Ram Kumar & Other vs State of Uttarakhand & another

Sharad Kumar Sharma, J.

These two C482 Applications are arising out of the Case Crime No. 279 of 2017, registered under Sections 420, 406 and 468 of I.P.C. which was

ultimately registered as Criminal Case No.469 of 2018, State Vs. Azad Singh and another and the same is pending before the Additional Civil Judge,

Senior Division-I / Judicial Magistrate, Haridwar.

The complainant Mohit Tiwari, who is present in person, who is identified by Mr. B.M. Pingal, Advocate. Similarly, the applicant Ram Kumar in C482

No. 1214 of 2018, who is present in the Court is identified by Mr. V.S. Chauhan, Advocate and Azad Singh, the applicant in C482 Application No.

1255 of 2018, who is present in Court is identified by Mr. Narendra Bali, Advocate.

As per the prosecution case, the accused / applicants have been implicated under Sections 420, 406 and 468 I.P.C. and the charges levelled against

the accused / applicants are now being sought to be compounded by the parties by filing the present Compounding Application Nos. 1744 of 2018 in

C482 No. 1214 of 2018 and 1741 of 2018 in C482 No. 1255 of 2018 respectively.

The Compounding Applications are supported by combined affidavits of applicants Ram Kumar and Azad Singh and the respondents, wherein, they

have submitted that the controversy as raised in the aforesaid cases have been amicably settled and no scores amongst them are any more existing.

On the other hand, the learned A.G.A., Mr. S.S. Adhikari, would submit that the offences as levelled against the applicants are not compoundable as

the F.I.R., for which, they have been chargesheeted on 25.04.2018 and summon is issued by order dated 02.07.2018, Section 320 would not be

attracted.

Considering the fact that the parties have settled their dispute and now no more any controversy exists inter se between them, as such, no useful

purpose would be served by forcing the parties to face litigation when it would be altogether a futile exercise to undertake the trial. Para 6, 8 and 9 of

the affidavit reads as under :-

“6. That during the pendency of the instant criminal misc. application, the better sense prevail over the party and the dispute has amicably been

settled by them and the parties have regain their cordial relationship, as such the respondent no. 2 is not at all interested to prosecute the applicant in

any manner, furthermore, in such circumstances the parties have reached to the final settlement there is remote chances of conviction of applicant,

hence continuation the such proceedings before the trial court are nothing but futile exercise.

That the applicant further undertake the cheque no. 200095 dated 20-12-2018, Rs. 10lacs though cheque no. 200096 dated 20-01-2019 and Rs.

5,50,000/- through cheque no. 200097 dated 20-02-2019 respectively issued by co-applicant Azad Singh, in case dishonored on account of insufficiency

of funds or any other reason the deponent will be at liberty to take legal recourse as available under the law and the present compromise is such

situation deem to have been withdraw.

That in terms of law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Gyan Singh Vs. State of Punjab reported in (2012) 1 SCC page 303, the

present criminal proceedings pending against the applicant can be quashed in view of amicable settlement between the parties to restore peace and

harmony in the Society if otherwise the offence charged is not crime against the society.â€​

To support his stand, he places reliance in the case of Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab and anotherr eported in (2012) 10 SCC 303. The

Hon’ble Apex Court in para 58 and 61, which are quoted hereunder, had laid down a wider principle under which the High Court while exercising

its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. will have to deal with each cases and its impact irrespective whether it is compoundable or non-compoundable.

Where High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that dispute between the offender and victim has been settled although

offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in the case

demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor. No

doubt, crimes are acts which have harmful effect on the public and consist in wrong doing that seriously endangers and threatens well-being of society

and it is not safe to leave the crime-doer only because he and the victim have settled the dispute amicably or that the victim has been paid

compensation, yet certain crimes have been made compoundable in law, with or without permission of the Court. In respect of serious offences like

murder, rape, dacoity, etc; or other offences of mental depravity under Indian Penal Code or offences of moral turpitude under special statutes, like

Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, the settlement between offender and victim

can have no legal sanction at all. However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil,

mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or

the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to victim and the offender and victim have settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of

the fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal

proceeding or criminal complaint or F.I.R if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of offender being convicted

and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated. The above list is illustrative and not

exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts and no hard and fast category can be prescribed.

