Ram Narain Katiyar vs State of U.P.and another

Dasu Ram Azad, J.—Heard learned counsel for the applicant, learned A.G.A. for the State and perused the material placed on record.

This Criminal Misc. application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed with the prayer to quash the chargesheet dated 14.9.2007 in Case Crime No. 919G of 1998 under Sections 467, 468, 420, 409, 471 and 477A IPC, Police StationChakeri, District Kanpur Nagar pending in the Court of Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Kanpur Nagar.

The facts of the case, in brief, are that a first information report was lodged by one Vijay Shankar Dubey, Commandant, P.A.C. 37 Battalion, Kanpur Nagar on 13.4.1999 under Sections 467, 468, 471, 477A IPC Police StationChakeri, districtKanpur Nagar. The Deputy Superintendent of Police (Anti Corruption) investigated the case and recorded the statement of Sri Vijay Shankar Dubey, Rakesh Chandra Mishra and Hakim Singh. The Investigating Officer investigated the case and submitted the chargesheet against the applicant on the ground that Rakesh Chandra Mishra has clearly stated against the applicant in the complicity of the case. After filing of the chargesheet the applicant challenged the aforesaid chargesheet before this Court.

The main contention of learned counsel for the applicant is that in the present case no sanction for launching the prosecution under Section 197 Cr. P. C. has been accorded therefore, the entire proceedings against the applicant is illegal because the applicant is a government servant.

The other argument advanced by learned counsel for the applicant is that in this case the incident is of the year 1998 but the Investigating Officer submitted the chargesheet on 14.9.2007. It is argued by learned counsel for the applicant that the delay in filing the chargesheet and concluding the trial is of more than eight years therefore, the applicant?s fundamental right to speedy trial is clearly violated due to nonconclusion of the trial within time.

Learned counsel for the applicant has placed reliance upon the judgement of this Court in the cases of Prabhat Kumar Shrivastava Versus State of U. P. and another reported in [2008 (62) ACC 208], Mahendra Lal Das Versus State of Bihar and others reported in [2001 (43) ACC 1089] (SC).

On the other hand, learned A. G. A. has argued that in this case the name of the applicant has come into light in the statement of the witness, Rakesh Chandra Mishra and the allegation is of very serious nature therefore in this case no interference is called for by this Court.

So far as the first argument advanced by counsel for the applicant, regarding sanction for launching of the prosecution is concerned, the Apex Court in a recent judgement rendered in the case of State of Maharashtra Versus Devahari Devasingh Pawar and others reported in [2009 (64) ACC 117] (SC) has clearly held that the question of sanction for prosecution shall be decided by the trial court at the end of trial. Para 13 which is relevant in the present case is reproduced below:

?13. In Romesh Lal Jain Versus Naginder Singh Rana, this Court held and observed as under:

?33. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that whereas an order of sanction in terms of section 197 Cr. P. C. is required to be obtained when the offence complained of against the public servant is attributable to the discharge of his public duty or has a direct nexus therewith, but the same would not be necessary when the offence complained of has nothing to do with the same. A plea relating to want of sanction although desirably should be considered at an early stage of the proceedings, but the same would not mean that the accused cannot take the said plea or the Court cannot consider the same at a later stage. Each case has to be considered on its own facts. Furthermore, there may be cases where the question as to whether the sanction was required to be obtained or not would not be possible to be determined unless some evidence is taken, and in such an event, the said question may have to be considered even after the witnesses are examined...

So far as second argument advanced by counsel for the applicant regarding the delay in filing a chargesheet and concluding the trial is concerned, in this regard it is to say that from the perusal of the record it appears that the Investigating Officer has recorded the statement of witnesses and collected the material which prima facie discloses commission of the offence. The Investigating Officer therefore, has not committed any error in submitting the chargesheet on 14.9.2007 which discloses the commission of the offence. The chargesheet has been submitted on 14.9.2007 in respect of the incident taken place in the year, 1998. The ground of delay in submission of chargesheet and conclusion of trial after the retirement of the applicant, is not a good ground for quashing the chargesheet.

Therefore, the prayer for quashing the chargesheet is refused.

In the present case, the allegations against the applicant is of very serious nature and if the allegations are proved, these constitute serious offence therefore they are to be tried in the interest of justice. This is not a case where the applicant?s right to speedy trial has been violated. The truth of the allegations can be arrived at only after proper trial. In the case of Santosh De and another Versus Archna Guha and others reported in 1994 SCC (Cri) 546 the Apex Court has held that the criminal proceedings under Sections 482 and 465 Cr. P. C. called for only in case of grave illegality . Provisions for interference by superior courts should not be allowed to be misused by those who can afford to approach them. In this regard para 15 of the judgement is quoted below:

?15. The facts of this case impel us to say how easy it has become today to delay the trial of criminal cases. An accused so minded, can stall the proceedings for decades together, if he has the means to do so. Any and every single interlocutory is challenged in the superior courts and the superior courts, we are pained to say, are falling prey to their stratagems. We expect the superior courts to resist all such attempts. Unless a grave illegality is committed, the superior courts should not interfere. They should allow the court which is seized of the matter to go on with it. There is always an appellate court to correct the errors. One should keep in mind the principle behind Section 465 Cr. P. C. Any and every irregularity or infraction of a procedural provisions cannot constitute a ground for interference by a superior court unless such irregularity or infraction has caused irreparable prejudice to the party and requires to be corrected at that stage itself. Such frequent interference by superior courts at the interlocutory stages tends to defeat the ends of justice instead of serving those ends. It should not be that a man with enough means is able to keep the law at bay. That would mean the failure of the very system.?

In this case considering the old age of the applicant it is directed that the applicant shall appear before the Court concerned within forty five days from today and in case he applies for bail, the same shall be heard and decided expeditiously if possible, on the same day by the Court concerned. Thereafter in case the applicant moves discharge application before the court concerned, the same shall be heard and disposed of expeditiously in accordance with law.

Accordingly, the trial court is directed to proceed with the trial expeditiously, if possible, on day to day basis and no adjournment shall be granted except for very good and sufficient reason.

In this view of the matter, this application is dismissed.