AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
No AI summary yet
Generate an eight-section analysis of this judgment — facts, issues, reasoning, ratio and a plain-language gist.
Judgment
320 paragraphs · 6,952 wordsLok Pal Singh, J
Instant review application along with delay condonation application has been filed by the applicant/petitioner seeking review/recall of judgment and
order dated 23.05.2019 passed by this Court. There is a delay of 96 days in filing the review/recall application.
It is stated that being aggrieved by the judgment dated 23.05.2019 review applicant/petitioner preferred Special Leave to Appeal (C) No.18348 of
2019 before the Hon’ble Apex Court, wherein, upon hearing the counsel, on the request of learned counsel for the applicant/petitioner, the appeal
was dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to approach the High Court, vide order dated 09.08.2019. It is, under these circumstances, that the review
application along with delay condonation application has been filed before this Court. Delay condonation application is not opposed by the counsel
appearing for the respondent. In such circumstances, delay is condoned. Delay condonation application stands allowed.
Review application has been filed by the applicant/petitioner, inter alia on the grounds that this Court did not appreciate the relevant aspect of the
matter that the trial court and the revisional court, both exercising their respective jurisdiction, were duty bound to bring the compromise decree dated
23.8.2012 to its logical conclusion, bringing equitable justice to both the parties. It is also stated that, under Article 227 of Constitution of India, this
Court had the power to remand the matter back to the executing court for executing the decree by properly inviting objections from the defendant, if
necessary for proper adjudication of the compromise decree dated 23.8.2012. It is also stated that this Court has committed mistake which apparent
on the face of record. It is urged that the applicant/petitioner cannot be left remediless.
In support of review application, learned counsel for the applicant would place reliance on the following judgments:-
ii) Ram Narang vs. Ramesh Narang & another, [(2006) SCC 114, paras 14, 15, 18 & 23]
“14. A different view was taken by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Bajranglal Gangadhar Khemka v. Kapurchand Ltd. In that
case, a suit for specific performance by execution of a lease was compromised and consent terms were filed in the Court and an order was passed
thereon. One of the terms in the compromise recorded an undertaking by the defendant to have a third party joined as a confirming party to the lease
which the defendant had agreed to execute in favour of the plaintiff. The defendant failed to execute the lease. The plaintiff took out proceedings for
execution and the lease was executed by an officer of the Court. The defendant then refused to get the third party to confirm the lease in terms of his
undertaking. The plaintiff took out an application for contempt of court. The Single Judge allowed the application holding that the defendant was guilty
of willful default and asked the defendant to carry out the undertaking within one month failing which a warrant of arrest would issue. In the appeal
preferred by the defendant, it was contended by him that no undertaking was given by the defendant to the Court. Reliance was placed on the
decision of the Calcutta High Court in Nisha Kanto Case. The Division Bench rejected the submission and dismissed the appeal saying: (AIR p.337
para 4)
We are not prepared to accept a position which seems to us contrary to the long practice that has been established in this Court.
The Court opined that: (AIR p.338, para 7)
“The expression ‘undertake’ has come to acquire through long practice, a technical meaning. In all orders and decrees of the Court,
whenever the expression ""a party undertakes"" has been used, it has always borne the meaning that the undertaking has been to the Court. What is
more, it has been held by Bhagwati J.- an opinion with which I entirely agree - that it has been the long-standing practice on the original side that,
whenever counsel wishes to give an undertaking to the Court, he never expressly uses the words "" to the Court"" but merely states that he undertakes
on behalf of his client...
Accordingly it was concluded: (AIR pp.338-39, paras 7 & 8)
We can only construe the undertaking given by the defendants as an undertaking given to the Court and not given to the other side.
… The very fact that the Court passed a decree after an undertaking was embodied in the consent terms clearly shows that the Court did sanction a
particular course; and that course was the putting of its imprimatur upon the consent terms. The Court was led to pass an order upon the defendants
to execute a lease in view of the fact that an undertaking was given by the defendants to get the Paradise Cinema, Limited, to join the lease.
