Ram Kishan vs Jagtar Singh

Mahmood Ali Khan, J.—This revision petition under sub-section (8) of Section 25B of Delhi Rent Control Act (in short the Act) is filed by the petitioner, who is tenant, assailing in order of the Additional Rent Controller dated 06.10.2001 whereby he has rejected the application on affidavit filed by the tenant for leave to contest the application for recovery of the possession of the tenancy premises filed by the landlord and has passed an eviction order against him under clause (e) of Section 14(1) of the Act. The relevant facts necessary for appreciating the contentions of the parties on merit are as follows. The respondent is seeking eviction of his tenant the petitioner under clause (e) of Section 14(1) of the Act from the first floor and the second floor of the premises bearing No. 2446, Gali No. 10, Block-M, Karol Bagh, New Delhi. The allegations are that he is residing with his family in a rented accommodation in Chandigarh and that he is engaged in the transport business there. His family comprised of himself, his wife, a son, who is studying in M.E. and his three daughters who are students in B.A. final, 12th class and 8th class respectively in Chandigarh. He purchased this property in 1994 but because of the bar of his filing the eviction application before a lapse of five years from the date of his acquisition of the property, he filed the application now in May, 1999. It was also alleged that the premises were let to the petitioner/tenant by the previous owner/landlord for residential purpose and that the premises are required by him for occupation as residence for himself and other members of his family dependent upon him and that he is not in a possession of any reasonably suitable accommodation in Delhi. He further submitted that he requires one bedroom for himself and his wife, one bedroom for his son, one bedroom for his daughters and one study room for his son and daughters besides drawing-cum-dining room, one pooja room, one guest room and a store. He is also filing another eviction petition for evicting the tenant on the ground floor of this property for his personal bona fide need.

The summons in the form prescribed in Schedule-III of the Act was served on the defendant who preferred application on affidavit for seeking leaving to contest the eviction application. In the application he pleaded that the premises were taken on rent by him for residential-cum-commercial purpose and they were being used for this dual purpose right from the inception of tenancy. According to him, he was carrying on business in ''chappals'' and the premises were being used as godown for these goods right from the inception of the tenancy and both, the previous landlord as well as the petitioner were receiving the rent of the premises from him with full knowledge of the use of the premises by him for residential-cum-commercial purpose. It was also alleged that the petitioner was settled and resided with his family in Chandigarh and he owned house No. 454, Sector 47, Panchkula, Haryana, which is a spacious house and his children were also getting education in Chandigarh. Moreover he was also engaged in transport business which he was carrying on in the name and style of Kisan Transport in Chandigarh and he had no intention to shift to Delhi. Besides, it was alleged that the petitioner owned another house No. 2532A, Sector-47, Chandigarh in which also he had a legal right to live. In addition, the petitioner owned house No. D-1813, Rajouri Garden, New Delhi wherein he stays as and when he visits Delhi after a gap of one year or so. It is alleged that the petitioner''s requirement is not bona fide and that his intention is to sell off this property after getting it vacated by him. The petitioner also alleged that extent of the tenanted premises has not been correctly mentioned by the petitioner and that the petition is not maintainable for this reason also.

In reply to this application, the petitioner reiterated that he did not own any residential premises in Chandigarh or in Delhi, as alleged. According to him, he was presently residing as tenant in house No. 454, Sector 47, Panchkula, Haryana and earlier thereto he was tenant in house No. 2532A, Sector-47, Chandigarh. He also denied that he owned premises D-1813, Rajouri Garden, New Delhi. It was also denied that the premises were let to the petitioner for residential-cum-commercial purpose or the same were being used for this purpose. It was also refuted that he did not require the premises bona fide or that he did not have any intention of shifting to Delhi with his family and that he had filed the petition in order to dispose of this property after the eviction of the petitioner.

The learned controller dismissed the application filed by the petitioner holding that prima facie the respondent was an admitted landlord/owner and that the premises were used for residential purpose and incidental use thereof for storing the ''chappals'' by the petitioner will not convert it into non-residential premises since the petitioner was running his shop in Ghaffar Market. He further, prima facie, held that the respondent was residing in Chandigarh in a rented accommodation and he did not own any residential premises there or in Rajouri Garden in Delhi. He was told that during the pendency of the case the son of the respondent had shifted to Delhi and was studying in MBA. He also observed that since the respondent was running the transport business plying his vehicles between Delhi and Chandigarh, he could carry on this business from Delhi as well. He, accordingly, held that the landlord wanted to shift the residence and business to Delhi and this intention could not be doubted as the landlord was the best judge of his own residential need. For all this reason, the leave application was dismissed and an order of eviction was passed under clause (e) of Section 14(1) of the Act directing recovery of possession of the premises from the petitioner giving him six months time to vacate the premises.

