Ramesh Kumar Chawla vs State of Punjab

B. Rai, J.

This petition under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure has been filed by Ramesh Kumar Chawla for quashing FIR No. 35 dated 12.6.1994 under Sections 465/468/471/209/193/120B IPC (Annexure P1) registered at Police Station City Fazilka and subsequent order dated 2.9.1996 (Annexure P2) passed by learned Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class, Fazilka framing the charges against the petitioner and respondents No. 2 to 11 under Sections 468/471/120B and appellate order dated 6.5.1997 (Annexure P3) passed by the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Fazilka dismissing the appeal of the petitioner.

Brief facts of the case are that Keshap Chander Setia was the owner of a house measuring about 14 marlas in the revenue estate of village Panchanwalli, Mohalla Hazur Singh near Bus Stand, Fazilka. There was civil litigation in respect of said house between Keshap Chander Setia and Vijay Kumar and others. Vijay Kumar filed Civil Suit No. 384/1 dated 25.7.1989 titled as Vijay Kumar v. Keshap Chandar and other while civil suit No. 383/1 dated 12.6.1991 was filed by Roshan Lal titled as Roshan Lal v. Keshap Chandar. Suit filed by Vijay Kumar was for possession of residential house by way of specific performance of agreement for sale dated 24.4.1987. The suit filed by Roshan Lal was also for specific performance of the agreement dated 31.12.1986 entered into with him by defendant No. 1 for the sale of house in dispute. Both the said suits were ordered to be decided together as the decision of civil suit No. 383 of 12.6.1991 depended upon civil suit No. 383 of 25.7.1989. While civil suit No. 384/1 dated 25.7.1989 tilted as Vijay Kumar v. Keshap Chander and others was decreed by the learned Additional Senior SubJudge, Abohar vide his judgment and decree dated 26.10.1991, civil suit No. 383/1 dated 12.6.1991 was dismissed with costs. After the suit of Vijay Kumar was decreed he lodged FIR No. 35 dated 12.6.1994 against Ramesh Kumar Chawla and respondents 2 and 11. The case was investigated and final report under Section 173 of Code of Criminal Procedure was submitted in the court of Illaqa Magistrate. Charges under sections 468/471/120B were framed vide order dated 2.9.1996. The order framing the charge was challenged in the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Ferozepur by way of revision petition but that revision petition was dismissed vide judgment dated 6.5.1997. Petitioner feeling aggrieved by the FIR and the orders passed has come to this Court with the present petition.

It was argued by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that in view of the provisions of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the learned Magistrate should not have taken cognizance of the offences complained of. It was further argued that once the agreement to sell dated 31.12.1986 entered into between Keshap Chandar Setia with Roshan Lal and others, alleged to be forged one, was produced in the Court, only that court had the jurisdiction to file a complaint with regard to the alleged forgery and no other person had any jurisdiction to lodge the complaint in that regard much less to get the case registered. According to the learned Counsel the police should have not registered the case and put up the challan after investigation in the Court. If, at all, the challan was presented the trial Court after it had come to its notice that agreement of a sale dated 31.12.1986 had already been produced in the Court should not have taken cognizance of the report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. and framed the charges. That aspect was not considered even by the learned Additional Sessions Judge before whom the order framing the charges had been challenged in revision. It was strenuously argued that the agreement to sell dated 31.12.1986 was produced in the civil court during the trial of the civil suits. Not only this, the trial Court while deciding the suits; one filed by Vijay Kumar and the other filed by Roshan Lal did not record any finding that agreement to sell dated 31.12.1986 was a forged document. Even any observation to that effect was not made as is apparent from the judgment dated 26.10.1991, Annexure P4. It was submitted that viewed from any angle the FIR No. 35 dated 12.6.1994 (Annexure P1), order dated 2.9.1996 (Annexure P2) framing the charges and the order dated 6.5.1997 (Annexure P3) passed by the revisional court and other proceedings taken in the matter deserve to the quashed. In support of his assertions the learned Counsel relied upon Surjit Singh v. Balbir Singh, 1996(3) RCR 240 and Bhan Singh v. State of Punjab, 1996(3) RCR 679.

On the other hand the learned Counsel for Vijay Kumar, respondent No. 2A and Mr. Amol Rattan Sidhu, learned DAG Punjab appearing on behalf of the State have put in strenuous efforts to oppose the prayers made.

