Ramji and Others vs State of Raj. and Others

Pratap Krishna Lohra, J.—Assailing impugned order dated 26th of February 2015, appellants have laid this appeal under Order 43 Rule 1(r) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, ''C.P.C.''). By the order impugned, the learned Addl. District Judge, Parbatsar, District Nagaur (learned Trial Court), rejected their application for temporary injunction under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 C.P.C. in a suit for declaration and perpetual injunction.

Succinctly stated, the facts are that appellants in the capacity of Legal Representatives of Late Abdul Sattar instituted a civil suit before the learned trial Court claiming the relief of declaration as licence holder of 1/2 of Quarry No. 136/2, Gunawati Range, Makrana. Relief of perpetual injunction is also sought for perpetually restraining the legal representatives of Late Shri Abdul Karim from excavating 1/2 of the aforesaid quarry and to carry out other mining activities. The basis for craving the aforementioned reliefs as set out in the plaint is that at the threshold quarry licence for the aforesaid mine was granted in the joint name of Nanu and Abdul Karim on 3rd of May 1981. It is also averred that the mine in question is a Bapi mine which was regularized and licence was issued converting from rent cum royalty lease. Making serious insinuations against Assistant Mining Engineer, it is pleaded in the plaint that licence was illegally cancelled on 23rd of September 1986 after death of Shri Nanu in the year 1982. The order of cancellation of licence is assailed by Abdul Karim by way of preferring an appeal before Addl. Director (Mines), Udaipur, and on acceptance of the appeal the licence was restored. It is also pleaded in the plaint that though the licence was restored but the Mining Engineer, Makrana illegally deleted the name of Shri Nanu as licencee solely on account of the fact that he is no more. In the same breath, the Mining Engineer has also ordered that names of the legal representatives of Nanu shall be entered as licencee only on production of requisite succession certificate. As per the version of the appellants, in adherence of the directions of the Mining Engineer, they made endeavor for obtaining succession certificate by submitting application before the Court of competent jurisdiction, however, during pendency of the application for succession certificate this Court declared decision reported in AIR 1981 Raj. page 1 as per incuriam by its authoritative pronouncement in Iqbal Singh''s case. In terms of the decision in Iqbal Singh''s case, the appellants have made a categorical statement in the plaint that they are laying suit for declaration and perpetual injunction.

Staking their claim as licencee of the aforesaid quarry, the appellants have stated in the plaint that being legal representatives of Late Nanu they are still licencee as the rights emanating from licence are heritable. Alongwith the plaint, application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 C.P.C., was filed wherein it is averred that being legal representatives of Late Nanu, the appellants are still in possession of their share of the mine and are carrying out the excavation activities.

Attributing overtact against the legal representatives of Abdul Karim, 4th respondent, with a specific allegation that they are out and out to dispossess them from their share of the quarry, the appellants craved the relief of temporary injunction for restraining legal representatives of Abdul Karim, 4th respondent, from interfering with their mining activities and further to restrain them from dispossessing the appellants. Besides that, the appellants have also prayed for temporary injunction against respondent No. 1 to 3 to maintain status quo regarding quarry licence till the disposal of the suit.

The application for temporary injunction is contested by respondent No. 1 to 3 and a reply to the same is filed denying all the allegations. In the return, it is averred that, after setting aside of quarry licence order dated 23rd of September 1986, a specific order is passed on 29th of November 2000, whereby name of Shri Nanu is deleted as quarry licence holder. It is also stated in the reply that in the said order the legal representatives of Nanu were also asked to produce succession certificate. In all, the respondents prayed for rejection of the application for temporary injunction.

On behalf of respondent No. 4, a separate reply to the injunction application is filed. In the return, a specific plea is raised about incomplete description of the legal representatives of Late Nanu. It is also averred in the return that there is no Bapi right vis-�-vis the disputed quarry and name of Nanu has already been deleted from the quarry licence holders. It is specifically pleaded by the legal representatives of Abdul Karim that after death of Nanu, no endeavor was made by the legal representatives to deposit the entire outstanding dues of the Mining Department for getting quarry regularized. Alleging very specifically in the return that prior to 20th September 1986 Abdul Karim was in possession of the quarry, and therefore on cancellation of quarry licence possession was taken over by the Mining Department from him. It is also stated in the reply that after rescinding of the cancellation of quarry licence order by the appellate authority, possession was handed over to Abdul Karim and name of Nanu was deleted as licence holder on 29.11.2000. As per the legal representatives of Abdul Karim since deletion of the name of Shri Nanu as licence holder, almost 14 years have elapsed and therefore that order has attained finality and no relief can be granted to the appellants in the suit which is barred by limitation. With all these pleadings, a prayer is made for rejection of the application for temporary injunction.

Learned trial Court, after considering the rival submissions, opined that the appellants have failed to prove prima facie case in their favour. While switching on to the other ingredients, necessary for grant of temporary injunction, learned trial Court recorded a finding that both these ingredients are not available to the appellants and therefore with this finding prayer for temporary injunction is declined by the impugned order.

