Ramesh Bishnoi @APPELLANT@Hash Union of India

The petitioner by way of filing this writ petition is claiming for the following reliefs :-

 “(i) writ petition may kindly be allowed with costs and the impugned order dated 16.01.2018 (communicated vide letter dated 17.01.2018)

(Annex.1) may kindly be quashed and set aside and the petitioner may kindly be directed to be sent for training, which has started a few days back

only.

(ii) Any other appropriate writ, order or direction which this Hon`ble Court deems just and proper may kindly be passed in favour of the petitioner.â€​

The facts as noticed by this Court are that the petitioner is seeking recruitment on the post of Sub-Inspector in Central Industrial Security Force

(CISF) in pursuance of advertisement dated 28.3.2015 issued by the Staff Selection Commission. The petitioner passed written examination and

physical endurance test and thus was selected and was offered appointment in Central Industrial Security Force vide offer of appointment dated

15.9.2016. The petitioner submitted the verification certificate signed by the Superintendent of Police, Bikaner, in which, it was categorically

mentioned that a chargesheet has been filed against the petitioner on 30.6.2009 in the court of MJM, Kolayat in FIR No.70/2009 for the offence under

Sections 354, 447 and 509 IPC pertaining to Police Station, Bajju, District Bikaner and the petitioner has been acquitted from the aforesaid offence on

24.11.2011. Such information was there in the verification certificate dated 30.9.2016. The petitioner was also required to submit Attestation Form,

in which, the petitioner clearly mentioned “YES†against the column of information regarding any previous conviction, thus, the petitioner rendered

all necessary information regarding criminal case as and when sought by the respondents and did not conceal any material fact.

Counsel for the petitioner categorically pointed out that the petitioner’s date of birth is 05.9.1991 and charge-sheet of criminal case was filed

on 30.6.2009 when the petitioner was minor. Counsel for the petitioner further pointed out that the allegation against the petitioner was that he teased

a girl and was harassing her for many days and even went to the extent of catching hold of her hand. Counsel for the petitioner stated that the girl and

her parents did not depose against the petitioner, hence, order of acquittal dated 24.11.2011 was passed. Counsel for the petitioner argued that the

respondents without taking into consideration the facts relating to acquittal and also there being no concealment on the part of petitioner, cancelled

his offer of appointment of vide order dated 03.6.2017, thus, the petitioner having left with no option preferred writ petition before this Court against

cancellation of offer of appointment, being S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.7522/2017, wherein following order was passed by this Court on 06.12.2017;Â

operative portion reads as follows :-

“3. This Court confines that Avtar Singh (supra) is the latest precedent law governing the field, hence, it would be appropriate to dispose of the

matter with a direction to the respondents to consider case of petitioner strictly in light of the guidelines given in Avtar Singh (supra).

The decision shall be taken by the respondents within a periodof 15 days from today. In case the petitioner is found entitled, he shall be given

training alongwith the ongoing training course.â€​

4. The outcome of disposal of earlier writ petition was that the respondents were required to consider petitioner’s case within the parameters of

precedent law of Avtar Singh as well as the policy/guidelines of respondents. Counsel for the petitioner further pointed out that MHA policy/

guidelines formulated by the respondents dated 01.2.2012 (Annex.R/2) stipulates that a candidate shall not be debarred if he/she has been finally

acquitted/discharged by a Court from the offences in-question. Counsel for the petitioner laid emphasis on Clause 2(VI) of the guidelines. The

relevant portion of MHA Policy Guidelines dated 01.2.2012 reads as follows :

“2 (VI). Involvement in minor offences, traffic violations, juvenile in conflict with law (tried in open courts/Juvenile Justice Boards) and accident

cases will not debar any individual for appointment in CAPFs & ARs provided that appointments for the post of Driver and those related to driving will

not be offered to the individuals, punished for serious traffic offences.â€​

Counsel for the petitioner also pointed out from the same Policy the offences coming under the head of ‘Moral Turpitude’, as follows :

“MORAL TURPITUDE

Moral Turpitude refers to a conduct that shocks the public conscience and a crime of moral turpitude is inherently base, vile or depraved, contrary to

social stands of morality and done with reckless, malicious or evil intent. The following crimes shall definitely be construed as acts of moral

turpitude :

(a) Murder

(b) Voluntary man slaughter

(c) Rape

(d) Domestic violence

(e) Prostitution

(f) Blackmail

(g) Malicious destruction of property

(h) Arson

(i) Alien smuggling

(j) Harbouring a fugitive

(k) Bribery

(l) Perjuryâ€​

Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the petitioner’s alleged act does not fall within the domain of Moral Turpitude offences mentioned in the

Policy. Counsel for the petitioner thereafter pointed out that the respondents dismissed the consideration on three counts vide its order dated 16.1.2018

(Annex.1), which reads as follows :

“(i) He has merely been acquitted from criminal charges due to lack of adequate evidence and compromise as all the complainants and witnesses

turned hostile.