I have given my thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions and have perused the records.

Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure deals with prosecution for contempt of lawful authority of public servants, for offences against public justice and for offences relating to documents given in evidence. Section 195(1)(b)(ii) provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence described in Section 463 or punishable under Section 471, Section 475 or Section 476, of the said Code, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court; or

Before Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the new Code comes into play three pre requisites are necessary :

(a) Offence should be described as in Section 463 or punishable under Sections 471, 475 and 476 of the Indian Penal Code.

(b) Such an offence should have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence; and

(c) Such production or giving in evidence should be in a proceeding in any Court.

The offence which is made punishable under Section 467 IPC is in respect of an offence described in Section 463 IPC. Section 463 defines forgery and Section 467 provides punishment for the offence of forgery of a particular category as has been observed in Karnail Singh and another v. State of Punjab, 1983(1) RCR 38 (DB) . In Budhu Ram v. State of Rajasthan, 1963(3) SCR 376, their Lordships of the Supreme Court considered the scope of section 195 and held as under :

"It will be seen on a plain grammatical construction of this provision that a complaint by the Court is required where the offence is of forging or if using as genuine any document which is known or believed to be a forged document when such document is produced or given in evidence in Court. It is clear, therefore, that it is only when the forged document is produced in Court that a complaint by the Court is required. Where, however, what is produced before the Court is not the forged document itself, Section 195(1)(c) will not apply on its terms. The reasons for this, as stated by the Judicial Committee, is the practical common sense of the matter, for the Court before which a copy of a document is produced is not really in a position to express any opinion on the genuineness of the original. Therefore, even if the Assistant Settlement Officer is assumed to be a Court within the meaning of Section 195(1) no complaint was necessary because the forged document itself was not produced before the Assistant Settlement Officer in this case but only a copy thereof."

In the present case it was held that since the copy of the document was produced, Section 195 of the Code was not a bar to lay private complaint. In Sushil Kumar v. State of Haryana, 1988(1) R.C.R. (Crl.) 113 : AIR 1988 SC 419 the question was when a copy of the original document is produced and private complaint is laid on the basis of a copy of the forged document, whether bar of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) gets attracted. The Hon''ble Supreme Court held that until the original document is produced in the Court there is no bar of Section 195 and that, therefore, private complaint was held not a bar. In the case in hand it has nowhere been pleaded by the petitioner that original agreement alleged to have been forged was filed and as such only the Court had the jurisdiction to file a complaint by itself or by someone else on its behalf as provided under Section 340 of Criminal Procedure Code and no private complaint could be filed or that case could not be got registered. A careful reading of judgment dated 26.10.1991 by the Court of learned Additional Senior SubJudge, Abohar, Annexure P4 would show that in paras 23 and 27, it has been specifically stated that only photostat copy, Exhibit D1 of the agreement dated 31.12.1986 was produced in the Court and not the original agreement alleged to have been forged. Therefore, I am of the considered view that the bar created by Section 195(1)(b)(ii) is not attracted as held by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Budhu Ram''s and Sushil Kumar''s cases (supra). On facts the decisions relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner are not applicable in the instant case.

It was next argued by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the criminal proceedings have been initiated after the period of limitation and no reason for the delay has been furnished by the complainant and as such criminal proceedings against the petitioner are barred by limitation prescribed under Section 468 Cr.P.C. Therefore, the orders Annexures P2 and P3 are not sustainable in the eyes of law. There is neither any substance nor force in the contention raised. The offences complained of are under Sections 468/471 and 120B IPC. Offence under Section 468 IPC is punishable with imprisonment for seven years and fine. Same punishment has been provided for the offence punishable under Section 471 IPC. Section 468 of Code of Criminal Procedure reads as under :

"468. Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation (1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code, no Court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in Subsection (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation.

(2) The period of limitation shall be :

(a) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only;

(b) one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year;

(c) three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years.

(3) For the purpose of this section, the period of limitation, in relation to offences which may be tried together, shall be determined with reference to the offence which is punishable with the more severe punishment, or as the case may be, the most severe punishment."

A plain reading of Section 468 Cr.P.C. would show that no limitation has prescribed for the offences punishable for a term exceeding three years. Therefore the contention raised is repelled.

No other point has been raised or canvassed before me. Consequently the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. fails and is dismissed.