Ram Ratan Goel and Others vs Ankita Goel and Another

S.S. Chauhan, J.—The present petition u/s 482, Cr. P.C. has been filed for quashing the orders dated 25.4.2007, 27.8.2007 and 17.10.2007 passed by the Judicial Magistrate-I, Lucknow, contained in Annexures-1 and 2 to the petitions respectively. It has further been prayed that Complaint Case No. 909 of 2007 registered u/s 403/406/504/506/507/34, I.P.C. read with Section 6, Dowry Prohibition Act, pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate-I, Lucknow, contained in Anenxure-6 to the petitions respectively, be also quashed.

The facts giving rise to the present petition are that Petitioners No. 1 and 2 are the grandparents, Petitioners No. 3 and 4 are father and mother, Petitioner No. 5 is uncle of husband of opposite party No. 1, Petitioner No. 6 is husband of opposite party No. 1 and Petitioner No. 7 is cousin sister of husband of opposite party No. 1. Petitioner No. 6 and opposite party No. 1 were married on 19.2.2006 at Ahmedabad according to the Hindu Rites and Religion. According to the opposite party No. 1, a huge amount of Rs. 16 lakhs was spent on the marriage and various articles annexed as Annexure-A to the complaint were also given. The Petitioners after marriage started harassing the opposite party No. 1 for demand of dowry and demanded an Octiva Car and Rs. 50,000 cash from her and forced her to get it from her parents. The complainant refused to meet the demand on the ground that her parents were not in a position to fulfil the demand. The maid-servant was also relieved with a view to harass the opposite party No. 1. Opposite party No. 1 was doing M.B.A. course at the time of her marriage from Lucknow University, but in spite of that she was made to do all household work. She tried to satisfy her in-laws and husband, but she was always abused and mentally tortured. Opposite party No. 1 was not permitted to use her goods for personal use and they were used by the accused persons. When the dowry demand was not fulfilled by the parents of opposite party No. 1, then Petitioner No. 6 got the reservation ticket of complainant to Delhi from his credit card and forcibly boarded her in the train on 25.11.2006 and thereafter father of the complainant went from Lucknow to Delhi to bring her back to her parental house. The accused did not return the stridhan to opposite party No. 1 and send her to Lucknow with only Rs. 500. The keys of locker was also taken away from her. The goods and articles mentioned as Annexure-A to the complaint were the personal property of opposite party No. 1 and she is legally authorised to possess them. The complainant after coming to her parental house requested Petitioners No. 1 to 7 on 7.1.2007 on phone to return her stridhan, but they refused the same and threatened the complainant of dire consequences. It was also stated that they will sell all the articles if she again demands stridhan. Opposite party No. 1 again requested for return of stridhan on 4.2.2007, but she was again threatened on phone and told that they will get her killed from hired criminal. On the aforesaid allegations the complaint has been filed.

A counter-affidavit has been filed denying the allegations made in the petitions and it has been stated that opposite party No. 1 was subjected to physical as well as mental cruelty by the Petitioners by demand of dowry and having no option an F.I.R. was lodged on 28.12.2006 against Petitioners No. 3, 4 and 6. It has further been stated that opposite party No. 1 was compelled to leave her matrimonial house forcibly on 25.11.2006 and she was forced to board the train providing her a valid ticket upto Delhi with only Rs. 500 cash and the dress which she was wearing and when she reached to Delhi she informed her father, who reached Delhi and brought her back to Lucknow. It has also been stated that Petitioners were habitual of demanding dowry, which was every time fulfilled by father of opposite party No. 1, but the huge demand of buying a car worth Rs. 12 lakhs could not be fulfilled by the father of the opposite party No. 1 as he was not having financial resources to that extent.

