Ramesh Dutt, Driver vs Delhi Transport Corporation And Others

S.N. Terdal, Member (J)

We have heard Ms. Jasvinder Kaur, counsel for applicant and Ms. Mona Sinha for Ms. Ruchira Gupta, counsel for respondents, perused the pleadings and all the documents produced by both the parties.

In this OA, the applicant has prayed for the following reliefs:

"1. May quash and set aside the impugned order of punishment dated 14.09.09 in view of order of acquittal dated 23.09.2013;

May quash and set aside the impugned orders dated 01.01.2016 being passed by an incompetent authority.

May direct the Respondents to release the increment withheld under order of punishment and fix pay and allowances of the applicant and pay arrears of pay for the period of suspension which were withheld on account of pending criminal case against applicant. Also to grant financial upgradation under MACP/ ACP Scheme which has been with held on account of punishment awarded to applicant.

May direct the respondents to pay penal interest on the delayed payment of dues including arrears of pay and allowances.

May allow the present OA with costs in favour of applicant."

The relevant facts of the case are that on the allegation that the applicant being the driver of the DTC bus caused accident to one pedestrian and later on he took him and admitted him at trauma centre Safdarjung Hospital and also that he did not inform his office regarding the said incident, a charge sheet was issued to him vide order dated 19.02.2009. The detailed chare sheet is extracted below:-

"It is expected you to explain as to why for the following irregularities disciplinary action be not taken against you, under DTC (Amended) Act, 1971 Rule 4 (e) read with DTC (Appointment & Terms of Service Condition) Rule, 1952, Rule 15 (2).

That on 12.01.2009 when you were on duty Bus no. 9850 duty no. 423/15 at Khanpur T point (Ambedkar Nagar) you accidented one pedestrian one Mr. Nanhe Khan s/o Asmin Khan r/o D-259, JJ Colony Khanpur and got him admitted at trauma centre Safdarjung Hospital but he died on 14.01.2009.

You did not inform your office regarding this incident but came to know upon service of notice u/section 133 MV Act from PS Ambedkar Nagar. According to that notice an FIR No. 13/09 u/section 279/304A IPC was registered against you.

It is clear from the above that you drove the vehicle negligently and concealed the facts from the corporation. Had you been driving the vehicle cautiously and within speed limit the fatal accident could be avoided.

You above act amounts to violation of para__of working orders related to duties of Drivers/ Co drivers and misconduct within the meaning of Para 4 & 19 (H), (M) & (K) of Standing Orders related to Conduct of DTC Employees......."

Alongwith the charge sheet, list of witnesses and list of documents were served on the applicant. As the applicant did not admit the charge, an Inquiry Officer was appointed. The Inquiry Officer following the principles of natural justice as well as the rules governing the holding of the departmental enquiry conduced the departmental enquiry and examined the witnesses and took on record the evidence and after analyzing and discussing the deposition came to the conclusion that the charges leveled against the applicant were proved vide his inquiry report. Copy of the inquiry report was served on the applicant. A show cause notice was also issued to the applicant to enable him to file reply to the inquiry report. The applicant filed his reply to the inquiry report on 09/10-09-2009. After considering the entire case and also going through the reply filed by the applicant, the disciplinary authority imposed the penalty of forfeiture of one year increment with cumulative effect vide order dated 14.09.2009. The applicant filed an appeal. The appellate authority also after going through the entire evidence and taking into account all the points raised by the applicant in his appeal rejected the appeal vide order dated 01.01.2016.

The counsel for the applicant vehemently and strenuously submitted that the applicant never draw the vehicle in either rash or in negligent manner and there is no allegation of rash or negligent driving by the applicant and the applicant simply helped the pedestrian old man who fell down while crossing the road whereas all these aspects are not considered by the inquiry officer and only on the assumption and presumption he submitted a perverse finding holding that the charges leveled against the applicant were proved. She further submitted that on the same set of facts a criminal case was registered against him and in the said criminal case he was acquitted by the order of the Metropolitan Magistrate-04 South, New Delhi vide judgment dated 23.09.2013 in FIR No. 13/09 U/s 279/304 A IPC and as such the inquiry report be set aside and subsequent punishment order and the order of the appellate authority be set aside.

