Ranga Dasan vs Latchuma Dasan and Others

The lower appellate Court has found that the plaintiff is the Pujari or trustee of the suit temples. It has also been found that the suit property is

property attached to the temples. The plaintiff''s suit to recover possession has, however, been dismissed on the ground that it is barred by Article

134 of the Limitation Act.

It has been held by the Privy Council in Vidyavaruthi v. Balusami Aiyar ILR (1921) M 831 : 41 MLJ 346 that Article 134 of the Limitation Act

does not apply to a case of this kind. The respondents'' learned vakil seeks to distinguish the present case from the decision in Vidyavaruthi v.

Balusami Aiyar ILR (1921) M 831 : 41 MLJ 346 by pointing out that in the Privy Council case the alienation by the trustee complained of was

only a permanent lease and not a sale as in this case and reliance is placed upon the following passage in Subbaiya Pandaram v. Mahomed

Mustapha Marcayar ILR (1923) M 751 : 1923 45 MLJ 588 in support of the distinction. The passage runs as follows : _"" This is not, in fact, a

transfer by the trustee himself for a valuable consideration, though there is little difference in principle between a transfer under an adverse

execution and a sale by the trustee himself, but disregarding that Article, Article 144 covers the exact case."" It will be remembered that in Subbaiya

Pandaram v. Mahomed Mustapha Marcayar ILR (1923) M 751 : 1923 45 MLJ 588, the trust property sought to be recovered was acquired by

the purchaser under an execution sale and the question was whether the suit was barred under Article 134 or Article 144 of the Limitation Act.

From the context in which it appears it seems to me that in the passage quoted their Lordships of the Privy Council were only meeting an argument

that must have been raised at the bar with reference to Article 134. They were only pointing out this, namely, that it might be that there is little

difference between a transfer under an execution sale, i. e., involuntary transfers, and a sale by the trustee himself, i. e., voluntary transfers; but

Article 134 applies to transfers by the trustee himself for a valuable consideration, namely voluntary transfers. Then their Lordships proceed to

discuss the applicability of Article 144. That no such distinction as is now pointed out was present to their Lordships'' mind is also clear from the

fact that their Lordships in the course of the elaboration of the principle refer to cases of alienation by leases and mortgages. [Cf. Mahomed v.

GanapathiILR (1889) M 277; Jamal Saheb v. Murgaya Swami ILR (1885) B 34; Behari Lal v. Mohamad Muttaki ILR (1898) A 482.] The

decisions quoted by the learned vakil for the respondents, Madhavarao Vaman v. Raghunath Venkatesh ILR (1923) 248, Kuppuswami Mudaliar

v. Samia Pillai (1921) 42 MLJ 1 and Khaji Mir Majavath Alli Vs. Khaji Mir Mujafar Alli and Another, do not refer to this distinction. I therefore

think that the plaintiff''s suit is not barred by limitation under Article 134 of the Limitation Act. As it has been admittedly brought within two years

after he became a pujari his suit is within time.

I therefore set aside the decree of the Courts below and give the plaintiff a decree as prayed for subject to his giving defendants 3 to 5 Rs.

1,700 for the value of improvements effected by them. The plaintiff will have his costs in all the Courts.