Ramesh Singh vs State of Orissa

S.K. Sahoo, J.—The Appellant faced trial in the Court of Learned 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Puri in S.T. Case No. 14/664 of 2002 for commission of the offence punishable under Section 302 I.P.C. for committing murder of one Pabitra Kumar Samantray (hereinafter ''the deceased'') on 27/28.6.2002 night at about 2 a.m. at Nua bazaar & also under Section 379 I.P.C. for committing theft of the motorcycle of the deceased bearing Regn. No. OR-13-3419. The Learned Trial Court vide impugned Judgment & Order Dated 23.7.2004 convicted the Appellant under Section 302, I.P.C., & sentenced him to under go R.I. for imprisonment for life & also convicted him under Section 379 I.P.C. & sentenced him to undergo R.I. for one year. Both the sentences were directed to run concurrently. On 28.6.2002 one Dhusasan Samantray (P.W. 7), who is the natural father of the deceased lodged an F.I.R. before the Officer-in-Charge of Gop Police Station stating therein that on 27/28.6.2002 night at about 2.00 a.m. he received a telephone call from one Braja Kishore Routray (P.W. 5) that the Appellant after committing theft of the motorcycle of the deceased bearing Regn. No. OR-13-3419 from the cashew nut camp, Nua bazaar was proceeding on that motor cycle & on the way he met an accident at Balighai square & leaving the motor cycle at the accident site, he escaped. Getting such news, P.W. 7 proceeded to the spot i.e., the cashew nut camp site, Nuabazar & found on the way that the motorcycle of the deceased was lying at Balighai square. He then proceeded to Nuabazar camp site & found the deceased lying there with bleeding injuries. A vegetable cutter & a laterite stone having bloodstains were also lying close to the deceased at the spot. The deceased was immediately shifted by Pravakar Chhotray (P.W. 18) & Prasanta Kumar Patsahani @ Abua (P.W. 15) to District Headquarters Hospital, Puri on a motorcycle. The informant ascertained from inquiry that during the evening hours on 27.6.2002 the deceased along with P.W. 15, P.W. 18, Kalandi Singh (P.W. 3), Padmanav Singh (P.W. 4), Sanjaya Singh (P.W. 2) & the Appellant had organized a feast which lasted upto 11 O''clock in the night & thereafter the Appellant & the deceased slept in the camp house & others returned back to their camps. The Appellant after committing theft of the motorcycle of the deceased was proceeding towards Balighai at a fast speed & on the way near F.C.I., Bazar, he was obstructed by one Kartik Singh & Bijaya Singh but he did not stop there & proceeded ahead & ultimately met with an accident at Balighai square. Suspecting that the Appellant had committed murder of the deceased by means of the vegetable cutter & laterite stone & also committed theft of the motorcycle of the deceased, the F.I.R. was lodged. At the time of lodging of the F.I.R., the deceased was hospitalized in a critical condition at S.C.B. Medical College & Hospital, Cuttack.

The F.I.R. was registered vide Gop P.S. Case No. 93 of 2002 under Sections 307 & 379, I.P.C. After registration of the F.I.R. by the Officer-in-Charge of Gop Police Station, P.W. 17 Pandab Behera, A.S.I. of Police was directed by the O.I.C. to investigate the matter. P.W. 17 examined the witnesses, visited the spot which is Nuabazar area situated on Puri-Konark marine drive road & prepared the spot map (Ext. 12). He also issued requisition to the Scientific Officer, D.F.S.L. who collected & examined the blood stained earth, big piece of stone, three mattresses, napkin stained with blood, laterite stone, full pant, Chadi & a pair of shoe & thereafter P.W. 17 seized all these materials from the room where the deceased was lying with bleeding injuries under seizure list (Ext. 2). Apart from other things, the motorcycle of the deceased was also seized from Balighai Chhak under seizure list (Ext. 4). The Appellant was arrested on 29.06.2002 & his nail clippings & pant were also seized under seizure list (Ext. 6). On 3.7.2002 P.W. 17 received information from Mangalabag Police Station regarding death of the deceased on 1.7.2002 & accordingly the case was converted to one under Section 302 I.P.C., & P.W. 17 handed over the charge of investigation to P.W. 20, the Officer-in-Charge of Gop Police Station. P.W. 20 sent requisition to the I.I.C. Mangalabag Police Station for submission of case diary in connection with Mangalabag P.S.U.D. Case No. 559 of 2002, He also sent V.H.F. message to the R.T.O. Puri for furnishing the detailed particulars of the seized motorcycle bearing Regn. No. OR-13-3419. After receipt of the case diary, post-mortem examination report, inquest report, dead body challan, three sealed packets containing blood, nail clipping & hair from Mangalabag Police Station in the aforesaid U.D. Case on 5.10.2002, P.W. 20 made a query to the doctor to explain about the discrepancies found in the injury report vis-a-vis the post-mortem report & obtained the reply. On 20.10.2002 P.W. 20 made a prayer to the J.M.F.C. Nimapara for sending the exhibits to the S.F.S.L. Rasulgarh & accordingly the exhibits were sent on 24.10.2002. After completion of investigation, charge sheet was submitted against the Appellant under Sections 379 & 302 I.P.C.