The petitioner is aggrieved and has filed the present revision petition.

The argument of counsel for petitioner/tenant are two-fold. Firstly, it is argued that the respondent has admitted that he is residing with his family in Chandigarh and has also an established transport business there, therefore, the question whether he was residing in Chandigarh in a rented accommodation and that he did not own two houses, or a house in Rajouri Garden as mentioned in the leave application and that he requires the suit premises bona fide needed evidence before recording a finding on these questions. He also argued that the learned Controller without any material on record had observed that the respondent was plying his transport vehicles between Delhi to Chandigarh, therefore, he could carry on the business from Delhi as well. His second submission is that the premises in question were being used by the petitioner for residential-cum-commercial purpose right from the inception of the tenancy and that the previous landlord and the respondent, both, were accepting rent of the premises with full knowledge that the premises were being used for residence as well as for storing ''chappals'' etc. and, therefore, the ground of eviction under clause (e) of Section 14(1) of the Act was not available. It is further submitted that long use of the premises for commercial purpose with the knowledge and consent of the previous landlord will change the purpose of letting to be residential-cum-commercial purpose and the petitioner is not entitled to the order of eviction under clause (e). He relied upon the judgement in Khubchandani Meherchand K. Vs. Hiralal Dayalal, in support of his contention that merely because the petitioner had purchased this suit property and had filed the eviction petition stating that he wanted to reside in it is not in itself a ground to hold that the premises are required by him bona fide. He also referred to Smt. A.N. Kapoor Vs. Smt. Pushpa Talwar, where it was held that continued user of the building for the purpose of lodging paying guests shows that the respondent-landlord and her father have not only been aware of such user of the building, but have also impliedly consented to such user. This presumption is irresistible for the evidence on record. Such user takes the premises in question out of the ambit of ''premises let for residential purposes'' so as to exclude the ground contained in clause (e) of Section 14(1) of the Act. Counsel also referred to Precision Steel Engg. Vs. Premdev Niranjadev 1982 RLR SC 781 wherein the Supreme Court had laid down that when a tenant applied for leave to defend, the Controller should grant him leave if the tenant had disclosed facts which, if proved, would defeat the landlord''s case and the Controller was not entitled to look into the documents to find out whose case was true. Counsel also relied upon I Inderjeet Kaur Vs. Nirpal Singh, where it was laid that if the fact stated in defence in the application for leave to defend by the tenant were not frivolous and they, prima facie, disclosed that the landlord would be disentitled to obtain the order of recovery of the possession of the premises from the tenant, then leave could be granted.

On the other hand counsel for respondent/landlord has justified the order of the Controller. It is argued that the respondent/landlord did not own any house in Chandigarh or any other house in Delhi and that he wanted to shift to Delhi and live in his own house and that his need is bona fide and petitioner''s leave application has been rightly rejected by the Controller. It was also contended that in the affidavit filed by the petitioner it has not been disclosed as to for what commercial purpose the premises were being used by him. Counsel also argued that the petitioner was running his ''chappal'' business in a shop in Ghaffar Market and that the incidental use of the premises for storing the chappals in the tenancy premises where the petitioner is residing with his family would not change the letting purpose from residential to residential-cum-commercial. It was also argued that the respondent was living in Chandigarh in a rented accommodation and that he wanted to shift to Delhi and reside in the premises and his need is bona fide. It was also argued that the landlord was not required to shift to Delhi and live in a rented accommodation before filing a petition for eviction of his tenant in order to show bona fide of his requirement. He has referred to Dipika Arora Vs. S.N. Sehgal and Others, where it was held that if the landlord was living outside Delhi and she intended to file a petition for eviction against a tenant in Delhi, it was not necessary for her to take a house on rent or be a guest and then show her accommodation to be insufficient. She also need not give reasons for shifting to Delhi as decision may take a decade and original reason disappear. She, as a landlady, was entitled to live in her house and she has to show bona fide of her desire. He also referred to Saroj Khemka Vs. Indu Sharma and Another, wherein it was held that if a tenant had applied for leave to defend claiming that the letting purpose for composite purpose, then if he omits to give details of the alleged commercial purpose and activities, there was no disclosure of facts entitling him to leave to defend. It was further observed that if the landlord was living abroad and filed a petition for eviction of his tenant alleging that he required the premises for occupying it during his occasional visit since he was forced to live in hotels or with relatives during the sojourn, his need should be treated to be bona fide. It was also observed that if the tenant say that the landlord has intention to sell the house, he must file the documents to show it along with application for leave to defend.

