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Judgment
5 paragraphs · 443 wordsJ.V. Gupta, J.
This petition is directed against the order of the Collector dated 21st March, 1985, whereby the reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act (for short, the Act) was declined.
The award under the Act was announced on the 18th July, 1983. Admittedly, the petitioner was not present on that day. The application claiming reference under section 18 of the Act was filed on 19th March, 1984. The same was declined on 21st March, 1985 by the impugned order, on the ground that the application had been made after a period of about eight months, thus, being timebarred. It was also observed that even the applicant had made no request for forwarding the application to the District Judge.
Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the application was filed within six months of the date of the knowledge of the award and was, therefore, within limitation. In support of this contention, he referred to Mangilal Jawanmal v. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer (I), Thana, AIR 1978 Bom. 325, andRaja Harish Chandra v. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 1961 SC 1500. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent relied on AIR 1943 Mad. 327.
After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and going through the case law cited at the Bar, I find force in the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner. Under section 18 of the Act, the application for reference could be made within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under section 12 (2) or within six months from the date of the award by the Collector, whichever period shall first expire. It is not disputed that no notice under section 12 (2) was received by the petitioner in the present case. The ``date of the award of the Collector'''' was interpreted by the Supreme Court vide Raja Harish Chandra''s case (supra) where it was held that ``it means the date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructively''''. It was further held that ``it will be unreasonable to construe the words'''' from the date of the Collector''s award used in the proviso to section 18 in a literal or mechanical way. In these circumstances, the application could not be dismissed as barred by time because it was filed within six months from the date of the knowledge of the award. Consequently, this petition succeeds, the impugned order is set aside and the Collector is directed to make the reference under section 18 of the Act to the District Judge concerned, within two months from today.
