High CourtsSingle Bench

Rama Devi vs State of Punjab and another

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 5 August 2013 · Citation: (2013) 08 P&H CK 0586

HON’BLE JUDGES
Mehinder Singh Sullar, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 155(2), 156(1), 482 · Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 34, 420
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
CRM No. M-9859 of 2013
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Judgment

25 paragraphs · 2,007 words

Mehinder Singh Sullar, J.—The contour of the facts which needs a necessary mention for the limited purpose of deciding the core controversy involved in the instant petition and emanating from the record is that having read the advertisement in ''Ajit Newspaper'', the complainant-Tarsem Singh son of Sadhu Singh, (for brevity "the complainant") has applied for the allotment of petrol pump in open category of Rural Marketing Plan at Tanda Urmurh, District Gurdaspur. He could not get the allotment of petrol pump for want of complete papers. According to the complainant accused Jaimal Kumar claiming himself to be a Manager of the Oil Company met him and promised the allotment of the petrol pump, in case the complainant would pay him an amount of Rs. 10 lacs as bribe money. However, the matter was settled for Rs. 8 lacs. Consequently, the complainant paid the amount of Rs. 8 lacs to the husband of the petitioner in her presence. The accused has neither got the allotment letter of the petrol pump as promised nor returned the pointed amount. Levelling a variety of allegations and narrating the sequence of events, in all, the prosecutions claimed that petitioner, her husband and other co-accused with their common intention have cheated the complainant and misappropriated the amount of Rs. 8 lacs on false promise. In the background of these allegations and in the wake of complaint of the complainant, the present case was registered against the petitioner and her other co-accused vide FIR No. 26 dated 17.04.2012 (Annexure P-1) on accusation of having committed an offence punishable u/s 420 read with Section 34 IPC by the police of Police Station Division No. 2, Pathankot, District Gurdaspur, in the manner depicted here-in-above.

2.

After completion of the investigation, the police submitted a final police report, the accused were, accordingly, charge sheeted for the commission of indicated offence, and the case was slated for evidence of the prosecution by the trial Court.

3.

Instead of submitting to the jurisdiction of the trial Court, petitioner-Rama Devi accused straightway jumped to file the instant petition to quash the impugned FIR (Annexure P-1), charge sheet and all other subsequent proceedings arising therefrom invoking the provisions of Section 482 Cr.P.C.

4.

The case set up by the petitioner, in brief insofar as relevant, is that the complainant has lodged the impugned FIR against her with a mala fide intention. Her name is not mentioned in the initial complaint, but later on added in the police report. She was not instrumental in the allotment of petrol pump to the complainant. No offence u/s 420 read with Section 34 IPC is made out against her. The trial Court is stated to have framed the charges against her without any legal basis. On the strength of aforesaid grounds, the petitioner has sought to quash the impugned FIR, chargesheet and subsequent proceedings arising thereto.

5.

Respondent No. 1 has refuted the prayer of the petitioner and filed the reply, inter-alia, pleading certain preliminary objections of, maintainability of the petition, cause of action and locus standi of the petitioner. It has been specifically mentioned that the matter was referred to Incharge Economic Offences, Wing, Pathankot, who conducted the thorough inquiry and found that the petitioner, her husband and other co-accused have cheated the complainant and duped him of Rs. 8 lacs with the false promise of allotment of petrol pump, which was neither allotted nor the amount had been returned. The Investigating Officer concluded that complainant has given the amount to the petitioner, her sister and husband-Jaimal Kumar. They have counted and kept the entire amount with them. It will not be out of place to mention here that respondents have stoutly denied all other allegations contained in the main petition and prayed for its dismissal.

6.

At the very outset, what cannot possibly be disputed here is that the Hon''ble Supreme Court has authoritatively held, in a celebrated judgment in case State of Haryana and others Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others, , which was again reiterated in case Som Mittal v. Government of Karnataka 2008 (2) R.C.R. (Cri) 92, that the criminal prosecution can only be quashed in rarest of rare case at the initial stage as per the following conditions:-

(i) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

(ii) Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under S. 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of S. 155(2) of the Code.

(iii) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(iv) Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under S. 155(2) of the Code.

(v) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(vi) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

vii) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.

7.

