Ramaswami Pillai vs Badra Nayakkan and Others

This is a petition to revise the order of the District Judge of Ramnad refusing to allow the petitioner to conduct his appeal. His allegation was that

his vakil has improperly withdrawn the appeal. The reasons given by the District Judge do not commend themselves to me. None the less I would

have had no jurisdiction to go into this matter but for the fact that the District Judge ends his order by saying that ""the petition does not lie"" thereby

declining jurisdiction to hear the petition. The allegations contained in the affidavit of the petitioner certainly require investigation. Without asking the

vakil concerned for an explanation and without taking further evidence in the case the District Judge disposed of the application on two grounds

both of which are unsustainable. The first ground is that the vakalat authorised the vakil to compromise and therefore the vakil was competent to

withdraw the appeal. He is clearly wrong here. The power to compromise does not involve a power to withdraw an appeal unconditionally. That

power must be given specifically and cannot be implied from the general words authorising the vakil to compromise. Thenal Ammal and

Sokkammal I.L.R (1917) Mad. 233 this Court held that the powers to compromise must be very Carefully scrutinised. Reference may also be

made to Basan Gowda v. Chanchigiri Gowda ILR (1910) 34 Bom. 408.

The other reason given by the District Judge is equally wrong. He refers to an order made by the District Judge Mr. Moore as if that learned

Judge had authorised the withdrawal on the day the case was to be heard. The order of Mr. Moore is ""Adjourned to 22-3-1917 at the request of

the vakils on both sides. It is stated that this appeal will be withdrawn as the matters in dispute have been compromised."" This does not show that

without a compromise the vakils promised to withdraw the appeal. It is clear that the present District Judge has misunderstood the terms of the

vakalat as well as the terms of the order of Mr. Moore and by misunderstanding these two documents he has declaimed to go into the case by

saying that a petition does not lie. Therefore I am entitled u/s 115 to set aside that order. I reverse his order and direct him to enquire into the

allegations contained in the affidavit. The District Judge will see that it is in the interests of the legal practitioner concerned that this matter should be

set at rest as early as possible before the parties and the pleaders forget what happened on those dates.

With these remarks I send back the case to the District Judge with directions to retake the case on his file and dispose of it according to law

Costs will abide.