Sub-section (4) of Section 25-B of the Act requires a tenant to file affidavit disclosing his defence for obtaining leave to contest application for eviction filed by the landlord. Sub-section (5) of this section casts a duty upon the Controller to grant leave to contest the eviction application if the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such facts as would dis-entitle the landlord from obtaining an order of eviction against the tenant under clause(e) of Section 14(1) of the Act. For establishing a ground for eviction under clause (e) the landlord has to allege and prove that he is owner of the premises, the premises were let to the tenant for residential purpose and the premises are required bona fide for occupation of self or other members of his family dependent upon him for residence and further that neither he nor the member of the family for whose occupation the premises are needed had no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation available. The landlord may also seek eviction of the tenant for the bona fide need of the person for whose benefit the premises are held by him. In the instant case argument of counsel for petitioner are two-fold, which according to him, if proved at trial, would dis-entitle the landlord from obtaining an eviction order against the petitioner. The first contention is that the premises were let for dual purpose i.e. for residential-cum-commercial purpose and from the inception of the premises, the same were used by the petitioner for his residence as well as for carrying on his business and this fact was in the knowledge of the predecessor-in-interest of the respondent and after the purchase of this property, the respondent also. His second contention is that the premises are not required bona fide by the landlord since he is well settled in business in Chandigarh and he is in occupation of a spacious accommodation there, which is owned by him and he has also another premises in Chandigarh. His children are also getting education in Chandigarh, therefore, the eviction is claimed in this case for latent purpose for disposal of the property after getting the premises vacant. It was also pointed out that the premises are situated in a slum like locality whereas the landlord is accustomed to live in a big house in a good locality in Chandigarh, which also leads to the inference that the eviction petition is filed for extraneous reasons.

Before adverting to the merit of the contention of the petitioner tenant it will be useful to refer to the principles of law which should be taken into consideration while dealing with an application of the tenant filed for grant of leave to contest.

The Supreme Court in Charan Dass Duggal v. Brahma Nand, (1983) 1 SCC 301 has laid down the following principles of law to be considered while dealing with an application for leave to defend in a case under clause(e) of Section 14(1) of the Act:

What should be the approach when leave to defend is sought? There appears to be a mistaken belief that unless the tenant at that stage makes out such a strong case as would non-suit the landlord, leave to defend cannot be granted. This approach is wholly improper. When leave to defend is sought, the tenant must make out such a prima facie case raising such pleas that a triable issue would emerge and that in our opinion should be sufficient to grant leave. The test is the test of a triable issue and not the final success in the action (see Santosh Kumar Vs. Bhai Mool Singh). At the stage of granting the leave parties reply in support of their rival contentions on affidavits and assertions and counter-assertions on affidavits may not afford such incontrovertible evidence to lead to an affirmative conclusion one way or the other. Conceding that when possession is sought on the ground of personal requirement, an absolute need is not to be satisfied but a mere desire equally is not sufficient. It has to be something more than a mere desire. And being an enabling provision, the burden is on the landlord to establish his case affirmatively. If as it appears in this case, the landlord is staying at Pathankot, that a house is purchased, may be in the name of his sons and daughters, but there may not be an apparent need to return to Delhi in his old age, a triable issue would come into existence and that was sufficient in our opinion to grant leave to defend in this case.

