Rangadas Naik vs State of Karnataka

Tirath S. Thakur, J.—The Petitioners in all these Writ Petitions except those in Writ Petition Nos. 27695/95 & 25119/1995 are claimants in

different Claim Petitions presently pending disposal before the respective Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals in the State of Karnataka. Writ

Petitions No. 27695/95 & 25119/1995 have been filed by the Belgaum and the Mangalore Bar Associations in public interest for the general

benefit of the claimants who are for economic reasons disabled from instituting independent Writ Petitions.

The Writ Petitions call in question Notification dated 30th March, 1995, issued by the Government of Karnataka in exercise of its powers u/s

165 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and Circulars dated 6th April, 1995 and 29th May, 1995 issued by the Registrar (General) of the High

Court of Karnataka, prescribing certain Guidelines for the Accidents Claims Tribunal to follow while transferring the Accidents Claims Cases to

the Additional Tribunals constituted under the said Notification.

By Notification dated 30th March, 1995, the Government has in partial modification of all previous orders appointed all Civil Judges as

Members of the Additional Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals and directed that Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals constituted at the District

Headquarters presided over by the Principal District and Sessions Judge shall transfer the Claim Petitions instituted before them to the Additional

Claims Tribunals constituted under the Notification depending upon the area of the Civil Jurisdiction exercised by the Judges or otherwise deemed

prudent in the interest of speedy disposal of such claims. Since the validity of the Notification has been questioned on various grounds, it is

necessary to extract the same in extenso. The Notification reads thus:-

GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA

No. HTD 2 TMR 92 Karnataka Govt. Secretariat,

M.S. Building,

Bangalore, Dt.30th March,1995.

NOTIFICATION

In exercise of the powers conferred u/s 165 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1988, the Government of Karnataka on the recommendation of the High

Court of Karnataka and in partial modification of all previous orders appointing members to Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal appoints :-

a) The Principal District and Sessions Judges as members of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals at the respective District Headquarters;

b) The Additional District Judges of the District as members of the Additional Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals;

c) All the Civil Judges as members of the Additional Motor Accidents claims Tribunal.

II. To facilitate proper and effective supervision over the functioning of the additional Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals it is hereby stipulated

that:-

a) Every claims petition shall be instituted in the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals constituted at the District Headquarters presided over by the

Principal District & Sessions Judge;

b) The claims shall be transferred to the Additional Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals constituted as above, by the Principal District & Sessions

Judges of the District depending upon the area of Civil Jurisdiction exercised by the Judges and as otherwise deemed prudent in the interest of

speedy disposal of such claims.

By Order and in the Name of the Governor of Karnataka,

Sd/-

(A. CHANNAPPA)

Under Secretary to Govt., Home

& Transport Department (Transport).

Shortly after the issue of the aforesaid Notification the Registrar General of the High Court of Karnataka, issued a Circular dated 6th of April,

1995, forwarding therewith copies of the Notification issued by the Government to the Claims Tribunal with instructions to transfer the pending

cases on the files of the concerned Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and the existing Additional Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal to the

Additional Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals constituted under the Notification. The Circular reads thus:-

No.GOB-(I)533/94 High Court of Karnataka,

Bangalore,dt.6th April,

1995

From.

The Registrar General,

High Court of Karnataka,

Bangalore.

To,

Sir,

Sub: Forwarded of Notification issued by the Government

u/s 165 of the MVC Act appointing all

District Judges/Additional District Judges and Civil

Judges as Members of the claims Tribunal in partial

Modification of all previous order - Regarding.

With reference to the above subject, I am to forward herewith a copy of the Notification No. HTD 2 TMR 92 dated 30.3.1995 issued by the

Secretary to the Government, Home & Transport Department, Bangalore, u/s 165 of the MVC Act for circulating the said Notification to all the

Additional District Judges/Civil Judges working under your Unit.

Further I am to inform that all claims cases pending on the file of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals and the existing Additional Motor

Accidents Claims Tribunal shall also be transferred to the Additional Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal constituted as per the said Notification after

following the procedure as per Rules.

Further, I am also to inform that the said Notification is effective from 3.4.1995 i.e., the date of publication in the official (extraordinary) Gazette.

Yours faithfully,

Sd/-

(M.P. CHINNAPPA)

Registrar-General.

Nearly a month and a half later, yet another Circular was issued by the Registrar General in continuation of the earlier one in which certain

Guidelines were framed for the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals to keep in mind while exercising their jurisdiction in the matter of transfer of

pending Claims Petitions. The Guidelines given in the Circular read as under: -

All the claim petitions, in which the recording of evidence has been completed and hearing of the arguments has been over, shall be disposed of

by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals before which they are pending;

All the claim petitions, in which the recording of evidence has been completed and the matters are posted to hear arguments, shall be disposed

of by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals in which the claim petitions are pending;

All the claim petitions, in which the recording of evidence is to commence and in which all the parties are represented by Lawyers of their

choice, shall be transferred to the Additional Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals having jurisdiction to try the claim petitions giving a date for further

proceedings with a direction to the parties to appear before the transferee Tribunals on the date so given and at the time stated in the order,

without expecting any fresh notice or communication from the transferee - Tribunals. The transferee -Tribunals shall proceed to determine the claim

petitions as they go to them.

