Ram Kishan vs Punjab Wakf Board and Others

Ram Chand Gupta, J.—The present revision petition has been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India for setting aside impugned order dated 7.10.2010, passed by learned Additional District Judge, Panipat, vide which appeal filed against order dated 31.10.2009 passed by learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Panipat, rejecting objection petition filed by Petitioner in execution proceedings was dismissed.

I have heard learned Counsel for the Petitioner and have gone through the whole record carefully including the impugned orders passed by learned both the Courts below.

Admitted facts are that Petitioner has purchased the property in dispute during pendency of present litigation. Hence, it has been rightly held by learned Courts below that sale is hit by doctrine of lis pendence and he is having no right to obstruct the execution of decree passed in favour of Respondent-decree-holder and that he has no right to obstruct the process of possession, which is sought to be taken by decree-holder pursuant to the decree passed in its favour. Learned Courts below have rightly placed reliance upon Usha Sinha Vs. Dina Ram and Others, . Relevant paragraphs of the same read as under:

It is thus settled law that a purchaser of suit property during the pendency of litigation has no right to resist or obstruct execution of decree passed by a competent Court. The doctrine of ''lis pendens'' prohibits a party from dealing with the property which is the subject matter of suit. ''Lis pendens'' itself is treated as constructive notice to a purchaser that he is bound by a decree to be entered in the pending suit. Rule 102 therefore, clarifies that there should not be resistance or obstruction by a transferee pendente lite. It declares that if the resistance is caused or obstruction is offered by a transferee pendente lite of the judgment debtor, he cannot seek benefit of Rules 98 or 100 of Order XXI.

In Silverline Forum Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Rajiv Trust and another, , this Court held that where the resistance is caused or obstruction is offered by a transferee pendente lite, the scope of adjudication is confined to a question whether he was a transferee during the pendency of a suit in which the decree was passed. Once the finding is in the affirmative, the Executing Court must hold that he had no right to resist or obstruct and such person cannot seek protection from the Executing Court.

The Court stated:

It is true that Rule 99 of Order 21 is not available to any person until he is dispossessed of immovable property by the decree-holder. Rule 101 stipulates that all questions "arising between the parties to a proceeding on an application under Rule 97 or Rule 99" shall be determined by the executing court, if such questions are "relevant to the adjudication of the application". A third party to the decree who offers resistance would thus fall within the ambit of Rule 101 if an adjudication is warranted as a consequence of the resistance or obstruction made by him to the execution of the decree. No doubt if the resistance was made by a transferee pendente lite of the judgment debtor, the scope of the adjudication would be shrunk to the limited question whether he is such transferee and on a finding in the affirmative regarding that point the execution court has to hold that he has no right to resist in view of the clear language contained in Rule 102. Exclusion of such a transferee from raising further contentions is based on the salutary principle adumbrated in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act.

(emphasis supplied)

[See also Sarvinder Singh Vs. Dalip Singh and Others, ]

We are in respectful agreement with the proposition of law laid down by this Court in Silverline Forum. In our opinion, the doctrine is based on the principle that the person purchasing property from the judgment debtor during the pendency of the suit has no independent right to property to resist, obstruct or object execution of a decree. Resistance at the instance of transferee of a judgment debtor during the pendency of the proceedings cannot be said to be resistance or obstruction by a person in his own right and, therefore, is not entitled to get his claim adjudicated.

For invoking Rule 102, it is enough for the decree holder to show that the person resisting the possession or offering obstruction is claiming his title to the property after the institution of the suit in which decree was passed and sought to be executed against the judgment debtor. If the said condition is fulfilled, the case falls within the mischief of Rule 102 and such applicant cannot place reliance either on Rule 98 or Rule 100 of Order XXI.

In view of the aforementioned facts, it cannot be said that any illegality or material irregularity has been committed by learned courts below in passing the impugned orders or that a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby, warranting interference by this Court.

Moreover, law has been well settled by Hon''ble Apex Court in Surya Dev Rai Vs. Ram Chander Rai and Others, , that supervisory jurisdiction is not available to be exercised for indulging in re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correcting the errors for drawing inference like a Court of appeal. It has been observed as under:

Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied: (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.

Hence, the present revision petition is, hereby, dismissed being devoid of any merit.