Ram Nihore Tewari and Others vs State of U.P.

Surendra Vikram Singh Rathore, J.—1. Shri Ravi Kant Pandey and Shri Ashutosh Misra, learned counsel for the appellants, and Shri Mohd. M.Y. Ansari, learned AGA for the State, were heard at length.

Since all the aforesaid criminal appeals arise out of a common judgment hence the same are being disposed of together.

Criminal Appeal No. 626 of 2010 has been preferred by appellant Ram Nihore Tiwari, Criminal Appeal No. 894 of 2010 has been preferred by appellant Kamla Devi and Criminal Appeal No. 895 of 2010 has been preferred by appellant Ram Rang Tiwari. It is a case of dowry death. In this case husband of the deceased was not made an accused. Appellant Kamla Devi happens to be the mother-in-law of the deceased and appellant Ram Rang Tiwari happens to be the father-in-law of the deceased and appellant Ram Nihore Tiwari is the cousin of Ram Rang Tiwari.

Under challenge in the aforesaid appeals is the judgment dated 28.01.2010 and order dated 29.01.2010 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 2, Gonda, in Sessions Trial No. 289 of 1996 arising out of Case Crime No. 22 of 1996, Police Station Kaudiya, District Gonda, whereby the present appellants were convicted and sentenced as under:--

"(a) Under Section 304-B IPC - Appellants Ram Rang and Ram Nihore were convicted and sentenced with imprisonment for life and appellant Kamla Devi was convicted and sentenced with rigorous imprisonment for a period of ten years.

(b) Under Section 498-A IPC - All the three appellants were convicted and sentenced with rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year and also with fine of Rs. 3,000/- with default stipulation of three months'' additional imprisonment.

(c) Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act - All the three appellants were further convicted and sentenced with rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year and also with fine of Rs. 2,000/- with default stipulation of three months'' additional imprisonment.

All the sentences were directed to run concurrently."

In brief, the case of the prosecution, for the purpose of the aforesaid criminal appeals, is that the complainant Ram Rakhan, who happens to be the grandfather of the deceased, lodged a first information report at police station Kaudiya, District Gonda, on 22.03.1996 at 2105 hours alleging therein that his granddaughter Poonam was married with Nand Kumar Tewari about four years prior to her death. At the time of marriage, she was aged about 19 years. On 22.03.1996 at about 06.00 PM the deceased was brought to a field near the village of the complainant by her parents in law Ram Rang Tewari and Kamla Devi and Ram Nihore Tewari, cousin of Ram Rang Tiwari and she was set ablaze in the field and thereafter the appellants ran away because their demand of motorcycle in dowry could not be fulfilled. Seeing the flames of the fire and hearing the cries of the victim, the complainant, his neighbour Bechu Dayal and several other persons of the village reached at the place of occurrence and subsided the fire, brought the victim in burnt condition to the police station and lodged the first information report. On the basis of this information, the case was registered and the place of occurrence was inspected. On 23.03.1996, dying declaration of the deceased Poonam Devi was recorded by the Tehsildar at 12.34 PM which concluded at 12.40 PM. The dying declaration of the deceased reads as under:--

"She is in a fit mental status to record her statement at 12.34 p.m. on 23.03.1996.

She was in fit mental status during the recording of her statement at 12.40 PM on 23.03.96.

RTI of Poonam

Seal of EMO District Hospital Gonda"

The victim was admitted in the hospital and she died on 27.03.1996 in district hospital Gonda. Inquest proceedings were conducted and thereafter the dead body was sent for postmortem. Prior to that, at the time of admission, the victim was medically examined on 22.03.1996 at Primary Health Centre. There were 60% burn injuries on the whole body. Her condition was serious so she was referred to District Hospital, Gonda on the back of Chitthi Mazrubi. At District Hospital Gonda she was medically examined on 22.3.1996 at 09.45 PM. As per postmortem report of the deceased, which was conducted on 28.03.1996 at 02.20 PM, her age was about 20 years and rigor mortis was present in lower limbs. However, it passed from upper limbs. Multiple pus flakes were present all over the body. The doctor noted the ante-mortem injury as under:--

"Superficial to deep burn all over body except head, face and neck. Pus flakes were present. She died in the hospital on 27.03.1996 at 07.00 AM and the cause of death was septicemia due to shock and ante-mortem burn injury."