All the claim petitions, in which the recording of evidence is to commence, but in which only some or the other parties, shall be transferred to the

Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals having Jurisdiction for disposal according to law, with a direction to issue notice to the parties yet to be served

and proceed to determine the claim petitions after service of notice on such parties.

With a view to obviate the avoidable inconvenience to the respondents and claimants, the Additional Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals

presided over by Civil Judges, should be asked to operate with regard to the amounts awarded as compensation on the account of the Civil Court

deposit, pending necessary amendments to the Accounts Rules for Subordinate Courts and the other relevant Rules. Such a practice would

prevent the respondents and claimants awarded with compensation, from going to the M.A.C.T.-1 situated at the District Headquarters, either to

deposit the amount awarded as compensation or to receive the same.

Aggrieved by the Notification and the Circulars mentioned above, the petitioners have filed these Petitions challenging the validity thereof on a

number of grounds. It was urged by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners that Notification dated 30th March, 1995 was

illegal and violative of Section 165 of the Motor Vehicles Act in that; i) it does not constitute a Tribunal before appointing the Civil Judge as ex-

officio members thereof; ii) it does not specify the territorial jurisdiction of each such Tribunal; iii) it has the effect of depriving the claimants of the

choice of forum available to them u/s 166(2) of the Act; and iv) it appoints all Civil Judges as Members of the Tribunals ex-officio even when all of

them are not eligible to be appointed as District Judges in terms of Article 233 of the Constitution.

In so far as Circulars issued by the High Court are concerned, the challenge is based on the proposition that the High Court cannot in exercise

of its administrative or judicial power of superintendence issue a Circular so as to usurp the jurisdiction otherwise vested in the Tribunals in terms of

a Statutory Notification issued by the Government. It was contended that inasmuch as the Circulars issued by the High Court leave no choice for

the Tribunals except to transfer the pending cases and those that may be instituted hereafter to the Additional Tribunals comprising of the Civil

Judges concerned, it grossly interfered with the exercise of jurisdiction vested with the Principal Accidents Claims Tribunals thereby rendering the

Circulars illegal. Alternatively it was submitted that the impugned Notification dated 30th March, 1995, did not have any application to the pending

Motor Accidents Claim cases and that the directions issued by the High Court by virtue of the two circulars mentioned earlier amounted to making

an unwarranted addition into the said Notification.

The Respondents have in a common statement of objections filed to all these Petitions, denied the allegations made by the Writ petitioners and

asserted that the Notifications as also the Circulars issued are perfectly legal and within the powers of the authorities issuing the same.

In the context of the above the following Questions fall for Consideration:-

1) Is the Notification dated 30th March, 1995, in any manner violative of Section 165 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 ?

2) Does the Notification in question in any manner offend the right of the claimants to choose the Forum for the adjudication of their Claim Petition

in terms of Section 166(2) of the Act?

3) Is the Ex-officio appointment of all Civil Judges as Members of the Additional Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, in any manner illegal ?

4) Are the Circulars issued by the High Court incompetent/or illegal because they interfere with the exercise of discretion by the Principal

Accidents Claims Tribunal in the matter of transfer of the Claims Petitions to the Additional Tribunals ?

For the sake of clarity in the treatment to each one of these Points, I propose to deal With the same ad seriatum.

Re:Question No. 1 :- Learned Counsel for petitioners made a two fold submission in so far as this question is concerned. It was urged that u/s

165 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, before the Government could appoint whether ex-officio or otherwise Members of an Accidents Claims

Tribunal or an Additional Tribunal it must first constitute such a Tribunal by an independent Notification. According to the petitioners, the

appointment of Civil Judges as Members of the Additional Tribunals without first constituting such Additional Tribunals by an independent

Notification was inconsequential, legally defective and non-est. Alternatively, it was submitted that a Notification constituting a Tribunal in order to

be valid must specify the area for which the same is being constituted. It was urged that in as much as the impugned Notification did not specify the

area for which the Additional Tribunals were being constituted, the same fell short of the requirements of the law, and was liable to be quashed.

Section 165 of the Motor Vehicles Act reads thus:

Section 165(1) A State Government may by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute one or more Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals

(hereafter in this Chapter referred to as Claims Tribunal) for such area as may be specified in the notification for the purpose of accidents involving

the death of, or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles, or damages to any property of a third party so arising, or both.

Explanation:- For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the expression ""claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the

death of or bodily injury to persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles"" includes claims for compensation u/s 140 (and Section 163-A).

(2) A Claims Tribunal shall consist of such number of members as the State Government may think fit to appoint and where it consists of two or

more members, one of them shall be appointed as the Chairman thereof.

(3) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as a member of a Claims Tribunal unless he,-

(a) is, or has been, a Judge of a High Court, or

(b) is, or has been a District Judge, or

(c) is qualified for appointment as a Judge of a High Court (or as a District Judge).

(4) Where two or more Claims Tribunals are constituted for any area, the State Government, may by general or special order, regulate the

distribution of business among them.