The Act has been duly widened. It provides inter-alia for definitions of the terms and lays down firmer bases for exercise of the court's jurisdiction
in contempt. Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 defines civil contempt as meaning ""willful disobedience to any judgment decree,
direction, order, writ or other process of a Court or willful breach of an undertaking given to Court"". Analysed, the definition provides for two
categories of cases, namely, (1) willful disobedience to a process of Court and (2) willful breach of an undertaking given to Court. As far as the first
category is concerned, the word ""any"" further indicates the wide nature of the power. No distinction is statutorily drawn between an order passed
after an adjudication and an order passed by consent. This first category is separate from the second and cannot be treated as forming part of or
taking colour from the second category. The legislative intention clearly was to distinguish between the two and create distinct classes of
contumacious behaviour. Interestingly, the Courts in England have held that the breach of a consent decree of specific performance by refusal to
execute the agreement is punishable by way of proceedings in contempt (see C.H. Giles and Co. Ltd. v. Morris).
The question which was before the Court in Babu Ram Gupta case was limited to the issue whether the appellant had given any undertaking to
the Court, either expressly or impliedly, which he had violated. In other words it was limited to the second category of cases mentioned under Section
2(b) of the Act. The Court was not called upon to decide whether there was any contumacious conduct as envisaged by the first category of cases
under that Section. The observations made in that regard, are strictly speaking, obiter. The Court was not called upon to consider nor did it construe
the language of Section 2(b) of the Act. If we were to accept the observations of the Court as an enunciation of the law, it would run contrary to the
express language of the statute. As we have earlier noted, the section itself provides that willful violation of any order or decree etc. would tantamount
to contempt. A compromise decree is as much a decree as a decree passed on adjudication. It is not as has been wrongly held by the Calcutta High
Court in Nisha Kanto Roy Chowdhury merely an agreement between the parties. In passing the decree by consent, the Court adds its mandate to
the consent. A consent decree is composed of both a command and a contract. The Bombay High Court's view in Bajranglal Gangadhar Khemka
correctly represents the law that a consent decree is a contract with the imprimatur of the Court. 'Imprimatur' means 'authorized' or 'approved'. In
other words by passing a decree in terms of a consent order the Court authorizes and approves the course of action consented to. Moreover, the
provisions of Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires the Court to pass a decree in accordance with the consent terms only when it is
proved to the satisfaction of the court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement.â€
ii) Matajog Dobey vs. H.C. Bhari (AIR 1956 SC 44, para 23)
“23. Where a power is conferred or a duty imposed by statute or otherwise, and there is nothing said expressly inhibiting the exercise of the power
or the performance of the duty by an limitations or restrictions, it is reasonable to hold that it carries with it the power of doing all such acts or
employing such means as are reasonably necessary for such execution. If in the exercise of the power or the performance of the official duty,
improper or unlawful obstruction or resistance is encountered, there must be the right to use reasonable means to remove the obstruction or overcome
the resistance. This accords with commonsense and does not seem contrary to any principle of law. The true position is neatly stated thus in
Broom’s Legal Maxims, 10th Edn. at p.312: “It is a rule that when the law commands a thing to be done, it authorizes the performance of
whatever may be necessary for executing its command.â€
iii) Matthan Singh v. IInd Addl. District Judge, Meerut and others, [(1996) 1 ARC 117, paras. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 21]
“15. This aspect was considered by the Hon’ble A.K. Banerjee, in the case of Sri Kunj Behari v. Sri Krishna Dutta, AIR 1994 Alld. 198 :
1993 (2) ARC 414, where it was observed:
“It is well settled that for interpreting the words of statute the intention of the legislature, which can be gathered from the objects and reasons for
which the provision has been enacted, must be borne in mind. The amendment in Section 113 C.P.C. was necessitated as is apparent from the
statement of objects and reasons appended to 1970 Amendment Act, to help in reducing the pressure of work on the High Court. For that purpose
legislature had in its wisdom laid down that the decision of an appeal or revision by the District Court was not amenable to Section 115 C.P.Câ€
The order question whether the Civil Court, who are not parties to the lis or dispute between two private individuals in a civil suit, while exercising
judicial function, can be called ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution in order to render it amenable to writs apart from the
principle of existence of alternative remedy in the form of Article 227 of the Constitution of India can also not be raised so long the decision in the
case of Ganga Saran (supra), holds the field.