After completing the investigation, charge sheet was filed.

The defence of the appellants was of total denial and their false implication. It was also pleaded that there was separate living and the police under the pressure of Ram Rakhan has falsely implicated them. Appellant Kamla Devi has stated that at the time of incident, deceased Poonam was present in her parental house and she was a lady of loose character. Appellant Ram Rang Tewari has stated that his daughter-in-law Poonam was living in her parental house. Father and husband of the victim were working in Delhi. Since the deceased became pregnant by some other person therefore she committed suicide and they have been falsely implicated.

In order to prove its case, the prosecution has examined PW-1 Ram Rakhan - the complainant of this case, PW-2 Shyam Kumari - grandmother of the deceased, PW-3 Smt. Shobha - mother of the deceased, PW-4 Ram Rang Pandey - son of Ram Rakhan and father of the deceased, PW-5 Bechu Dayal Pandey - uncle of the deceased, PW-6 Dr. Girjesh Chandra, who has medically examined the victim in Primary Health Centre and referred her for further treatment to District Hospital Goda, PW-7 Dr. Javed Hayat, who has conducted the postmortem on the body of the deceased, PW-8 Head Moharrir Subhash Ji Verma, who has prepared the Chik Report and GD of this case, PW-9 Constable Samar Singh, who is the carrier of the dead body for postmortem, PW-10 Indra Prakash Singh, Tehsildar, who has recorded the dying declaration of the deceased, PW-11 Ram Lakhan Tewari, Pairokar, who has proved the recovery memo of ash as secondary evidence, PW-12 Bihari Prasad - the Investigating Officer of this case, and PW-13 Ghanshyam Mishra, Pharmacist, District Hospital Gonda, who has proved the signatures of Dr. R.P. Sinha.

In defence, D.W. -1 Shiv Bhagwan and D.W. -2 Nand Kumar were examined. D.W. -1 Shiv Bhagwan has stated that he had heard about the pregnancy of the deceased by some other person due to which she has committed suicide. This witness was resident of the village of the complainant. He has also stated that it is within his knowledge that she gave birth to still born child. He has also stated that the village of the appellants is situated at a distance of about 3/4 kilometers from the place of occurrence. D.W. -2 Nand Kumar is the husband of the deceased. He has stated that for the last about two and half years he was living in Delhi along with PW-4 Ram Rang Pandey - father of the deceased and after getting the information, he along with his father-in-law came to the village. He went to the hospital where deceased Poonam disclosed him that she was pregnant and people used to pass remarks on her therefore she has committed suicide.

After appreciating the evidence on record, learned trial court has convicted the appellants, as above, hence, the instant criminal appeal.

Submission of learned counsel for the appellants was that the defence taken by the appellants was not only probable but it stands substantiated by the medical evidence of Dr. Javed Hayat who has conducted the postmortem on the body of the deceased. He has also argued that dying declaration of the deceased was not wholly reliable because bare perusal of the same shows that she was not in a fit state of mind and she was not even in a position to recollect as to whether she was rescued in the morning or in the night. In spite of that learned trial court has not given due importance to these facts which were very important in the facts of the instant case which has rendered its judgment unsustainable under law.

Learned AGA has submitted that a prompt first information report was lodged. The deceased died an unnatural death. There is specific allegation of demand of dowry and consequential ill treatment. The appellants have failed to rebut the presumption raised against them under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act. Learned trial court by a reasoned judgment has convicted the appellants and the judgment needs no interference by this Hon''ble Court.

First we propose to consider the medical evidence which is in the form of medical examination report of the victim and evidence of PW-6 Dr. Girjesh Chandra and PW-7 Dr. Javed Hayat. PW-6 Dr. Girjesh Chandra has simply stated that the victim was brought to the Primary Health Centre on 22.03.1996. He has not stated the time at which he had examined the victim. She was more than 60% burnt and he referred her for further treatment to District Hospital, Gonda. Thereafter she was medically examined by Dr. R.P. Sinha at District Hospital, Gonda, on 22.03.1996 at 09.45 PM. The doctor found burn injuries on her body. She was admitted and it was reported that she has suffered about 85% burn injuries of kerosene oil and the duration was fresh. Evidence of PW-7 Dr. Javed Hayat is very important. He has stated that the deceased died due to septicemia which was the result of burn injuries. However, he has also stated in his examination in chief that on the basis of findings of internal genital organs of the deceased it can be said that she might have given birth to a child 2-4 days prior to her death. He has also stated that the burn injuries of the deceased could have been caused on 21.03.1996 also. Apart from burn injuries, there was no other injury on her body. So unnatural death of the deceased by ante-mortem burn injuries stands proved.