A plain reading of the provision shows that the same does not in terms require the Government to issue two separate Notifications, one

constituting the Tribunal and the other appointing the Members thereof. What is required is that the Government should constitute a Tribunal

specifying the area for which it will exercise jurisdiction and appoint a person duly qualified in terms of Sub-section (3) of Section 165 to serve as

Member of any such Tribunal. The constitution of the Tribunal and the appointment of the Member or Members to the same, are not in terms of

Section 165 required to be two separate exercises to be accomplished by two separate Notifications issued for the purpose. There is nothing in

the provisions of Section 165 to prevent the Government from constituting a Tribunal or an additional Tribunal and by the same Notification

appointing Member or Members of the same. The very fact that two separate Notifications could also have been issued for the purpose does not

by itself mean that, that was the only proper course open to the Government. A composite Notification constituting a Tribunal and appointing

Members of the same and even providing for distribution of business if there are more than one Tribunals constituted under the said provision, was

permissible and could have been legitimately issued by the Government.

In the instant case, Notification dated 30th March, 1995 is a composite Notification by which the Government has constituted the Additional

Tribunals and appointed Civil Judges as ex-officio Members of the same and also provided for the distribution of business among such Tribunals.

The expression ""The Claims shall be transferred to the Additional Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals constituted as above"" clearly imply the

constitution of the Tribunals in terms of Section 165(1) and appointment of the Civil Judges, as Members of the same. A harmonious and a careful

reading of the Notification leaves hardly any manner of doubt that by the impugned Notification the Government intended to constitute the

Additional Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals and appoint the Civil Judge as ex-officio Members of the same. This is apparent not only from a

bare reading of the Notification but also the background in which the said Notification came to be issued. The Notification makes a reference to

the recommendations made by the High Court of Karnataka which recommendations were admittedly made with a view to constitute and appoint

the Civil Judges as Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunals under the Motor Vehicles Act. The argument that the impugned Notification does

not actually constitute the Tribunals as required u/s 165 but simply appoints Members to nonexistent Tribunals, therefore does not commend itself

to me nor do I have any hesitation in rejecting the same.

Equally untenable is the other limb of the petitioners'' submission in so far as this aspect of the case is concerned. It was contended that the

Notification in question does not specify the area for which the Additional Tribunals are being constituted as required by Section 165(1) of the Act.

It is true that the State Government while constituting one or more Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals, u/s 165(1) is required to specify the

area/areas for which such Tribunal or Tribunals are being constituted, yet I find it difficult to accept the argument advanced on behalf of the

petitioners that the impugned Notification does not so specify the areas for which the Additional Tribunals have been constituted. The expression

the claims shall be transferred to the Additional Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals constituted as above by the Principal District & Sessions Judge

of the District depending upon the area of Civil jurisdiction exercised by the Judges and as otherwise deemed prudent in the interest of justice and

speedy disposal of such claims"" clearly implies that the Civil Judges constituted as Additional Tribunals under the Act, shall exercise the powers

vested in the Tribunals limited to the area of their civil jurisdiction. It is not as though the Notification purports to constitute the Civil Judges for

areas beyond their civil Jurisdiction nor is it possible to say that the Civil Judges appointed as Additional Tribunals, will have no defined area in

respect of which they shall be exercising their jurisdiction. While it is true that the Notification does not in specific terms state that the Additional

Tribunals comprising of the Civil Judges shall exercise jurisdiction only in respect of areas falling within their territorial jurisdiction, yet the intention

of the Government is much too clear from the expression appearing in the Notification and re-produced above to need any elaboration. A reading

of the Notification hardly leaves any doubt that the Additional Tribunal to whom the Accidents Claims Cases may be transferred by the Principal

District & Sessions Judge in his capacity as the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal at the District Headquarters, will exercise his jurisdiction limited

only to the area of his civil Jurisdiction as a Civil Judge. No fault can thus be found with the impugned Notification on this ground also. My answer

to question No. 1 is therefore in the negative.

Re: Question No. 2 :-

On behalf of the petitioners it was contended that in terms of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimants have the option of instituting

their claims either in the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal within whose jurisdiction the accident has taken place or the Tribunal within whose

jurisdiction the claimants reside or the Tribunal within whose jurisdiction the defendant resides. This option, it was argued, is taken away by the

impugned Notification, according to which, all such claims had to be necessarily instituted in the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal at the District

Headquarters and presided over by the Principal District & Sessions Judge. The compulsion created by the Notification, it was contended was

offensive to the statutory option given to the claimants by Section 166 of the Act, rendering the Notification illegal. I find no substance in this

argument either. Section 166 no doubt gives to the claimants the option of instituting the Claim Petitions with any one of the three Tribunals,

referred to therein yet it is difficult to appreciate how any such option is in any manner taken away by the impugned Notification. Take for instance,

a case where the accident takes place within the jurisdiction of Tribunal-''A'' the claimant resides within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal-''B'' and the

Defendants resides within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal-''C''. The option to the claimants to institute the Claim Petition in any one of these three

Tribunals continues to remain available notwithstanding the fact that within the jurisdiction of one of such Tribunals, the Government has under the

impugned Notification created more than one Additional Tribunal, The creation of Additional Tribunals, does not appear to have any co-relation

with the option exercisable by a claimant in so far as the choice of Forum is concerned. All that the Notification requires is that in case the claimant

choses to institute the proceedings within the jurisdiction of one of the three Tribunals, referred to in Section 166, such an institution shall be made

only by presenting a Claim Petition in the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal at the District Headquarters presided over by the Principal District and

Sessions Judge. It is therefore obvious that once the option available to the claimant is exercised, the requirement of Section 166 is exhausted.