In the same judgment, in para 7 it is further observed:

The genesis of our procedural laws is to be traced to principles of natural justice, the principal amongst them being that no one shall suffer civil or evil or pecuniary consequence at his back without giving him an adequate and effective opportunity to participate to disprove the case against him and provide his own case. Summary procedure does not clothe an authority with power to enjoy summary dismissal. Undoubtedly wholly frivolous defence may not entitle a person leave to defend. But equally a triable issue raised, enjoins a duty to grant leave. May be in the end the defence may fail. It is necessary to bear in mind that when leave to defend is refused the party seeking leave is denied on opportunity to test the truth of the averments of the opposite party by cross-examination and rival affidavits may not furnish reliable evidence for concluding the point one way or the other. It is not for a moment suggested that leave to defend must be granted on mere asking but it is equally improper to refuse to grant leave though triable issues are raised and the contro Travel versy can be properly adjudicated after ascertainment of truth through cross-examination of witnesses who have filed their affidavits. Burden is on the landlord to prove his requirements and his assertion is required to be tested more so when it is shown that for long he is staying outside Delhi, that he has a building albeit standing in the names of his sons and daughters where he is staying and at which place he receives his normal correspondence, if in such a situation one can say that a triable issue is not raised, one is at a loss to find out where, when and in what circumstances such an issue would arise. We are, therefore, satisfied that this is a case in which triable issues were raised and both the learned Rent Controller and the High Court were in error in refusing to grant the leave.

In Precision Steel and Engineering Works and Another Vs. Prem Deva Niranjan Deva Tayal, again the Supreme Court laid down the following principles of law to be borne in mind while deciding an application for leave to contest filed by the tenant on the ground of personal bona fide need:

It would be open to the landlord to contest the application of the tenant seeking leave to contest and for that purpose he can file an affidavit in reply but production and admission and evaluation of documents at that stage has no place. The Controller has to confine himself to the affidavit filed by the tenant under sub-section 4 and the reply, if any. On perusing the affidavit filed by the tenant and the reply if any filed Controller has to pose to himself the only question: Does the affidavit disclose, not prove, facts as would dis-entitle the landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession on the ground specified in clause(e) of the proviso to Section 14(1). The Controller is not to record a finding on disputed questions of facts or his preference of one set of affidavits against other set of affidavits. That is not the jurisdiction conferred on the Controller by sub-section 5 because the Controller while examining the question whether there is a proper case for granting leave to contest the application has to confine himself to the affidavit filed by the tenant disclosing such facts as would prima facie and not on contest dis-entitle the landlord from obtaining an order for recovery of possession. At the stage when affidavit is filed under subsection (4) by the tenant and the same is being examined for the purposes of sub-section (5) the Controller has to confine himself only to the averments in the affidavit and the reply if any and that becomes manifestly clear from the language of sub-section (5) that the Controller shall give to the tenant leave to contest the application if the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such facts as would dis-entitled the landlord from recovering possession etc. The jurisdiction to grant leave to contest or refuse the same is to be exercised on the basis of the affidavit filed by the tenant. That alone at the state is the relevant documents and one must confine to the averments in the affidavit. If the averments in the affidavit disclose such facts which, if ultimately proved to the satisfaction of the Court, would disentitle the landlord from recovering possession, that by itself makes it obligatory upon the Controller to grant leave. It is immaterial that facts alleged and disclosed are controverted by the landlord because the stage of proof is yet to come. It is distinctly possible that a tenant may fail to make good the defence raised by him. Plausibility of the defence raised and proof of the same are materially different from each other and one cannot being in the concept of proof at the stage when plausibility has to be shown. This view taken in S. Kanjibhai and Others Vs. Mohanraj Rajendra Kumar, Kishan Singh Vs. Mohd. Shafi and others, proved in Santosh Kumar Vs. Bhamool Singh, where at p. 1217 this Court while commenting upon an order granting conditional leave under Order XXXVII, Rule 3 passed by the trial Judge which was to this effect: "In the absence of these documents, the defence of the defendants seems to be vague consisting of indefinite assertions", observed as under:-

This is a surprising conclusion, The facts given in the affidavit are clear and precise, the defence could hardly have been clearer. We find it difficult to see how a defence that on the face is clear becomes vague simply because the evidence by which it is to be proved is not brought on file at the time the defence is put in.

The learned judge has failed to see that the stage of proof can only come after the defendant has been allowed to enter an appearance and defend the suit, and that the nature of the defence has to be determined at the affidavit is put in. At that stage all that the Court has to determine is whether, ''if the facts alleged by the defendant are duly proved'' they will afford a good or even a plausible answer to the plaintiffs claim. Once the Court is satisfied about that, leave cannot be withheld and no question about imposing conditions can arise and once leave is granted the normal procedure of a suit, so far as evidence and proof go, obtains.