The defence plea was one of denial & it was pleaded by the Appellant that due to previous enmity with Kalu Singh (P.W. 3), he has been falsely entangled in the case.

In order to prove its case, the prosecution examined 20 witnesses.

P.W. 1 Dibakar Jena stated to have received information from Braja Kishore Routray (P.W. 5) over telephone that the deceased was lying with bleeding injuries in front of a camp house near Nua bazaar on the Marine Drive road & also regarding the motorcycle accident of the Appellant at Balighai Chhak. He further stated to have noticed the motorcycle lying in a damaged condition at Baligahi & also the deceased lying in a bleeding condition in the camp at Nua bazaar. He spotted a big stone stained with blood & a vegetable cutter also stained with blood lying at the spot. He further stated about shifting of the deceased from the spot to District Headquarters Hospital, Puri.

P.W. 2 Sanjaya Singh, P.W. 3 Kalandi Singh & P.W. 4 Padmanav Singh had participated in the feast & they stated that the Appellant & the deceased remained in the camp house after the feast was over while others had left the place. They further stated to have come to the camp house receiving information regarding commission of theft of the motorcycle of the deceased & noticed one stone & vegetable cutter lying at the spot.

P.W. 5 Braja Kishore Routray had found the deceased lying in a pool of blood with serious injuries at camp house.

P.W. 6 Gagan Bihari Roy is a witness to the seizure of blood stained earth, mats & vegetable cutter etc. from the camp house under seizure lists (Exts. 1 & 2). P.W. 7 Dhusasan Samantray is the natural father of the deceased & he is the informant in the case. P.W. 8 Jayant Kumar Maharatha is also a witness to the seizure of different articles under seizure list (Exts. 1 & 2) & motor cycle at Balighai Chhak under seizure list (Ext. 4).

P.W. 9 Dhadu Singh is a witness to the seizure of pant of the Appellant under seizure list (Ext. 5).

P.W. 10 Sadhu Charan Muduli stated that a motor cycle was lying at Balighai Chhak after the accident. P.W. 11 Shyam Sundar Behera stated to have seen the damaged motorcycle lying at Baligahi Chhak. P.W. 12 Dusasan Sahoo is a witness to the accident of the motorcycle at Baligahi Chhak. P.W. 13 Kailash Chandra Majhi is a witness to the seizure of the nail clippings of the Appellant by the Investigating Officer under seizure list (Ext. 6).

P.W. 14 Dr. Prabhat Kumar Sahu examined the deceased at District Headquarters Hospital, Puri & noticed a lacerated wound on the left side parietal region so also a depressed fracture on the skull bone. He had referred the deceased to S.C.B. Medical College & Hospital, Cuttack on the same day. He also proved the injury report of the deceased vide Ext. 7 & also the query report vide Ext. 8/3 which was made by the I.O. regarding the possibility of injuries on the deceased by the vegetable cutter & laterite stone.