The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or

FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences

Under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline

engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the

criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and

circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the

nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity,etc. cannot be fittingly

quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and

have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like

Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for

quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil favour stand on

different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like

transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in

nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because

of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put

accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete

settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of

justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite

settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to

an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal

proceeding.â€​

It is further laid down that if the Court arrives at a conclusion that continuance of the criminal proceedings will be a futile exercise and it would not

lead to meet ends of justice, the parties to the proceedings may not be forced to undergo the trial in a proceeding which otherwise has got no logical

conclusion. In para 61 of the judgment, the Hon’ble Apex Court has dealt with the inherent power and wide plentitude with no statutory limitations

but it has to be exercised by the Court in accord with the guidelines engrafted in such power.

Another judgment, on which, the reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the parties is in the case of Mal Singh and others Vs. State of

Punjab and others reported in 2016 SCC OnLine P&H 10179. Para 8 and 10 of the said judgment reads as under :-

“8. The record does not show that there was any fracture as such caused to injured-Jail Singh. However, the injury caused to the mandible is in the

nature of big contusion, reddish in colour and is a serious injury caused by the butt of the gun. Nevertheless, there was no fracture and as such, in law,

the same cannot be held to be grievous hurt, though, in other words, the same can be described as ‘hurt’ in the definition of ‘hurt’. In that

view of the matter, even otherwise, the conviction under Section 308 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’ in short) may not be justified. It is

seen from the

background facts and evidence of the case that the appellants assaulted injured-Jail Singh with the allegation that he was always abusing. Looked

from that background and at the nature of the injuries caused, as stated above, I do not think that the conviction could really be made under Section

308 IPC. Be that as it may, without disturbing the finding of conviction; having regard to the fact that the appellants have undergone enough sentence

and further fact that the informant-Maghar Singh and injured-Jail Singh both have approached this Court by way of their application and affidavits that

they want to compound the offences in view of their relationship in the village where they live. In that view of the matter, the counsel for the parties

have prayed for compounding the offences for which they have been convicted.

I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, also the application and affidavits filed by injured-Jail Singh and

complainant-Maghar Singh residing in the same village. It is stated in the affidavits that the villagers have impressed upon them to have compounding

and live in peace. I think compounding of offences as prayed for should be allowed to be made in the light of parameters laid by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab and another, (2012) 10 SCC 303 . â€​

In para 10 of the said judgment, the Coordinate Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court has considered and followed the propriety of the judgment

as laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Gian Singh (Supra). Moreover, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Gian Singh

(Supra) has also dealt with the judgment in the cases of B.S. Joshi and others Vs. State of Haryana and anotherr eported in (2003) 4 SCC 675

and Nikhil Merchant Vs.Central Bureau of Investigation and anoher reported in (2008) 9 SCC 677.

The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of B.S. Joshi and others Vs. State of Haryana (2003) 4 SCC 67,5 while dealing with the issue as to

whether the High Court ceased with the jurisdiction under C-482 or in a writ jurisdiction, can it exercise its powers to compound the offences which

are mentioned in Section 320 Cr.P.C. In the case of B.S. Joshi (Supra), the Court while dealing with the various other judgments has held as under:

“6. In Pepsi Food Ltd. & Anr. v. Special Judicial Magistrate & Ors. [(1998) 5 SCC 749], this Court with reference to Bhajan Lal’s case

observed that the guidelines laid therein as to where the court will exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code could not be inflexible or laying

rigid formulae to be followed by the courts. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole

purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is well settled that these powers have no limits. Of

course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers.

It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye’s case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or

FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extra ordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the

view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of

power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such a

power.

In State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy & Ors. [(1977) 2 SCC 699], considering the scope of inherent power of quashing under Section 482, this

Court held that in the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash proceedings if it comes to the conclusion that ends of

justice so require. It was observed that in a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the

structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice and that the ends of

justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice had got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. This Court said that

the compelling

necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realization of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent

powers of the High Court to do justice between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient

jurisdiction. On facts, it was also noticed that there was no reasonable likelihood of the accused being convicted of the offence. What would happen to

the trial of the case where the wife does not support the imputations made in the FIR of the type in question.

