Ram Prasad Bhatra vs State Of Chhattisgarh

Sanjay K. Agrawal, J

The appellant has preferred this appeal under Section 374(2) of the CrPC against the impugned judgment of conviction recorded and sentence awarded by the learned Sessions Judge, Bastar at Jagdalpur in Sessions Trial No.36/2015 by which he has been convicted for offence under Section 302 of the IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life.

Case of the prosecution, in short, is that on 18-3-2015 at 11:30 p.m., at Village Vishrampuri, Salhebhata Para, Police Station Bhanpuri, Distt. Bastar, the appellant assaulted his wife Smt. Neelavati by spade by which she sustained grievous injuries and died and thereby committed the offence. Further case of the prosecution is that deceased Smt. Neelavati has sold mahuwa flowers (a forest produce which is used for preparation of liquor) and did not cook food right in time because of which dispute took place between them and the appellant assaulted her on 18-3-2015 at 11.30 p.m. by spade on her head due to which she sustained grevious injuries and died, which was witnessed by Raju (PW-6) – son of the appellant & the deceased, who informed the same to his close relative Shyamlal, who in turn, visited the house of the appellant and saw the dead body of the deceased and thereafter, reported the matter to the Village Kotwar Roop Singh, Daiman Banchor & Premnath and along with them went to Police Station Bhanpuri and lodged morgue intimation Ex.P-1 and first information report Ex.P-2 on 19-3-2015. Spot map was prepared vide Ex.P-5 and inquest was conducted vide Ex.P-4. Dead body of deceased Smt. Neelavati was sent for autopsy to Community Health Centre, Bastar vide Ex.P-17 and autopsy was conducted vide Ex.P-15 by Dr. Ravindra Kumar Netam (PW-7) and cause of death was stated to be on account of excessive bleeding and death was homicidal in nature. Based on the memorandum statement of the appellant recorded vide Ex.P-18, weapon of offence spade has been recovered from him vide Ex.P-14. Spade and other articles were recovered and the same were sent for chemical examination to the FSL, Raipur. Report of the FSL shows that blood was found on the spade.

Statements of the witnesses were recorded under Section 161 of the CrPC. After due investigation, the appellant was charge-sheeted and charge-sheet was filed before the jurisdictional criminal court and the case was committed to the Court of Sessions where the learned Sessions Judge, Bastar at Jagdalpur conducted trial in accordance with law.

The accused abjured the guilt and entered into defence. In order to bring home the offence, the prosecution examined as many as eight witnesses and exhibited 26 documents. The defence has examined none, but exhibited two documents Exs.D-1 & D-2 – statements of Shyam Lal Bhatra and Rup Singh recorded under Section 161 of the CrPC.

The trial Court after appreciating oral and documentary evidence available on record, convicted and sentenced the appellant herein in the manner mentioned in the opening paragraph of this judgment holding the death of the deceased to be homicidal in nature and the appellant herein as the author of the crime against which the instant appeal under Section 374(2) of the CrPC has been preferred by the appellant.

Mrs. Usha Chandrakar, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, would submit that at the best, case of the appellant would fall under Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC, as such, the appellant has an arguable case of alteration of his conviction to that under Section 304 Part-II of the IPC and also for reduction of sentence as he is already in jail for more than 8 years. As such, it is a fit case where conviction of the appellant can be converted/ altered to an offence under Section 304 Part-II of the IPC. Therefore, taking into consideration the period already undergone by the appellant, the appeal of the appellant be allowed in part.

Per contra, Mr. Sudeep Verma, learned Deputy Government Advocate appearing for the State / respondent, would support the impugned judgment and oppose the appeal and would submit that it is the appellant who had assaulted the deceased due to which the deceased died. He would further submit that the prosecution has been able to bring home the offence against the appellant and the appellant has rightly been convicted and sentenced, as such, no case is made out for conversion / alteration of the offence against the appellant to an offence under Section 304 Part-II of the IPC.