In Inderjeet Kaur Vs. Nirpal Singh, same principles of law were reiterated.

On the basis of the principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the above cited judgments governing grant of leave to contest to a tenant under sub-section (5) of Section 25-B, of the Act the proposition of law may be summed up as under:-

Sub-section (5) of Section 25-B, casts a statutory duty on the Controller to give to the tenant leave to contest an eviction application if the tenant has disclosed such facts on affidavits which would disentitle the landlord from obtaining possession of the premises under clause (e) of Section 14(1) and Section 14-A to 14-D of the Act.

Upon reading of the affidavit filed by the tenant, within the specified time, conjointly with the rejoinder thereto filed by the landlord, the facts and documents admitted by the parties, the facts judicial notice of which can be taken and the facts which a court may presume under law of evidence, if the Controller is prima facie, satisfied that the tenant has raised triable issues on all or any of the requirement of the ingredients of clause (e) of Section 14(1) or Sections 14-A to 14-D, which require investigations and trial for resolving them, he shall grant the leave.

The tenant at this stage is not required to make out a strong case as would unsuit the landlord. His affidavit should disclose, not prove, facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order under clause (e) of Section 14(1). He is not required to produce evidence to prove the defence raised.

The Controller is not to record a finding on disputed questions raised by the tenant in his affidavit. All that the Controller has to determine is whether if the facts alleged by the tenant are duly proved they will afford a good or even a plausible answer to the landlord''s claim.

The Controller shall primarily consider the facts stated by the tenant in his affidavit which is the only relevant document at this stage for exercising power under sub-section (5) of Section 25B, but he should be circumspect and careful that the defence pleaded by the tenant is not wholly frivolous, sham and a ruse for delaying the eviction order.

Once leave to contest has been granted to a tenant, the normal procedure of trial of an eviction application, so far as evidence and proof of, shall obtain. The Controller shall not impose any condition to the grant. But the Controller in order to ensure expeditious trial and disposal of the eviction application in terms of sub-section (6) of Section 25B, may give suitable directions and fix the time and mode of the trial and evidence.

On the touchstone of these propositions of law, now the facts of the present case may be examined.

As regards the first contention of the petitioner on purpose of letting, the view of the Controller is that the premises were being used for residential purpose by the petitioner and his family and in case the petitioner is storing ''chappals'' in a portion of the premises, that would not change the purpose of letting. It is also his view that the tenant is running a chappal shop in Ghaffar Market and there is no evidence that he is running a shop in these premises. The premises are predominantly used as residential by the petitioner and his family. There is no dispute about it. Assuming that the tenant is also storing the goods in which he is dealing and which he is selling at his shop in Ghaffar Market, that would prima facie not convert the premises into a commercial premises. (See Shiv Sarup Gupta Vs. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, Therefore, prima facie, this contention of the petitioner is not enough to disentitle the respondent from recovery of the possession of the tenancy premises.

The second contention, however, is important. The landlord has to prove the bona fide of his requirement of the premises. The Supreme Court in Shiv Sarup Gupta Vs. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta (supra) has observed as under:-

The phrase "required bona fide" is suggestive of legislative intent that a mere desire which is the outcome of whim or fancy is not taken note of by the rent control legislation. A requirement in the sense of felt need which is an outcome of a sincere, honest desire, in contradistinction with a mere pretence or pretext to evict a tenant, on the part of the landlord claiming to occupy the premises for himself or for any member of the family would entitle him to seek ejectment of the tenant. Looked at from this angle, any setting of the facts and circumstances protruding the need of the landlord and its bona fides would be capable of successfully withstanding the test or objective determination by the court. The judge of facts should place himself in the armchair of the landlord and then ask the question to himself - whether in the given facts substantiated by the landlord the need to occupy the premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere, honest. If the answer be in the positive, the need is bona fide. The failure on the part of the landlord to substantiate the pleaded need, or, in a given case, positive material brought on record by the tenant enabling the court drawing in inference that the reality was to the contrary and the landlord was merely attempting at finding out a pretence or pretext for getting rid of the tenant, would be enough to persuade the court certainly to deny its judicial assistance to the landlord.