As earlier noticed, now she has filed an affidavit that the FIR was registered at her instance due to temperamental differences and implied

imputations. There may be many reasons for not supporting the imputations. It may be either for the reason that she has resolved disputes with her

husband and his other family members and as a result thereof she has again started living with her husband with whom she earlier had differences or

she has willingly parted company and is living happily on her own or has married someone else on earlier marriage having been

dissolved by divorce on consent of parties or fails to support the prosecution on some other similar grounds. In such eventuality, there would almost be

no chance of conviction. Would it then be proper to decline to exercise power of quashing on the ground that it would be permitting the parties to

compound non-compoundable offences. Answer clearly has to be in ‘negative’. It would, however, be a different matter if the High Court on

facts declines the prayer for quashing for any valid reasons including lack of bona fides.

In Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia & Ors. v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre & Ors. [(1988) 1 SCC 692], it was held that while exercising inherent

power of quashing under Section 482, it is for the High Court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to

consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. Where, in the opinion of the Court, chances of an

ultimate conviction is bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may, while

taking into consideration the special facts of a case, also quash the proceedings.

In view of the above discussion, we hold that the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint

and Section 320 of the Code does not limit or affect the powers under Section 482 of the Code.â€​

The aforesaid judgment of laying down the ratio with regard to the competence of the High Court in relation to the compounding of the offence not

covered by Section 320 Cr.P.C. has been followed in a subsequent judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Nikhil

Merchant (supra). Paragraph 7, 8 and 9 of the judgment read as under :-

In support of the aforesaid contentions made on behalf of the appellant before the High Court, reference was made to the decision of this Court in

the case of Central Bureau of Investigation v. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd. (1996) 5 SCC 591 wherein on the basis of facts similar to the facts of

this case, this Court had held that even if an offence of cheating is prima facie made out, such offence is a compoundable offence and compromise

decrees passed in the suits instituted by the Bank, for all intents and purposes, amount to compounding of the offence of cheating. This Court

accordingly, upheld the order of the High Court quashing the criminal complaint after the civil action had been compromised between the parties.

Apart from the said decision, reliance was also placed on another decision of this Court in the case of B.S. Joshi and Ors. v. State of Haryana and

Anr (2003) 4 SCC 675 wherein while dealing with the proceedings under Sections 498A and 406 Indian Penal Code involving matrimonial disputes and

offences, this Court held that even though the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would not apply to such offences, which

are not compoundable it did not limit or affect the powers under Section 482 and the powers conferred on the High Courts and the Supreme Court

under Articles 226 and 136 of the Constitution of India. Referring to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1) SCC

335 this Court observed that the categories indicated in the said case which warranted exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC were only

illustrative and not exhaustive. This Court ultimately held that the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash criminal proceedings or a

FIR or complaint and Section 320 CrPC does not limit or affect the power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code.

After considering the said decision in the light of the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties, the High Court took the view that in the

Duncans Agro case (supra) this Court was considering the situation involving Section 420 IPC which was compoundable under Section 320(2) CrPC,

while in the instant case, the charge sheet was also under Sections 467, 468, 471-A IPC along with the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act,

which were noncompoundable. The High Court, therefore, held that neither of the said two cases would have application to the facts of this case and

rejected the appellant's prayer for discharge from the criminal cases.

In view of the above, the Compounding Application No. 1744 of 2018, filed in C-482 No. 1214 of 2018 and Compounding Application No. 1741 of

2018, filed in C-482 No. 1255 of 2018 are allowed. The Criminal Case No. 469 of 2018, State of Uttarakhand Vs. Azad Singh and others, pending

before the Court of Additional Civil Judge, Senior Division-I, Haridwar as well as the cognizance and summoning order dated 02.07.2018 and charge

sheet dated 25.04.2018 would stand quashed and set aside.

Consequently, the C-482 Applications would stand disposed of. There would be no order as to costs.