Ramar A. vs District Collector of Ramanathapuram and Others

M. Karpagavinayagam, J.—A. Ramar, the petitioner herein is seeking for the issue of a Writ of Certiorari by calling for the records from the

file of the Collector. Ramanathapuram District, the first respondent herein, in his proceedings No. W1/75085/1991, dated April 29, 1992 and to

quash the same.

The facts that are required and relevant for the disposal of this writ petition are as follows:

The Commissioner, Mudukulathur Panchayat Union, the second respondent herein invited applications for the post of Noon Meal Organiser. The

petitioner applied for the said post. He was asked to attend the interview on February 19, 1992. He attended the interview and produced all

relevant records. He was selected by the Commissioner of Panchayat Union, the second respondent. The District Collector also issued orders

appointing the petitioner as Noon Meal Organiser in his proceedings NAW1/19257/1992, dated March 5, 1992. The petitioner was directed to

pay the security deposit. Accordingly, he paid the security deposit of Rs. 600/- on March 10, 1992. The petitioner joined the said post on April 1,

1992 and took charge as Noon Meal Organiser in Vikramapandiapuram Panchayat Union Noon Meal Centre and also submitted the joining

report to the second respondent. While he was working as a Noon Meal Organiser, the Collector of the District, the first respondent herein by the

order dated April 29, 1992 passed an order terminating the services of the petitioner on the ground that he is having a reliable information that the

appointment of the petitioner was made on the wrong information given by the petitioner and the same was served on him on May 9, 1992. Hence,

this writ petition challenging the order of termination of the services of the petitioner dated April 29, 1992, the impugned order.

A detailed counter has been filed by the first respondent. According to the counter, the petitioner had been temporarily appointed as Nutritious

Meal Organiser by the order dated March 5, 1992 and when he attended the interview, he concealed the fact that he was serving as Makkal Nala

Paniyalar and subsequently, he confessed that he acted as Makkal Nala Paniyalar and as such, he gave false information about his past service to

the appointing authority and, therefore, he was terminated from services and since his. appointment was purely temporary, the appointment order

was cancelled without giving any prior notice.

The counsel for the petitioner as well as the Government advocate appearing for the respondents have argued at length on the basis of their

respective pleas.

After having gone through the records and considered the submissions on either side, I am of the view that the impugned order is illegal and

unsustainable in law for the following reasons.

On the application requesting for the appointment as a Noon Meal Organiser sent by the petitioner, interview was conducted on February 19,

1992. The petitioner appeared in the interview and produced relevant records to prove his qualifications. On satisfying about the same, he was

appointed as a Noon Meal Organiser by the first respondent on (sic) March 5, 1992.

There is no dispute with regard to the fact that the petitioner took charge thereafter and sent joining report to the second respondent and from

then onwards, he was on duty. Within a month after joining the duty, the impugned order had been passed on April 29, 1992 by the first

respondent terminating the services of the petitioner on the ground that he obtained the order of appointment by concealing the fact about his past

service.

It is thus clear that the order of cancelling the appointment order is not on the ground that he was a temporary worker and his service was no

more required, but, on the ground that he suppressed the vital fact of his past service and misguided the interviewing officer that he never worked

as Makkal Nala Paniyalar in the village. Under those circumstances, it is not a mere termination simpliciter, but it is a punishment. In other words, a

stigma is attached on the petitioner by virtue of the impugned order.

When the impugned order terminating the services of the petitioner, who was working as a Noon Meal Organiser is passed as a punishment, it

goes without saying that it shall be only after conducting enquiry and after giving reasonable opportunity to the petitioner.

Admittedly, in the instant case, there is no indication either in the counter or in the records that any such opportunity was given to the petitioner

to explain the reason for which he was terminated. As a matter of fact, in the counter-affidavit filed by the first respondent, it has been stated in

detail that initially the petitioner said that he did not act as a Makkal Nala Paniyalar in the village, but subsequently, when he was interrogated, he

confessed having given the false information to the interviewing officer.

It is quite strange to see as to how those details have been incorporated in the counter, in the absence of any enquiry. Admittedly, the petitioner

was working as a Noon Meal Organiser from April 1, 1992 to May 9, 1992 and in the meantime, he was not given any show cause seeking for

the explanation from him as to why his services should not be terminated.

Furthermore, the impugned order also would disclose that the termination was on the ground that the appointment was made on the basis of

wrong information. It is not clear in the impugned order as to what was the wrong information submitted by the petitioner before the first

respondent, which made him to pass order appointing the petitioner. It is also quite preposterous for the first respondent to state in the counter that

since the petitioner was a temporary worker, he was terminated without any notice.

As indicated earlier, the termination order was not on the ground that his services was temporary. He was sent out by virtue of the impugned

order on the ground that he suppressed vital fact and gave false information about his past service, thereby misguided the interviewing officer.

When such is the ground for termination, the principles of natural justice demands that there shall be enquiry by giving reasonable opportunity to the

petitioner to explain the same. Admittedly, there was no opportunity nor any enquiry conducted after observing the formalities required.

The application of the principles of natural justice that no man should be condemned unheard would intend to prevent the authority from acting

arbitrarily affecting the rights of the concerned person. No decision shall be taken which will affect the right of any person without his first being

informed of the case and giving him an opportunity of putting forward his case.

The duty to give reasonable opportunity to be heard will be implied from the nature of the function to be performed by the authority which has

the power to take punitive or damaging action. The executive authorities which take administrative action involving any restriction on inherent

fundamental rights of citizens, shall take care to see that justice is not only done but manifestly appears to be done. They have a duty to proceed in

a way which is free from even the appearance of arbitrariness, unreasonableness or unfairness. They have to act in a manner which is patently

impartial and meets the requirements of natural justice. It is not so much to act judicially but is to act fairly.

The procedure to be followed before taking punitive action, shall be just, fair and reasonable even though there is no specific provision in a

statute or rules made thereunder for showing cause against action proposed to be taken against an individual, which affects the right of that

individual.

Natural justice is invoked to ensure fair adjudication wherever fights of individuals are affected. In other words, the principles of natural justice

are well settled, in the sense that even if any provision of statute or rule does not provide for giving an opportunity to the aggrieved person in an

enquiry, the principles of natural justice require that such opportunity should be given and that there should be a fair determination of a question.

Natural justice, though is not fundamental right, yet, its non-observance may result in contravention of fundamental rights. To put it briefly, the

principles of natural justice have to be observed in any enquiry unless the statute either expressly or by necessary implication prohibits it.

The above principles have been enunciated by the Apex Court in D.K. Yadav Vs. J.M.A. Industries Ltd., .

When these principles are taken into consideration, it can be safely concluded that in the present case, the authority who passed the impugned

order has not followed the required procedure before taking punitive action of termination by giving the fair and reasonable opportunity to the

petitioner to putforth his case.

In view of what is stated above, the impugned order shall be held to be illegal and the same is liable to be set aside. Thus, the writ petition is

allowed and the impugned order, dated April 29, 1992 is set aside. No costs. Consequently, W.M.P. Nos. 9759 and 9760 of 1992 and 8960 of

1993 are closed.