Applying the proposition of law laid down to the facts of the case in hand, it is clear that prima facie the defence raised by the petitioner tenant that the landlord does not have bona fide need of the premises and the latent object in filing eviction application is to dispose of the house cannot the lightly brushed aside at this stage. As per the allegations of the landlord, he is well settled in transport business in Chandigarh. His children are getting education in Chandigarh. He is living in a spacious house in Chandigarh. The tenant had further alleged that the landlord was owner of the premises which were occupied by him in Chandigarh and he also owned another premises in Chandigarh and both of these allegations were refuted by the respondent/landlord. He alleged that the present premises and the previous one were under his tenancy but prima facie there is nothing to reject the contention of the tenant at this stage. Similarly, the contention of the tenant that the suit premises which are situated in a not very good locality as compared to the accommodation and the locality in Chandigarh where the respondent and his family are accustomed to live may not cut much ice at this stage because if the landlord prima facie can be held to require the suit premises bona fide for his own occupation the bona fide of the landlord cannot be doubted simply because the locality of the tenancy premises is not so good or the accommodation available therein is also not comparable to the premises available to the landlord in Chandigarh. Even if the respondent landlord owned a premises in Chandigarh in which he was residing, he can still desire to occupy the suit premises for occupation of himself and the members of his family. The only restriction of this right is that he is to show that his need is genuine, real and he has honest desire to occupy the premises and there is absence of any mala fide or latent objective to be achieved in ousting the tenant from the premises. The Controller in the impugned order had observed that the elder son of the respondent was now studying in MBA course in Delhi. Similarly, he also observed that the respondent''s transport vehicles were plying between Delhi and Chandigarh so the same transport business could be carried out by him in Delhi but there is no material for such views in the pleadings or admission on the part of the tenant or a fact judicial notice of which could be taken. At this stage, the facts which have been disclosed by the tenant in the affidavit that the requirement of the landlord is not bona fide have raised serious dispute and triable issues which needed investigation and trial. Therefore, applying the proposition of law evolved on the basis of the principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court in Charan Dass Duggal Vs. Brahma Nand (supra) and Precision Steel & Engineering Works Vs. Prem Deva Niranjan Deva Tayal (supra) the Additional Rent Controller ought to have granted leave to contest to the tenant. May be certain directions as to the time or mode of trial could have been given for expeditious disposal of the case.

The case law cited by the respondent in Saroj Khemka Vs. Indu Sharma (supra) to my view would not advance the case of the respondent at this stage. In this case the landlord was living outside the country and he alleged that he was occasionally visiting Delhi but had no other place to stay, forcing him to be lodged in hotels or take obligations of some relatives. It is not a case here. The landlord/respondent does not plead that he is well settled and living in Chandigarh but in connection with his business or even otherwise he frequently visited Delhi but had no other accommodation for his and his family stay in Delhi and that he wanted to live in his own house rather being a guest of other persons or staying in hotels and lodging houses. Similarly in Dipika Arora Vs. S.N. Sehgal & Ors. (supra) the landlady was living outside Delhi with an intention to shift to Delhi and it was held that the landlady was intended to live in her own house and she has to show the bona fide desire and further that it was not necessary for the landlady first to take a house on rent or be a guest and then file a petition for eviction of a tenant. Even in this judgment it has been held that the landlady had to show that her requirement of the tenancy premises was bona fide, therefore, the requirement being bona fide, has to be established in the case. Each case has to be decided on its own peculiar facts and the principles of law laid down are also applied keeping in view of the peculiarities of facts and circumstances in which it was laid down. For the reasons stated above, the order of the Additional Rent Controller refusing leave to contest to the petitioner/tenant cannot be said to be ''according to law'' within the purview of sub-section (8) of Section 25-B of the Act. Accordingly, the impugned order of the Additional Rent Controller dated 06.10.2001 is set aside. The petitioner is granted leave to defend the application for eviction filed by the respondent, with the following directions:-

1) The petitioner shall file his reply (written statement) to the eviction petition within four weeks from today and the respondent/landlord may, if need be, file his rejoinder/replication thereto within four weeks thereafter.

2) The parties shall file all documents in original, if not already filed, along with their respective pleadings.

3) The Additional Rent Controller shall give two opportunities to the respondent/landlord to produce the evidence and conclude it. Thereafter, the petitioner/tenant shall also be given only two opportunities to produce his evidence and complete it. The parties shall not be given any further opportunity. The evidence of the parties shall be concluded, preferably within six months from the date on which the replication is filed, as aforesaid.

The petition stands disposed of, as above.