After such an institution, the claimant cannot claim any further right statutory or otherwise to have his Claim Petition tried necessarily either by the

Principal Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal or by any particular Additional Tribunal created by the Government. I therefore see no conflict

between the impugned Notification and the provisions of Section 166 of this Act so as to render the former illegal or incompetent.

Reg:Question No. 3 :-

Section 165 Sub-section (3) prescribes that a person shall not be qualified for appointment as a member of the Tribunal unless he satisfies the

conditions stipulated therein namely; a) is or has been a Judge of the High Court; b) is or has been a District Judge; c) is qualified for appointment

as a Judge of the High Court or as a District Judge. The words ""or as a District Judge"" appearing in Clause (c) of Section 165(3) were added by

Motor Vehicles Amendment Act No. 54/1994 with effect from 14th of November, 1994. On behalf of the petitioner it was contended that only

such persons could be appointed as Members of the Claims Tribunals as were qualified to be appointed as District Judges under Article 233 of the

Constitution, and were eligible for appointment by direct recruitment as such Judges, Ex-officio appointment of all Civil Judges, regardless whether

they were actually qualified to be appointed as District Judges under Article 233 was illegal, according to the petitioners.

I find no merit even in this submission. Article 233 of the Constitution of India, reads thus:-

Article 233(1) Appointments of persons to be, and the posting and promotion of, District Judges in any State shall be made by the Governor of

the State in consultation with the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to such State.

(2) A person not already in the service of the Union or of the State shall only be eligible to be appointed a. District Judge if he has been for not less

than seven years in advocate or a pleader and is recommended by the High Court for appointment.

A plain reading of the above provision shows that the same provides the qualifications required for appointment as a District Judge, on direct

recruitment basis only. The provisions of Article 233 do not however forbid appointments by promotion of Civil Judges in accordance with the

Rules regulating such appointments. On the contrary Article 233(2) prescribes the conditions of eligibility for appointment as a District Judge only

in regard to ""persons not already in service"". Civil Judges are not therefore governed by the requirement of Article 233 of the Constitution of India

in so far as their eligibility for promotion as District Judges are concerned. Such appointment is on the other hand governed by Karnataka Judicial

Service (Recruitment) Rules, 1983, which provide that a Civil Judge shall be eligible for promotion irrespective of the length of his service or the

number of years he has put in as an Advocate or as a Pleader. It follows that all Civil Judges are eligible to be appointed as District Judges by

promotion regardless of the fact whether they fulfil the eligibility conditions prescribed by Article 233(2) for appointment by direct recruitment to

the said post.

The argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners that for the purposes of appointments as Members of the Accidents Claims Tribunal, the

qualifications required to be fulfilled are only those that are prescribed for direct recruit does not impress me. I see no reason to read into the

provisions of Section 165 any such requirement. Appointments it is well settled can be made both by way of direct recruitment as also by way of

promotion. Once a person is eligible to be appointed by either one of these two modes, he has to be treated to be a person qualified for

appointment to any such post. There is no principle of law or other sound reason by which the term ""qualified for appointment"" appearing in

Section 165(3)(C) should be interpreted to mean qualified for direct recruitment only. The challenge to the Notification based on the alleged

ineligibility of the Civil Judges for appointment as District Judges also fails in the above circumstances.

Reg:Question No. 4:-

That brings me to the question as to whether the two Circulars issued by the High Court are legally valid and competent. The petitioners argued

that the High Court had no power or jurisdiction to issue such Circulars except to the extent Article 227 of the Constitution empowered it to have

superintendence over all Courts and Tribunals subordinate to it throughout the territory in relation to which it exercised jurisdiction. It was urged

that although Article 227 envisaged both Judicial as also Administrative superintendence over the Courts and Tribunals functioning within the limits

of its territorial jurisdiction, any such power whether Judicial or Administrative, did not extend to the issue of directions to a Tribunal exercising

powers under a specific Statute, to act in a particular fashion or to pass a specific order in exercise of such jurisdiction. Reliance was placed in

support upon Judgments of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab and Another Vs. Hari Krishan Sharma, in Commissioner of Police, Bombay Vs.

Gordhandas Bhanji, in The Purtabpore Co., Ltd. Vs. Cane Commissioner of Bihar and Others, , Mohd. Yunus Vs. Mohd. Mustaqim and Others,

in Mohd. Yunus Vs. Mohd. Mustaqim and Others,

Mr. Ullal, learned Government Advocate appearing on behalf of the Respondents however sought to support the issue of the Circulars by the

High Court and placed reliance upon Article 227 to contend that the power of superintendence was unlimited, and could be exercised by the High

Court even for the purposes of giving guidelines to Tribunals functioning within the territorial limits of its jurisdiction. He relied upon the meaning of

the word ""superintendence"" given in the Oxford Dictionary and Law Lexicon to show that the name comprehends the power to issue Guidelines

and even directives to the subordinate Tribunals. He relied upon in Phalgu Dutta Kirpa Ram Vs. Pushpa Wanti and Others, Partap Singh Kairon

Vs. Gurmej Singh, and In Re: Annamalai Mudaliar, , S.R.No. 3853/1952, D/3.9.1952, in support of his argument that the power available to the

High Court under Article 227(1) was wide enough to justify the issue of the impugned Circulars and the Guidelines contained therein.

