Ram Pal And Others vs State Of H.P. And Another

Rakesh Kainthla, J

The present petition is directed against the order dated 27th May 2016 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.III, Amb, District Una (learned Trial Court) in a case titled State versus Ram Pal and others, vide which the learned Trial Court framed charges against the petitioners (accused before the learned Trial Court) for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 147, 342, 323, and 504, read with Section 149 of Indian Penal Code (IPC). (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner in which they are arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience).

Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that police presented a challan against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 147, 149, 323, 342, and 504 of IPC. It was asserted that the informant, Saroj Kumari, reached home on 21st March 2013 at about 3 PM. She heard the noise of a tractor being driven. She enquired from her sister, Manju, about her father. Manju replied that he had gone towards the field. The informant and Manju went towards the field. She enquired from Rampal, his wife Sushma Devi, his mother Prakash Devi, sister Veena Devi and nephew Pankaj as to why they were cultivating the land when an injunction order was issued by the Court. Ram Pal snatched her mobile. Other persons pushed her and gave her beatings with kicks and fist blows. They also beat her father and her sister Manju. They took the informant and her sister to their room where they abused and beat the informant and her sister. The informant’s earrings, necklace and mobile were missing after the incident. The police registered the FIR and conducted the investigation. The police filed a chargesheet against the accused for the commission of offences punishable and Sections 147, 149, 323, 447, and 504 of the IPC after the completion of the investigation. Learned Trial Court took cognizance and ordered the putting of notice of accusation on 27th May 2016.

Being aggrieved by the order of putting the notice of accusation, the petitioners/accused filed the present petition asserting that learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Amb, District Una had directed the parties to maintain status quo qua the possession and alienation on 7th March 2012. The petitioner’s father applied for implementation of the status quo order. Learned Trial Court directed Station House Officer (SHO) Amb to implement the status quo order issued by it and file a status report on or before 22nd February 2013 vide order dated 16th January 2013. SHO and other police officials visited the spot on 16.01.2013 and directed the parties not to interfere in the possession of others and obey the orders of status quo passed by the Court. The petitioner started ploughing Khasra number 882 adjoining his house on 21st March 2013 at about 3:15 PM with the help of a tractor owned by Sudarshan Kumar and driven by Mahinder Singh. Ram Pal and his daughters, Saroj Manju, Harmesh, Rashpal, Madhubala, Veena and Sushma came to the spot to interfere in the possession of the petitioner and violate the order dated 7th March 2012. They abused and gave beatings to Rampal, who cried for help and his wife Sushma and mother Prakash Devi came to the spot to rescue him. However, they were beaten by Agya Ram and others. Rampal, Sushma and Prakash Devi sustained injuries in the incident. Sushma also lost her mangalsutra. Surinder Thakur, Shama Devi, Rani Bala and Mukesh Kumar rescued the petitioners from the informant and others. FIR no. 31/2013 was lodged by Rampal on 21st March 2013 regarding the incident. The police applied for demarcation. Jagdev Singh Kanugo and Bidhi Chand Patwari demarcated the land. Khasra number 882 was found in possession and ownership of Daulat Ram. Sudarshan Kumar and Mahendra Singh did not support the prosecution case and the other persons are interested witnesses. They were the aggressors and were arrested as accused in FIR No. 31 of 2013 lodged by the petitioner. The informant lodged the present FIR as a counterblast to the FIR lodged against them. FIR does not fulfil the basic ingredients of the offences punishable under Sections 147, 149, 323, 447, 504, and 342 of IPC. Even if the allegations are accepted at their face value, they do not constitute any offence. The FIR does not mention the common object of the unlawful assembly. The informant Saroj Kumari and Aya Ram were aggressors and obstructed the petitioners from sowing the crop. Learned Trial Court failed to apply its mind to the facts of the case. The allegations in the FIR are civil and the learned Trial Court erred in putting the notice of accusation to the accused. The allegations in the FIR are inherently improbable. No prudent person would act upon them and conclude that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The criminal proceedings were maliciously instituted with the ulterior purpose of wreaking vengeance upon the petitioners and settling scores with them. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed, the order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside and FIR and consequential proceedings arising out of the FIR be quashed.

