Ram Kishun Sharma and Others vs The State of Bihar

Vikash Jain, J.—The present appeal has been filed against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence both dated 23.09.1993 passed by the 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Saharsa in Sessions Trial No. 27 of 1986, whereby all the five appellants have been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and for six months for the offences under Sections 302 and 452 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, both the sentences having been directed to run concurrently.

According to the prosecution case instituted at 10 A.M., on 12.03.1985, at the Supaul Police Station, on the basis of a fardbeyan of the informant, Buchia Devi, recorded at Supaul Hospital, at around 8.45 A.M., on 12.03.1985, there had been an altercation about one month prior to the occurrence between her husband, Jiyalal Sharma (deceased), and appellant Nos. 1 and 4, namely, Ram Kishun Sharma and Mahendra Sharma relating to cattle grazing. The said dispute had been resolved through Panchayat with intervention of the villagers. It is alleged that on the date of occurrence, i.e., on 11.03.1985, at about 2.00 P.M., when the informant''s husband was cleaning the straw of the leaves of the thatched roof of his house, all the five appellants entered into the angan (courtyard). Appellant No. 1 Ram Kishun Sharma was armed with lathi, appellant No. 4, Mahendra Sharma, was armed with bhala and the other appellant Nos. 2, 3 and 5, Parmeshwar Sharma, Thithar Sharma and Charitar Sharma respectively, were armed with brick-bats and assault was made upon the informant''s husband. It is further alleged that appellant No. 1, Ram Kishun Sharma, gave a lathi blow on the head, appellant Nos. 2 and 3, Parmeshwar Sharma and Thithar Sharma, assaulted with brick-bats on the chest and Panjra (i.e., ribs) and appellant No. 4, Mahendra Sharma, gave order to kill Jiyalal Sharma and, then, appellant No. 5, Charitar Sharma, hit with brick-bats on the chest causing injuries to the informant''s husband, who became unconscious and fell down at the angan. When the informant ran to rescue her husband, she was threatened to be killed by the appellants. It is stated that upon her hulla, several co-villagers, such as, Indradeo Singh, Sito Singh, Babu and others arrived at the spot and Indradeo Singh snatched away the bhala from the hand of appellant No. 4, Mahendra Sharma. The villagers tried to save her husband, but he remained unconscious, he was taken to Supaul Hospital for treatment, where he died on 12.03.1985 at about 7.30 A.M.

The case was investigated by the police and charge sheet was submitted, pursuant to which the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Supaul, took cognizance and committed the case to the Court of Sessions, Saharsa, who transferred the same to the Court of the 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Saharsa, for trial. The appellants pleaded not guilty to the charges and claimed that they had been falsely implicated owing to previous enmity.

In order to prove the charges, the prosecution produced six witnesses, who were examined during the trial. P.W. 1 (Suraj Sharma) is the son of the informant; P.W. 2 (Dr. Navin Kumar Das) is the doctor, who submitted post mortem report; P.W. 3 (Buchiya Devi) is the informant herself; P.W. 4 (Tulai Kamat) is a co-villager; P.W. 5 (Meena Devi) is the daughter-in-law of the informant and, finally, P.W. 6 (Bibhuti Bhushan Jha), is the Investigating Officer, who has proved the writing on the fardbeyan, inquest report and the First Information Report.

Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the appellants have wrongly been convicted as the prosecution cannot be said to have proved the charges against them.

At the outset, it is pointed out that even though the occurrence of assault is said to have occurred on 11.03.1985, the fardbeyan was recorded by the informant only the following day, i.e., on 12.03.1985, after her husband died without there being any explanation for such delay. This apart, though the First Information Report was instituted on 12.03.1985, the same was forwarded to the Magistrate on 16.03.1985 after further unexplained delay.

Learned counsel next submits that the evidence of various prosecution witnesses is wholly unreliable and there is considerable doubt whether any of them could at all have been eye-witness to the alleged occurrence. Further-more, there are serious discrepancies and contradictions in the versions of various prosecution witnesses and, as such, it cannot be said that the charges against the appellants have been proved beyond reasonable doubt. It is also submitted that while the only independent witness Tulia Kamat (P.W. 4), a co-villager, has turned hostile, other co-villagers, named in the First Information Report, who are said to have come to the spot on hulla, have not been examined at all.

Significantly, the injuries on the chest and body, said to have been suffered by the deceased as a result of brickbats, are not supported by the post mortem report, which discloses only head injuries. Moreover, P.W. 6, Bibhuti Bhushan Jha, being the Investigating Officer, has also stated in his deposition that he did not find any brickbat or sign of blood at the place of occurrence, on 12.03.1985, during his visit there.