We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the record with utmost circumspection.

The first question whether the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature has been answered by the trial Court in affirmative considering the postmortem report Ex.P-15, which has been proved by Dr. Ravindra Kumar Netam (PW-7) in which cause of death was stated to be on account of excessive bleeding and death was homicidal in nature. The finding recorded by the trial Court that death of deceased Smt. Neelavati was homicidal in nature, is a finding of fact based on the evidence available on record, it is neither perverse nor contrary to the record and we hereby affirm the said finding.

Now, the question for consideration would be, whether the appellant is the author of the crime in question?

Taking into consideration the statement of Raju (PW-6) – son of the appellant & the deceased, who has maintained his version that he has seen the appellant assaulting the deceased and the FSL report which states that blood was found on the seized weapon of offence spade recovered from the appellant, it can be safely inferred that the appellant is the author of the crime.

The aforesaid finding brings us to the next question for consideration, whether the trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant for offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC or his case is covered within Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC vis-a-vis culpable homicide not amounting to murder and, thus, his conviction can be converted to Section 304 Part-II of the IPC, as contended by learned counsel for the appellant?

The Supreme Court in the matter of Sukhbir Singh v. State of Haryana (2002) 3 SCC 327 has observed as under:-

“21. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that in the absence of the existence of common object Sukhbir Singh is proved to have committed the offence of culpable homicide without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and did not act in a cruel or unusual manner and his case is covered by Exception 4 of Section 300 IPC which is punishable under Section 304 (Part I) IPC. The finding of the courts below holding the aforesaid appellant guilty of offence of murder punishable under Section 302 IPC is set aside and he is held guilty for the commission of offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304 (Part I) IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs.5000. In default of payment of fine, he shall undergo further rigorous imprisonment for one year.”

The Supreme Court further, in the matter of Gurmukh Singh v. State of Haryana (2009) 15 SCC 635 has laid down certain factors which are to be taken into consideration before awarding appropriate sentence to the accused with reference to Section 302 or Section 304 Part-II of the IPC, which state as under :-

“23. These are some factors which are required to be taken into consideration before awarding appropriate sentence to the accused. These factors are only illustrative in character and not exhaustive. Each case has to be seen from its special perspective. The relevant factors are as under :

(a) Motive or previous enmity;

(b) Whether the incident had taken place on the spur of the moment;

(c) The intention/knowledge of the accused while inflicting the blow or injury;

(d) Whether the death ensued instantaneously or the victim died after several days;

(e) The gravity, dimension and nature of injury;

(f) The age and general health condition of the accused;

(g) Whether the injury was caused without premeditation in a sudden fight;

(h) The nature and size of weapon used for inflicting the injury and the force with which the blow was inflicted;

(i) The criminal background and adverse history of the accused;

(j) Whether the injury inflicted was not sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death but the death was because of shock;

(k) Number of other criminal cases pending against the accused;

(l) Incident occurred within the family members or close relations;

(m) The conduct and behaviour of the accused after the incident.

Whether the accused had taken the injured/the deceased to the hospital immediately to ensure that he/she gets proper medical treatment?

These are some of the factors which can be taken into consideration while granting an appropriate sentence to the accused.

The list of circumstances enumerated above is only illustrative and not exhaustive. In our considered view, proper and appropriate sentence to the accused is the bounded obligation and duty of the court. The endeavour of the court must be to ensure that the accused receives appropriate sentence, in other words, sentence should be according to the gravity of the offence. These are some of the relevant factors which are required to be kept in view while convicting and sentencing the accused.”

Likewise, in the matter of State v. Sanjeev Nanda (2012) 8 SCC 450, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that once knowledge that it is likely to cause death is established but without any intention to cause death, then jail sentence may be for a term which may extend to 10 years or with fine or with both. It has further been held that to make out an offence punishable under Section 304 Part-II of the IPC, the prosecution has to prove the death of the person in question and such death was caused by the act of the accused and that he knew that such act of his is likely to cause death.

