Ram Pal vs Harish Chand and anr.

I.S. Tiwana, J.—Does the pendency of civil proceedings regarding possession between the same parties pertaining to the same land bar proceedings under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (hereinafter referred to as `the Code''). Herein lies the controversy raised.

The dispute here is with regard to 24 kanals and 14 marlas of land, which was owned by one Harish Chand. On August 8, 1982, he is said to have entered into an agreement for the sale of this land to the petitioner and on receipt of earnest money, delivered possession thereof to the petitioner. Later on January 17, 1983 the said Harish Chand is said to have executed a 99 years lease in favour of the respondents. It was in this situation that the petitioner Ram Pal, on February 2, 1983, filed an application under Section 145 of the Code in the court of the SubDivisional Magistrate, Ballabgarh, who, by his order of February 18, 1983, attached the land in dispute and appointed a Receiver in respect thereof. This order was set aside in revision by the Additional Sessions Judge, but was resorted by the High Court.

Both the parties, thereafter, went to the civil court. The petitioner sought a decree for specific performance while the respondents claimed under the 99 years lease of January 17, 1983. Both these suits were consolidated and in the application for temporary injunction, an order was passed that status quo regarding possession be maintained.

It was at the stage that on December 9, 1985, the respondents filed an application before the SubDivisional Magistrate praying therein that as the dispute relating to the land in question was pending before the civil court, proceedings under Section 145 of the Code could not continue. This application was dismissed by the SubDivisional Magistrate, by his order of May 8, 1986, but in revision, the Additional Sessions Judge, Faridabad, by his impugned order of September 22, 1986, accepted this plea and directed the SubDivisional Magistrate not to proceed with the proceedings under Section 145 of the Code "in view of the fact that the parties are already agitating the dispute regarding possession of the property in dispute in civil Court". It is the legality and correctness of this order that is now questioned.

Mr. Harbans singh, counsel for the respondent, in support of his contention that the pendency of the civil proceedings in this case, constituted a bar a action under Section 145 to the Code, referred to Pritam Singh v. The state of Punjab & Ors. 1986(2) C.L.R.653 : 1987(1) Recent CR 195 , Anant Ram Nanda v. The State & Anr. 1986(1) C.L.R. 632 : 1986(1) Recent CR 127 and Bhawan Pal v. Prem Kumar Jain & others, 1982 C.L.R. 121. A reading of these authorities would show that they are all distinguishable on facts from the present case and do not lay down as an invariable proposition of law that when a civil suit is pending between the parties, no proceedings between them in respect of the same subjectmatter of the dispute can be initiated or continued in the criminal court under section 145 of the Code.

The main reliance was, however, placed upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ram Sumar Puri Mahant v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1985 Supreme Court 472 : 1985(2) Recent CR 343 where it was observed as under :

"When a civil litigation is pending for the property wherein the question of possession in involved and has been adjudicated, we see hardly any justification for initiating a parallel criminal proceeding under Section 145 of the Code. There is no scope of doubt or dispute the position that the decree of the Civil Court is binding on the Criminal Court in a matter like the one before us. Counsel for respondents 25 was not in a position to challenge the proposition that parallel proceedings should not be permitted to continue and in the event of a decree of the Civil Court, the Criminal Court should not be allowed to invoke its jurisdiction particularly when possession is being examined by the Civil Court and parties are in a position of approach the Civil Court for interim orders such as injunction for appointment of receiver for adequate protection of the property during pendency of the dispute. Multiplicity of litigation is not in the interest of the parties nor should public time be allowed to be wasted over meaningless litigation."

While dealing with the point in issue here, the judgment of the Division Bench in Mohinder Singh v. Dilbagh Rai, 1976 PLR 803, also deserves due note.

In the recent case of Jagdish v. SubDivisional Magistrate, Panipat, 1987 Recent Criminal Reports 433; 1987(1) PLR 206, Pritpal singh, J. had an occasion to consider both the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ram Sumer Puri Mahant''s case (supra) as also of the Division Bench in Mohinder Singh''s case (supra) in the context of facts very similar to the case in hand. The respondent in that case filed a suit for injunction and obtained as order from the civil court regarding maintenance of status quo during the pendency of this suit. They also initiated proceedings under Section 145 of the Code, where the SubDivisional magistrate, after passing a preliminary order also attached the disputed the land under Section 146 of the Code. These proceedings were challenged in a petition under Section 482 of the Code on the ground that during the pendency of the civil suit, parallel criminal proceedings with regard to the same land and between the same parties could not continue. It was held that according to the law laid down in Division Bench in Mohinder Singh''s case (supra), the impugned proceedings under Sections 145 and 146 of the Code could not be quashed merely on account of the pendency of the civil suit between the parties relating to the same land. As regards the observations of the Supreme Court in Ram Sumer Puri Mahants case (supra), it was held that they did not conflict with the law laid down by this Court in Mohinder Singh''s case (supra), nor that it had been ruled by this Court in Mohinder Singh''s case(supra), more that it had been ruled by the Supreme Court that in other case where a civil suit is pending regarding the same subject matter, criminal proceedings under Section under Section 145 of the Code cannot continue.

On a reading of the judgment of the Division Bench of the Division Bench of in Mohinder Singh''s case (supra) and of the Supreme Court in Ram Sumer Puri Mahant''s case (supra) no different view is indeed warranted than that of Pritpal Singh, J. in Jagdish''s case (supra) which must consequently be concurred with. There is thus no escape from the conclusion that the impugned order is clearly contrary to law and cannot, therefore, be sustained. It is accordingly hereby set aside with the direction to the SubDivisional Magistrate to continue with the proceedings under Section 145 of the Code and to endeavour to complete them as expeditiously as possible.

This petition is thus hereby accepted.