Ramesh Bachubhai Parmar and 7 Ors. vs The State of Gujarat and Another

G.R. Udhwani, J.—Rule. The respondents waive service. Considering the short issue involved in the settlement between the petitioners and the second respondent, Rule is heard today by consent of the parties.

The petitioners are alleged to have committed an offence punishable under Sections 143, 147, 148, 149, 326, 324, 323, 341, 397, 427 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code (for short "IPC"). The petitioners and the second respondent have now settled the matter and the learned counsel for each of the parties while drawing attention of this Court to Nikhil Merchant Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation and Another, as also Jayrajsinh Digvijaysinh Rana Vs. State of Gujarat and Another, and Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Another, and Dimpey Gujral and Others Vs. Union Territory Through Administrator, U.T. Chandigarh and Others, would contend that the dispute being predominantly of private character and having arisen out of trivial incident amongst two friends, may be allowed to be settled and the complaint and connected proceedings may be quashed.

The learned APP while vehemently opposing the application would contend that a serious offence punishable u/s 397 of IPC is also alleged and the nature of offences alleged does not warrant compromise, and therefore, this Court may not exercise extraordinary powers u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short "Cr.P.C.").

Having considered the rival contentions as also series of decisions prior to and subsequent to Gian Singh (supra) the trend of the Courts is to let the parties to settle the matter mainly on either of the two considerations being (I) the dispute is predominantly of private nature; and (II) the dispute is civil in nature. In Gian Singh (supra), the Supreme Court has distinguished the powers of this Court under Sections 320 and 482 of Cr.P.C. as under:

The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal Court for compounding the offences u/s 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz.; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R. may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim''s family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and ''compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.

Thus, it is clear that the High Court u/s 482 of Cr.P.C. would be justified in its exercise of powers if (I) ends of justice needs to be secured; (II) abuse of process of the Court is required to be prevented. It was also pointed out that the category of cases where only such powers can be exercised will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The Hon''ble Supreme Court by way of illustration referred to certain serious cases which cannot be settled or compounded u/s 482 of Cr.P.C. Some of the illustrations of such cases are the heinous crimes like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. The learned APP while laying emphasis on such references made by the Hon''ble Supreme Court would contend that Section 397 of IPC having been invoked, it does not fall within the categories of suitable cases to be settled. True it is that such heinous crime would not qualify for settlement u/s 482 of Cr.P.C. However, what is required to be borne in mind is not mere provision, but the substance of the allegation and the circumstances under which such crime occurred. While in case of professional or hardened criminals whose only object of crime is to either rob or commit dacoity for their livelihood stand on a different footing than the cases in which incidental allegations of heinous crime are made. In the later category of cases, the test would be the main source wherefrom the dispute occurs. In the instant case, admittedly, there was a free fight between two parties and in a subsequent statement, the allegations for offence u/s 397 of IPC came to be made. The complainant did not emphasize on the offence u/s 397 of IPC at the inception. Thus, his main emphasis was on other offences referred to hereinabove. He has now by filing an affidavit even retracted the subsequent statement alleging offence u/s 397 of IPC. It is stated on affidavit that the victim and the petitioners are friends and desire to maintain relations as such. Thus, in peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, this appears to be appropriate case which can be allowed to be compromised u/s 482 of the Cr.P.C.

However, at the same time, undisputedly, the victim had to be hospitalized for a period of five days on account of injuries sustained by him on account of the incident. The petitioners by entering into the settlement with the complainant appear to have resolved their dispute, but they are also answerable to the society for having indulged into alleged acts. Therefore, while acknowledging the settlement on the basis of the compromise tendered by victim and the complainant, the cost of Rs. 1,000/- on each of the petitioners is required to be imposed. Such cost shall be paid by them to the first respondent. The petitioners to pay the cost of Rs. 1,000/- each to the first respondent. On deposit of such cost before the Trial Court and on production of acknowledgment thereof before the concerned Police Station, the complaint and other proceedings connected thereto shall stand quashed. Rule is made absolute.

Direct Service is permitted.