What then is the true content and scope of the power of superintendence available to the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of

India? Is it indefinite and unlimited both in the matters of Judicial interference as also the administrative control or is the power hedged in by any

limitation ? In other words is the very plentitude of the power available to the High Court enough to justify its issuing what in its wisdom may

appear to be proper Guidelines or tests to be adopted by a Tribunal exercising independent powers under a special Statute or is any such power

beyond the purview of Article 227 are some of the incidental questions that arise for consideration. Article 227 as the same stands after the 44th

Amendment Act, 1978 reads thus:-

Article 227(1) Every High court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals through out the territories in relation to which it exercises

jurisdiction. -

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provision, the High Court may -

(a) call for returns from such courts;

(b) make and issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating the practice and proceedings of such courts; and

(c) prescribe forms in which books, entries and accounts shall be kept by the officers of any such courts.

(3) The High Court may also settle tables of fees to be allowed to the sheriff and all clerks and officers of such courts and to attorneys, advocates

and pleaders practising therein;

Provided that any rules made, forms prescribed or tables settled under Clause (2) or Clause (3) shall not be inconsistent with the provision of any

law for the time being in force, and shall require the previous approval of the Governor.

(4) Nothing in this article shall be deemed to confer on a High Court powers of superintendence over any court or tribunal constituted by or under

any law relating to the Armed Forces.

A plain reading of the extracted provisions shows that the power of superintendence conferred on the High Court Part-I of Article 227 is both

indefinite and unlimited. The power is not subject to any limitation and is primarily designed to keep the subordinate Courts and Tribunals within the

limits of their jurisdiction and correct and prevent abuse of authority of them.

The jurisdiction is discretionary in character and in terms of a long string of Judgments of the Supreme Court and the High Courts in the

Country has to be sparingly exercised. The power being supervisory in nature its exercise is warranted only in cases where the subordinate Courts

or Tribunals proceed in an arbitrary fashion or cause gross injustice that may result in an irreparable injury. The power is resorted to only in

extraordinary and unusual situations where ordinary remedies provided are found to be inadequate. The very nature of the power and its scope as

also the lack of any limitations on the same, impose upon the Courts an onerous responsibility to make a prudent and sparing use of the same along

sound judicial lines. The exercise of the power is not a substitute for an Appellant jurisdiction nor is it exercisable only to correct an error of law

except where such an error is apparent on the face of record. Suffice it to say that the power of Judicial superintendence over subordinate Courts

and Tribunals is intended to ensure that the subordinate Courts and Tribunals abide by the law and exercise their jurisdiction in keeping with the

letter and the spirit thereof.

Besides, the power to interfere on the Judicial side the High Court also exercises powers of superintendence over the subordinate Courts and

Tribunals in administrative matters. This power however is subject to the limitation imposed by Proviso to Sub-rule (3) of Article 227 which

requires that the Rules which the High Court may make, the Forms it may choose to prescribe or the Table of Fees it may settle in terms of part-3

of the Article shall not be inconsistent with the provisions of law for the time being in force and shall require the previous approval of the Governor.

In other words, in so far as '' administrative matters are concerned, the power of superintendence is not unlimited and or unconditional in nature.

Such a power is subject to the same fulfilling the dual tests prescribed by the Proviso namely the same is not exercised in derogation of any existing

law and the Rule framed and the Forms and tables prescribed have the prior approval of the Governor. This appears to be the only distinguishing

feature between the content and the nature of the two powers exercisable by the High Court under this Article.

The impugned Circulars issued by the High Court cannot obviously be deemed to be an exercise of the powers of the Judicial superintendence

exercisable by the High Court under Article 227(1) of the Constitution. The exercise of power of Judicial superintendence under Article 227(1)

will require a situation where a Court or Tribunal subordinate to the High Court either exercises its jurisdiction improperly or fails or declines to

exercise the same in accordance with law. If it is a case of improper exercise of jurisdiction the High Court can in exercise of its power of

superintendence under Article 227 intervene and correct the path of adjudication. Similarly in case a Court or Tribunal even though required to

exercise its jurisdiction in accordance with law fails or omits to do so, the Court may even in such a case intervene and issue requisite directions in

exercise of its power of superintendence, compelling the Court or Tribunal to act and discharge the duty enjoined upon it by the law under which it

functions. The impugned Circulars do not fit in or answer any one of these two situations, The same have therefore to be treated to have been

issued in exercise of the powers of administrative superintendence of the High Court over subordinate Courts and Tribunals.

Two Questions arise at this stage, namely:

(i) Does the High Court enjoy any power of superintendence on matters over and above these mentioned in Sub-article (2) of Article 227 of the

Constitution ? and

(ii) Does any such power extend to controlling, regulating or interfering even with matters which are within the discretion and jurisdiction of a

subordinate tribunal exercising powers under a special enactment ?

In so far as the first of these questions is concerned, the words ""without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provision"" appearing in

para-2 of Article 227 in my opinion provide the answer. These words clearly imply that the enumeration of the extent of administrative powers in

part-2 of Article 227 is not exhaustive of the said power. In other words, the administrative power exercisable is not limited to the matters set out

in Clauses (a) to (c) of part-2 of Article 227. These subjects are identified for purposes of enumeration without prejudice to the generality of the

powers vested with the High Court under that Article both in regard to Judicial and administrative superintendence. The source of power under

Article 227(1) is available both in regard to Judicial and administrative superintendence and is not controlled by the provisions of Sub-article (2) of

Article 227. It follows that the High Courts have the power of superintendence in administrative matters even in regard to subjects other than those

enumerated under Sub-article (2) of Article 227. The position may have been different if the general power had followed the specific enumeration

of the subjects, for in that case the Rule of Ejusdem Generis could be invoked to limit the general power to subjects alike or analogues to those

that are specifically enumerated. This however is not so and since the Rule has no inverse application, there is no option but to hold that the specific

subjects mentioned after the conferment of a general power does not prejudice or limit the general power to the specified subjects only. This is

apparent even from the words used in part (2) of Article 227 itself reference whereto has been made by me earlier. My answer to Question-1

above is therefore in the affirmative.

