Rama Krishna Rice Mills vs Municipal Committee and Another

D.S. Tewatia, J.—This Regular Second Appeal was admitted to Division Bench at the motion stage itself when it was noticed that the Learned Single Judge who was a party to the Division Bench decision of this Court reported in Ramesh Kumar and Ors. v. The Municipal Committed, Gurdaspur and Ors. 1981 P&H 295 later on sought to distinguish the said judgment. While rendering his judgment reported in Municipal Committee, Amritsar v. Bala Mal Ishar Dass 1982 S.L.J. (P&H) 134 the admitting Judge thought that a clarification of the two judgments in question was necessary, otherwise it was likely to create confusion and that is how this appeal is before us.

The question that came up for consideration before the Division Bench was whether Section 84 and 86 of the Punjab Municipal Act barred the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters of assessment and computation of house-tax u/s 61(1)(a) of the said Act. The Division Bench following the two Supreme Court decisions one reported in Munshi Ram and Ors. v. Municipal Committee, Chheharta 1979 Rev. Law Reporter 419 and another reported in Bata Shoe Co. Ltd. Vs. City of Jabalpur Corporation, besides the Full Bench decision of this Court reported in Kelash Nath and Others Vs. Municipal Committee, Batala, answered the question in the affirmative.

In Municipal Committee Amritsar''s case (Supra) my brother Goyal, J., who was a party to the Division Bench case (Municipal Committee Amritsar v. Bala Mal Ishar Dass) when dealing with the contention that Section 86 of the Punjab Municipal Act completely barred the jurisdiction of the Civil Court for which submission the reliance was placed on the Supreme Court decision of Munshi Ram''s case (supra) and Ramesh Kumar''s case (supra)(D.B.) observed that in Munshi Ram''s case the Supreme Court did not deviate from the ratio of Firm Seth Radha Kishan (Deceased) Represented by Hari Kishan and Others Vs. The Administrator, Municipal Committee, Ludhiana, and had in fact approvingly quoted the following observations from the judgment:

The Court distinguished that class of cases where the Municipal Committee in levying a tax or committing an act, clearly acts outside or in abuse of its powers under the Municipal Act, and explained that it is only in such cases, the bar to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court would not apply.

In regard to the ratio of Ramesh Kumar''s case (supra) he observed that the Bench had answered the question in an abstract manner and the question was not dealt with in a detailed manner nor any argument was raised before the Bench that there was no absolute bar and a suit under certain given circumstances would be competent.

The question posed in Ramesh Kumar''s case would show that the Bench in Ramesh Kumar''s case was only concerned with the question as to whether the assessment and computation of house tax could be challenged in the Civil Court.

There cannot be two opinions regarding the answer, which the Bench in that case had returned to that question, that assessment and computation of tax in view of the provisions of Sections 84 and 86 would be beyond the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. But if the tax payer challenged the very basis of the legality of the tax, in that, that the given tax could not be imposed under the Act or the authority that had levied the tax or had passed the order of assessment, was not authorised under the Act, then the question undoubtedly could be canvassed before the Civil Court.

Coming now to the merits of the present case, the grievance that survived for consideration before the Civil Court was that the assessment had not been made on the basis of fair rent calculated under the provisions of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act as on the contrary it had been determined on basis of the theory of supply and demand.

This merely raised an issue to the legality of the assessment order and not either to the legality of the levy or the jurisdiction of the assessing authority. Thus jurisdiction of the Civil Court obviously could not be invoked in this regard and a civil suit therefore was not competent.

In view of the above, we sustain the concurrent funding of both the Courts below regarding the question of jurisdiction of the Civil Court and dismiss the appeal but with no order as to costs.