I have heard Mr Vishwas Kaushal, learned counsel for the petitioners/accused, Mr Ajit Sharma learned Deputy Advocate General for respondent no. 1/State, and Mr Arun Kumar learned counsel for respondent no. 2/informant.

Mr. Vishwas Kaushal, learned counsel for the petitioners/accused submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in putting the notice of accusation to the accused. A civil suit was pending between the parties in which an order of status quo was issued. The Court had directed SHO to enforce the order of status quo. The informant obstructed the petitioner from sowing the crop in the garb of the status quo order. An FIR was lodged by petitioner, Ram Pal, against the informant. There was no unlawful assembly and the learned Trial Court erred in putting the notice of accusation to the petitioners. The allegations in the FIR do not constitute the commission of cognizable offences. He prayed that the present petition be allowed and the order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.

Mr Ajit Sharma, Learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent no.1/State submitted the allegations in the FIR and the charge sheet show the commission of cognizable offences. The learned Trial Court had rightly put the notice of accusation to the accused. There is no infirmity in the order passed by the learned Trial Court; hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

Mr. Arun Kumar learned counsel for respondent no. 2/informant submitted that Ram Pal was violating the order of status quo issued by the Court. The informant had only gone to him to request him not to violate the order passed by the Court. He and his family members gave beatings to the informant and his family members. There is no infirmity in the order passed by the learned Trial Court; hence he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

The present petition has been filed under Section 482 of CrPC. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sanjay Kumar Rai v. State of U.P., (2022) 15 SCC 720: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 367 that the High Court can exercise inherent jurisdiction vested in it to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court or secure ends of justice. However, this power is to be exercised with circumspection. It was observed at page 726:

“14. The correct position of law as laid down in Madhu Limaye [Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551: 1978 SCC (Cri) 10], thus, is that orders framing charges or refusing discharge are neither interlocutory nor final in nature and are, therefore, not affected by the bar of Section 397(2) CrPC. That apart, this Court in the above-cited cases has unequivocally acknowledged that the High Court is imbued with inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of process or to secure ends of justice having regard to the facts and circumstances of individual cases. As a caveat, it may be stated that the High Court, while exercising its aforestated jurisdiction ought to be circumspect. The discretion vested in the High Court is to be invoked carefully and judiciously for the effective and timely administration of the criminal justice system. This Court, nonetheless, does not recommend a complete hands-off approach. Albeit, there should be interference, maybe, in exceptional cases, failing which there is the likelihood of serious prejudice to the rights of a citizen. For example, when the contents of a complaint or the other purported material on record is a brazen attempt to persecute an innocent person, it becomes imperative for the Court to prevent the abuse of the process of law.

Further, it is well settled that the trial court while considering the discharge application is not to act as a mere post office. The court has to sift through the evidence in order to find out whether there are sufficient grounds to try the suspect. The court has to consider the broad probabilities, the total effect of evidence and documents produced and the basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. [Union of India. Prafulla Kumar Samal [Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, (1979) 3 SCC 4: 1979 SCC (Cri) 609]]. Likewise, the Court has sufficient discretion to order further investigation in appropriate cases, if need be.

This brings us to the present case wherein the High Court has not gone into the merits of the case and did not analyse the case in light of the settled law referred to above.

The High Court has committed jurisdictional error by not entertaining the revision petition on merits and overlooking the fact that “discharge” is a valuable right provided to the accused. In line with the fact that the High Court and the court below have not examined the fairness of criminal investigation in this case and other related aspects concerning the improvement of witness statements, it is necessary for the High Court to reconsider the entire matter and decide the revision petition afresh. Accordingly, we set aside the impugned order dated 28-11-2018 [Sanjay Kumar Rai v. State of U.P., 2018 SCC OnLine All 5995] and remand the case back to the High Court for its reconsideration in accordance with law.”