P.W. 15 Prasanta Patsahani & P.W. 18 Pravakar Chhotray had participated in the feast & further stated that the Appellant & the deceased stayed in the camp house after the feast was over & he further stated to have proceeded to the spot hearing about the motorcycle accident as well as the injured condition of the deceased & noticed the deceased in a bleeding condition & a stone & the vegetable cuter with blood stains lying at the spot. Both of them shifted the deceased in that injured condition to Puri Government Hospital in a motorcycle. P.W. 16 Subhendra Kumar Behera was the A.S.I. of police attached to Mangalabag Police Station who had conducted inquest over the dead body vide inquest report (Ext. 9) & had sent the dead body for post-mortem examination & also collected the sealed packets containing blood, nail & hair of the deceased from the doctor after the post-mortem examination vide seizure list (Ext. 11). P.W. 19 Dr. Braja Kishore Das conducted the autopsy over the dead body of the deceased at S.C.B. Medical College & Hospital, Cuttack & he opined that the cause of death is due to cranio-cerebral injury. P.W. 17 & P.W. 20 are the Investigating Officers of the crime.

Admittedly in this case there is no direct evidence as to who committed the crime, when it was committed or how it was committed. The case rests upon circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence is evidence of relevant facts from which, one can, by process of intuitive reasoning, infer about the existence of facts in issue or factum probandum. It is aptly said that "man may tell lies, but circumstances do not" but we should not forget that circumstances can be created/concocted/planted in order to falsely entangle a person on mere suspicion. In the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda Vs. State of Maharashtra, , their Lordships have laid down five golden principles so as to constitute "Panchsheel" in the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence which are as follows:

The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established;

The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty;

The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature & tendency;

They should exclude every, possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, &

There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused & must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused."

In the case of Jaharlal Das Vs. State of Orissa, , it is held as follows:

"The Court has to bear in mind a caution that in cases depending largely upon circumstantial evidence, there is always a danger that the conjecture or suspicion may take the place of legal proof & such suspicion however so strong cannot be allowed to take the place of proof. The Court has to be watchful & ensure that conjectures & suspicions do not take the place of legal proof. The Court must satisfy itself that the various circumstances in the chain of evidence should be established clearly & that the completed chain must be such as to rule out a reasonable likelihood of the innocence of the accused".

In case of Budhuram Vs. State of Chhattisgarh, , it is held as follows:-

"The law relating to proof of a criminal charge by means of circumstantial evidence would hardly require any reiteration, save & except that the incriminating circumstances against the accused, on being proved, must be capable of pointing to only one direction & to no other, namely, that it is the accused & nobody else who had committed the crime. If the proved circumstances are capable of admitting any other conclusion inconsistent with the guilt of the accused, the accused must have the benefit of the same."

In case of Kanhaiya Lal Vs. State of Rajasthan, , it is held as follows:

"Where a case rests squarely on circumstantial evidence, the inference of guilt can be justified only when all the incriminating facts & circumstances are found to be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or the guilt of any other person. The circumstances from which an inference as to the guilt of the accused is drawn have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt & have to be shown to be closely connected with the principal fact sought to be inferred from those circumstances."

In this case first we have to see whether the deceased met a homicidal death or not?

P.W. 19 Dr. Braja Kishore Das conducted post-mortem over the dead body of the deceased on 1.7.2002 at S.C.B. Medical College & Hospital, Cuttack & he noticed partial healed abrasions on the dorsal aspect of both the soles, stitched wound starting 2 c.m. above the left mostoid portion going vertically upwards for 6 c.m. & then goes horizontally backward for 4 c.m. He further noticed another stitched wound on the left side neck. On dis-Section he found a depressed fracture of size 8.5 c.m. X 5 c.m. situated below the left parietal eminence so also a fissure fracture on the same area. There was massive haemorrhage into the brain stem. The doctor gave his opinion that all the injuries are ante mortem in nature & combinedly fatal in ordinary course of nature & the cause of death was due to cranio-cerebral injury & he further opined that the injuries are possible by stone boulders & sufficient to cause death. The post-mortem report has been marked as Ext. 13. The Learned Counsel for the Appellant has also not challenged the evidence of P.W. 19 or the findings in post-mortem examination report. Thus, it is conclusively established by the prosecution that the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature & it was due to cranio-cerebral injury.

