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Judgment
Padmini Jesudurai, J.—This is an appeal preferred by the complainant, viz., Ramanathapuram Market Committee, against the acquittal of the
respondent by the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Devakottai, in S.T.C. S.78 of 1981, acquitting him of an offence under S. 18(1)(2) and S. 25(b)
of the Tamil Nadu Agricultural Produce Markets Act (23 of 1959) (hereinafter referred to as the Act), read with rule S-A(1) and (2) of the Tamil
Nadu Agricultural Produce Market Rules framed under the Act (hereinafter referred to as the Rules).
The facts briefly are--The respondent was a licence to deal in the business of paddy under S. 6(1) of the Act for the period from 1.4.1979 to
31.3.1980 in Ramanathapuram, which was a notified area under the Act. The respondent was carrying on business in paddy from 1.7.1979 to
31.3.1980. Under R.51A(1) the respondent had to file returns regarding the business done by him in order to enable the Market Committee to
levy fee under S. 18 of the Act. In spite of a request to furnish the above returns and in spite of repeated reminders, the respondent failed to furnish
the returns under R.51-A. The petitioner, therefore, addressed the Commercial tax Department for particulars regarding the extent of business
done by the respondent and on receipt of information from them under Ex. P21 that the respondent had done business to the extent of Rs.
17,34,702.48 and calculating market fee leviable on the above turn over, fixed the same at Rs. 5,854.60, issued a notice of demand under Ex.
P23 on 6.7.1981, requiring the respondent to pay the above amount within two weeks from the date of receipt of the demand. The respondent
received Ex. P23 as per acknowledgement Ex. P24. Despite the same, the respondent failed to pay the fee levied and hence the petitioner
launched prosecution under S. 18(2) of the Act for failure to pay the fees, made punishable under S. 25(b) of the Act.
During trial, on behalf of the prosecution, P.Ws. 1 and 7 were examined and Exs. P1 to P31 were marked. When questioned under S. 313,
Crl.P.C. the respondent stated that he was not doing business within the notified area and that, therefore, he was not liable to pay any market fee.
The respondent examined his shop Manager as D.W.1 and had Exs.D1 to D5 marked on his side.
The trial court, on the above evidence, held that the prosecution for non-payment of the above fee for the period from 1.7.1979 to 31.3.1980
ought to have been filed within six months from the starting point of limitation, viz., 31.3.1980, that the complaint having been filed on 16.11.1981,
was barred by limitation under S 468, Crl.P.C., and that in view of the above finding it was not necessary to go into the further question as to
whether the respondent was liable to pay market fee or not and acquitted the respondent. Aggrieved with the acquittal, the present appeal has
been filed by the complainant.
Thiru K. Alagiriswami, Learned Counsel for the petitioner, contended that the prosecution was under S. 18(1) and (2) of the Act, viz., non-
payment of market fee which was made punishable under S. 25 of the Act, and that, therefore, the offence is committed when the respondent fails
to pay the fee demanded from him within the time stipulated in the demand and limitation could start running only from the date of such failure.
Viewed thus, the complaint was filed within time and the acquittal, therefore, was erroneous.
Thiru V.R. Kuppuswami, Legal Aid Counsel for the respondent, contended that the view taken by the trial court that the limitation started
running from 31.3.1980 was correct, and that, therefore, the complaint not having been filed within the period of six months was barred by
limitation.
The question that has to be determined is at what point of time the offence of non-payment of market fee under S. 18 of the Act is said to have
been committed.
It is admitted by both parties that the period during which the respondent is said to have done business for which fee was levied under S. 18 of
the Act was from 1.7.1979 to 31.3.1980. It is also not challenged that despite repeated reminders the respondent did not file any returns under S.
51 A so as to enable the petitioner to assess the fee that would be leviable on the business of the respondent. The petitioner, therefore, was forced
to get information from other sources, as contemplated under R.51A(2). The above information was received under Ex. P21, only on 29.5.1981.
Thereafter, the fee leviable on the respondent was worked out and under Ex. P23, dated 6.7.1981, a demand was issued to the respondent
requiring him to pay fee of Rs. 5,854.60 within two weeks from the date of the receipt of the notice. The respondent has received Ex. P23 on 7-7-
1981. The respondent was entitled to pay the fee on or before 21.7.1981. The offence is committed only on the next day, viz., 22.7.1981.
Limitation therefore starts running only from the date of the commission of the offence viz., 22.7.1981. The complaint had to be filed within six
months of the date of the commission of the offence. In fact, the complaint has been filed on 16.11.1981 well within the period of limitation.
The trial court failed to note that the accused was being prosecuted not for failure to furnish the return but for failure to pay the market fee.
There was, therefore, no basis for holding that the offence had been committed on 31.3.1980 and for holding that the limitation started running
from the above date. As already stated by me earlier, the offence is committed only when the respondent failed to pay the fee within the time
stipulated in the demand notice and limitation starts running only from that date. It therefore follows that the prosecution is well within time.
Since the respondent has raised certain questions of fact regarding his liability to pay fee and since the trial court has refrained from going into
those facts on the ground that the taking of cognisance beyond the period of limitation was illegal, the matter has to go back to the trial Court for a
finding on the above facts.
In the result, the appeal is allowed. The judgment of the court below is set aside and retrial is ordered.