The F.I.R. lodged on 28.12.2006 at Mahila Thana, Hazratganj, Lucknow was subject-matter of challenge before the Gujarat High Court and by means of order dated 9.2.2007 an interim order was passed in favour of the Petitioners. The said order was challenged before the Apex Court in Special Leave to Appeal No. 2908 of 2007. The Apex Court while allowing SLP observed that the investigation should not have been stayed by the High Court and the interim order dated 9.2.2007 was set aside and the matter was remitted to the Gujarat High Court for deciding the dispute on merits in accordance with law without being influenced by the observations made in the said order. The matter is engaging the attention of the Gujarat High Court in regard to the proceedings and a charge-sheet has been filed in pursuance to the F.I.R. The complaint has been filed for return of stridhan for which the opposite party No. 1 is entitled under law. The Petitioners have no right to retain the stridhan, which is the personal property of the opposite party No. 1. The statements under Sections 200 and 202, Cr. P.C. go to indicate that the articles, which have been given in the form of stridhan to the Petitioners have not been returned in spite of the demand being made. The demand has been made from Lucknow and, therefore, the cause of action has accrued at Lucknow and Section 181(4), Cr. P.C. also provides that in case of criminal breach of trust the complaint would be maintainable even where the property is to be returned.

Learned Counsel for the Petitioners has submitted that no cause of action has accrued within the territorial jurisdiction of the Judicial Magistrate-I, Lucknow and, therefore, the power to entertain the complaint does not vest with the Magistrate at Lucknow. He has also submitted that the marriage has taken place at Ahmedabad and the articles have been given at Ahmedabad and merely residence of opposite party No. 1 at Lucknow will not create any jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. It has further been submitted that the Gujarat High Court is already seized of the matter in regard to jurisdiction and no judgment has been rendered in this regard up till now ; hence no cause of action has accrued within the territorial jurisdiction of Judicial Magistrate-I, Lucknow and as such the complaint is not maintainable and is liable to be rejected. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance upon the following cases:

Smt. Sujata Mukherjee Vs. Prashant Kumar Mukherjee, Y. Abraham Ajith and Others Vs. Inspector of Police, Chennai and Another, and Manish Ratan and Others Vs. State of M.P. and Another,

Learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 1 on the other hand has submitted that demand for return of stridhan has been raised from Lucknow, therefore, the cause of action has accrued at Lucknow. Section 184, Cr. P.C. also gives jurisdiction to the Magistrate to proceed in the matter where the offence is a continuing offence or where the offence has been committed partly in one local area and in the other area, then the offence can be inquired into or tried by the Court that having jurisdiction on any such local area. Learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 1 has also relied upon the provisions of Section 460(e), Cr. P.C. to contend that the proceedings will not vitiate even if the Magistrate is not powered by law to do the things stated in the aforesaid section. Clause (e) of Section 460, Cr. P.C. provides to take cognizance of an offence under Clause (a) or Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 190, Cr. P.C. Submission is that the accused persons can move a discharge application at the time of framing of charges in case the charge is not made out against them. The trial court has committed no illegality in entertaining the complaint and the order passed by the court below is perfectly valid in law. In support of his contention, he has relied upon the following decisions:

Pratibha Rani Vs. Suraj Kumar and Another, Trisuns Chemical Industry Vs. Rajesh Agarwal and others,

I have heard learned Counsel for the Petitioners and the learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 1 and the learned A.G.A.

In substance the argument of the learned Counsel for the Petitioners is only to the effect that no cause of action has accrued within the territorial jurisdiction of the Judicial Magistrate-I, Lucknow and, therefore, the manifest error of law has been committed by the Judicial Magistrate while taking cognizance of the complaint u/s 406, I.P.C.

From the pleadings of the parties, it is evident that Petitioner No. 6 was married to opposite party No. 1 on 19.2.2006 at Ahmedabad according to Hindu Rites and Religion. In the marriage about Rs. 16 lakhs were spent and various articles in the form of stridhan were given to the Petitioners, which has been annexed as Annexure-A to the complaint. The Petitioners after marriage started harassing the opposite party No. 1 on account of demand of dowry and also demanded an Octiva Car and Rs. 50,000 cash from her parents, which her father could not fulfil as his financial condition was not so sound at the relevant time. The maid-servant of opposite party No. 1 was also relieved and the Petitioners started taking all household works from her. Opposite party No. 1 was doing M.B.A. course at the time of her marriage from Lucknow University, but in spite of that she was made to do all household works. She tried to satisfy her in-laws and husband, but she was always abused and mentally tortured. The allegation is that Petitioner No. 6 was not performing the matrimonial obligation and opposite party No. 1 was neglected by him. Opposite party No. 1 was not permitted to use her goods for personal use and they were used by the accused persons. When the dowry demand was not fulfilled by the opposite party No. 1, then Petitioner No. 6 got the reservation ticket of complainant to Delhi from his credit card and forcibly boarded her in the train on 25.11.2006 and thereafter father of the complainant went from Lucknow to Delhi to bring her back to her parental house. After coming back to her parental house she requested the Petitioners No. 1 to 7 to return her stridhan, but they refused the same and threatened the opposite party No. 1 of dire consequences. Then again a request was made on 4.2.2007 for return of stridhan, but again the stridhan was not returned. In the aforesaid circumstances, the complaint was filed and after statements under Sections 200 and 202, Cr. P.C. were recorded, the Magistrate issued process u/s 406, I.P.C. for appearance of the Petitioners.