The counsel for the respondents equally vehemently submitted that there are two charges leveled against the applicant and one is regarding accident caused and taking the victim to the trauma Safdarjung Hospital and the other is not informing the said accident to the official superior and after following the principles of natural justice and giving the applicant reasonable opportunity and following the rules governing the holding of the departmental enquiry, the inquiry officer has come to the conclusion after analyzing the evidence before him and as such the inquiry report is neither perverse nor based on assumption and presumption. Even when we enquired from the counsel for the applicant regarding violation of any of the rules for holding of departmental enquiry she did not point out any violation of any procedural rules.

The law relating to judicial review by the Tribunal in the departmental enquiries has been laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the following judgments:

(1). In the case of K.L.Shinde Vs. State of Mysore (1976) 3 SCC 76), the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 9 observed as under:-

"9. Regarding the appellant's contention that there was no evidence to substantiate the charge against him, it may be observed that neither the High Court nor this Court can re-examine and re-assess the evidence in writ proceedings. Whether or not there is sufficient evidence against a delinquent to justify his dismissal from service is a matter on which this Court cannot embark. It may also be observed that departmental proceedings do not stand on the same footing as criminal prosecutions in which high degree of proof is required. It is true that in the instant case reliance was placed by the Superintendent of Police on the earlier statements made by the three police constables including Akki from which they resiled but that did not vitiate the enquiry or the impugned order of dismissal, as departmental proceedings are not governed by strict rules of evidence as contained in the Evidence Act. That apart, as already stated, copies of the statements made by these constables were furnished to the appellant and he cross-examined all of them with the help of the police friend provided to him. It is also significant that Akki admitted in the course of his statement that he did make the former statement before P. S. I. Khada-bazar police station, Belgaum, on November 21, 1961 (which revealed appellant's complicity in the smuggling activity) but when asked to explain as to why he made that statement, he expressed his inability to do so. The present case is, in our opinion, covered by a decision of this Court in State of Mysore v. Shivabasappa, (1963) 2 SCR 943=AIR 1963 SC 375 where it was held as follows:-

"Domestic tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions are not courts and therefore, they are not bound to follow the procedure prescribed for trial of actions in courts nor are they bound by strict rules of evidence. They can, unlike courts, obtain all information material for the points under enquiry from all sources, and through all channels, without being fettered by rules and procedure which govern proceedings in court. The only obligation which the law casts on them is that they should not act on any information which they may receive unless they put it to the party against who it is to be used and give him a fair opportunity to explain it. What is a fair opportunity must depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, but where such an opportunity has been given, the proceedings are not open to attack on the ground that the enquiry was not conducted in accordance with the procedure followed in courts.

In respect of taking the evidence in an enquiry before such tribunal, the person against whom a charge is made should know the evidence which is given against him, so that he might be in a position to give his explanation.

When the evidence is oral, normally the explanation of the witness will in its entirety, take place before the party charged who will have full opportunity of cross-examining him. The position is the same when a witness is called, the statement given previously by him behind the back of the party is put to him ,and admitted in evidence, a copy thereof is given to the party and he is given an opportunity to cross-examine him. To require in that case that the contents of the previous statement should be repeated by the witness word by word and sentence by sentence, is to insist on bare technicalities and rules of natural justice are matters not of form but of substance. They are sufficiently complied with when previous statements given by witnesses are read over to them, marked on their admission, copies thereof given to the person charged and he is given an opportunity to cross-examine them."

Again in the case of B.C.Chaturvedi Vs. UOI & Others (AIR 1996 SC 484) at para 12 and 13, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:-

"12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in eye of the Court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of a misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice be complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent office is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal on its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at the own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry of where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case.

The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has co-extensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H. C. Goel (1964) 4 SCR 718 : (AIR 1964 SC 364), this Court held at page 728 (of SCR): (at p 369 of AIR), that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence, reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued".

Recently in the case of Union of India and Others Vs. P.Gunasekaran (2015(2) SCC 610), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:-

"Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re-appreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge no. I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into re-appreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether:

a. the enquiry is held by competent authority;

b. the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf;

c. there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings;

d. the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case;

e. the authorities have allowed themselves to be influence by irrelevant or extraneous consideration;

f. the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion;

g the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence;

h. the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding;

i. the finding of fact is based on no evidence."

In view of the facts of the case narrated above and in view of the law laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above and in view of the fact that the counsel for the applicant has not brought to our notice violation of any procedural rules or principles of natural justice, the OA requires to be dismissed.

Accordingly, OA is dismissed. No order as to costs.