It is seen that in the F.I.R. P.W. 7 has mentioned that he received telephone call from P.W. 5 on 27/28.6.2002 night at about 2.00 p.m. regarding theft of motor cycle of the deceased & proceeded to the spot but during evidence P.W. 7 has stated that he was called by P.W. 1 who informed him that he (P.W. 1) had received a phone call from P.W. 5 that the deceased has been murdered in the Forest Camp House at Nuabazar & thereafter he proceeded to the camp house. P.W. 5 has stated that on the date of occurrence while he was returning home after attending the marriage ceremony at Konark, on the way in front of Ghanasyam Hemalata Institute he met Kartik & Bijaya Kumar Singh (both of them have not been examined in this case) who told him about the motor cycle accident & accordingly he proceeded to the camp house & after seeing the deceased lying in a pool of blood with severe injuries, he intimated P.W. 1 about the condition of the deceased. Thus from the evidence of P.W. 5, it comes out that he never had any telephonic conversation with the informant (P.W. 7) directly as was narrated in the F.I.R. by P.W. 7. P.W. 1 on the other hand, has stated that on the occurrence night at about 1.30 a.m., P.W. 5 intimated him over telephone that the deceased was lying with bleeding injuries in front of the camp house near Nuabazar & that the Appellant was fleeing away with the motor cycle of the deceased & met with an accident at Balighai Chhak where after he fled away leaving the motor cycle in a damaged condition. When P.W. 5 was not informed by Kartik & Bijaya Kumar Singh that the Appellant was fleeing away with the motor cycle of the deceased & met with an accident & such fact was not within the knowledge of P.W. 5 then the statement of P.W. 1 that P.W. 5 intimated him that Appellant was fleeing away with the motor cycle of the deceased & met with an accident cannot be accepted.

It is pertinent to note that P.W. 7 though in his evidence has stated that he was informed by P.W. 1 about the murder of his son in the forest camp house at Nuabazar but he has not stated that P.W. 1 informed him about any motor cycle accident of the Appellant at Balighai Chhak. Thus when Kartik & Bijaya Kumar Singh from whom P.W. 5 first received information about the motor cycle accident have not been examined in this case, the evidence of P.W. 5, P.W. 1 & P.W. 7 becomes hearsay & inadmissible evidence. In case of State of Maharashtra Vs. Kamal Ahmed Mohammed Vakil Ansari and Others, , it is held as follows:

"A perusal of Section 60 of Evidence Act leaves no room for any doubt that oral evidence in respect of a fact, must be of a primary nature. It would be evidence of a primary nature, if it satisfies the state of facts described as "direct" in Section 60. Illustrative instances of direct/primary evidence, are expressed in Section 60 itself. When it pertains to a fact which can be seen, it must be the statement of the person who has himself seen it; if when it refers to a fact which can be perceived, it must be the statement of the person who has perceived it; & when it pertains to an opinion (or the basis on which that opinion has been arrived at), it must be the statement of the person who has himself arrived at such opinion. Stated differently, oral evidence cannot be hearsay, for that would be indirect/secondary evidence of the fact in issue (or the relevant fact)".

Thus the evidence of P.W. 1, P.W. 5 & P.W. 7 relating to the accident of the Appellant at Balighai Chhak while carrying motor cycle of the deceased is not admissible being hit by Section 60 of the Evidence Act.

Motive & charge under Section 379 I.P.C.

In the present case the prosecution has attributed the commission of theft of the motor cycle belonging to the deceased by the Appellant as the motive behind commission of the murder. This is also co-related to the charge under Section 379 I.P.C. In the case of Sathya Narayanan Vs. State Rep. by Inspector of Police, , it is held as follows:

"In the case of circumstantial evidence, motive also assumes significance for the reason that the absence of motive would put the Court on its guard & cause it to scrutinize each piece of evidence closely in order to ensure that suspicion, omission or conjectures do not take the place of proof."

In this case, as appears from the evidence on record, that P.W. 2, P.W. 3, P.W. 4, P.W. 15 & P.W. 18 are the persons who had participated in the feast along with the Appellant & the deceased in the camp house. None of these prosecution witnesses have stated that the deceased had come to the camp house with the motor cycle in question. P.W. 12 is the only witness who had seen the Appellant coming on a motor cycle & dashing against the nearby shop of Shyamsundar Behera & ran away leaving the motor cycle & he further stated that the motor cycle belonged to the deceased. He has not stated the registration number of the motor cycle. The seizure list Ext. 4 indicates that a black colour Hero Honda Motor cycle bearing registration OR-13-3419 was seized on 28.6.2002 at 11.50 p.m. from Balighai crossing in front of the cycle repairing shop of Daitari Nayak. When according to P.W. 12, the accident took place due to dashing of the motor cycle against the shop of one Shyamsundar Behera & the motor cycle was left there by the Appellant, it is not understandable as to how the same was seized in front of the cycle repairing shop of one Daitari Nayak.