Considering the arguments of the Petitioners, the Court is to see as to whether the offence as alleged u/s 406, I.P.C. is a continuing offence or that the entire cause of action and gamut of facts have to come to an end at Ahmedabad and no further offence has been committed thereafter.

The reliance on the case of Manish Ratan (supra) and the facts which engaged the attention of the Apex Court were that after marriage the couple was living at Jabalpur. A complaint was lodged by father-in-law of the husband with the police station at Jabalpur on 19.4.1997 with the allegation that the Appellants have been ill-treating his daughter and demanded dowry. Meena allegedly lodged another first information report against the Appellants at Police Station Datia on 25.5.1997, whereupon a criminal case was registered. In the said complaint, the incident was said to have taken place in House No. 151, Adarsh Nagar, Narbada Road, Jabalpur. The period during which the incident took place was said to be before November, 1995 till 25.8.1997. In the complaint the allegation was that during the time of Dussehra the complainant''s husband Manish, father-in-law S. S. Ratan, mother-in-law Smt. Kiran and sister-in-law Menaka (Minni) ill-treated her so much that she left her house and saved her life by some means and reached her mama''s house at Bhopal and from there she reached her house and since then she has been staying with her father. A criminal revision was filed by the Appellants questioning the jurisdiction of the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Datia. The said revision was dismissed holding that the offence was a continuing offence and Datia Court had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence. In the aforesaid case, in para 11 the Apex Court ruled as under:

In a case of this nature, an offence cannot be held to be a continuing one, only because the complainant is forced to leave her matrimonial home.

The facts enumerating therein in the aforesaid case were confined to the demand of dowry and ill-treatment. There the Apex Court in those circumstances held that the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Datia was having no jurisdiction in respect of the offence which has taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jabalpur.

In the case of Y. Abraham Ajith (supra), the facts enumerating in the complaint were that the complainant left Nagercoil and came to Chennai and was staying there. The Court found that all the allegations according to the complaint took place at Nagercoil and in those very peculiar circumstances it was held that the Courts at Chennai did not have the jurisdiction to deal with the matter and Smt. Sujata Mukherjee''s case was distinguished on the peculiar facts of that very case.

In the present case, the Court finds that the reasoning given in Smt. Sujata Mukherjee''s case (supra) seems to be more appropriate to be applied in the present case as in the said case on some occasions all accused had taken part in one local area and on other occasion only husband had taken part in another local area where the complaint was lodged. The Court took into consideration the provisions of Section 178(c), Cr. P.C. and held that the complaint was maintainable on either of the places.

The situation in regard to a complaint filed u/s 406, I.P.C. has to be seen in the light of the allegations made in the complaint itself. If the facts stated in the complaint are confined to the cause of action, which has taken place entirely at Ahmedabad, then certainly the Courts at Lucknow will have no jurisdiction. But in the present case, if the allegations made in paragraphs 16 and 17 of the complaint are taken into consideration, then it is amply clear that after returning to her parental house the demand for return of stridhan was made by the opposite party No. 1 on 7.1.2007 and 4.2.2007 from Lucknow. For perusal paragraphs 16 and 17 are quoted below:

That the complainant after coming in her matrimonial house requested accused Nos. 1 to 7 on 7.1.2007 on phone to return her stridhan but they refused the same and threatened the complainant of dire consequences and stated that they will sell all the articles if she again demands stridhan.

