Ramneesh Kaushal vs Champa Devi

Heard.

The present petition is against the judgment dated 22.04.2022 passed by the Rent Control Tribunal, Raipur, wherein the appellate Tribunal has reversed the order passed by the Rent Control Authority, Katghora, District Korba and has granted a decree for possession.

The petitioner, who is a tenant, has challenged the said order on the ground that different proceedings were pending in between the parties including the proceeding under Section 145 of the Cr.P.C. on an earlier point of time.

Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that in a proceeding under Section 145 of the Cr.P.C. the categorical finding was arrived at by the concerned authority that the property on which the possession is sought for is described as 'Bade Jhaad ka Jungle', therefore, the property for which the ejectment is sought for do not belong to the respondent. He would further submit that the Rent Control Authority has taken into account these facts and since the ownership do not belong to the respondent, the Rent Control Tribunal dismissed the petition filed for ejectment. He would further submit that learned Tribunal ignoring such finding has passed an order of ejectment, which is contrary to the law and the effect of the order would be that the respondent would step into the shoes of ownership though the ownership belongs to the State. He would further submit that his suit for permanent injunction is still pending for the reason that an agreement was entered into the parties for purchase of the suit property on 19.10.2012 and an amount of Rs.4,00,000/- was paid, therefore, in these background of facts, the finding arrived at by the Rent Control Tribunal is completely perverse and is liable to be set aside.

Per contra, respondents, who are present in person, would submit that the order of the Rent Control Tribunal is well merited which do not call for any interference by this Court.

We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the documents.

After going through the bunch of the bulk of the papers, it shows that the parties are litigating for quite a long time. The Rent Control Authority order dated 16.04.2019 (Annexure P-2) on the document filed on behalf of the parties came to a conclusion that the petitioner being a tenant entered into an agreement initially on 01.07.2007 for 11 months thereafter on 01.06.2008 and lastly on 01.01.2012. On the basis of such agreement, which is not disputed by the parties, the Rent Control Tribunal gave a finding that the relation in between the petitioner and the respondent is that of landlord and tenant. Learned Rent Control Authority further came to a finding that on the basis of the document filed it was clear that the shop situated at village Ayodhyapuri, Ward No.46 Shop No.22 is owned by the respondent, wherein the petitioner is a tenant. The order would further show that learned Rent Control Authority further quoted a repealed Section 8 of the C.G. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act, 1961') and held that in a proceeding under Section 145 of the Cr.P.C. on the basis of Panchnama report since the subject land was shown as 'Bade Jhaad Ka Jungle' as such the ownership cannot be attached to the respondent as a landlord and non-suited the respondent. The order of the Rent Control Authority prima facie is completely perverse and misconceived for the reason that C.G. Rent Control Act, 2011 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act, 2011') was already promulgated which had replaced the earlier Act, 1961, then while deciding a petition under the Act, 2011 there was no necessity for the Rent Controller to refer to a repealed act and it would be a completely misconceived action along with the fact lack of application of mind.

Now coming back to the further action while evaluating the order of the Rent Control Tribunal, it would be apt to refer the definition of accommodation, landlord and tenant which is defined under Sections 2 (1), 2 (5) & 2 (14) of the Act, 2011 and for sake of brevity the same are reproduced herein below:-

2 (1) "Accommodation" means any building or part of a building, whether residential or non-residential, leased out by the landlord to the tenant and includes open space, staircase, grounds, garden, garage and all facilities and amenities forming part of the agreement between them of any land which is not being used for agricultural purposes;

2 (5) "Landlord" means a person who for the time being is receiving or is entitled to receive, the rent of any accommodation, whether on his own account or on account of or on behalf of or for the benefit of any other person or as a trustee, guardian or receiver for any other person or who would so receive the rent or to be entitled to receive the rent, if the accommodations were let to a tenant;

2 (14) "Tenant" means-

(i) the person by whom or on whose account or behalf rent is, or but for, a contract express or implied, would be payable for any accommodation to his landlord including the person who is continuing its possession after the termination of his tenancy otherwise than by an order or decree for eviction passed under the provisions of this Act; and

(ii) in the event of death of the person referred to in sub-clause (i)-

(a) in case of accommodation let out for residential purposes, his surviving spouse, son, daughter, mother and father who had been ordinarily residing with him in such accommodation as member of his family up to his death;

(b) in case of accommodation let out for commercial or business purposes, his surviving spouse, son, daughter, mother and father who had been ordinarily carrying on business with him in such accommodation as member of his family up to his death.

The order of the Rent Control Tribunal would show that it affirmed the finding of fact that the certain shops including the subject shop was constructed over the Abadi land and, therefore, would not be within the ambit of Section 3 of the Act, 2011. Reading of Section 3 (1) & (2) of the Act, 2011 it shows that it exempts the accommodation which is owned by department of Government or any other building or a category of building specifically exempted in public interest by the Government through notification. The subject premise being a shop and the petitioner who admitted to have entered into the possession by virtue of agreement which was renewed from time to time would lead to draw an inference that the accommodation means building or part of building whether residential or non-residential which is leased out by landlord. Consequently, the superstructure which stands on the land would be within the definition of accommodation.

Since the finding of both the Rent Control Authority and the Rent Control Tribunal show that the tenancy agreement exists and the rent was being paid, in a result, reading it with definition of landlord, which includes the person, who for the time being is receiving or is entitled to receive, the rent of any accommodation, whether on his own account or on account of or on behalf of or for the benefit of any other person, the respondent would step into the shoes of “landlord” as defined under the Act of 2011 coupled with the fact that the petitioner shall also step into the shoes of tenant for the reason that tenant includes the person by whom or on whose account or behalf rent is paid. For purpose of adjudication of an application under the Act, 2011 landlord is not synonym to the ownership except for payment & receipt of rent.

The submission of the petitioner that since the other suit is pending for permanent injunction in respect of the same suit property may not be a valid defence which can be considered qua the act of 2011 to nullify the effect and operation of the Act, 2011 which operates in a different field and with different objective. The petitioner's contention that a sale agreement was entered into in between the parties, if is accepted, which is said to be of the year 2012, enforcement of such relief may have a different field, which cannot take into eclipse the proceeding under the Act, 2011 commenced at the instance of landlord, who receives the rent. Likewise with the finding of the SDO under Section 145 of the Cr.P.C., the object and purpose of the Act, 2011 cannot be shelved which has a different field of operation.

In a result, we do not find an merit in this petition. Accordingly, the same is dismissed.