(ii) The offence in the charge-sheet U/Ss.354 & 447 IPC, falls in the category of serious offence. MHA guidelines says that “though later on

acquitted by extending benefit of doubt or acquitted for reasons that the witnesses have turned hostile due to fear of reprisal by the accused person(s),

he/she will generally not be considered suitable for appointment in the CAPF. iii) As per Para.30(5) of JO dated 21.07.2016 in SLP (C)No.

20525/2011 (Avtar Singh Vs. UoI and Ors.) wherein at Para.30(5) the Hon`ble Supreme Court has authorized the Department to consider the

antecedents and the department cannot be compelled to appoint the candidate even when he has made declaration truthfully of a concluded criminal

case.â€​

As regards the first reason “acquitted from criminal charges due to lack of adequate evidence and compromise†counsel for the petitioner argued

that this reason could not have been considered by the Screening Committee because the Policy of respondents itself makes it clear that a candidate

shall not be debarred if he/she has been finally acquitted/discharged by a competent court. As per counsel for the petitioner the second reason

mentioned is “the offence in the charge-sheet U/Ss.354 & 447 IPC, falls in the category of serious offence†which as per the Policy of

respondents do not fall within the domain of offence affecting moral turpitude. Learned counsel for petitioner has further submitted that Avtar Singh

gives leverage to check antecedents of a candidate, whereas antecedents of the petitioner has not at all been called for by the respondents to show

that there was any past criminal antecedent besides the instant case which disqualifies the petitioner from the appointment. Counsel for the

petitioner has further emphasized on the fact that the application of mind by the Screening Committee is contrary to the norms, which has to be

followed by the respondents and further stated that MHA Policy/ Guidelines clearly bifurcate juvenile offenders and gives protection to them and

states that a juvenile who has come in conflict with law and has been dealt with under the provisions of Juvenile Justice Act, she/she shall not suffer

any disqualification on account of conviction in an offence under the said law.

Counsel for the respondents vehemently opposed the submissions made by counsel for the petitioner by stating that a clear application of policy and

precedent law of Avtar Singh is reflected from the decision given by Screening Committee vide order dated 16.01.2018 (Annex.1) wherein

petitioner’s case was re-examined on 02.1.2018 and a recommendation was made that the petitioner is unsuitable for appointment in CISF, a

uniform force. To strengthen his argument, learned counsel for the respondents relied upon latest decision of Hon`ble Supreme Court rendered in the

case of Union Territory, Chandigarh Administration & Ors. Vs. Pradeep Kumar & Anr. (Civil Appeal No.67 of 2018, decided on 08.1.2018), the

relevant portion of which reads as follows :

“15. From the above details, we find that the Screening Committee examined each and every case of the Respondents and reasonings for their

acquittal and taken the decision. While deciding whether a person involved in a criminal case has been acquitted or discharged should be appointed to

a post in a police force, nature of offence in which he is involved, whether it was an honourable acquittal or only an extension of benefit of doubt

because of witnesses turned hostile and flaws in the prosecution are all the aspects to be considered by the Screening Committee for taking the

decision whether the candidate is suitable for the post. As pointed out earlier, the Screening Committee examined each and every case and reasonings

for their acquittal and took decision that the Respondents are not suitable for the post of Constable in Chandigarh Police. The procedure followed is as

per guideline 2(A)(b) and object of such screening is to ensure that only persons with impeccable character enters police force. While so, the court

cannot substitute its views for the decision of the Screening Committee.

On behalf of the Respondents, much reliance was placedupon Joginder Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh and Ors. (2015) 2 SCC 377. In the

said case, the Appellant thereon was charged Under Sections 148, 149, 323, 325 and 307 Indian Penal Code but acquitted by the trial court holding

that the prosecution has failed to prove the charges levelled against him since complainant as well as injured eye witnesses failed to identify the

assailants and the complainant had stated that his signature was obtained on a blank sheet by the Investigating Officer. The case involved was a

family dispute. In such facts and circumstances, this Court held that acquittal of Appellant Joginder Singh was an honourable acquittal and hence, he

should not be denied appointment to the post in question. The decision in Joginder Singh case does not advance the case of the Respondents herein.