There is no evidence as to who shifted the motor cycle from near the shop of Shyamsundar Behera to the cycle repairing shop of Daitari Nayak. The record indicates that the accused was arrested on 29.6.2002 at 1.00 p.m. but there was no visible injury on the person of the accused which falsifies the accident theory put forth by the prosecution. Though the I.O. (P.W. 20) has stated that he sent a V.H.F. message to R.T.O., Puri for furnishing detail particulars of the motor cycle bearing registration No. OR-13-3419 but there is no evidence as to what was the reply given by the R.T.O., Puri. The registration certificate & other documents of the motor cycle have not been seized. Thus the prosecution has failed to prove that the motor cycle bearing registration No. OR-13-3419 belonged to the deceased & that he had taken the same with him to the camp house on the date of occurrence or that the Appellant took away the same without the consent of the deceased. In absence of such evidence, it cannot be said that the prosecution has established the charge under Section 379 I.P.C. against the Appellant beyond all reasonable doubt or the theft of the motor cycle as the motive behind the commission of murder of the deceased. If theft of motor cycle was the motive behind the crime, the Appellant would not have left the motor cycle after the alleged accident at Balighai when there is no evidence that the motor cycle was not in a running condition after such an accident. In this case when all the persons including the Appellant & the deceased organized a feast & participated in the same, it shows that there were cordial relationships between them & when no untoward incident happened during the feast, it cannot be said that there was any motive behind the commission of the crime. P.W. 2 has stated that the feast ended peacefully & there was no previous enmity between the Appellant & the deceased. P.W. 4 has stated that during the feast there was no altercation between them. Thus the prosecution has miserably failed to establish any motive in the commission of the crime in question.

Last seen theory

It is the prosecution case that a feast was organized at the camp house on the date of occurrence & after the feast was over, only the Appellant & the deceased stayed in the camp house & went to sleep in the night & during that night the body of the deceased was found lying in the camp house in a bleeding condition & the blood stained laterite stone & vegetable cutter were lying nearer to the deceased. This according to the prosecution is the "last seen theory" of the Appellant with the deceased.

P.W. 2 has stated that he along with P.W. 3, P.W. 4, P.W. 15, P.W. 18 & the Appellant & the deceased participated in the feast & the feast was over by midnight & the Appellant & the deceased remained in the camp & he along with P.W. 3 & P.W. 4 stayed in a nearby camp & P.W. 15 & P.W. 18 went away to the village.

P.W. 3 has stated that he alongwith P.W. 2, P.W. 4, P.W. 15, P.W. 18 & the Appellant & the deceased participated in the feast & the Appellant & the deceased stayed there in the camp house & he along with P.W. 2 & P.W. 4 slept in a nearby camp whereas P.W. 15 & P.W. 18 went back to the village.

P.W. 4 has stated that he along with P.W. 2, P.W. 3, P.W. 15, P.W. 18 & the Appellant & the deceased participated in the feast & the feast was over in the midnight & the Appellant & the deceased stayed back in the camp house & he along with P.W. 2 & P.W. 3 slept in a nearby camp & P.W. 15 & P.W. 18 went back to the village.

The evidence of these three witnesses i.e., P.Ws. 2, 3 & 4 indicate that only seven persons participated in the feast & those persons are P.W. 2, P.W. 3, P.W. 4, P.W. 15, P.W. 18, the Appellant & the deceased. The evidence of P.W. 18 on the other hand is that ten persons participated in the feast & all the participants including him returned after the feast except the Appellant & two others. P.W. 15 on the other hand states that he & P.W. 18 left the place at 10.30 p.m. leaving five of the participants in the camp. Thus the statements of P.W. 15 & P.W. 18 run contrary to the evidence of P.W. 2, P.W. 3 & P.W. 4 that only the Appellant & the deceased were left in the camp after the feast. In view of such evidences on record, it cannot be said that only the Appellant & the deceased were at the camp house after the feast & they slept together in one room. P.W. 3 has stated that since the camp is situated at the road side, some outsiders were coming there. Thus it cannot be said that the place of occurrence was such that no stranger could have any access there.

