

deceased was burnt after her death. Dr. V.G.Hinduja and the team of doctors who conducted autopsy of the deceased found some symptoms which

indicate that the deceased had died before she was burnt. The symptoms that were (I) no carbon particle was present in her trachea, (ii) tongue was

stuck between her teeth outside her mouth, (iii) tongue was burnt, (iv) hairs and head of the deceased were burnt, (v) smell of kerosene was coming

from her hairs, (vi) deceased had sustained 100% burn injuries all over the body.

11.

This Court does not find any reason to disbelieve the postmortem report. There is nothing in the report which indicates that there might be a

possibility that the deceased would have committed suicide. From the evidence on record, it is also found that there is a possibility that the deceased

got burnt accidentally.

12.

It is pertinent to note that the deceased died within seven years of her marriage. To attract the provisions of Section 304B of the IPC, the main

ingredient of the offence to be established is (a) that soon before the death of the deceased, she was subjected to cruently and harassment in

connection with the demand of dowry, (b) the death of the deceased woman was caused by any burn or bodily injury or some other circumstance

which was not normal, (c) such death occurs within seven years from the date of her marriage, (d) that the victime was subjected to cruelty or

harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband, (e) such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with demand of dowry, and

(f) it should be established that such cruelty and harassment was made soon before her death. (See also Kashmir Kaur vs. State of Punjab, AIR 2013

SC 1039; Prema S.Rao v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao, AIR 2003 SC 11).

13.

‘Soon before her death’, means interval between the cruelty and her death should not be major. There must be existence of a proximate and

live links between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and concerned death. If the alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has

become state enough not to disturb the mental equilibrium of the woman concerned, it would be of no consequence. (See also Mustafa Shahdal Shaikh

vs. State of Maharashtra AIR 2013 SC 851; Yashoda vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (2004) 3 SCC 980).

14.

In the light of the above principle laid down by the Supreme Court, it is essential to evaluate the prosecution evidence with regard to “cruelty

soon before the death of the deceased.â€​

15.

It is not in dispute that the body of the deceased was found in the house of the appellants. The burn injuries of sustained by the decease are itself

strong evidence of cruelty soon before the death. Even Dr. Hinduja who conducted autopsy of the deceased opined that there were symptoms that the

deceased was dead before she was burnt.

16.

Vidya Devi (PW-8) deposed that whenever deceased Dayawati (sister-in-law) came to her maternal house, she narrated about the demand of

dowry by her in-laws and her husband. They demanded gold ornaments and motor-cycle. Â On one occasion, three months prior to the death of the

deceased, appellant No. 1 came to their house to take the deceased. At that time also he demanded dowry and warned them that he will not send the

deceased to the maternal house. The deceased even wanted to continue her studies at her matrimonial house. The appellants did not agree to that. In

her cross-examination, Vidya Devi (PW-8) she admitted that on the date of incident, Abhay Raj Singh (PW-12) went to her matrimonial house to take

her with him.

But the appellants did not agree to send her to her matrimonial house. After returning of her Abhay Raj Singh, within one hour, the relatives of the

deceased received the news of death. Â Similarly, the statement has been given by mother of the deceased Sampatiya (PW-9), Ramkhilawan (PW-

11), Abharaj Singh (PW-12) brother of the deceased.

17.

Learned counsel for the appellants contended that the testimony of relative cannot be relied upon as they are interested witnesses. They want to

falsely implicate the appellants for death of the deceased.

18.

This contention of the learned counsel for the appellants cannot be accepted. A female is more close and open to her family members.

19.

In case of Vijendra Singh vs. State of UP (2017) 11 SCC 129, Kamta Yadav vs. State of Bihar AIR 2016 SC 4866, Juman vs. State of Bihar AIR

2017 SC 1121, Muttaicose vs. State of Tamil Nadu 2017 (8) SCC 598 and Arjun vs. State of C.G. AIR 2017 SC 1150; it was held that the testimony

of related witnesses cannot be brushed because only on the ground that they are interested witnesses. 20. In Hari Obula Reddy v. State of A.P.

[(1981) 3 SCC 675], the Court has ruled that evidence of interested witnesses per se cannot be said to be unreliable evidence. Partisanship by itself is

not a valid ground for discrediting or discarding sole testimony. We may fruitfully reproduced a passage from the said authority:-

13……...An invariable rule that interested evidence can never form the basis of conviction unless corroborated to a material extent in material

particulars by independent evidence. All that is necessary is that the evidence of interested witnesses should be subjected to careful scrutiny and

accepted with caution. If on such scrutiny, the interested testimony is found to be intrinsically reliable or inherently probable, it may, by itself, be

sufficient, in the circumstances of the particular case, to base a conviction thereon.

21.

From the testimony of the above witnesses, it is established that the appellants demanded dowry from the deceased and her family members. But

due to non-fulfillment of dowry demand, the deceased was subjected to cruelty. Such plea is not helpful in the view of presumption that they are

innocent or they did not demand after marriage.

22.

Section 113-B of Indian Evidence Act reads as under : “113B. Presumption as to dowry death.â€"When the question is whether a person has

committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or

harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death.â€​

23.

This Court finds that the trial Court has rightly taken the adverse view against the appellants under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act.

There is no cogent and trustworthy evidence of the defence side to establish that at the time of incident, they were not present at the spot or they

were elsewhere. The conduct of appellants show that they had common intention to commit dowry death of the deceased. No one from the appellants

had tried to save the deceased or brought her to the hospital immediately, hence the active involvement of the appellants in committal of the offence is

duly established by the prosecution evidence. In case of Pradeep Kumar vs. State of Haryana (2014) 7 SCC 395, it was held that, “if it is proved

that death of woman took place within seven years of marriage otherwise than in normal circumstances, and “soon before her death†deceased

was subjected to cruelty or harassment by such person for or in connection with dowry demand, court shall presume that such person had caused

dowry death â€" Further held, presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act on court to raise presumption of dowry death.†24. Therefore,

the appellants are rightly convicted under Section 304-B of the IPC.

25.

Learned counsel for the appellants contended that the appellants are facing trial since long. Hence, liberal view may be taken to reduce their

sentence.

26.

In the opinion of this Court, the appellant filed this appeal in the 1998. Since then the appellants have prolonged the hearing of this case by seeking

adjournment or remaining absent.

27.

In such circumstances, particularly looking to the nature of offence, it is not just and proper to take lenient view with regard to conviction and

sentence in favour of the appellants. The trial Court has rightly convicted the appellants under Section 304-B of IPC and awarded proper sentence.

28.

With the aforesaid, the appeal stands dismissed.