That brings me to the second Question namely whether the power of administrative superintendence can be invoked so as to regulate or guide

the exercise of discretion vested in a subordinate Tribunal under a special enactment, like the Motor Vehicles Act. Now it is fairly well settled that

the power of superintendence whether Judicial or administrative, cannot be exercised, so as to interfere with an intravires exercise of discretionary

power unless it is violative of the principles of Natural Justice. Refer RAJKAMAL v. INRAM MOTION PICTURE UNION 1963 I LLJ 318

nor can it be exercised to correct mere errors of law as a Court of Revision refer WARYAM v. AMARNATH AIR 1954 SC 58. In other words,

so long as the power being exercised by the Court or Tribunal is intravires, the High Court would not be justified in interfering with the same or the

exercise of discretion vested in the Tribunal. This appears to be in keeping with the basic object behind the conferment of the power, which, no

matter is wide in its amplitude, is all the same not wide enough to be exercised for the purposes of interfering with what the Tribunals are entitled to

do within the legitimate limits of their jurisdiction. There is therefore a need for the High Court to be extremely careful and reluctant in issuing

Guidelines in the exercise of its powers of superintendence for such Guidelines coming from the High Court, would be treated with the same

reverence by the subordinate Courts and Tribunals as would be due to a command issued by it. This would mean that the Tribunals would instead

of exercising their own discretion in the matter which a statute or a statutory notification may confer upon them, wholly abdicate in favour of the

Higher wisdom of the High Court. They will become mere post offices mechanically operating the mechanism without independent thought or

judgment, simply to obey what the High Court may have asked them to do, under the thin veil of what is said to be a Guideline but what in fact is a

Mandamus issued to them. Such a situation, can hardly be countenanced or accepted as an ideal state of affairs let alone a prudent and Judicious

exercise of the power reserved with the High Court under Article 227. The principle is well settled that if an authority is vested with a certain

power, then the exercise thereof is also left with the authority alone. It cannot of its own, abdicate in favour of another authority no matter higher in

status and better of in wisdom, nor can the higher authority impose its will upon the subordinate, howsoever infallible the judgment of the former

may be.

Let us now see the two Circulars issued by the High Court that has invoked such a sharp reaction both from the Bar as also the litigants. The

first Circular while forwarding the statutory Notification issued by the Government to the Tribunals informs them that all claims cases pending on

the file of the Motor Vehicles Claims Tribunals shall be transferred to the Additional Motor Vehicles Claims Tribunals constituted as per the

Government Notification. The Circular uses the word ""shall also be transferred"" which adds a touch of command and apparently leaves little to the

discretion of the Motor Vehicles Claims Tribunals. In the second Circular, the Tribunals have been asked to follow the Guidelines set-out therein

while exercising jurisdiction in the matter of transfer of pending Claim Petitions. The Guidelines state that all the Claim Petitions in which the

evidence has been recorded and the arguments already heard or in which the evidence is recorded and the matters are posted for arguments shall

be disposed of by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals before which they are pending. In respect of other Claim Petitions in which the evidence

is yet to commence the Guidelines direct the same to be transferred to the Additional Motor Vehicles Claims Tribunals constituted under the

Notification in question. What is significant is that, paras-1 to 4 of the second Circular which even though purport to be only Guidelines, are in

substance, directions issued to the Tribunals to exercise their discretion in a particular fashion while transferring the Claim Petitions filed before

them. It cannot be, disputed that Guidelines contained in paras-1 and 2 of the 2nd Circular directing the cases in which the arguments have already

been heard or evidence is already completed should be decided by the respective Tribunals before which they are pending, can hardly be found

fault with. The petitioners also had no grievance to make in so far as these two Guidelines were concerned. What however, came under severe

criticism are the Guidelines issued in para-3 and 4 which it was urged, left no choice for the Tribunals except to do what was directed by the High

Court to be done in the matter of transfer of pending cases.

Learned Government Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents submitted that the transfer of the Claim Petitions has to be ordered

after following the procedure as per Rules as mentioned in the first Circular of the High Court and that the said expression clearly left the matter to

the discretion of the respective Motor Vehicles Accidents Claims Tribunals to determine whether or not to transfer the pending Claim Petitions to

the Additional Tribunals constituted under the impugned Notification. He further submitted that this was true even in respect of the second Circular

which simply provided the Guidelines without in the least affecting the discretion vested in the Tribunals one way or the other. He filed an additional

statement of objections in which it is pointed out that there was no intention on the part of the High Court to affect the discretionary jurisdiction

vested in the District Judges in the matter of transfer of cases under the Government Notification, and that the Circulars only contained Guidelines

which cannot be deemed to be directives to the Tribunals.