Not only that, again the Hon''ble Apex Court in case Jeffrey J. Diermeier and Another Vs. State of West Bengal and Another, having interpreted the scope of section 482 Cr.P.C., has ruled (para 16) as under:-

16.

Before addressing the contentions advanced on behalf of the parties, it will be useful to notice the scope and ambit of inherent powers of the High Court u/s 482 of the Code. The Section itself envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code; (ii) to prevent abuse of process of Court; and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. Nevertheless, it is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction of the Court. Undoubtedly, the power possessed by the High Court under the said provision is very wide but is not unlimited. It has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and cautiously, ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for which alone the court exists. It needs little emphasis that the inherent jurisdiction does not confer an arbitrary power on the High Court to act according to whim or caprice. The power exists to prevent abuse of authority and not to produce injustice.

8.

After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, going through the record with their valuable assistance and after deep consideration of the matter, to my mind, there is no merit in the instant petition.

9.

Ex facie the argument of the learned counsel that, since the petitioner has been falsely implicated by the complainant in this case, so, the impugned FIR is liable to be quashed, is not only devoid of merits but misplaced as well.

10.

As is evident from the record that there is direct allegation that Jaimal Kumar-husband of the petitioner, claiming himself to be a Manager in the Oil Company, promised the complainant to allot a petrol pump and received Rs. 8 lacs as bribe money. The Investigating Officer has clearly concluded that the complainant has paid the amount, which was counted and kept by the petitioner and her sister. Thus, all the accused with their common intention have cheated the complainant and misappropriated his amount of Rs. 8 lacs in this regard.

11.

Moreover, Jaimal Kumar-husband of the petitioner has categorically admitted the receipt of indicated amount, executed the agreement dated 14.10.2011 (Annexure R-2/1) and promised to return the amount to the complainant on 20.10.2011, but he has not returned the amount till today.

12.

Therefore, if the nature of accusation of cheating and misappropriation of the huge amount with their common intention material/evidence, legal position and totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, as discussed here-in-above are put together then, to me, the conclusion is in-escapable that there is an ample evidence on record to prosecute the petitioner in the present case.

13.

There is yet another aspect of the matter which can be viewed entirely from a different angle. As is clear that direct allegations of cheating and misappropriation are assigned to the accused. Whether the pointed allegations are true or otherwise, whether all the essential ingredients of cheating and misappropriation are complete or not and all other submissions, relatable to the appreciation of evidence (as now sought to be urged on her behalf), would be the moot points to be decided during the course of trial. If all such intricate questions, which require determination by the trial Court, after production of evidence by the parties, are to be decided by this Court, in the absence of any evidence in this respect, in the garb of petition u/s 482 Cr.P.C., then the sanctity of the trial would pale into insignificance and amount to nullify the statutory procedure of trial as contemplated under the Code of Criminal Procedure, which is not legally permissible.

14.

Not only that, it is now well settled principle of law that the High Court should not ordinarily embark upon an inquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it the accusation would not be sustained, are the functions of the trial Judge to do so. The High Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of its power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. Reliance in this connection can be placed upon the judgment of Hon''ble Supreme Court in case U.P. Pollution Control Board Vs. Dr. Bhupendra Kumar Modi and Another,

15.

Therefore, the Bench mark set out for quashing the FIR in the aforesaid judgments is not attracted in the present case. Taking into consideration the entire material on record, to my mind, the trial Court has rightly charge sheeted the accused to face the trial for offence in question. In this manner, once the trial Court has framed the charges against the petitioner-accused, then, no ground for quashing the impugned FIR and chargesheet, much less cogent, is made out, in view of the ratio of law laid down by the Hon''ble Apex Court in case Minakshi Bala Vs. Sudhir Kumar and Others, which is the complete answer to the problem in hand.

16.

No other legal point, worth consideration has either been urged or pressed by the learned counsel for the petitioner.

17.

In the light of aforesaid reasons and without commenting further anything on merits, lest it may prejudice the case of either side during the course of trial of the main case, as there is no merit, therefore, the instant petition is hereby dismissed as such. Needless to mention that nothing observed, here-in-above, would reflect, in any manner, on merits during the trial of the main case, as the same has been so recorded only for a limited purpose of deciding the present petition u/s 482 Criminal Procedure Code and not otherwise.