In case of Arjun Marik and Others Vs. State of Bihar, , it is held that the only circumstances of last seen will not complete the chain of circumstances to record the finding that it is consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused &, therefore, no conviction on that basis alone can be founded. Thus when the prosecution has failed to establish that the deceased was in the solitary company of the Appellant in the camp house, it would be very risky to accept the so called "last seen theory" to convict the Appellant in a case under Section 302 I.P.C. The possibility of somebody else committing the murder of the deceased cannot be ruled out.

Absconding:

Merely because the Appellant was not found at the spot, such circumstance alone is not sufficient to convict him under Section 302 I.P.C. In case of Bata Munda Vs. The State, , it is held as follows:

"Absconding is a weak link in the chain of circumstances. Even an innocent person may feel panicky & try to keep out of the way if he learns of his false implication in a serious crime reported to the police. It is not, by itself, conclusive either of guilt or of a guilty conscience & may only lend some assurance to the other evidence pointing to the guilt of an accused person".

The conclusion of the Learned Trial Court that motive behind the murder can be attributed to commission of theft of motor cycle belonging to the deceased is fallacious. The Learned Trial Court has relied upon the hearsay evidence relating to theft of motor cycle of the deceased by the Appellant which is not legally acceptable. The conclusion of the Learned Trial Court that there was no third person in the camp house where the occurrence took place & that the Appellant was last seen together with the deceased is certainly a misreading of evidence. The assessment of evidence has not been done in accordance with law & the inadmissible evidence has been taken into account & moreover basing mainly conjecture & suspicion, the Learned Trial Court has found the Appellant guilty.

The conclusion arrived at by the Learned Trial Court in convicting the Appellant & the reasoning assigned for arriving at such a conclusion is not borne out from the record & it seems that the Learned Trial Court has proceeded pedantically without making an in depth analysis of facts & circumstances & evidence led in the trial. In our opinion, the legal duty to separate the grain from the chaff has been abandoned by him & therefore his entire approach is faulty & infallible which deserves to be rectified & upturned.

In case of State of Haryana Vs. Bhagirath and Others, , it is held as follows:

"The Principle of benefit of doubt belongs exclusively to criminal jurisprudence. The pristine doctrine of benefit of doubt can be invoked when there is reasonable doubt regarding guilt of the accused. It is the reasonable doubt which a conscientious judicial mind entertains on a conspectus of the entire evidence that the accused might not have committed the offence, which affords the benefit to the accused at the end of the criminal trial. Benefit of doubt is not a legal dosage to be administered at every segment of the evidence, but an advantage to be afforded to the accused at the final end after consideration of the entire evidence, if the Judge conscientiously & reasonably entertains doubt regarding the guilt of the accused."

In case of Jaharlal Das (supra), it is further held as follows:

"The Court has to be watchful & avoid the danger of allowing the suspicion to take the place of legal proof for sometimes unconsciously it may happen to be a short step between moral certainty & the legal proof. At times it can be a case of "may be true". But there is a long mental distance between "may be true" & "must be true" & the same divides conjectures from sure conclusions."

Law is well settled that the suspicion, howsoever strong or emotional consideration cannot take the place of proof. Fouler the crime, the higher should be the proof. In the absence of legal proof of a crime, there can be no legal criminality. Moral conviction regarding the involvement of the Appellant in the commission of crime cannot be a substitute for a legal verdict based upon facts & law. In view of the facts & circumstances discussed above, we are not able to agree with the findings of the Trial Court & we hold that the case against the Appellant has not been established by the prosecution beyond all reasonable doubt.

In the result, the appeal is allowed & the impugned Judgment & order of conviction & sentence is set aside & the Appellant is acquitted of the charge under Sections 379/ 302 I.P.C. The Appellant is on bail by virtue of the order of this Court. He is discharged from liability of his bail bond. The personal bond & the surety bond stand cancelled.