The power to transfer business exercisable by the Tribunals is statutory in nature. The said power owes its origin to the Notification issued by

the Government u/s 165(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act. The Government has by issuing the said Notification indicated the matters to be taken into

consideration by the Principal Motor Vehicles Tribunals while transferring the Motor Vehicles Accident cases to the Additional Tribunals. The

Notification provides that the Principal District & Sessions Judge shall transfer the Claim Petitions to the Additional Motor Vehicles Claims

Tribunals depending upon the area of civil jurisdiction exercised by the Judges and as otherwise deemed prudent in the interest of speedy disposal

of such claims. The decision as to what would be a prudent order in the matter of transfer of pending Claim Cases and how can the speedy

disposal of the claims be ensured has been left to the discretion of the District Judges. While exercising the said discretion it is for the District

Judges to decide and take into consideration the facts and circumstances of each case that is placed before them as to whether the case should or

should not be transferred and if transferred, to which Additional Tribunal. It was open to the Government to have prescribed any additional norms

that may be required to be followed by the Tribunals while exercising the power of transfer. This has not, however, been done except using the

expression ""deemed prudent in the interest of speedy disposal of such claims"". That being so, it appears to me as though the Circulars issued by the

High Courts make an addition to the Notification in question by prescribing the tests and Guidelines to be adopted by the Tribunals while

transferring the pending Cases. This addition is impermissible in law, I say so for two reasons. Firstly because the power to regulate the distribution

of business among the Tribunals being a statutory function it is only the Government who can exercise the same. The High Court cannot in the form

of Circulars provide for a matter which legitimately falls with the purview of the authority designated by the statute. In other words what cannot be

done by the High Court directly cannot also be done by it indirectly in the guise of an administrative Circular. Secondly because the power of

administrative superintendence cannot be exercised so as to clutch at the jurisdiction vested in the Tribunals in terms of the statutory Notification

issued by the Government. Any administrative action, (be that a simple Circular or a Guideline couched in words that are mandatory in their

implications), which has the effect of controlling, in a strait jacket formula the discretion vested in the Tribunals would be ultravires, and offensive to

the well settled Rule that the power vested in an authority whether Judicial or otherwise, can and ought to be exercised only by the authority in

whom the power is vested uninfluenced by any factor extraneous to the legitimate exercise of the said power. This position is well settled by a

number of Supreme Court Judgments starting with its Judgment in Commissioner of Police, Bombay Vs. Gordhandas Bhanji, in which Case the

Supreme Court struck down an order purported to have been passed by the Commissioner of Police, in exercise of his powers under the Bombay

Police Act, as the order in question was in fact made by the Government who had no authority under the Act to do so or arrogated to itself the

powers that were vested in the Police Commissioner.

The Rule laid down in the above Case was reiterated in State of Punjab v. Hari Krishna wherein the Court held that the State Government was

not justified in assuming jurisdiction which had been conferred on the licensing authority by Section 5(1) and (2) of the Punjab Cinema Regulation

Act. In The Purtabpur Company Ltd. v. Cane Commissioner of Bihar and Ors. an order passed by the Cane Commissioner in exercise of the

power delegated to him by the Central Government was quashed by the Apex Court, as the said order has been passed by the Cane

Commissioner in accordance with the directions issued to him by the Chief Minister. The Court held that the Chief Minister was not justified in

interfering with the functions of the Cane Commissioner as a statutory authority, under the Sugarcane Control Order and any order passed by the

latter at the instance of the former vitiated such an order. Relying upon its earlier Judgments reported in Province of Bombay Vs. Kusaldas S.

Advani and Others, , Shivji Nathubhai Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, and Board of High School and Intermediate Education, U.P.,

Allahabad Vs. Ghanshyam Das Gupta and Others, , the Court held that the proceedings before the Cane Commissioner are quasi judicial

proceedings, and the manner in which the power conferred upon the Commissioner was to be exercised would depend upon the express

provisions of the Statute, the nature of the rights and the manner of disposal provided, the objective criteria if any to be adopted and the effect of

the decision on the persons affected.

In Ramji Sharma v. High Court of M.P. Jabalpur and Ors. a Memorandum issued by the High Court of M.P. was called in question on the

ground that the same was destructive of Statutory Notification issued by the Government in exercise of its powers u/s 35 of the Court Fees Act

remitting in whole the Court fee mentioned in Article 1 (a) and 2 of the I Schedule of the Act, payable on plaints by the specified category of

persons whose annual income immediately preceding the date of presentation of plaint from all sources did not exceed Rs. 60,000/-.

Notwithstanding the Notification, the Memorandum issued by the High Court addressed to the District Judges informed them that the procedure

prescribed for suits instituted by ''Indigent Persons'' under Order 33 Rule 1 to 8 read with Section 141 of C.P.C. should be followed in all cases

instituted by persons seeking exemption from payment of Court fee under Notification in question. A Division Bench of the High Court while

quashing the Memorandum held that the force and effect of a statutory Notification like the one issued by the Government in the said Case could

not be impaired even by a Rule framed under Article 227(2) of the Constitution of India. The Court held that the effect of a statutory Notification

could not be nullified in the process of regulating the procedure of any Civil Court subordinate to the High Court and that the Memorandum in

question was not saved either by Article 225 or Article 235 of the Constitution.