In a catena of judgments, the importance of integrity andhigh standard of conduct in police force has been emphasized. As held in Mehar Singh

case, the decision of the Screening Committee must be taken as final unless it is mala fide. In the case in hand, there is nothing to suggest that the

decision of the Screening Committee is mala fide. The decision of the Screening Committee that the Respondents are not suitable for being appointed

to the post of Constable does not call for interference. The Tribunal and the High Court, in our view, erred in setting aside the decision of the

Screening Committee and the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside.

In the result, the impugned judgment is set aside and theappeals are allowed. The cancellation of candidature of the Respondents is upheld. No

costs.â€​

Counsel for the respondents argued that since no malafide has been attributed to the Screening Committee, then the decision of Screening Committee

must be taken as final and ought not to interfered with by the Courts. Central Industrial Security Force being disciplinary force and the post of Sub-

Inspector demands an impeccable integrity and track record besides good character and suitability. Once deficiency in character has been noted by

the Screening Committee, then appointment can’t be given. Counsel for the respondents further justified that offence under Sections 354 & 447

IPC are of such nature that it would amount to have an impact upon the life of petitioner. Counsel for the respondents argued that each and every

aspect of the matter was taken into consideration by the Screening Committee in light of Avtar Singh’s case and policy/guidelines of MHA and

even if disclosure has been made truthfully, then too, an employer has a right to consider fitness of a candidate. Under such circumstance even if

petitioner’s acquittal is honourable, then too, the petitioner is not entitled for any relief from this Court. Counsel for the respondents has drawn

attention of Court to non-obstante clause (iii) and (v). Clause (iii) shall not apply in the case where acquittal is given by giving benefit of doubt and

offences are serious as per Schedule-A. Counsel for the respondents has shown AnnexureA-Sections of Indian Penal Code concerning serious

offences/moral turpitude, which categorically includes Section 354 IPC as serious offence. In rejoinder, learned counsel for the petitioner stated that

Policy itself says that where the Appointing Authority is of the opinion that it is necessary or expedient to do so, it may after consultation with the

Ministry of Home Affairs, by order, for reasons to be recorded in writing, relax any of the provisions of this Policy with respect to any individual, class

or category of individuals. Thus, the respondents ought to have excluded juvenile offender from conflict of law.

After hearing learned counsel for the parties and perusing record of case, particularly, Police/Guidelines of MHA, this Court is of the opinion that

the petitioner, who was a minor, probably teased a girl and went to the extent of catching hold of her hand and finally the girl and her parents decided

to pardon the boy by not giving any evidence against him resulting into acquittal of the petitioner. This Court finds that the respondents while passing

impugned order 16.1.2018 (Annex.1) have not adhered to the Policy on the face of it and, therefore, in light of precedent law of Avtar Singh the

respondents were required to make application of mind in accordance with their own Policy. The judgment cited by counsel for the respondents will

not apply in the present case as here the result of Screening Committee is directly in conflict with Policy of the respondents to deal with such situation,

which is a standard policy, uniformly applicable to recruitment of candidates on the post of Sub-Inspector in CISF. Out of the three reasons

summarized by the Screening Committee it its impugned order, the petitioner has been disqualified on account of acquittal being not honourable,

whereas already this Court has taken note of the fact that the Policy itself states that if a person has been finally acquitted, then his recruitment could

be considered. Charge-sheet for the offence under Sections 354 and 447 of IPC falls in the category of serious offence as mentioned in Annex.A but

ultimately petitioner cannot be made to suffer disqualification on account of merely charges being levelled against him for the offence under Sections

354 & 447 IPC.   This Court also notes that the precedent law of Avtar Singh requires the respondents to consider antecedents. In the instant

case, the Screening Committee failed to call for antecedents, except the one, to support disqualification of the petitioner. More so, petitioner had been

acquitted long before the recruitment process and he disclosed each and every fact regarding criminal case to the respondents as and when required.

The policy of the respondents not to penalize the juveniles also clearly helps the petitioner. That being so, the impugned order dated 16.1.2018

(communicated vide letter dated 17.01.2018) (Annex.1) is quashed and set aside; the respondents are directed to activate offer of appointment of the

petitioner earlier made to the petitioner for the post of Sub-Inspector in Central Industrial Security Force. The order may be operated upon within a

period of thirty days from today and all notional benefits shall be prospectively given.