Yet in another case viz. Ram Singh v. Special Judge, 1993 Alld. CJ 902 : 1993 (1) ARC 364, the Hon'ble S.R Singh, J. after dealing with case of
Ganga Saran (supra) and Qamruddin (supra), had held that “I am also of opinion that the High Court while exercising its writ jurisdiction against an
appellate or revisional order can issue a writ of certiorari/mandamus not only against the Subordinate Courts but it may also issue any order or
direction not necessarily in the nature of writ, which it considers necessary to be issued in order to effectuate its certiorari jurisdictionâ€.
It was further held that “I am also of opinion that the High Court while seized of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution can also
pass any order including an order in the nature of injunction against a private individual in exercise of its inherent power.â€
The above view was buttressed by His Lordship “with the principle of interpretation of the fundamental document namely, the Constitution
which is regarded as a living organism will equipped to suit the ever changing social political and economic needs of the peopleâ€.
The judgment in the case of Ram Singh (supra), did not address itself to the existence of Article 227 or Section 115 of the Code which are
complete answer to the questions raised. Neither the object and purpose of the U.P Amendment of Section 115 as was reflected in the case of
Vishesh Kumar (supra), was attended to.
There is no second opinion that Code of Civil Procedure is self sufficient and a complete Code in itself. The Civil Courts do not need the help of
Article 226. The judicious principle of self restraint and an workable efficacious system through Article 226 would be over crowded beyond capacity
while on the other hand the object and purpose of U.P Amendment of Section 115 for reduction of pressure on High Court would become frustrated.
All these reasons which has reasonable nexus on the question has not been considered in the case of Ram Singh (supra). Even then this decision
cannot over-come the ratio decided in the case of Ganga Saran (supra).
iv) Indu Singh and Anr. v. Prem Chaudhary and Ors., (2018 SCC Online Del 8951, paras 21, 21(i))
“21. One more argument which was urged on behalf of the plaintiffs was that in the present case the order which was passed in the suit on
7.72008 being a compromise decree under Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC, therefore the court should treat such compromise decrees as different from the
decrees on merits which was passed by the Court, and that only decrees passed on merits should be held to be subject matter of Section 2(15) of the
Stamp Act. We have however really failed to understand this argument because a decree as defined under Section 2(2) CPC is a final adjudication of
rights of the parties in the suit and such final adjudication can take place either after contest resulting in a judgment being passed on merits by deciding
respective contentions of the parties, or on the other hand there can be adjudication of rights which results in a decree even without decision on
contest, and which position is when as per the consent of the parties a decree is passed. The fact that there is a consent decree however would not
take away the fact that there is final adjudication of the rights of the parties, and which adjudication is also very much a decree as envisaged by
Section 2(2) CPC. In our opinion therefore merely because a decree is a consent decree or a compromise decree would not mean that such a decree
if it results in a final decree for partition dividing the properties of the co-sharers, yet this consent/compromise decree will not be a final decree for
partition simply and only because the decree is a consent/compromise decree.
21.(i) Lastly we would like to refer to the arguments urged on behalf of the plaintiffs with reference to the observations made by the Supreme Court
in the judgment in the case reported as Shub Karan Bubna v. Sita Saran Bubna, (2009) 9 SCC 68.9 It is argued on behalf of the plaintiffs by placing
reliance upon the observations made by the Supreme Court in this judgment that every suit for partition has three stages and even after preliminary
decree is passed yet a stage is envisaged before passing of the final decree, and that an order of a sale of the joint property is such a stage prior to
execution proceedings, and the steps taken for sale fall in the stage after the passing of the preliminary decree but before the stage of the first decree.