In support of the submissions made on behalf of the appellants, reliance has been placed on the decision of the Supreme Court, in the case of Lakshman Prasad Vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1981 SC 1388 : (1981) CriLJ 1010 : (1981) 1 SCALE 580 : (1981) 1 SCC 22 Supp : (1981) SCC 22 Supp : (1981) SCC(Cri) 642 as well as that of the Jharkhand High Court, in the case of Birsa Ahir Vs. State of Bihar (now Jharkhand), (2004) CriLJ 4773 .

Learned Additional Public Prosecutor, on the other hand, submits that the judgment of the learned trial Court does not suffer from any infirmity and the appellants have rightly been convicted for the offences, which they stood charged with. It is also submitted that the prosecution witnesses, barring P.W. 4, Tulai Kamat, have supported the prosecution case and there is consistency in their versions and, hence, the prosecution has succeeded in proving the charges against the appellants.

We have heard the parties at length and carefully considered the materials on record.

A perusal of the deposition of P.W. 1, Suraj Sharma, being the son of the deceased, shows that he had gone to attend the call of nature at the time of occurrence and, upon hearing the hulla, he came to the angan (courtyard) being the place of occurrence. From his statement, therefore, it is quite evident that having gone to attend the call of nature, he could not have been present at the time of occurrence, when the assault was being made upon the deceased. Had he been present at the time of occurrence and shouted along with his mother and others, as claimed, surely his mother, being the informant P.W. 3, would have mentioned this fact in her fardbeyan, whereas, however, she has not acknowledged the presence of her son and has merely stated that upon her shouting, other co-villagers arrived. The statement of P.W. 1 does not, therefore, find corroboration from the narration contained in the fardbeyan and whether or not he was an eye-witness to the occurrence remains open to question.

P.W. 3, Buchiya Devi, being the informant, has not specifically stated in her fardbeyan that she was an eye witness to the occurrence. Even during her deposition, she has stated, at paragraph 7 of her cross-examination, that at the time of occurrence, she was milling wheat and, upon coming out of the house, she saw 200-300 brick-bats in the angan, where she saw her husband lying in the angan in injured condition. This clearly suggests that, even on her own saying, she could not have been an eyewitness to the actual occurrence of assault; rather, she arrived soon thereafter.

P.W. 5 (Meena Devi), daughter-in-law of the deceased, has stated, in her deposition, that at the time of occurrence, she was making her child sleep. In paragraph 2 of her cross-examination, she has stated that when she came out of the house in which she was helping the child sleep, she saw that her father-in-law (deceased) had fallen and was lying on the ground and there were injuries on his whole body. It is, therefore, not free from doubt whether P.W. 5 could also have actually seen the occurrence as she appears to have arrived at the spot well after the alleged assault had started and the victim was already lying on the ground having sustained injuries.

There is considerable inconsistency also with regard to the nature and manner of assault alleged against the appellants, who are said to have attacked the deceased with lathi and brick-bats. The informant, in her fardbeyan, has stated that appellant Nos. 2 and 3, namely, Parmeshwar Sharma and Thithar Sharma respectively, assaulted the deceased with brick-bats on his chest and panjra and that appellant No. 5, Charitar Sharma, assaulted the deceased with brickbats on his chest. P.W. 5, Meena Devi, has stated that the deceased had suffered injuries on his body from head to toe as he had been beaten all over. These versions are in sharp contrast with the post mortem report, which discloses that the deceased had sustained injuries only on his head and the cause of death was intracranial haemorrhage resulting in central cardio respiratory arrest. The evidence of these witnesses are, therefore, not corroborated by the medical evidence by way of post mortem report, which has been proved by Dr. Navin Kr. Das, P.W. 2, as Extihibit 1.

It is further relevant to note that the doctor (P.W. 2) has opined, in paragraph 5 of his cross-examination, that the injuries, in question, could occur also if the roof of a tiled house collapses and falls on the head. This assumes significance in the backdrop of the statement of the informant (P.W. 3) to the effect that the deceased was cleaning the thatched roof of the house. So also P.W. 5, in her cross-examination, has stated that the deceased was taking down the thatched roof at the time of occurrence.

The post mortem report, thus, leaves room for doubt with regard to the circumstances in which the deceased came to be injured as to whether it was by reason of having injured himself, while repairing his thatched roof, which might have fallen on his head, or by reason of assault made on his head. This assumes still greater significance from the fact that P.W. 6, being the Investigating Officer, has stated in paragraph 6 of his deposition, that he did not find any stone or brick-bat nor any sign of blood when he went to the place of occurrence on 12.03.1985.

In the alternative, the inference drawn in Birsa Ahir''s case (supra), taking note of the fact that there was no blood found near the dead body nor on the two stones found there to the effect that the victim must have been murdered somewhere else and the body brought and kept on the village Akhara may not be ruled out even in the present case.