Further, the Supreme Court in the matter of Arjun v. State of Chhattisgarh (2017) 3 SCC 247 has elaborately dealt with the issue and observed in paragraphs 20 and 21 as under :-

“20. To invoke this Exception 4, the requirements that are to be fulfilled have been laid down by this Court in Surinder Kumar v. UT, Chandigarh [(1989) 2 SCC 217 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 348], it has been explained as under :

(SCC p. 220, para 7)

“7. To invoke this exception four requirements must be satisfied, namely, (i) it was a sudden fight; (ii) there was no premeditation; (iii) the act was done in a heat of passion; and (iv) the assailant had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. The cause of the quarrel is not relevant nor its I relevant who offered the provocation or started the assault. The number of wounds caused during the occurrence is not a decisive factor but what is important is that the occurrence must have been sudden and unpremeditated and the offender must have acted in a fit of anger. Of course, the offender must not have taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. Where, on a sudden quarrel, a person in the heat of the moment picks up a weapon which is handy and causes injuries, one of which proves fatal, he would be entitled to the benefit of this exception provided he has not acted cruelly.”

Further in Arumugam v. State [(2008) 15 SCC 590 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1130], in support of the proposition of law that under what circumstances Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC can be invoked if death is caused, it has been explained as under : (SCC p. 596, para 9)

“9. …. '18. The help of exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused (a) without premeditation; (b) in a sudden fight; (c) without the offender's having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner; and (d) the fight must have been with the person killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that the “fight” occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is not defined in the Penal Code, 1860. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there must be no time for the passions to cool down and in this case, the parties had worked themselves into a fury on account of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat between two or more persons whether with or without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. For the application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in cruel or unusual manner. The expression “undue advantage” as used in the provisions means “unfair advantage”.

In Arjun (supra), the Supreme Court has held that if there is intent and knowledge, the same would be case of Section 304 Part-I of the IPC and if it is only a case of knowledge and not the intention to cause murder and bodily injury, then same would be a case of Section 304 Part-II of the IPC.

Further, the Supreme Court in the matter of Rambir v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2019) 6 SCC 122 has laid down four ingredients which should be tested for bringing a case within the purview of Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC, which read as under:

“16. A plain reading of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC shows that the following four ingredients are required:

(i) There must be a sudden fight;

(ii) There was no premeditation;

(iii) The act was committed in a heat of passion; and

(iv) The offender had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.

xxx xxx xxx”

Reverting to the facts of the present case in light of the above principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, it is quite vivid that the appellant is said to have caused injury to his wife Smt. Neelavati by spade on the dispute of selling mahuwa flowers and not preparing food right in time, out of anger on the spur of moment by which the deceased died. As such, there was no intention on the part of the appellant to cause the death of the deceased, but he has knowledge that the injury caused is sufficient to cause death. Considering the nature of injury it can be held that the appellant must have had the knowledge that such injury inflicted by him on the body of the deceased would likely to cause her death, however, it can safely be inferred that there is no premeditation on the part of the appellant to cause death of the deceased. Considering the fact that the injury caused upon the deceased is on account of a sudden quarrel that erupted between the parties, however, the appellant has not taken undue advantage and has not acted in unusual manner, in our considered opinion, this case would fall within the purview of Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC.

In view of the aforesaid discussion, conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of the IPC as well as the sentence awarded to him by the learned trial Court is hereby set aside. Considering that there was no premeditation on the part of the appellant to cause death of the deceased but the injury caused by him was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the appellant is convicted for offence punishable under Section 304 Part-II of the IPC. Since the appellant is in jail from 20-3-2015, we award him the sentence of nine years imprisonment.

The criminal appeal is party allowed to the extent indicated herein-above.

Let a certified copy of this judgment along with the original record be transmitted to the trial Court concerned for necessary information and action, if any. A certified copy of the judgment may also be sent to the concerned Jail Superintendent forthwith wherein the appellant is suffering the jail sentence.