Ram Shankar Tripathi vs State of West Bengal

Ray, J.—This appeal is from the judgment and order of Sinha, J., dated May 2, 1961.

The appeal was assigned to this Bench on June 11, 1968, for hearing.

The appeal arises out of an application of the Appellant, inter alia, for the issue of a writ of certiorari to show cause as to why the order of the First Labour Court dated September 27, 1957, should not be quashed.

The Appellant is the proprietor of a newspaper called the

In the year 1953 there was an order of Reference to the Industrial Tribunal. On May 23, 1953, there was an Award passed by the Tribunal. On June 4, 1953, the Award was published in the Calcutta Gazette. On July 3, 1953, an appeal was preferred to the Labour Appellate Tribunal. On June 13, 1955, the appeal was dismissed for default. On July 30, 1956, the application for restoration of appeal was dismissed.

In the month of July 1957, the Petitioner received a notice from the First Labour Court forwarding applications u/s 33C of the Industrial Disputes Act filed by the Respondents for recovery of the sum u/s 33C of the Industrial Disputes Act.

In the application the Respondents alleged that there was an Award and an appeal from the Award was dismissed with costs. The workmen alleged that they did not receive from the employer the dues under the said Award. The workmen asked for recovery of the same from the employer u/s 33C of the Industrial Disputes Tribunal Act. In all the applications the workmen gave a schedule of the dues calculating the gratuity payable as also compensation payable in terms of the Award.

The employer filed an objection before the Labour Court and contended, inter alia, that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition and to adjudicate the same. The employer further denied in the written statement the correctness of the amounts mentioned in the schedule and denied that the workmen were entitled to the amounts claimed.

The First Labour Court on September 27, 1957, calculated the dues of the workmen and forwarded the same to the Government for necessary action.

It was contended by counsel for the Appellant that the relevant provisions applicable was Section 20 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunals) Act, 1950. Counsel for the Appellant submitted that Section 20 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunals) Act, 1950, was repealed in the month of September 1956, and that on March 10, 1957, Section 33C of the Industrial Disputes Act came into force. It was contended, on the reasoning of Section 8 of the General Clauses Act, that the rights and liabilities of the party were to be governed by Section 20 of the Industrial Disputes Act. There is no merit and substance in that contention. Section 20 was repealed and was not the law at the relevant time. The recovery of the amounts due under the Award is a matter of procedure. Section 33C of the Industrial Disputes Act was the relevant section applicable.

The second contention of counsel for the Appellant was that u/s 33C of the Industrial Disputes Act the Government had no jurisdiction to send the applications to the Labour Court and the Government exceeded jurisdiction by converting the applications which were applications under Sub-section (1) of Section 33C of the Industrial Disputes Act to applications under Sub-section (2) of Section 33C of that Act. Sub-section (1) of Section 33C of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1950, enacts that where any money is due to a workman from an employer under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of chap. VA, the workmen may, without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, make an application to the appropriate Government for the recovery of the money due to him and, if the appropriate Government is satisfied that any money is so due, it shall issue a certificate for that amount to the Collector who shall proceed to recover the same in the manner as an arrear of land revenue. Sub-section (2) of Section 33C of the Act on the other hand states that where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money, the amount at which such benefit should be computed may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be determined by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government and the amount so determined may be recovered as provided for in Sub-section (1).

The distinction between the two Sub-sections is that under Sub-section (1), where any amount is due under an award, an application may be made by the workmen to the Government for the recovery of the same as an arrear of land revenue. In the present case there was no money stated in the Award and, therefore, no money was recoverable on the application of the workmen as arrears of land revenue. The Government did not, however, take any steps under Sub-section (1) of Section 33C.

In Sub-section (2) where a workman is entitled to receive any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money the amount is to be determined by the Labour Court as specified by the appropriate Government and, thereafter, the amount may be recovered as an arrear of land revenue.

In the present case, all that the Government did was to forward the applications to the Labour Court. It was the duty of the Government to specify the Labour Court which had to determine the computation. The Government in the present case did not deal with the applications of the workmen. The Government did not convert the applications into one for computation. The Government merely sent the applications to the Labour Court. There is no substance in the contention of the Appellant that the Govenrment exceeded jurisdiction.