The relevant paras of the judgment in the case of Shub Karan Bubna (supra) are paras 5 to 30, and these paras read as under:-
“…
…
18.2 In regard to immovable properties (other than agricultural lands paying land revenue), that is buildings, plots etc. or movable properties:
(i) where the court can conveniently and without further enquiry make the division without the assistant of any Commissioner, or where parties agree
upon the manner of division, the court will pass a single decree comprising the preliminary decree declaring the rights of several parties and also a final
decree dividing the suit properties by metes and bounds.
(ii) where the division by metes and bounds cannot be made without further inquiry, the court will pass a preliminary decree declaring the rights of the
parties interested in the property and give further directions as may be required to effect the division. In such cases, normally a Commissioner is
appointed (usually an Engineer, Draughtsman, Architect, or Lawyer) to physically examine the property to be divided and suggest the manner of
division. The court then hears the parties on the report, and passes a final decree for division by metes and bounds.
The function of making a partition or separation according to the rights declared by the preliminary decree, (in regard to non-agricultural immovable
properties and movables) is entrusted to a Commissioner, as it involves inspection of the property and examination of various alternatives with
reference to practical utility and site conditions. When the Commissioner gives his report as to the manner of division, the proposals contained in the
report are considered by the court; and after hearing objections to the report, if any, the court passes a final decree whereby the relief sought in the
suit is granted by separating the property by metes and bounds. It is also possible that if the property is incapable of proper division, the court may
direct sale thereof and distribution of the proceeds as per the shares declared.â€
I have heard learned counsel for the parties on the review/recall application and perused the case-laws.
The scope of review in view of the provisions contained under Section 114 and Order 47 Rule 1 of the CPC are limited. Section 114 and Order 47
Rule 1 of CPC are extracted hereunder:-
“114. Review:- Subject as aforesaid, any person considering himself aggrieved -
(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed by this Code, but from which no appeal has been preferred,
(b) by a decree or order from which no appear is allowed by this Code, or
(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or
made the order, and the Court may make such order thereon as it thinks fit.â€
Application for review of judgment- (1) Any person considering himself aggrieved-
(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from no appeal has been preferred,
(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or
(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which,
after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or
order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain
a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made
the order.
(2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or order may apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by
some other party except where the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant, or when, being respondent, he can
present to the Appellate Court the case on which he applies for the review.
[Explanation.-The fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the Court is based has been reversed or modified by
the subsequent decision of a superior Court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment.]â€
The jurisdiction of review is within the parameters of the provisions contained under Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC. In order to entertain a review
application, the first and foremost thing is that there must be an error or mistake apparent on the face of record. Under the guise of review, the parties
are not entitled to be reheard on merit. While hearing the review application, the review court should not enter into and decide the controversy de
novo as a trial or as an appellate authority. If an error in a judgment is apparent on the face of record, the court may review the judgment, but if the
review court is required to discuss the pleading and the evidence de novo, it cannot be a subject matter of the review petition and in such a situation,
the judgment, sought to be reviewed, can only be challenged before the appellate court. Law on this subject is no more res integra and has been
discussed in a catena of judgments.
In Sasi (D) Through Lrs. Petitioner (s) Versus Aravindakshan Nair and Others, (2017) 4 SCC 692, Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:-
“5. Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads as follows:- “1. Application for review of judgment.- (1) Any person
considering himself aggrieved - (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred.
(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from
the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not
be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of
the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a
review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order. (2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or order may
apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by some other party except where the ground of such appeal is
common to the applicant and the appellant, or when, being respondent, he can present to the Appellate Court the case on which he applies
for the review. Explanation.- The fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the Court is based has been reversed
or modified by 4 the subsequent decision of a superior Court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment.