It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Manjit Singh Virdi v. Hussain Mohammed Shattaf, (2023) 7 SCC 633: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 653 that truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations made in the complaint cannot be seen at the time of framing of charges. It was observed:

The law on the issue as to what is to be considered at the time of discharge of an accused is well settled. It is a case in which the trial court had not yet framed the charges. Immediately after the filing of the charge sheet, an application for discharge was filed. The settled proposition of law is that at the stage of hearing on the charges, the entire evidence produced by the prosecution is to be believed. In case no offence is made out then only an accused can be discharged. Truthfulness, sufficiency and acceptability of the material produced can be done only at the stage of trial. At the stage of charge, the court has to satisfy that a prima facie case is made out against the accused persons. Interference of the Court at that stage is required only if there are strong reasons to hold that in case the trial is allowed to proceed, the same would amount to abuse of process of the court.

The law on the point has been summarised in a recent judgment  of  this  Court  in State  of  Rajasthan v. Ashok Kumar Kashyap [State of Rajasthan v. Ashok Kumar Kashyap, (2021) 11 SCC 191: (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 286].  Relevant paras are extracted below: (SCC pp. 197-98, para 11)

“11. … 11.1. In P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala [P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala, (2010) 2 SCC 398: (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1488], this Court had an occasion to consider Section 227CrPC. What is required to be considered at the time of framing of the charge and/or considering the discharge application has been considered elaborately in the said decision. It is observed and held that at the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. It is observed that in other words, the sufficiency of grounds would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him. It is further observed that if the Judge comes to a conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed, he will frame a charge under Section 228CrPC, if not, he will discharge the accused. It is further observed that while exercising its judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court after the trial starts.

11.2. In the recent decision of this Court in State of Karnataka v. M.R. Hiremath [State of Karnataka v. M.R. Hiremath, (2019) 7 SCC 515: (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 109: (2019) 2 SCC (L&S) 380], one of us (D.Y. Chandrachud, J.) speaking for the Bench has observed and held in para 25 as under: (SCC p. 526)

‘25. The High Court [Hiremath v. State of Karnataka, 2017 SCC OnLine Kar 4970] ought to have been cognizant of the fact that the trial court was dealing with an application for discharge under the provisions of Section 239CrPC. The parameters which govern the exercise of this jurisdiction have found expression in several decisions of this Court. It is a settled principle of law that at the stage of considering an application for discharge the court must proceed on the assumption that the material which has been brought on the record by the prosecution is true and evaluate the material in order to determine whether the facts emerging from the material, taken on its face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary to constitute the offence. In State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan [State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 529 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 721], adverting to the earlier decisions on the subject, this Court held : (N. Suresh Rajan case [State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 529 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 721], SCC pp. 721-22, para 29)

“29. … At this stage, the probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have committed the offence on the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini-trial at this stage.”

It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294 that at the time of framing of the charge the Court has to see the material collected by the prosecution to determine whether a case has been made out for proceeding with the trial or not. It is not necessary to examine the defence of the accused. It was observed:-

It is trite law that the application of judicial mind being necessary to determine whether a case has been made out by the prosecution for proceeding with trial and it would not be necessary to dwell into the pros and cons of the matter by examining the defence of the accused when an application for discharge is filed. At that stage, the trial judge has to merely examine the evidence placed by the prosecution in order to determine whether or not the grounds are sufficient to proceed against the accused on the basis of charge sheet material. The nature of the evi-dence recorded or collected by the investigating agency or the documents produced in which prima facie it reveals that there are suspicious circumstances against the ac-cused, so as to frame a charge would suffice and such ma-terial would be taken into account for the purposes of framing the charge. If there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused necessarily, the accused would be discharged, but if the court is of the opinion, af-ter such consideration of the material there are grounds for presuming that the accused has committed the of-fence which is triable, then necessarily charge has to be framed.”