The third contention on behalf of the Appellant was that an application had to be made by a workman before the Labour Court and there was no such application by any workman before the Labour Court. The application was in the present case addressed to the Joint Secretary to the Government of West Bengal, Labour Department. The application was instituted as an application u/s 33C of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunals) (sic) Act. Rule 74 of the Industrial Disputes Act states that applications are to be sent to the Government. It will appear from the contentions advanced in the trial Court that at the time when these applications were made, Rule 74 was not in existence. The applications of the workmen were sent to the Labour Court by the Government. The applications were addressed to the Government in the Labour Department. In my opinion, the applications were correctly forwarded because the applications were to be determined by the Labour Court. It was for the Government to specify the Labour Court, and until and unless the Government specified the Labour Court, the workmen could not make any application to the Labour Court. This view was expressed in the Bench decision in the case of the The Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. and Another Vs. Treogi Nath and Others, .

The final contention on behalf of the Appellant was that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to compute because the Petitioner asked for recovery of specific sums of money and the Petitioner did not invoke the jurisdiction of the Labour Court by asking for computation. Counsel for the Respondents relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in H.H. The Maharana Sahib Shri Bhagwat Singh Bahadur of Udaipur Vs. The State of Rajasthan and Others, , in support of the proposition that a proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act, is not initiated by the presentation of a plaint or an application. That was a case of a Reference u/s 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. The order of Reference is the initiation of a proceeding in those cases. That decision is not really of aid in the present case. It cannot be disputed that the Labour Court has jurisdiction to compute. There are certain unimpeachable facts in the present case. First, there was an Award and the Award did not quantify the sum in terms of money. Secondly, the workman was entitled to benefits under an Award. Thirdly, the workman was entitled u/s 33C of the Industrial Disputes Act to ask for reliefs under that section. Fourthly, the workmen asked for recovery of dues and, fifthly, the workmen went to the Labour Court for proper adjudication of their benefits. It cannot be said that the Labour Court was vested with jurisdiction by any particular petition or application of the workman. The Government specified the Labour Court u/s 33C to compute in terms of money any benefit which any workman is entitled to receive from an employer. In the present case the workman asked for recovery or dues. The quantification of dues is within the province and jurisdiction of the Labour Court. Even if the workman quantified the amount, it would not take away the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to compute the same in accordance with the jurisdiction of the Labour Court.

The contention on behalf of the Appellant is answered by a Bench decision of this Court in the case of M.L. Bose and Co. Private Ltd. Vs. State of West Bengal and Others, . In that case forty four workmen asked for recovery of the benefits due to them in terms of the Award. The Government u/s 33C of the Industrial Disputes Act specified the Second Labour Court as the Labour Court authorised to compute the benefit due to the workmen. The only distinction between the case of M.L. Bose & Co. Private Ltd. and the present case is that, in the present case, the workmen in addition to asking for recovery of benefits gave a schedule of the dues which the workmen claimed to be due. In the case of M.L. Bose & Co. Private Ltd. it was contended that the State Government had no jurisdiction to refer to the Labour Court the matter for the computation of benefits due on an Award which was governed by Sub-section (2) of Section 33C and secondly that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to make such computation unless the workmen directly applied to the Labour Court and that application addressed to the State Government could not give jurisdiction to the Labour Court to make a determination. Both the contentions were negatived. It was held that the Government could entertain an application from the workmen containing the claim and could refer or forward the same to the Labour Court specified by it for determination of the same by the Labour Court.

It was pointed out in the Bench decision in the case of M.L. Bose & Co. Private Ltd. Supra that under Sub-section (2) of Section 33C of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the Government had to specify to particular Labour Court and there was no Court to which the workmen could go unless the Government specified it. Therefore, the workmen had to apply to the Government for specification of the Labour Court to entertain the application.

In my opinion, the Labour Court having jurisdiction to compute, it cannot be said that the Labour Court exceeded its jurisdiction or assumed a jurisdiction which it did not possess. The workmen in their applications asked for recovery of dues, and the quantification of dues by the workmen themselves could not rob the Labour Court of its inherent jurisdiction to deal with the matter and pass the necessary orders. All that can be said about the application of the workmen is that, in addition to asking for determination of dues, they themselves quantified the dues which the Court was to adjudicate.

For these reasons I am of the opinion that the contention advanced fail. The judgment is affirmed. The appeal is dismissed. Each party to pay and bear its own costs.

S.K. Mukherjea, J.

I agree.