The grounds enumerated therein are specific. The principles for interference in exercise of review jurisdiction are well settled. The Court
passing the order is entitled to review the order, if any of the grounds specified in the aforesaid provision are satisfied.
In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P.1 , the Court while dealing with the scope of review had opined:-
“What, however, we are now concerned with is whether the statement in the order of September 1959 that the case did not involve any
substantial question of law is an ‘error apparent on the face of the record’). The fact that on the earlier occasion the Court held on
an identical state of facts that a substantial question of law arose would not per se be conclusive, for the earlier order itself might be
erroneous. Similarly, even if the statement was wrong, it would not follow that it was an ‘error apparent on the face of the record’,
for there is a distinction which is real, though it might not always be capable of exposition, between a mere erroneous decision and a
decision which could be characterised as vitiated by ‘error apparent’. A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an
erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error.â€
In Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi , the Court after referring to Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. (supra), Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari
Choudhury and Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma, held thus:-
“Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the
record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on
the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under
Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be “reheard and correctedâ€. A review petition, it must be
remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in disguiseâ€â€.
The aforesaid authorities clearly spell out the nature, scope and ambit of power to be exercised. The error has to be self-evident and is
not to be found out by a process of reasoning. We have adverted to the aforesaid aspects only to highlight the nature of review
proceedings.
In Haryana State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. vs. Mawasi & Ors. (2012) 7 SCC 20, 0Hon’ble Apex Court, while discussing the
law on the subject matter from the very beginning, has held as under:-
At this stage it will be apposite to observe that the power of review is a creature of the statute and no Court or quasi-judicial body or
administrative authority can review its judgment or order or decision unless it is legally empowered to do so. Article 137 empowers this
Court to review its judgments subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament or any rules made under Article 145 of the
Constitution. The Rules framed by this Court under that Article lay down that in civil cases, review lies on any of the grounds specified in
Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 which reads as under:
Order 47, Rule 1:
Application for review of judgment.- (1) Any person considering himself aggrieved-
(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred,
(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or
(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which,
after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or
order made, or on account of some 439 mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to
obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the court which passed the decree
or made the order.
(2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or order may apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by
some other party except where the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant, or when, being respondent, he can
present to the Appellate Court the case of which he applies for the review.
Explanation- The fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the Court is based has been reversed or modified by
the subsequent decision of a superior Court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment.
The aforesaid provisions have been interpreted in several cases. We shall notice some of them. In S. Nagaraj v. State of Karnataka
1993 Supp (4) SCC 595, this Court referred to the judgments in Raja Prithwi Chand Lal Choudhury v. Sukhraj Rai and Rajunder Narain
Rae v. Bijai Govind Singh and observed: (S. Nagaraj case, SCC pp. 619-20, para 19)
“19. Review literally and even judicially means re-examination or re-consideration. Basic philosophy inherent in it is the universal
acceptance of human fallibility. Yet in the realm of law the courts and even the statutes lean strongly in favour of finality of decision legally
and properly made. Exceptions both statutorily and judicially have been carved out to correct accidental mistakes or miscarriage of justice.
Even when there was no statutory provision and no rules were framed by the highest court indicating the circumstances in which it could
rectify its order the courts culled out such power to avoid abuse of process or miscarriage of justice. In Raja Prithwi Chand Lal Choudhury
v. Sukhraj Rai the Court observed that even though no rules had been framed permitting the highest Court to review its order yet it was
available on the limited and narrow ground developed by the Privy Council and the House of Lords. The Court approved the principle laid
down by the Privy Council in Rajunder Narain Rae v. Bijai Govind Singh that an order made by the Court was final and could not be
altered:
―... nevertheless, if by misprision in embodying the judgments, by errors have been introduced, these Courts possess, by Common law, the
same power which the Courts of record and statute have of rectifying the mistakes which have crept in .... The House of Lords exercises a
similar power of rectifying mistakes made in drawing up its own judgments, and this Court must possess the same authority. The Lords have
however gone a step further, and have corrected mistakes introduced through inadvertence in the details of judgments; or have supplied
manifest defects in order to enable the decrees to be enforced, or have added explanatory matter, or have reconciled inconsistencies.
