Rambai vs State Of Chhattisgarh

This second appeal preferred by the appellant/plaintiff was admitted for hearing on the following substantial question of law :Â​

“Whether the first appellate Court was justified in dismissing the appeal as barred by limitation by recording a finding which is perverse and

contrary to the record ?â€​

(For the sake of convenience, the parties will be referred hereinafter as per their status in the trial Court.)

Plaintiff filed a suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction which was opposed by the State stating that plaintiff is neither entitled for

declaration of title nor for permanent injunction.

Learned trial Court eventually partly decreed the suit holding that plaintiff is only entitled for permanent injunction but not for declaration of title,

being aggrieved by which, plaintiff preferred an appeal under Section 96 of the CPC along with an application for condonation of delay explaining

therein the cause of filing the appeal with a delay of 163 days, but the first appellate Court did not found favour with the application for condonation of

delay and rejected it and consequently, by its impugned judgment and decree, dismissed the appeal also. Questioning the said judgment and decree of

the first appellate Court, this second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC has been preferred by the plaintiff in which substantial question of law has

been formulated and set out in the opening paragraph of this judgment.

Mr. Praveen Dhurandhar, learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff would submit that the finding recorded by the first appellate Court holding that

sufficient cause has not been shown by the plaintiff for condoning the delay of 163 days in filing the first appeal is perverse and contrary to the law

laid down by the Supreme Court in the matter of N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy (1998) 7 SCC 123, as such, the second appeal deserves to be

allowed by setting aside the judgment and decree of the first appellate Court.

On the other hand, Mr. Ravi Bhagat, learned State counsel, while supporting the impugned judgment and decree of the first appellate Court, would

submit that no sufficient cause has been shown by the plaintiff for filing the appeal with a delay of 163 days, as such, the second appeal deserves to be

dismissed.

I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein above and went through the records with utmost

circumspection.

The Supreme Court in N. Balakrishnan (supra) observed that sufficient cause has to be construed liberally especially when the delay is not

deliberate and mala fide. Paragraphs 11 and

12 of the report state as under :Â​

“11. Rule of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek

their remedy promptly. the object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. Law of limitation fixes a lifeÂ‐

span for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. During efflux of

time newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a life span must be fixed for each

remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. Law of limitation is thus founded on

public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be putt to litigation). Rules of

limitation are not meant to destroy the right of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy

promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time.

A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in

approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words ""sufficient cause"" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive

a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain Vs. Kuntal Kumari [AIR 1969 SC 57]5 and State of West Bengal

Vs. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality [AIR 1972 SC 749].â€​

Thus, applying the principle of law laid down by the Supreme Court in N. Balakrishnan (supra) which has been followed by their Lordships in

Bhivchandra Shankar More v. Balu Gangaram More and Ors. (2019) 6 SCC 38 7to the facts of the case at hand, it is the case of the plaintiff that he

was not informed about the decree of the trial Court by his counsel, therefore, he could not prefer the appeal right in time and that constitutes

sufficient cause for delay in filing the appeal, even otherwise, plaintiff would not get any benefit by not filing the appeal right in time as his suit was

only partly decreed by the trial Court. In the considered opinion of this Court, sufficient cause was shown by the plaintiff before the first appellate

Court for condoning the delay in filing the appeal.

Consequently, the instant second appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court is set aside; delay in

filing the appeal is condoned and the first appeal is restored to its original file for hearing and disposal on merits in accoradance with law before the

Court of 1st Additional Judge, Durg, preferably within a period of three months from the date of receipt of record and certified copy of this order. No

cost(s).

Registry is directed to return back the records to the first appellate Court forthwith.