The Government Advocate however urged that since the High Court never intended to interfere with the exercise of the discretion vested in the

Tribunals in the matter of transfer of Cases and since the said position has been made clear in the additional objections filed, this Court need not

interfere with the Circulars. It is true that in the additional objections, the High Court has stated that the Circulars were never intended to interfere

with the exercise of the discretion vested in the Tribunals, yet in my opinion, such a statement can hardly allay the apprehension of the petitioners

that the Tribunals will always feel constrained to strictly adhere to the so-called Guidelines while exercising their power of transfer. The very

possibility of the Tribunals'' discretion in the matter of transfer of Cases, being restricted or confined to the options given in the Circulars issued by

the High Court, is in my opinion sufficient for this Court to intervene and clear the clouds cast upon the powers of the Tribunals vested in them in

terms of the Notification in question. In the interest of a fair and an objective consideration of the relevant factors, by the Tribunals concerned

unhindered by any Guidelines or Circulars issued by the High Court, I consider it necessary that instead of allowing the Circulars to stay, subject to

the condition that they shall only be Guidelines and nothing more, it is better to get rid of the Circulars, themselves so as to leave the Tribunals

completely free to determine in each Case, the question whether the same should or should not be transferred on its merits and according to the

best of the tribunals'' judgment.

Before parting however I must advert to two more aspects that were argued by the petitioners. II was contended that the impugned

Notification does not provide for transfer of pending Cases, and therefore the Tribunals were not required to transfer the Cases that were pending

on the date of the issue of the Notification. I do not however find any substance in this argument. The method of distribution of business, is a

procedural matter, and it is well settled that a provision regulating the procedures to be followed by a Tribunal or Court is always retrospectively in

the sense that it applies even to the pending cases. Reference in this connection can be made to Mukund Deo (Dead) represented by his legal

representatives Kasibai and Others Vs. Mahadu and Others,

It was next argued that the second Circular issued by the High Court was incompetent as the same was not supported by any Full Court

Resolution approving the Guidelines contained in the Circular. From the record produced before me by the Government Advocate, it appears that

a Committee headed by K.B. Navadgi J., as his Lordship then was, was constituted in terms of a Full Court Resolution passed on 1st September

1994. The Committee submitted its Report dated 15th September, 1994 which was approved by the Full Court in its Meeting held on 29th

November 1994. It is significant that the Report of the Committee which came up for approval before the Full Court did not contain any

Guidelines for circulation among the Tribunals. The question of the Full Court approving any such Guidelines therefore did not arise. Much after the

Report submitted by the Committee, had been approved by the Full Court and the Committee had thereby become functus officio as nothing

further was required to be done by it, Justice Navadgi, appears to have addressed a letter dated 16th May, 1995 to the Hon''ble Chief Justice

proposing the Guidelines for being circulated among the Tribunals in the matter of transferring the Cases. A note is then put up to Hon''ble Acting

Chief Justice on the basis of the above letter on which the Acting Chief Justice passes an order an 19th May, 1995 authorising circulation of the

Guidelines suggested by Justice Navadgi.

The Guidelines suggested were as a matter of fact never placed before the Full Court nor were there Guidelines a part of the Report submitted

by the Committee and approved by the Court in its Meeting held on 29th of November, 1994. The Guidelines were for the first time proposed in

Justice Navadgi''s letter dated 16th May, 1995 and it is not disputed that there was no Full Court Meeting held for consideration of the said

Guidelines at any time between 16th May and 29th May 1995 when the Hon''ble Acting Chief Justice approved the issue of the Circulars

containing the Guidelines. It is therefore manifest that the Guidelines in question did not have the approval of the Full Court and consequently could

not be said to be an action taken by the High Court in exercise of its administrative powers. Mr. Ullal, was unable to point out any provision under

which the Hon''ble Acting Chief Justice could direct the circulation of the Guidelines in question without having the same approved by this Full

Court. That apart, the second Circular issued by the Registrar General purports to have been issued for and on behalf of the High Court and unless

it is demonstrated that such Guidelines could be issued even in the absence of a proper Resolution by the Full Court, the same must be held to be

incompetent, I may however hasten to add that the error appears to have crept in on account of the failure of the office to point out to the Hon''ble

Acting Chief Justice that the Guidelines in question, had never been approved by the Full Court. I have gone through the note prepared by the

office for the perusal of the Acting Chief Justice and I find that this aspect of the matter has not been brought out in the note. Indeed if the note had

pointed-out that the guidelines proposed by Justice Navadgi, in the enclosure to his letter dated 16th May, 1995 had never been considered or

approved by the Full Court the Hon''ble Acting Chief Justice may not have approved the circulation of the Guidelines without the same being first

placed for the approval of the Full Court in a proper Meeting. Consequently the Guidelines framed and circulated under the second Circular issued

by the High Court, must be held to be bad even for this additional reason also.

In the result these Writ Petitions are allowed but only in part and to the extent that Circulars dated 6th April 1995 and 29th May 1995 issued

by the Registrar General of the High Court, are hereby quashed. As a consequence, the Motor Accident Claims Tribunals shall be at liberty to

exercise their power of transferring Claim Cases both pending as also those that may be instituted in future in accordance with the Statutory

Notification dated 30th March 1995 issued by the Government u/s 165 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1988, uninfluenced by the contents of the

Circulars in question. In the peculiar circumstances of the case however the parties shall bear their own costs.