Ramswaroop Kadape vs State Of Madhya Pradesh

The present appeal is directed against an order passed by the learned Single Bench on 08.12.2017 whereby, the termination of the contractual services of the writ petitioner after serving one month's notice, were ordered to be stayed. Such order was vacated by this Court in appeal on 06.04.2018.

We find that an interim order which has the effect of granting the final relief in the writ petition itself, cannot be granted. An order of termination of services of a contractual employee should not have been stayed by the learned Single Bench as it amounts to grant of main relief claimed in the writ petition itself.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court in a judgment reported as (1985) 1 SCC 260 (Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandan Nagar, West Bengal vs. Dunlop India Ltd. and others) deprecated the practice of granting interim orders which practically give the principal relief sought in the petition. The Court said to the following effect:

"5. We repeat and deprecate the practice of granting interim order which practically give the principal relief sought in the petition for no better reason than that a prima facie case has been made out, without being concerned about the balance of convenience, the public interest and a host of other relevant considerations......

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In Union of India v. Jain Shudh Vanaspati Ltd., C.A. No.11450 of 1983, Chandrachud, C.J., A.P. Sen, R.N. Misra, JJ. allowed an appeal against an interim order making the following observations:

"After hearing learned counsel for the rival parties, we are of the opinion that the interim order passed by the High Court on November 29, 1983 is not warranted since it virtually grants to the respondents a substantial part of the relief claimed by them in their writ petition. Accordingly, we set aside the said order."

In another judgment reported as (2003) 6 SCC 65 (Union of India and others vs. Modiluft Ltd.) the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the interim relief, as is the main relief in the writ petition, cannot be granted at an interlocutory stage. The Court held as under:

"17. Seen from any angle, we think the High Court has erred in granting the impugned relief to the respondent which in our opinion is in the nature of a final relief which on facts and circumstances of this case, without deciding the issues involved in the writ petition, could not have been granted. Therefore, we allow the appeal and set aside the impugned order. The NOC which is said to have been issued provisionally stands revoked. Payment made, if any, by the respondent would be given credit or adjusted in a manner considered appropriate by the High Court in the pending writ petition."

In (2005) 13 SCC 505 (Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited and others vs. Prem Chand Premi and another) the Supreme Court reiterated that the High Court should not have granted the ultimate relief at the interim stage. The Court held as under:

"2. We are of the view that the High Court should not have granted the ultimate relief at the interim stage as the issue seems to be a highly debatable one. The question is whether the eligibility of the respondents for promotion should be decided according to the 1996 Rules, the 1999 Rules or the 2001 Rules. We accordingly, allow the appeal by setting aside the interim order passed by the High Court. However, we pass the following interim relief:

"If the respondents are ultimately successful in their writ petition, they will be granted retrospective seniority based upon the relevant rules which might be held to be applicable."

The stay of order of termination is inequitable inasmuch as in the event the writ petition is allowed, the writ petitioner would be entitled to all consequential benefits including salary for the period. But in the event the writ petition is dismissed the State will be burdened with financial expenditure though none was payable to the petitioner. Such financial burden even without determination of right of writ petitioner cannot be accepted.

In view of the above, the present appeal is disposed of while setting aside the order of stay of termination passed by the learned Single Judge on 08.12.2017.