Now we proceed to consider the dying declaration of the deceased. The deceased in her dying declaration has stated that she was being brought on cycle to her parental house and in a field which was near the village of her parental house she was set on fire. She has also stated that in the morning some persons heard her cries then they gave information at her house thereafter her parents brought her for treatment. So the last part of the dying declaration is incorrect because the deceased was taken to the hospital in the night of 22.03.1996. After registration of the case at 09.05 PM, she was immediately taken to Primary Health Centre where she was examined at 09.15 PM and from there she was sent to District Hospital, Gonda, where she was medically examined on 22.03.1996 at 09.45 PM. Thus, there is no dispute to the fact situation that the victim was taken by her family members in the evening of 22.03.1996 and not in the morning. The prosecution has come with a definite case that the deceased was set on fire in the evening of 22.03.1996. Therefore, the statement that she kept on burning throughout the night becomes unreliable. There is documentary evidence and the evidence of the complainant and other witnesses also which lead to the conclusion that she was rescued and medically examined in the evening of 22.03.1996. So definitely this last part of the dying declaration was not correct. Thus, in the facts of the instant case part of the dying declaration is patently false and is not supported by the documentary evidence and the evidence of the witnesses. Whether such a dying declaration can be relied upon? Law is settled on the point that dying declaration may be made the sole basis for conviction provided the Court reaches the conclusion that it is wholly reliable. In the facts of the instant case, whole of the dying declaration is not correct.

We are of the considered view that such a dying declaration cannot be made the sole basis for recording conviction. When one part of dying declaration is admittedly wrong then we also cannot be sure about the other part of the same statement. Even otherwise this fact reflects that she was not in a fit mental state to recollect the time at which she was rescued. So we will have to consider the ocular testimony of the witnesses relied upon by the prosecution keeping in view the specific defence taken by the appellants. PW-1 Ram Rakhan, who is the grandfather of the deceased, has stated that this incident had taken place in the evening at about 07.00 PM. Admittedly, this witness himself has not seen the incident. He has stated that hearing the cries of the deceased, Bechu Lal was the first person to reach there and thereafter he also reached there and subsided the fire. Deceased Poonam disclosed the names of the appellants who had put her on fire. This witness has also made allegation of demand of motorcycle in dowry. He has stated that thereafter he brought the victim to the police station. On the way to the police station, he got the first information report of this case scribed. He has also admitted in the cross examination that the house of the appellants is situated at a distance of less than 200 paces from his house. He has also stated that husband of the deceased namely Nand Kumar lives with Ram Rang Pandey (father of the deceased) in Delhi. Gauna took place about one year after the marriage. Nand Kumar had not demanded motorcycle in the marriage or in Gauna. He has also admitted that Nand Kumar was living in Delhi with Ram Rang Pandey for the last 3-4 years. However, he has expressed his inability to say regarding the time gap during which Nand Kumar had not come to the village. He has also stated that the deceased Poonam was living in her matrimonial home for the last 2-4 days. Poonam used to sent messages through Juvad Nai (barber) to him regarding the cruel behaviour of the appellants. He has fairly admitted that he had not seen the appellants setting the deceased on fire. In between the villages of this witness and the appellants there exists one small pond. He has stated that he was aware of the fact that Poonam was pregnant and Nand Kumar used to say that she was pregnant by him. He has also denied the suggestion that there was rumor in the village that the deceased was pregnant by some other person and not by her husband as she had illicit relations with one Ram Jage.

