Ram Sabhag Singh vs Emperor

Agarwala, J.—The petitioner has been convicted under Rule 15(f), Bihar and Orissa Sugarcane Rules of 1934, for having omitted to pay sugar-cane supplied to him as a purchasing agent of a sugar-cane mill and has been sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 500. Rule 15 of the Act creates a number of new penal offences in connection with the administration of the Act: but Rule 20 debars the institution of a prosecution under the rules except by an order of or under authority from the District Magistrate. Sub-section 2, R.. 20, declares:

No Court, inferior to that of a Magistrate of the second class, shall try any offence under these rules.

Rule 21 provides a period of limitation for a prosecution under the rules and Rule 22 protects persons acting in good faith. The case against the petitioner is based on a receipt (Ex. 10) for Rs. 56-8. The history of the proceedings is as follows: On 30th March 1936, a number of persons presented a petition to the District Magistrate stating that they had supplied sugar-cane to this factory which had not been paid for. Notices were issued to the manager and the purchaser apparently u/s 7(6). On 2nd May 1936, the alleged sellers of the sugar-cane were directed to file receipts which they said had been granted to them for the sugar-cane purchased from them. On 8th May fresh notices were issued to the manager and the purchaser apparently because the previous notices had not been served. On 24 th July 1936, the purchasing agent appeared and asked for time, which was granted. On 12th August 1936, the purchasing agent filed a petition showing cause. On the next day the District Magistrate passed the order which is the subject matter of the present application convicting the petitioner and sentencing him as already stated. It is, I think, clear that there has been no proper trial of the petitioner. The Act appears to contemplate, first, the sanction by the District Magistrate and secondly, a complaint to a Court within the period of limitation prescribed and then the trial of the person complained against according to the procedure provided by the Code of Criminal Procedure. What appears to have happened in the present proceedings is that while the District Magistrate was considering whether he should sanction the prosecution of the petitioner or not he suddenly convicted and sentenced the petitioner. So far as the order itself is concerned, it is impossible for a Court of revision to decide on the facts stated in the order whether any offence has been committed or not, for the order merely states that having compared the signature on the receipt, Ex. 10, with the signature of the petitioner on the declaration which he filed u/s 7 of the Act, the District Magistrate was satisfied that they were the signatures of one and the same person. The order does not refer to the evidence in the case other than the receipt.

The order convicting the petitioner is set aside. If the District Magistrate considers that the petitioner should be prosecuted, he will sanction the prosecution and proceed according to law. I may also point out that there is considerable danger of a miscarriage of justice when a criminal Court relies on its own comparison of a disputed signature with another signature for the purpose of determining its authenticity. It is usually desirable to obtain the opinion of an expert with regard to this or, better still, the evidence of persons who can speak to the signature having been written in their presence.