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Ramsingh @ Tungan vs State of Madhya Pradesh (now Chhattisgarh)

Chhattisgarh High Court · Decided on 31 August 2010 · Citation: (2010) 5 MPHT 44

HON’BLE JUDGES
Rajeev Gupta, C.J · Sunil Kumar Sinha, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 300, 302, 304
CASE NUMBER
Criminal Appeal No. 488 of 1992
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Judgment

9 paragraphs · 1,073 words

Sunil Kumar Sinha, J.—Appellant-Ramsingh stands convicted u/s 302, IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life by the Additional Sessions Judge, Khairagarh, Camp Kawardha, in Sessions Trial No. , 43/91, on 26th of February, 1992.

2.

The facts, briefly stated, are as under:

Deceased-Suna was resident of Village Chuwachaper. Appellant-Ramsingh is the brother of wife of the deceased from her maternal side. He is resident of a nearby village namely Datrari-tola. On 7-4-91 at about 4.00 p.m., the deceased went out from his house and reached to a nearby gali. The Appellant was also coming through the same gali. The Appellant was holding bow & arrow. The allegations are that the Appellant said to the deceased that today he will kill the deceased and thereafter he shot one arrow on the deceased which hit on his abdominal portion. The Appellant came to the deceased and tried to take out the arrow, but in the process the wooden portion detached from the iron portion and the iron portion could not be taken out from the body of the deceased. After sometime the deceased died. The incident was witnessed by three witnesses namely Itwari (P.W. 1), Parbati (P.W. 2 - wife of the deceased) and Sonibai (P.W. 9 - sister of the deceased). Itwari (P.W. 1) lodged the First Information Report (Exh. P-12). The Investigating Officer reached to the place of occurrence, gave notice (Exh. P-1) to the Panchas and prepared inquest (Exh. P-2) on the body of the deceased. The post-mortem examination was conducted by Dr. R.K. Bakshi (P.W. 13), who found that the liver of the deceased was damaged as there was an injury of 2 cm x 1 cm x 2 cm on the left lobe of the liver. Blood was found in the abdominal cavity. According to the post- mortem report (Exh. P-17), the cause of death was syncope as a result of injury to the liver causing haemorrhage.

3.

The learned Sessions Judge relied on the testimonies of the above three eye-witnesses and recorded the conviction u/s 302, IPC and sentenced the Appellant as aforementioned.

4.

We have perused the records of the Sessions Court. We have no doubt about the involvement of the Appellant in the above incident. On the basis of evidence of the above three eye-witnesses, it was established that the Appellant shot an arrow on the deceased which resulted into his death. The question which requires consideration is as to whether the act of the Appellant would be punishable u/s 302, IPC or the Appellant would be liable for punishment under some lesser Section.

5.

Mr. Akhil Mishra, learned Dy. Govt. Advocate appearing on behalf of the State, argued that the Appellant shot an arrow on the deceased with intention to cause his death, therefore, he was rightly punished u/s 302, IPC and there is hardly any scope for interference in this matter.

6.

In Virsa Singh Vs. The State of Punjab, , it was held that the prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case u/s 300 "thirdly"; First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present; Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved. These are purely objective investigations. Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended. Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further and, Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type, just described, made up of the three elements set out above, is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender. Once these four elements are established by the prosecution, the offence is murder u/s 300 "thirdly". It does not matter that there was no intention to cause death, or that there was no intention even to cause an injury of a kind that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, or even that there is no knowledge that an act of that kind will be likely to cause death. Once the intention to cause the bodily injury actually found to be present is proved, the rest of the enquiry is purely objective and the only question is whether, as a matter of purely objective inference, the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The question whether the intention is there or not is one of fact and not one of law. Whether the wound is serious or otherwise, and if serious, how serious, is a totally separate and distinct question and has nothing to do with the question whether the prisoner intended to inflict the injury in question.

7.

In Laxminath Vs. State of Chhattisgarh, , the Appellant show one arrow which hit on the arm of the victim. Thereafter he shot another arrow on his mother-in-law (deceased) which hit on her chest. The Supreme Court, relying on the judgment of Virsa Singh (supra), held that in the factual scenario and fact that one arrow was shot, the offence would be covered by Section 304, Part I and not Section 302, IPC and conviction awarded to the Appellant u/s 302, IPC was altered u/s 304, Part I, IPC with custodial sentence of eight years. If we examine the case on hand on the principles laid down in Virsa Singh''s case (supra), it does not appear that the Appellant had an intention to cause such bodily injury (i.e., injury on the liver) to the deceased and for the said reason, his act would not be punishable u/s 302, IPC and he would be liable for punishment under Part I of Section 304, IPC.

8.

In the result, the appeal is partly allowed. The conviction and sentence awarded to the Appellant u/s 302, IPC are set aside. The Appellant is convicted u/s 304, Part I, IPC and sentenced to undergo RI for 10 years. We gathered from the record that the Appellant was arrested on 8-4- 91 and was released on bail on 7-5-2002, hence, he has already served more than the sentence awarded to him. Therefore, he is not required to surrender. He is on bail. His bail bonds are cancelled and surety stands discharged.