PW-2 is grandmother of the deceased. She has also supported the allegation of demand of motorcycle in dowry. She has stated that this demand was made in the marriage also which could not be fulfilled. She has also stated about the cruel behaviour of the appellants. Hearing the cries, she also reached on the spot at about 07.00 PM and saw the victim in burnt condition where Poonam told that the appellants have set her on fire.

PW-3 Smt. Shobha is the mother of the victim. She has also supported the allegation of demand of dowry. However, she has admitted that her son-in-law Nand Kumar never made demand of dowry and he was also not present at his house as he used to live in Delhi.

PW-4 Ram Rang Pandey is the father of the deceased. He has also given the similar statement. A defence suggestion was given to all these witnesses regarding the illicit relation and the pregnancy of the deceased which has been denied by all these witnesses.

PW-5 is Bechu Lal Pandey, who, according to the evidence of PW-1, was the first person to reach the place of occurrence, has stated that on 21.03.1996, he was present at the door of his house. Seeing the flames of fire, he ran towards the place of occurrence and saw Poonam in flames and made an attempt to subside the fire. Thereafter he brought her at the door of his uncle where Poonam told that the appellants have set her on fire.

The evidence of PW-6 and PW-7 has already been considered by us. PW-8 Subhash Ji Verma and PW-9 Constable Samar Singh are formal witnesses. PW-10 I.P. Singh is Tehsildar who has proved the dying declaration regarding which we have already expressed our opinion. Evidence of PW-11 is also formal in nature. PW-12 Bihari Prasad is the Investigating Officer of this case and PW-13 is the Pharmacist, who has proved the signatures of Dr. R.P. Sinha.

Now the sole point that remains to be considered is whether in this background the case of the prosecution can be held to be proved.

Before proceedings further we would like to discuss the necessary ingredients to constitute an offence under Section 304-B IPC. Hon''ble Apex Court in the case of Rajinder Singh V. State of Punjab reported in , (2015) 6 SCC 477 has held in para 9 which is being reproduced as under:--

"9. The ingredients of the offence under Section 304-B IPC have been stated and restated in many judgments. There are four such ingredients and they are said to be:

(a) death of a woman must have been caused by any burns or bodily injury or her death must have occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances;

(b) such death must have occurred within seven years of her marriage;

(c) Soon before her death, she must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband; and

(d) such cruelty or harassment must be in connection with the demand for dowry."

Hon''ble Apex Court in the case of Ashok Kumar V. State of Haryana reported in , (2010) 12 SCC 350 has held in para 24 which is being reproduced as under:--

"Of course, deemed fiction would introduce a rebuttable presumption and the husband and his relatives may, by leading their defence and proving that the ingredients of Section 304B were not satisfied, rebut the same. While referring to raising of presumption under Section 304B of the Code, this Court, in the case of Kaliyaperumal v. State of Tamil Nadu reported in , (2004) 9 SCC 157, stated the following ingredients which should be satisfied:

1) The question before the Court must be whether the accused has committed the dowry death of a woman. (This means that the presumption can be raised only if the accused is being tried for the offence under Section 304B IPC).

2) The woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives.

3) Such cruelty or harassment was for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry.

4) Such cruelty or harassment was soon before her death."

Law is settled on the point that, in case the prosecution succeeds to prove that the deceased died an unnatural death within 7 years of her marriage and there was demand of dowry and consequential ill treatment soon before her death then a presumption shall be raised against the family members that they have committed her dowry death.

On this point reference may be made to the pronouncement of Hon''ble Apex Court in the case of Suresh Kumar V. State of Haryana reported in , (2013) 16 SCC 362 and the Apex Court has observed in paragraphs Nos. 30 and 46 which is being reproduced as under:--

"That the presumption under Section 113B of the Act is mandatory may be contrasted with Section 113A of the Act which was introduced contemporaneously. Section 113A of the Act, dealing with abetment to suicide, uses the expression "may presume". This being the position, a two-stage process is required to be followed in respect of an offence punishable under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code: it is necessary to first ascertain whether the ingredients of the Section have been made out against the accused; if the ingredients are made out, then the accused is deemed to have caused the death of the woman but is entitled to rebut the statutory presumption of having caused a dowry death."

Section 113B of the Evidence Act introduces a reverse onus, which is to say that though it is ordinarily for the prosecution to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, but when a reverse onus is introduced, it is for the accused to refute the case of the prosecution and prove his innocence."

