Ramanathan Chettiar vs K. Sivarama Subramania Aiyar

Venkatasubba Rao, J.—The accused was charged with misappropriation of paddy worth about Rs. 200. Summons was issued to him and

he now moves the High Court and asks that the proceedings before the Magistrate should be quashed.

The learned Public Prosecutor has contended that the High Court has no power to interfere with the proceedings of a Magistrate in a pending

trial. Whether this contention is correct depends upon the interpretation of Sections 435, 438 and 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

u/s 435 the High Court is empowered to call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior criminal Court and situate within

the local limits of its jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order

recorded or passed and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court. The section thus does not deal merely with "" finding,

sentence or order "" but with proceedings generally and the power of the High Court extends to calling for and examining the record of any

proceeding for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the regularity of such proceeding.

u/s 438, the Sessions Judge or District Magistrate may, on examining the record of any proceeding, report for the orders of the High Court the

result of such examination.

Then comes Section 439. It provides that in the case of any proceeding the record of which has been called for by the High Court or which

otherwise comes to its knowledge, it may in its discretion exercise any of the powers conferred on a Court of Appeal by certain sections of the

Code. The learned Public Prosecutor contends that none of the sections specified in Section 439 gives the High Court power to set aside or quash

proceedings in a pending case. The answer is simple. The sections dealing with the powers of a Court of Appeal necessarily deal with those orders

only from which under the Code there is an appeal provided. With reference to such orders, the sections lay down the powers of a Court of

Appeal. Exhypothesi the revisional powers of the High Court are invoked when no right of appeal exists, and although in some cases the High

Court may by exercising the powers conferred on a Court of Appeal be able to correct an error, it does not follow, having regard to the variety of

orders or proceedings which it may be called on to revise or deal with in its revisional jurisdiction, that it can by exercising those powers only

redress a wrong or do complete justice. In other words, Section 439 does not say that the High Court shall exercise only those powers that are

conferred on a Court of Appeal but on the other hand it enacts that among the powers possessed by the High Court are the powers conferred on

an appellate Court. The sections dealing with the powers of an appellate Court necessarily describe and define the powers of the Court with

reference to orders that are appealable. The legislature in enumerating the powers of the Court of Appeal had before its mind only a certain class

of orders and in the very nature of things that enumeration cannot be found complete or exhaustive when the Court is called on to deal with orders

of a different kind, orders not in the contemplation of the legislature when it was defining the powers of a Court of Appeal.

I am therefore of the opinion on a construction of the sections of the Code that the High Court has power at any stage to quash or set aside

proceedings.

The authorities on the point support this view; indeed, there is not a single reported case which supports the contention of the learned Public

Prosecutor.

The circumstances which will justify the interference of the High Court have not been and cannot be laid down with precision. While the Judges

repeatedly held that only when exceptional grounds exist the High Court ought to interfere, the decided cases show that no hard and fast rule can

be laid down but that when in the interests of justice the High Court''s intervention became necessary, it was not refused.

In Chandi Pershad v. Abdul Rahiman (1895) 11 R 22 C 131 , Jagat Chandra v. Queen-Empress ILR (1899) C 786 and In Re : S. Kuppusami

Aiyar, , the High Court quashed proceedings after a charge had been framed.

In Hari Char an v. Girish Chandra ILR (1910) C 68, Queen-Empress v. Nagasheppa Pal ILR (1896) Bom 543 and in Thackaria v. Pura

Singh 67 IndCas 589, the High Court interfered upon the issue of summons to the accused.

In Queen-Empress v. Jagan Singh (1892) 12 AWN 102 and in Chadha v. Emperor (1916) 14 ALJ 851, the High Court''s intervention was

sought for setting aside proceedings even at an earlier stage. The orders which the Court was requested to revise were to show cause why

sanction should not be accorded for prosecution for forgery and perjury respectively.

Choua Lal v. Ananta Pershad ILR (1898) C 233 is an instance where the High Court refused to exercise this power. But the learned Judges

even then observed that the High Court undoubtedly had the power to interfere in any case and at any stage of it.