Yet another noteworthy aspect of the matter is that while a large number of co-villagers including Indradeo Singh, Sito Singh, Babua Vajpayee are said to have arrived at the place of occurrence on hulla, none of these persons have deposed as witnesses in the case. On the other hand, Tulia Kamat P.W. 4, being an independent witness, has turned hostile. The Supreme Court, in Lakshman Prasad''s case (supra), noting that none of the nearby neighbours, who must have assembled in an occurrence of dacoity, was examined to support the complainant''s version, opined that these persons did not choose to support the complainant and observed,

"... the appellant had been falsely implicated and hence the persons who had assembled may not have relished the idea of supporting the complainant if he had gone to the extent of falsely implicating the appellant in the dacoity."

In this context, an important principle, which finds application, in the present case, is with regard to the effect of the prosecution''s failure to examine material or independent or other witnesses. In the case of Takhaji Hiraji Vs. Thakore Kubersing Chamansing and Others, AIR 2001 SC 2328 : (2001) CriLJ 2602 : (2001) 2 Crimes 288 : (2001) 1 JT 415 Supp : (2001) 3 SCALE 589 : (2001) 6 SCC 145 : (2001) 2 UJ 865 : (2001) AIRSCW 2077 : (2001) 3 Supreme 690 , the Supreme Court has laid down as follows:-

"..... It is true that if a material witness, who would unfold the genesis of the incident or an essential part of the prosecution case, not convincingly brought to fore otherwise, or where there is a gap or infirmity in the prosecution case which could have been supplied or made good by examining a witness who though available is not examined, the prosecution case can be termed as suffering from a deficiency and withholding of such a material witness would oblige the court to draw an adverse inference against the prosecution by holding that if the witness would have been examined it would not have supported the prosecution case."

Even though in the fardbeyan itself, the informant specifically stated the names of some of the villagers, such as, Indradeo Singh, Sito Singh and Babu, who had assembled on her bulla, none of them has been examined for taking their evidences on record. In a slight improvement at the time of her deposition, the informant (P.W. 3) stated the names of such villagers as Indradeo Singh, Sito Singh, Babu Vajpayee and Batulo Mahto. Again, P.W. 1 has named Indradeo Singh, Sito Singh apart from Babu Vajpayee and Ashok Vajpayee, who came to the spot on hulla. It is equally noteworthy that apart from the informant''s own deposition, the prosecution has sought to rely on the evidence of P.W. 1, son of the informant, and P.W. 5, daughter-in-law of the informant, both of whom are related witnesses being the members of the same family and were, admittedly on inimical terms with the appellants. P.W. 4, though a co-villager and an independent witness has, however, turned hostile.

Moreover, P.W. 3, Buchiya Devi, has stated, in her deposition, about the presence of her son, Suraj Sharma (P.W. 1), and her daughter-in-law, Meena Devi (P.W. 5), at the place of occurrence; whereas, she has not stated about their presence in her fardbeyan, which, thus, appears to be an improvement in her subsequent version. She has also stated, in paragraph 8 of her cross-examination, that the Investigating Officer found the brickbats lying in the angan but the same is not corroborated by the evidence of the Investigating Officer in paragraph 14 of his cross-examination, who has denied having found any stone or brick-bat or any sign of blood on his visit to the place of occurrence.

The versions of the witnesses, with regard to the assaults alleged at the hands of the appellants, are not free from doubt. The P.W. 5, in her deposition, stated that there was mar-pit between the parties thereby suggesting that there was scuffle between both the sides and not merely a one-sided assault on the deceased. Moreover, she has stated that at the time of occurrence, the deceased was taking down the thatched roof of the house, which, in conjunction with the opinion of P.W. 2 (Dr. Navin Kumar Das) that the injuries in question found on the body of the deceased could have resulted from the roof collapsing on the head, leaves considerable room for doubt with regard to the manner of death of the informant''s husband.

For the above reasons, this Court is of the view that the prosecution has failed to prove the charges against the appellants beyond all reasonable doubt and, as such, the appellants ought not to have been convicted in the facts and circumstances of the case.

In the result, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment of the trial Court passed in Sessions Trial No. 27 of 1986, arising out of Supaul P.S. Case No. 39 of 1985, and the consequential sentences passed against the appellants, are hereby set aside. Since the appellants are on bail, their bail bonds are hereby cancelled and their sureties shall stand accordingly discharged.

Let the Amicus Curiae be paid a fee of Rs. 5,000/-.

Registry shall, forthwith, send a copy of this judgment and order to the learned trial Court along with the Lower Court Records.

I.A. Ansari, J.

I agree.