Ramsunder Choudhary vs State

S.N. Imam, J.—This is an application in revision against the order of the learned appellate court dismissing the petitioner''s appeal against the order of the trial Court convicting him u/s 7(i) read with Section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (No. XXXVII) of 1954, and sentencing him to pay a fine of Rs. 200/-.

The prosecution case shortly is that the Sanitary Inspector on 5-7-1955, took sample of mustard oil from the petitioner''s shop and sent the same to the public analyst who found the oil to be adulterated.

The point taken before me is that the occurrence having taken place on 5-7-1955, the Bihar Act which is known as the Bihar Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1947, does not apply because the Central Act which is known as the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954 (Act XXVII of 1954) came into force on l-6-1955, that is before the offence was committed, repealing the Bihar Act, and therefore, the inspector, who had filed the complaint, had no authority to file a complaint since the Central Act does not empower him to do so. Hence the entire trial is vitiated and the petitioner should be acquitted. It appears that the Bihar Act in Section 21 has provided that--

"No court shall take cognizance of as offence against the provisions of this Act except on the complaint made by (b) the local authority or a person expressly authorised in this behalf by the local authority: But it also appears that Section 25(2) of the Central Act has provided as follows:

"Notwithstanding the repeal by this Act of any corresponding law all rules, regulations and bye-laws relating to the prevention of adulteration of food, made under such corresponding law and, in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall except where and so far as they are inconsistent with or repugnant to the provisions of this Ace continue in force until altered, amended or repealed by rules made under this Act."

Section 25 (1) of the Act is as follows:

"If, immediately before the commencement of this Act, there is in force in any State to which this Act extends any law corresponding to this Act, that corresponding law shall upon such commencement stand repealed."

It is thus clear from this that the Bihar Act must be deemed to have been repealed. What is provided is not the local Act but the rules, regulations and bye-laws relating to the prevention of adulteration of food made under such corresponding law and in force immediately before the commencement of the Central Act which shall, except where and so far as they are inconsistent with or repugnant to the provisions of the Central Act, continue in force until altered, amended or repealed by rules made under the Central Act.

Hence the entire Bihar Act was repealed and any complaint filed by the Inspector by virtue of Section 21 of the Bihar Act must be deemed to be a complaint filed by a person who was not authorised to do so. In this connection I would refer to a decision of the Allahabad High Court in the The State Vs. Mool Chand, . In that case the alleged offence was committed on 21-7-1955, and the prosecution was launched u/s 16 read with Section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act by the Assistant Medical Officer of Health prior to the enforcement of the rules made by the State Government under the Act.

In these circumstances it was held that the State Government had not authorised the Assistant Medical Officer by that date to prosecute any person for an offence under the Act and that he could not, therefore, institute a complaint in view of Section 20 of the Act. In that case the contention that by virtue of Section 25(2), Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, the power which the Assistant Medical Officer exercised under U. P. Pure Food Act and rules thereunder could be exercised by them under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act was not tenable because Food Inspectors appointed under the U. P. Pure Food Act were conferred the power to prosecute by the Act itself, namely by Section 34 and that they did not derive this power under any rules and that when Section 34 of the Act was repealed in view of the repeal of the entire Act, this power of the Food Inspectors came to an end and the notification appointing Health Officers and others to be Food Inspectors might serve the purpose of appointing them Food Inspectors under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, but it neither gave them the power to prosecute under the U. P. Pure Food Act nor could it be deemed to confer this power under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, and hence the prosecution was bad in law. The present case is on all fours with that case. Therefore, in my opinion the order of conviction and sentence passed on the petitioner in the present case for the reasons stated above must be set aside.

The result, therefore, is that the order of conviction and sentence passed against the petitioner is set aside, the petitioner is acquitted of the charge framed against him and the application is allowed.