Ranjeet Kaur vs Sukh Pal Kaur and Another

L.N. Mittal, J.—Defendant No. 2 Ranjeet Kaur has filed this revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India impugning order dated 02.04.2013, passed by learned trial court, thereby allowing application (Annexure P-1) filed by respondent No. 1-plaintiff Sukh Pal Kaur for treating carbon copy of compromise dated 28.04.2006 as secondary evidence. Respondent No. 2 Jasandeep Kaur is defendant No. 1 in the suit. She is daughter-in-law of respondent No. 1-plaintiff. Case of the plaintiff is that there was compromise dated 28.04.2006 between plaintiff and defendant No. 1. Case of the plaintiff is based on the said compromise.

The plaintiff alleged in her application (Annexure P-1) that the original compromise is with defendant No. 1 and carbon copy of the compromise was with the plaintiff and has been produced in the Court, whereas defendant No. I has failed to produce the original compromise, in spite of requests including application moved for the purpose.

Defendant No. 2, by filing reply (Annexure P-2), opposed the aforesaid application and pleaded that there is no pleading by the plaintiff that original compromise is in possession of defendant No. 1 and no application was moved by plaintiff for production of original compromise by defendant No. 1. On the other hand, defendant No. 1 had moved application for directing the plaintiff to produce the original compromise.

Learned trial court, vide impugned order dated 02.04.2013, has allowed the plaintiffs application. Feeling aggrieved, defendant No. 2 has filed this revision petition.

I have heard counsel for the petitioner and perused the case file.

Whole stand of the petitioner (defendant No. 2) in her reply (Annexure P-2) is factually incorrect. It has been specifically pleaded by the plaintiff in her replication that the original compromise is in custody of defendant No. 1. Perusal of impugned order also reveals that plaintiff had also moved application for directing defendant No. 1 to produce the original compromise. Thus, pleas to the contrary taken by defendant No. 2 in her reply (Annexure P-2), are factually incorrect.

It has also been observed in the impugned order that defendant No. 1 in her written statement has pleaded that alleged compromise was prepared by the plaintiff in collusion with Panchayat. Defendant No. 1 did not dispute the existence of the alleged compromise. Defendant No. I has also not denied her signatures on the alleged compromise. On the other hand, when defendant No. 1 moved application for directing the plaintiff to produce the original compromise, the plaintiff produced carbon copy of the compromise and thereupon, defendant No. 1 felt satisfied and got her application disposed of. Plaintiff has specifically alleged that original compromise is in custody of defendant No. 1.

On 11.04.2013, counsel for the petitioner contended that defendant had not pleaded in her written statement that compromise was executed in collusion with Panchayat and plaintiff, as erroneously observed in the impugned order by the trial court. Consequently, the petitioner was directed to place on record copy of written statement. However, the same has not been placed on record in spite of two adjournments. Counsel for the petitioner has today stated that he has received copy of written statement of defendant No. 1 wherein the aforesaid plea has been taken as rightly observed by the trial court. Counsel for the petitioner explained that he made submission on 11.04.2013 to the contrary on the basis of written statement of defendant No. 2 and not regarding written statement of defendant No. 1. In the aforesaid circumstances, plaintiffs application for treating carbon copy of the compromise as secondary evidence has been rightly allowed by the trial court. In fact, carbon copy of the compromise may even fall under the definition of primary evidence in view of Explanation 2 to Section 62 of the Evidence Act. Moreover, carbon copy of the compromise was prepared in the same process as the original compromise. In these circumstances, impugned order of the trial court does not suffer from any perversity, illegality or jurisdictional error so as to call for interference by this Court in exercise of power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The revision petition is devoid of merit and is accordingly dismissed in limine.