Basis for exercise of the power was stated in the same decision as under:
“It is impossible to doubt that the indulgence extended in such cases is mainly owing to the natural desire prevailing to prevent
irremediable injustice being done by a Court of last resort, where by some accident, without any blame, the party has not been heard and
an order has been inadvertently made as if the party had been heard.â€
Rectification of an order thus stems from the fundamental principle that justice is above all. It is exercised to remove the error and not for
disturbing finality. When the Constitution was framed the substantive power to rectify or recall the order passed by this Court was
specifically provided by Article 137 of the Constitution. Our Constitutionmakers who had the practical wisdom to visualise the efficacy of
such provision expressly conferred the substantive power to review any judgment or order by Article 137 of the Constitution. And clause (c)
of Article 145 permitted this Court to frame rules as to the conditions subject to which any judgment or order may be reviewed. In exercise
of this power Order XL had been framed empowering this Court to review an order in civil proceedings on grounds analogous to Order
XLVII Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code. The expression, 'for any other sufficient reason' in the clause has been given an expanded
meaning and a decree or order passed under misapprehension of true state of circumstances has been held to be sufficient ground 441 to
exercise the power. Apart from Order XL Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules this Court has the inherent power to make such orders as may
be necessary in the interest of justice or to prevent the abuse of process of Court. The Court is thus not precluded from recalling or
reviewing its own order if it is satisfied that it is necessary to do so for sake of justice.â€
In Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius AIR 1954 SC 52,6 the three Judge Bench referred to the
provisions of the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure, which was similar to Order 47 Rule 1 CPC and observed: ―
“32… It is needless to emphasise that the scope of an application for review is much more restricted than that of an appeal. Under the
provisions in the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure which is similar in terms to Order 47 Rule 1 of our Code of Civil Procedure, 1908,
the court of review has only a limited jurisdiction circumscribed by the definitive limits fixed by the language used therein.
It may allow a review on three specified grounds, namely, (i) discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of
due diligence, was not within the applicant's knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed,
(ii) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, and (iii) for any other sufficient reason.
It has been held by the Judicial Committee that the words ‘any other sufficient reason’ must mean ‘a reason sufficient on grounds,
at least analogous to those specified in the rule’. (See Chhajju Ram v. Neki). This conclusion was reiterated by the Judicial Committee in
Bisheshwar Pratap Sahi v. Parath Nath AIR 1934 PC 213 (E) and was adopted by on Federal Court in Hari Shankar Pal v. Anath Nath
Mitter AIR 1949 FC 106 at pp. 110, 111 (F). The learned counsel appearing in support of this appeal recognises the aforesaid limitations
and submits that his case comes within the ground of ‘mistake or error apparent on the face of the record’ or some ground
analogous theretoâ€.
In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P. (1964) 5 SCR 174, another three-Judge Bench reiterated that the power of review is not
analogous to the appellate power and observed (Para 11):
“11…A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent
error. We do not consider that this furnishes a suitable occasion for dealing with this difference exhaustively or in any great detail, but it
would suffice for us to say that where without any elaborate argument one could point to the error and say here is a substantial point of law
which stares one in the face, and there could reasonably be no two opinions, entertained about it, a clear case of error apparent on the
face of the record would be made out.â€
In Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aibam Pishak Sharma (1979) 4 SCC 389 ,this Court answered in affirmative the question whether the
High Court can review an order passed under Article 226 of the Constitution and proceeded to observe (Para 3):
“3….But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of
new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the
review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on
the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the
decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate
powers which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court.
In Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury (1995) 1 SCC 170 ,the Court considered as to what can be characterised as an error
apparent on the fact of the record and observed:
“9.…….it has to be kept in view that an error apparent on the face of record must be such an error which must strike one on mere
looking at the record and would not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions.
We may usefully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa
Tirumale AIR 1960 SC 137 wherein, K.C. Das Gupta, J., speaking for the Court has made 443 the following observations in connection with
an error apparent on the face of the record:
17….An error which has to be established by a longdrawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions
can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. Where an alleged error is far from self-evident and if it can be
established, it has to be established, by lengthy and complicated arguments, such an error cannot be cured by a writ of certiorari according
to the rule governing the powers of the superior court to issue such a writ.
In Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi (1997) 8 SCC 715, the Court observed:
“9….An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on
the face of the record justifying the Court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC…….. A review petition, it must be
remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be ―an appeal in disguiseâ€.
In Lily Thomas v. Union of India (2000) 6 SCC 224, R.P. Sethi, J., who concurred with S. Saghir Ahmad, J., summarised the scope of the
power of review in the following words
“56…―Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. The review cannot be treated
like an appeal in disguise. The mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review. Once a review petition is dismissed no
further petition of review can be entertained. The rule of law of following the practice of the binding nature of the larger Benches and not
taking different views by the Benches of coordinated jurisdiction of equal strength has to be followed and practised.
In Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Banik (2006) 4 SCC 78, the Court observed
“13…The parameters are prescribed in Order 47 CPC and for the purposes of this lis, permit the defendant to press for a rehearing
‘on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the records or for any other sufficient reason’. The former part of the
rule deals with a situation attributable to the applicant, and the latter to a jural action which is manifestly incorrect or on which two
conclusions are not 444 possible. Neither of them postulate a rehearing of the dispute because a party had not highlighted all the aspects of
the case or could perhaps have argued them more forcefully and/or cited binding precedents to the court and thereby enjoyed a favourable
verdict.â€
Further, in the case of Inderchand Jain (Dead) through LRS Vs. Motilal (dead) through LRS, (2009) 14 SCC 66,3 Hon’ble Apex Court
has observed that the Court, in a review petition, does not sit in appeal over its own order and rehearing of the matter is impermissible in law.
Paragraph 10 of the said decision is relevant which is extracted hereunder:
“10. It is beyond any doubt or dispute that the review court does not sit in appeal over its own order. A re-hearing of the matter is
impermissible in law. It constitutes an exception to the general rule that once a judgment is signed or pronounced, it should not be altered. It
is also trite that exercise of inherent jurisdiction is not invoked for reviewing any order. Review is not appeal in disguise. In Lily Thomas v.
Union of India [AIR 2000 SC 1650, this Court held: 440 ""56. It follows, therefore, that the power of review can be exercised for correction
of a mistake and not to substitute a view. Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power.
The review cannot be treated an appeal in disguise.
In the case of Lily Thomas & Ors. vs. Union of India &Ors. [(2000) 6 SCC 224], the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:
“56. It follows, therefore, that the power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake and not to substitute a view. Such powers
can be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. The review cannot be treated as an appeal in disguise.
The mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review.
The jurisdiction of the Court in hearing the review application is not akin to the appellate or trial jurisdiction, rather it is limited to correct the
accidental mistake or to avoid miscarriage of justice. This Court has already heard and discussed the merit of the case, while dismissing the writ
petition, and the same cannot be reopened in proceedings under review. The review proceedings are not by way of any appeal and have to be strictly
confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 of Code of Civil Procedure. Thus, applying the ratio of above case laws to the instant case, in my
view, there is no error or mistake apparent on the face of record in the impugned judgment. As far as the case-laws cited by learned counsel for the
review applicant is concerned, the same are not applicable in the instant case as all the judgments are related to the merit of the case and not on the
review.
In view of the foregoing discussion, I do not find any merit in the review application. Review application is accordingly dismissed.