Learned counsel for the appellants Mr. Muktesh Maheshwari has strenuously urged that quarry licence is heritable and therefore after death of licence holder legal representatives of Shri Nanu have stepped in his shoes to acquire the right of licencee, is an issue of great significance, which has not been addressed by the learned Court below in the impugned order. Mr. Maheshwari would contend that by not examining this legal aspect, as per Rule 74 of the Rajasthan Minor Mineral Concession Rules 1986, the learned trial Court has acted perversely and capriciously, which has vitiated the impugned order. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that deletion of the name of Shri Nanu, as joint licence holder of quarry No. 136/2, is a nonest order, a very vital issue, not been properly thrashed out by the learned trial Court while passing the impugned order, is sufficient to render the impugned order vulnerable. Lastly, learned counsel for the appellants, Mr. Maheshwari, has urged that finding of the learned Court below on the requisite ingredients for temporary injunction is dehors the legal principles governing the province of temporary injunction and as such the order impugned cannot be sustained.

Per contra, learned counsel for the 4th respondent caveator, Mr. Ranjeet Joshi, has vehemently argued that since deletion of the name of Nanu as quarry licence holder more than 14 years have elapsed, and therefore the learned trial Court has rightly declined the prayer for temporary injunction. Mr. Joshi would contend that the order deleting the name of Shri Nanu as joint quarry licence holder of Quarry No. 136/2 has attained finality, is a vital fact, which has been rightly taken cognizance of by the learned trial Court for rejection of the application for temporary injunction, and therefore, no interference in the impugned order is called for. Mr. Joshi submits that legal representatives of respondent Abdul Karim, who are in possession of the quarry and excavating as licence holder, cannot be deprived of their right to derive usufruct out of excavation of the mining quarry. Elaborating his submission, learned counsel for the respondent has contended that the learned Court below has rightly taken note of this fact for declining the prayer of temporary injunction, which is a just order requiring no interference. Lastly, Mr. Joshi would contend that temporary injunction is a discretionary relief and once the Court of first instance has exercised its discretion judiciously, the said decision is not liable to be upset by the appellate Court in exercise of its limited power of judicial review.

I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned order.

A close scrutiny of the factual matrix of the case with emphasis on order dated 29th of November 2000, whereby name of Shri Nanu has joint quarry licence holder is deleted, makes it crystal clear that the learned Court below has not committed any illegality or perversity in recording a finding that there is no prima facie case in favour of the appellant as the relief of temporary injunction is founded on the principles of equity, justice and good conscience.

While adverting to the other ingredients for grant of temporary injunction, learned Court below has recorded a definite finding that the appellants have failed to establish these two ingredients for grant of temporary injunction. It goes without saying that appellants remained dormant for 14 long years against the order dated 29th of November 2000, prima facie, pre-supposes that neither they are in possession of the quarry nor excavating the minerals from it. Assuming it that the order deleting the name of Shri Nanu as joint quarry licence holder was infirm, yet suffering the said order for almost one and half decades with sub-silentia by the appellants has rightly persuaded the learned Court below to decline the equitable relief of temporary injunction. Therefore, in the backdrop of facts and circumstances of the instant case, the learned Court below has not committed any perversity in passing the impugned order. Moreover, while exercising its discretion, the learned Court below has neither acted arbitrarily nor capriciously or in utter disregard to the sound legal principles governing the province of temporary injunction. This Court, in its authoritative pronouncement in Smt. Vimla Devi Vs. Jang Bahadur, AIR 1977 Raj 196 : (1977) WLN 143 has held that power of appellate Court in subject matter are to be exercised with great care and circumspection and not to upset every discretionary order. The Court held:

I have given my earnest consideration to the contentions raised on behalf of the defendant-petitioner. The order refusing temporary injunction is of a discretionary character. Ordinarily Court of appeal will not interfere with the exercise of discretion passed by the trial Court and substitute for it its own discretion. The interference with the discretionary order, however, may be justified if the lower Court acts arbitrarily or perversely, capriciously or in disregard of sound legal principles or without considering all the relevant records.

In the light of the above observations, I have now to see whether it was open to the learned District Judge to interfere with the order of the learned trial Court. It is well settled that the grant of temporary injunction is a discretionary order and the decision of the first Court could not be easily interfered with by the appellate Court vide Musa v. Badri Prasad, ILR (1953) 3 Raj 257. The mere possibility of the appellate Court coming to a different conclusion on the same facts and evidence will also not justify interference vide Wazir Sundar Singh v. Mst. Farida Khanam, AIR 1920 PC 132. Another well established principle while disposing of the application under O. 39, Rr. 1 and 2, C.P.C. is that when the Court while dealing with the case for grant of temporary injunction decides the question of prima facie case, it should apply its judicial mind to the materials which are placed on the record and if it does not do so then it commits illegality in the exercise of jurisdiction and in that case the High Court is competent to interfere in revision in such a case vide Musa v. Badri Prasad (supra). The view taken in Musa v. Badri Prasad (supra) has been followed by Kan Singh J. in Girdhari Lal v. Mahadevi Sharma, AIR 1958 Raj 237. It has been held in this case that the appellate Court should be slow in upsetting a decision of a trial Court in a matter relating to grant of temporary injunction unless the decision of the trial Court is arbitrary, perverse or is not based on sound legal principles. It has been further observed in that case that when the appellate Court does not apply its judicial mind on all the materials brought on the record then in that case the approach of an Appellate Court would be wrong and contrary to the well established principles laid down by the High Court, more so when the appellate Court does not deal with the reasoning that has prevailed with the trial Court and further when it does not apply its judicial mind on the materials placed on the record.

The ratio decidendi in Vimla Devi''s case (supra) is very well applicable in the facts and circumstances of the instant case and in the light of parameters and yardsticks set out by this Court in the aforesaid verdict, I am unable to find any infirmity in the impugned order warranting interference.

Resultantly, the appeal fails and the same is hereby dismissed.