It was further held that the accused has no right to produce the documents and the Court has to go through the ma-terial collected by the prosecution. It was observed:

“8. At the time of framing of the charge and taking cog-nizance the accused has no right to produce any material and call upon the court to examine the same. No provision in the Code grants any right to the accused to file any ma-terial or document at the stage of framing of charge. The trial court has to apply its judicial mind to the facts of the case as may be necessary to determine whether a case has been made out by the prosecution for trial on the basis of charge-sheet material only.

If the accused is able to demonstrate from the charge-sheet material at the stage of framing the charge which might drastically affect the very sustainability of the case, it is unfair to suggest that such material should not be considered or ignored by the court at that stage. The main intention of granting a chance to the accused of making submissions as envisaged under Section 227 of the Cr. P.C. is to assist the court to determine whether it is re-quired to proceed to conduct the trial. Nothing in the Code limits the ambit of such hearing, to oral hearing and oral arguments only and therefore, the trial court can consider the material produced by the accused before the I.O.

It is a settled principle of law that at the stage of con-sidering an application for discharge the court must pro-ceed on an assumption that the material which has been brought on record by the prosecution is true and evaluate said material in order to determine whether the facts emerging from the material taken on its face value, dis-close the existence of the ingredients necessary of the offence alleged. This Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709 adverting to the earlier propositions of law laid down on this subject has held:

“29. We have bestowed our consideration to the ri-val submissions and the submissions made by Mr Ranjit Kumar commend us. True it is that at the time of consideration of the applications for dis-charge, the court cannot act as a mouthpiece of the prosecution or act as a post office and may sift evi-dence in order to find out whether or not the alle-gations made are groundless so as to pass an order of discharge. It is trite that at the stage of consider-ation of an application for discharge, the court has to proceed with an assumption that the materials brought on record by the prosecution are true and evaluate the said materials and documents with a view to find out whether the facts emerging there-from taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged of-fence. At this stage, the probative value of the ma-terials has to be gone into and the court is not ex-pected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have committed the offence on the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the ac-cused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini-trial at this stage.”

The defence of the accused is not to be looked into at the stage when the accused seeks to be discharged. The expression “the record of the case” used in Sec-tion 227 Cr. P.C. is to be understood as the documents and articles, if any, produced by the prosecution. The Code does not give any right to the accused to produce any doc-ument at the stage of framing of the charge. The submis- sion of the accused is to be confined to the material pro-duced by the investigating agency.

The primary consideration at the stage of framing of charge is the test of the existence of a prima facie case, and at this stage, the probative value of materials on record need not be gone into. This Court by referring to its earlier decisions in the State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa, (1996) 4 SCC 659 and the State of MP v. Mohan Lal Soni, (2000) 6 SCC 338 has held the nature of evaluation to be made by the court at the stage of framing of the charge is to test the existence of the prima-facie case. It is also held at the stage of framing of charge, the court has to form a presumptive opinion to the existence of factual in-gredients constituting the offence alleged and it is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the mate-rial on record and to check whether the material on record would certainly lead to conviction at the conclu-sion of trial.”

It was specifically stated in the complaint made to

the police that Rampal snatched the informant’s mobile. Other people pushed the informant and gave her beatings with kicks and fist blows. They also gave beatings to Aagya Ram and Manju. They dragged the informant and her sister to a room where they abused and beat them. Her earrings, necklace and mobile were lost in the incident. These allegations constitute the commission of offences punishable under Sections 147, 447, 323, and 504, read with Section 149 of IPC and there is no infirmity in the order passed by the learned Trial Court in putting the notice of accusation to the petitioners/accused for the commission of aforesaid offences.

The pleas taken in the petition regarding the defence of the accused and the documents produced by them before this Court cannot be looked into to determine the validity of the order framing the charges.

In view of the above, the present petition fails and the same is dismissed.

The observation made hereinabove shall confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.

The parties, through their counsel are directed to appear before the learned Trial Court on 30th April, 2025.