That the complainant again requested on 4.2.07 for return of her stridhan but accused with criminal intention threatened the complainant on her phone and told her that they are very influential persons and will get her killed from hired criminal.

The cause of action in respect to Section 406, I.P.C. in the opinion of the Court will start from the point where the demand for return of stridhan has been made. In the complaint the entire allegation has been made in regard to ill-treatment and demand of dowry at Ahmedabad and in that regard no offence can be said to have been committed or continued up till Lucknow, but in the complaint u/s 406, I.P.C. the cause of action would arise from the place where the demand for return of stridhan has been made, because it is that juncture from where the offence in regard to Section 406, I.P.C. can be said to have come into existence. Demand of stridhan and denial to return it gives rise to the offence. The specific allegations made in the complaint go to indicate that the demand for return of stridhan has been made from Lucknow and the same has also been denied while the complainant was at Lucknow.

Section 181, Cr. P.C. deals with place of trial in case of certain offences. Sub-section (4) of Section 181 deals with an offence of criminal misappropriation or of criminal breach of trust and provides that the same may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed or any part of the property which is the subject of the offence was received or retained, or was required to be returned or accounted for, by the accused person.

Section 460(e), Cr. P.C. also deals with the situation where certain irregularities will not vitiate the proceedings. For convenience Section 460(e) is reproduced below:

(e) to take cognizance of an offence under Clause (a) or Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 190.

The Apex Court in the case of Pratibha Rani (supra) held that in the case of stridhan property also, the title of which always remains with the wife, if the husband or any other member of his family who are in possession of such property, dishonestly misappropriate or refuse to return the same, they will be liable to punishment for the offence of criminal breach of trust under Sections 405 and 406, I.P.C. In the aforesaid case also the facts were that in respect of marriage, which took place on February 4, 1972 at Ludhiana the wife was turned out alongwith her children in the year 1977. Thereafter, a complaint was filed for return of dowry. In that case also a request was made from Ludhiana for return of dowry. The Apex Court after considering catena of decisions held that stridhan is supposed to be intermediary custody of the husband and his family members, which they are bound to return.

Apart from Section 178, Cr. P.C., Section 179, Cr. P.C. also confers jurisdiction upon the Court where the consequences have ensued. The language employed and the interpretation put by the Apex Court in the case of State of M.P. Vs. Suresh Kaushal and Another, also make it clear that the complaint can be entertained at a place where a consequence has ensued. The Apex Court while interpreting Section 179, Cr. P.C. held in Paras 6 and 8 as under:

The above section contemplates two Courts having jurisdiction and the trial is permitted to take place in any one of those two Courts. One is the Court within whose local jurisdiction the act has been done and the other is the Court within whose local jurisdiction the consequence has ensued. When the allegation is that the miscarriage took place at Jabalpur it cannot be contended that the Court at Jabalpur could not have acquired jurisdiction as the acts alleged against the accused took place at Indore.

Be that as it may, as we found that the Court at Jabalpur has also the jurisdiction to try the case, it is unnecessary to consider whether the case should be transferred to Indore on that count.

More or less identical question arose in the case of Trisuns Chemical Industry (supra) on which the reliance has been placed by the counsel for the Respondents and has been vehemently argued that the Magistrate was having jurisdiction to take cognizance and any objection can be raised only after the cognizance has been taken.

Considering the effect and mandate of Section 181(4), Cr. P.C., it is clear that the property is to be returned at Lucknow, therefore, the complaint would be maintainable at Lucknow and taking note of Section 460, Cr. P.C., the proceedings will not vitiate even if the Magistrate is not empowered to do anything enumerated therein. Clause (e) of Section 460, Cr. P.C. deals with the situation in respect of taking cognizance of an offence under Clause (a) or Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 190. The decision in the case of Smt. Sujata Mukherjee (supra) in the given facts, in the opinion of the Court, is applicable to the present case as the entire gamut of facts, or the entire facts constituting the offences having been committed at Ahmedabad continued up till Lucknow from where the demand of return of stridhan has been made, but has been denied to be returned. The property entrusted in the form of stridhan is also to be returned at Lucknow. Therefore, I do not find any illegality in the summoning orders.

The petition lacks merit. It is accordingly dismissed.

However, the Petitioners will be at liberty to plead and take defences available to them in accordance with law.