Ram Krishna Misra, Ex parte

Das, J.—This appeal must be dismissed. The only question is, whether the provisions contained in Section 43 of the Insolvency Act are mandatory. That section provides that:

If the debtor does not apply for an order of discharge within the period specified by the Court, the order of adjudication shall be annulled, and the provisions of Section 37 shall apply accordingly.

It is contended on behalf of the appellant that the provisions of Section 43 are not mandatory and that there is a discretion in the Court to enlarge the time after the expiry of the period fixed by the Court for an application for an order of discharge. I am unable to agree with this view. Section 27 of the Act provides that:

If the Court does not dismiss the petition, it shall make an order of adjudication, and shall specify in such order the period within which the debtor shall apply for his discharge.

The provision was intended, to remedy the defect in the existing law under which the conduct of the debtor in many cases never came under the scrutiny of the Insolvency Court. It is a new provision and, in my opinion, must receive a strict interpretation. Section 41 provides that:

A debtor may, at any time after the order of adjudication, and shall, within the period specified by the Court, apply to the Court for an order of discharge, and the Court shall fix a day, notice whereof shall be given in such manner as may be prescribed, for hearing such application and any objection which may be made thereto.

It is obvious to my mind that the debtor has complete discretion to apply when he likes provided he applies within the period specified by the Court. The word "shall" in Section 41 of the Act imposes, in my opinion a duty upon the insolvent the breach of which involves the consequences pointed out in Section 43. In my opinion the decision of the learned District Judge on this point is right and must be affirmed.

I would dismiss this appeal.

Ross, J.

I agree.