Keeping in view the facts of the instant case there is no dispute to the fact situation that the deceased had died in less than seven years after her marriage. She died an unnatural death. The prosecution witnesses have consistently made allegation of demand of dowry and consequential ill treatment of the deceased. So in such circumstances, a presumption under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act was raised against the appellants.

As we have discussed earlier that the dying declaration of the deceased was not wholly reliable so we are ignoring the said dying declaration. The defence of the appellants that the deceased was having illicit relations as she was pregnant by some other person can also not be taken to be true simply because some person of the village has stated that he had heard that the deceased was pregnant by some other person. Admittedly the deceased was a married lady.

Before proceeding further, we would like to quote Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, which reads as under:--

"112. Birth during marriage, conclusive proof of legitimacy.--The fact that any person was born during the continuance of a valid marriage between his mother and any man, or within two hundred and eighty days after its dissolution, the mother remaining unmarried, shall be conclusive proof that he is the legitimate son of that man, unless it can be shown that the parties to the marriage had no access to each other at any time when he could have been begotten."

From the evidence of the doctors it transpires that few days before her death she had given birth to a child. However, there is no evidence on record as to when she gave birth to a child. But keeping in view the provisions of Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, the deceased was pregnant during continuance of her valid marriage. So it was a conclusive proof of the fact that her husband was the father of the said child. Simply because some other person heard otherwise was not sufficient to rebut the said fact because it was a conclusive proof. The word ''conclusive proof'' has been defined in the Indian Evidence Act in Section 4 which reads as under:--

"4...... "Conclusive proof".--When one fact is declared by this Act to be conclusive proof of another, the Court shall, on proof of the one fact, regard the other as proved, and shall not allow evidence to be given for the purpose of disproving it."

So, once it is established that during the continuance of valid marriage the deceased was pregnant then no other evidence shall be permitted to be taken contrary as the same was conclusive proof. So the defence taken by the appellants becomes unsustainable. As we have already discarded the dying declaration therefore the appellants have to be convicted only on the basis of presumption under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act which they have failed to rebut. So the conviction of the appellants cannot be interfered with.

Now the question of appropriate sentence is before us. We will have to consider the law on the point of sentence to be inflicted in cases under Section 304-B I.P.C. Hon''ble the Apex Court in the case of Hem Chand v. State of Haryana reported in , (1994) 6 SCC 727, in paragraph 7 of the judgment, has held as under:--

"Now coming to the question of sentence, it can be seen that Section 304B I.P.C. lays down that:

"Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life."

The point for consideration is whether the extreme punishment of imprisonment for life is warranted in the instant case. A reading of Section 304B I.P.C. would show that when a question arises whether a person has committed the offence of dowry death of a woman that all that is necessary is it should be shown that soon before her unnatural death, which took place within seven years of the marriage, the deceased had been subjected, by such person, to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with demand for dowry. If that is shown then the court shall presume that such a person has caused the dowry death. It can therefore be seen that irrespective of the fact whether such person is directly responsible for the death of the deceased or not by virtue of the presumption, he is deemed to have committed the dowry death if there were such cruelty or harassment and that if the unnatural death has occurred within seven years from the date of marriage. Likewise there is a presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act as to the dowry death. It lays down that the court shall presume that the person who has subjected the deceased wife to cruelty before her death shall presume to have caused the dowry death if it is shown that before her death, such woman had been subjected, by the accused, to cruelty or harassment in connection with any demand for dowry. Practically this is the presumption that has been incorporated in Section 304B I.P.C. also. It can therefore be seen that irrespective of the fact whether the accused has any direct connection with the death or not, he shall be presumed to have committed the dowry death provided the other requirements mentioned above are satisfied."

Hon''ble the Apex Court in the case of G.V. Siddaramesh v. State of Karnataka reported in , (2010) 3 SCC 152 has observed in paragraph 30 of the judgment as under:--

"On the point of sentence, learned Counsel for the appellant pointed out that the appellant is in jail for more than six years. The appellant was young at the time of incident and therefore, the sentence awarded by the trial court and confirmed by the High Court may be modified. In so far as sentencing under the section is concerned, a three Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Hemchand v. State of Haryana [, (1994) 6 SCC 727] has observed that:

"Section 304B merely raises a presumption of dowry death and lays down that the minimum sentence should be 7 years, but it may extend to imprisonment for life. Therefore, awarding the extreme punishment of imprisonment for life should be used in rare cases and not in every case."

Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court reduced the sentence from life imprisonment awarded by the High Court to 10 years R.I. on the above principle."

It is settled law that the courts are obliged to respect the legislative mandate in the matter of awarding of sentences in all such cases.

A reference on this point may also be made to the pronouncement of Hon''ble Apex Court in the case of Sunil Dutt Sharma V State reported in , (2014) 4 SCC 375 wherein Hon''ble the Apex Court has considered the point of sentence in detail and has observed in para 5 as under:--

"The power and authority conferred by use of the different expressions noticed above indicate the enormous discretion vested in the Courts in sentencing an offender who has been found guilty of commission of any particular offence. No where, either in the Penal Code or in any other law in force, any prescription or norm or even guidelines governing the exercise of the vast discretion in the matter of sentencing has been laid down except perhaps, Section 354(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which, inter-alia, requires the judgment of a Court to state the reasons for the sentence awarded when the punishment prescribed is imprisonment for a term of years. In the above situation, naturally, the sentencing power has been a matter of serious academic and judicial debate to discern an objective and rational basis for the exercise of the power and to evolve sound jurisprudential principles governing the exercise thereof."

The case of Sunil Dutt Sharma (Supra) was also a case of dowry death. In that case the cause of death was strangulation and Hon''ble Apex Court was of the view that a sentence of 10 years rigorous imprisonment would be appropriate.

In a very recent judgment in the case of V.K. Mishra and another v. State of Uttarakhand reported in , (2015) 9 SCC 588, Hon''ble the Apex Court has again considered the question of sentence in cases of dowry death and has observed in paragraph No. 42 as under:--

"42. For the offence Under Section 304-B Indian Penal Code, the punishment is imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life. Section 304-B Indian Penal Code thus prescribes statutory minimum of seven years. In Kulwant Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab , (2013) 4 SCC 177, while dealing with dowry death Sections 304-B and 498-A Indian Penal Code in which death was caused by poisoning within seven years of marriage conviction was affirmed. In the said case, the father-in-law was about eighty years and his legs had been amputated because of severe diabetes and mother-in-law was seventy eight years of age and the Supreme Court held impermissibility of reduction of sentence on the ground of sympathy below the statutory minimum."

The trial court has also awarded sentence for the offence under Section 498-A I.P.C. but the offence under Section 498-A I.P.C. is included in the offence under Section 304-B I.P.C. So there was no need to pass separate sentence under Section 498-A I.P.C. it has been so held by Hon''ble the Apex Court in the case of Smt. Shanti and another v. State of Haryana reported in , (1991) 1 SCC 371. Last lines of paragraph 5 reads as under:--

"5......... But from the point of view of practice and procedure and to avoid technical defects it is necessary in such cases to frame charges under both the sections and if the case is established they can be convicted under both the sections but no separate sentence need be awarded under Section 498-A in view of the substantive sentence being awarded for the major offence under Section 304-B."

Keeping in view the aforementioned legal position, we are of the considered view that in this case sentence of seven years rigorous imprisonment would be adequate sentence to meet the ends of justice. No separate sentence need to be inflicted for the offence under Section 498-A I.P.C. Thus, these appeals deserve to be partly allowed and are hereby partly allowed. The conviction of the appellants under Section 304-B I.P.C. is hereby confirmed. However, the sentence inflicted by the trial court is hereby reduced to a period of seven years. The conviction of the appellants for the offence under Section 498-A I.P.C. is also hereby confirmed but no separate sentence is being passed for the said offence. The conviction and sentence inflicted by the learned trial court for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act is also hereby confirmed. All the sentences shall run concurrently.

The appellants are in jail. They shall be released from jail only after serving out their sentence as modified by this Court.

The period of detention already undergone by the appellants in the instant case shall be set off in their substantive sentence in accordance with the provisions of Section 428 Cr.P.C.

Office is directed to communicate this order forthwith to the court concerned and also to send back the lower court record to ensure compliance.