In some of the cases mentioned above, the proceedings were set aside on the ground that the facts alleged did not in law constitute the offence

with which the accused had been charged. In other cases, evidence was examined and probabilities were discussed and the High Court set aside

the proceedings on the ground that it was not in the interests of justice that the proceedings should be allowed to continue.

In the four Calcutta cases and the Bombay case the decision in each was that of a Bench of two Judges.

The view I have taken of the sections of the Code is thus borne out by the authorities to which I have referred.

The question then remains to be decided with reference to the facts of the present case is the interference of the High Court justified ? There is

a kattalai attached to ""the Madura Devasthanam known as Nagappa Chetti Kattalai. The family of the accused had made the endowment. In 1915

a suit was filed for the settlement of a scheme in respect of this kattalai. In 1917, Venkatachellam Chetti, the brother of the accused, filed a suit for

partition of the family property and management of the villages that formed the subject of the endowment. In February 1921, the High Court finally

decided in the partition suit that the accused was to be a trustee of the kattalai and immediately after, he got possession. In the other suit, the suit

brought to settle a scheme, a scheme was settled on the 5th of August, 1921, and by it the trustee (the accused) was directed to submit yearly

accounts, which were to be duly audited, and the balance in the trustee''s hands was to be paid to the manager of the Madura Devasthanam. The

complainant is one Alagappa Chetti, the Receiver appointed in respect of that Devasthanan. It is alleged that after the accused obtained exclusive

possession of the property he passed two receipts to tenants, dated the 20th March, 1921, and 26th March, 1921, showing that a certain amount

of paddy was received by him but that the account-books maintained for the kattalai show that the quantity of paddy received was much less. The

difference is worth about Rs. 200 and odd and the charge is that the accused misappropriated paddy Worth this amount.

In accordance with the decree settling the scheme the accounts for the Fasli corresponding to 1921 were filed by the accused. The auditor

went through the accounts and submitted his report to the Court. Objections were filed to the report both by the accused and Alagappa Chetti. On

the 6th of March, 1923, the Subordinate Judge made an order in effect disallowing the objections of Alagappa Chetty in regard to the alleged

difference in the quantity of the paddy referred to above. Alagappa Chetti has filed no appeal against that order. But the accused himself has filed

one challenging it in so far as it was against him. While this appeal was pending, on 3rd December, 1923, Alagappa Chetti gets a clerk of his to file

the complaint and the summons was issued on 12th December, 1923.

Mr. C.S. Venkatachari for the accused has contended that the complaint was malicious and that the order of the Subordinate Judge was in his

favour and with a view merely to harass his client the Receiver-got the present complaint filed on account of private misunderstanding and spite.

There are several proceedings before the High Court now which clearly show that Alagappa Chetti and the accused are on inimical terms and it is

extremely probable that Alagappa Chetty is actuated by personal motives and that the prosecution has not been launched in public interest. The

receipts were given in March, 1921. The Subordinate Judge''s order was made in March, 1923, and it is about nine months subsequent to it that

the complaint was filed. It was open to Alagappa Chetty to place all the materials he could before the Subordinate Judge and he now pretends that

he did not do so. His Vakil says that although on this particular point the order of the Subordinate Judge was against hint, he may be able to

support the order generally in the appeal that is pending by showing that his client is entitled to this particular amount which has been disallowed by

the Subordinate Judge. Thus the matter is still in controversy between the parties in the Civil Courts and these facts lead to the inference that the

prosecution is not bona fide. But the allegations made in the complaint if proved will constitute the offence of misappropriation. The materials on

which either side may rely have not been placed before me and I am not in a position to say that the complaint is-false. It may be that the motive of

the complaint in preferring the charge may be bad but it does not follow that the proceedings for that reason should be quashed. I am nor,

therefore, prepared in the present case to set aside the proceedings wholly, but I think it is pre-eminently a case where the proceedings should be

stayed pending the disposal of the appeal before the High Court (A.A.O. No. 314 of 1923) from the order of the Subordinate Judge. I

accordingly make an order staying the proceedings pending the appeal. At this stage no further order will be necessary.