Ram Singh and another vs State of Uttar Pradesh and others

M. P. Mehrotra, J.

Both these petitions arise out of the proceeding under the U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act. 1960, They are directed against the same orders.

The tenureholder was Ram Singh, who is the petitioner in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 6667 of 1978. His son Ram Kumar is the petitioner in other connected writ petition No. 7019 of 1978. Objections were filed when the notice under Section 10 (2) of the Act was issued to the tenureholder and they were decided by the Prescribed Authority by his order dated 3061976, a true copy whereof is Annexure 1 to the petition of Ram Singh. It is Annexure 5 to the petition of Ram Kumar. Thereafter two appeals were filed one by the tenureholder Ram Singh and the other by his son Ram Kumar. Both the appeals were decided by the appellate Court by its judgment dated 2941978, a certified copy whereof is Annexure 2 to the petition of Ram Singh.

Now the petitioners have come up in these separate but connected writ petitions and in support thereof, I have heard Sri K. B. L. Gaur, learned counsel for the petitioners. In opposition, the learned Standing Counsel has made his submissions.

Three contentious were raised before me. Firstly, it was contended that the land which was included in the holding of the tenureholder Ram Singh was ancestral Sir and Khudkasht before the date of vesting and in the same his son Ram Kumar had half share. Therefore, the alleged half share of Ram Kumar should not have been included in the holding of the father Ram Singh. So far as this contention is concerned, it should be seen that a pure finding of fact has been returned that it was not proved that Ram Kumar was in existences on the date of vesting. Within limited jurisdiction in a writ petition I cannot reappraise the evidence and the said finding cannot be interfered with. In this view of the matter, the first contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner has to be rejected.

The second contention relates to the saledeed dated 2211970. This document was executed by the father Ram Singh in favour of the son Ram Kumar. A finding has been returned that this document was a sham one and the father continued to be in cultivatory possession of the land allegedly sold. Sri Gaur contended that the Lekhpal in the crossexamination had stated that the purchaser was in possession of the whole land. I have perused the statement of the Lekhpal, a trust copy whereof is Annexure 4 to the writ petition of Ram Kumar. In the examinationinchief he clearly, stated that the land which was allegedly sold was in the possession and management of the father Ram Singh. In the crossexamination he made a statement which is not very clear as to whether he was referring to Ram Kumar or the father so far as the question of possession is concerned and I need not say anything in this matter because, in my view, it was for the authorities below while appraising the evidence to accept one part of the statement in preference to another. If I were sitting in appellate jurisdiction, it might have been open to me to consider whether the authorities below were entitled to do so and whether in the appeal interference was called for. However, in the limited jurisdiction of a writ petition I cannot take exception to the appreciation of the evidence done by the Courts below.

Accordingly, the second contention is also rejected.

Lastly, the learned counsel contended that Plot No. 2605 should have been treated to be a grove. A clear finding has been recorded by the authorities below that cutting of the trees was done after 2411971 and thereafter new trees were planted. It is, therefore, obvious that the trees which came into existence were planted after 24171. Sri Gaur contended that if trees were in existence on 2411971 and if thoy were subsequently cut with a view to replant trees, then such land should be held to continue to be groveland. In my view, this interpretation cannot be accepted in view of the definition of groveland as given in subsection (8) of Section 3 of the Act which is as follows:

" ''groveland'' means any specific piece of land in a holding having trees not including (guava, papaya, banana or vine plants) planted thereon before January 24, 1971, in such numbers that they preclude, or when full grown, will preclude the land or any considerable portion thereof from being used primarily for any other purpose, and the trees on such land constitute a grove."

I should like to emphasise that this definition is materially different from the definition of groveland in the U. P. Tenancy Act. Therefore, whatever may be the position under the Tenancy law, so far as the definition in Ceiling Act is concerned, if the trees have been shown to have been planted after 2411971, then such land cannot be treated to be groveland even though such replanting has been done on land which formerly before 2411971 was grove land.

Both the petitions, accordingly, fail and are hereby dismissed, but in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.