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Judgment
Briefly stated, the facts of the current O.A. are that the respondent No.1 Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) issued an advertisement in March, 2000 for filling up 134 posts of Constables [Male/Female (Exe.)] and 05 Male Constables (Motor Transport) in various branches of its offices all over India. The applicants applied and participated in the written test conducted on 24.04.2000 and interviews were conducted on 30.04.2000. Thereafter, the results of selection were declared and communications to this effect were issued to the selected candidates. Medical fitness tests were also conducted in June, 2000. In January, 2001 the candidates were informed that the said selection has been cancelled. The said action of the respondents was challenged by one of the selected candidates before Ernakulam Bench of CAT and was dismissed at the admission stage itself. Aggrieved by the said order, the said applicant approached the Hon"ble Kerala High Court, which allowed the Writ Petition and directed the CBI in December, 2001 to correct the mistake in the selection by re-arranging the select list and completing the selection. CBI challenged the aforesaid order of Hon"ble High Court in Hon"ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 5321/2003. Vide order dated 30.07.2003, the said Civil Appeal was dismissed and directions were issued to the respondents to make appointments within 60 days from the date of judgment, without any further delay. In compliance thereof, in the last week of November, 2003, the candidates including the applicants were issued letters for their medical examination. It may be mentioned here that few of the applicants who were earlier not selected, were now selected as CBI had corrected its mistake. Medical examination was completed in the first week of December, 2003. Appointment letters were issued in March, 2004 by respondent No.1 in which it was not indicated that candidates would be member of the new contributory pension scheme.
The impact of issuance of this letter was that these applicants were deprived of the benefit of the earlier pension scheme which came to an end on 31.12.2003 without their fault and they are now making monthly contribution from their salary in accordance with the new scheme. It is stated in the OA that the respondent No.1 has not complied with the directions of Hon"ble Supreme Court dated 30.07.2003 within the stipulated time frame. The Old Pension Scheme was discontinued w.e.f. 31.12.2003 and new pension scheme was introduced w.e.f. 01.01.2004. The undue delay in appointing the applicants deprived them coming under the purview of the old pension scheme for no fault of theirs. The applicants submitted representations to respondent No.1 for treating them as members of old pension scheme instead of the new pension scheme. The representation of the applicant was forwarded to respondent No. 2 (DoP&T) for its advise and consultation. Respondent No.1 vide impugned order dated 09.05.2017 intimated that DoP&T opined that CCS (Pension) Rules are applicable to government servants appointed on or before 31.12.2003 only. Since the applicants have joined government service after 31.12.2003, hence they cannot be covered under the old pension scheme.
The applicants further submit that the Hon"ble Delhi High Court in CWP No. 10028/2009 vide its judgment has held that where the delay in appointment is not attributable to the applicant, the applicability of the old pension scheme would apply to him, instead of the new pension scheme. Vide another judgment dated 03.02.2011 in CWP No. 5983/2010 the Hon"ble High Court, acting on the principle that an order of Court cannot prejudice anyone, has granted relief in an identical situation. Similar is the position in Parma Nand Yadav & Ors. (CWP-3834/2013), P. Rajesh Kumar & Ors. Vs. UOI & Ors. (OA-724/2012 Ernakulam Bench), Sheeba B. & Anr. Vs. UOI & Ors. (OA-180/00020/2015 Ernakulam Bench), Sumant Kumar Baghmar Vs. UOI (OA-203/00290/2017 Jabalpur Bench) and in Special Appeal No. 330/2013 (Balwant Singh"s). Furthermore, seniority of a direct recruit is required to be reckoned from the year of vacancy (reference N.R. Parmar and Surendra Narain Singh Vs. State of Bihar & Ors., which principle has not been followed by the respondents.
Aggrieved by the action of the respondents, the applicants have filed the current O.A. seeking the following reliefs:-
"(a) Quash and set aside the impugned orders dated 09/05/2017 and 17/26.04.2017 placed at Annexure A/1 and A/2 respectively.
(b) Direct the respondent No.1 to induct the applicants into statutory pension scheme under CCS (Pension) Rules notionally treating them to have been appointed as Constables from the date of occurrence of vacancies/initiation of recruitment process in the year 2000 for the limited purpose of grant of pension under CCS (Pension) Rules only.
(c) Declare that the applicants are deemed to have been appointed as Constables Male/Female (Exe.) notionally and they are regulated by CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972.
(d) Pass any order/relief/direction(s) as this Hon"ble Tribunal may deem fit and proper in the interest of justice in favour of the applicants."
Without disputing the facts of the case, the respondents have submitted that the O.A. may be dismissed being barred by law of limitation. They aver that the cause of action to the applicants arose in the year 2004 whereas their representation was filed in the year 2016 and the O.A. was filed in 2017.
The respondents contend that it is incorrect to state that the directions of the Hon"ble Supreme Court were not complied with by respondent No.1 within the stipulated time frame. Since the matter involved appointment of about 134 candidates, considerable time was required for completion of all formalities. Accordingly, the stipulated time of 60 days granted by the Hon"ble Supreme Court was got extended twice by the respondents through orders of the Hon"ble Supreme Court on 03.11.2003 and 27.02.2004 in Civil Appeal No. 5321/2003 (UOI & Ors. Vs. Rajesh P.U. Puthuvalnikathu & Anr.).
The respondent further aver that after declaration of the result, appointment letters etc. were issued to the selected candidates, specifically mentioning that the applicant would be entitled to other allowances as admissible under the condition, rules and orders issued from time to time. They emphasize that the CCS Pension Rules are applicable only to those Government servants who were appointed on or before 31.12.2003 and as per the Gazette Notification dated 22.12.2003, New Pension Scheme was made mandatory for the Government employees, who joined the service from 01.01.2004. Since none of the applicants joined the service prior to 31.12.2003, hence their claim has been rightly rejected. It is submitted that the citations relied upon by the applicants are not relevant being distinguishable on facts. The Hon"ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 3911/2003 (Bihar School Examination Board Vs. Suresh Prasad Sinha) has held that:-
"The Courts should guard against the danger of mechanical application of an observation without ascertaining the context in which it was made."
Similarly, in the case of C.I.T. Vs. Sun Engg. Works (P) Ltd., 1992(4) SCC 363 it has held that:-
"39. It is neither desirable nor permissible to pick out a word or a sentence from the judgment of this Court, divorced from the context of the question under consideration and treat it to be the complete 'law' declared by this Court. The judgment must be read as a whole and the observations from the judgment have to be considered in the light of the questions which were before this Court. A decision of this Court takes its colour from the questions involved in the case in which it is rendered and while applying the decision to a later case, the courts must carefully try to ascertain the true principle laid down by the decision of this Court and not to pick out words or sentences from the judgment, divorced from the context of the questions under consideration by this Court, to support their reasonings."
Further, in the case of Government of Karnataka & Ors. Vs. Gowramma & Ors. , AIR 2008 SC 863 with reference to precedential value of decision, it was held by the Hon"ble Supreme Court that:-
Reliance on the decision without looking into the factual background of the case before it is clearly impermissible. A decision is a precedent on its own facts. Each case presents its own features. It is not everything said by a Judge while giving a judgment that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a Judge's decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi. According to the well-settled theory of precedents, every decision contains three basic postulates (i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of facts is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct, or perceptible facts; (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and (iii) judgment based on the combined effect of the above. A decision is an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically flows from the various observations made in the judgment. The enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a Court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. (See: State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra and Ors. (AIR 1968 SC 647) and Union of India and Ors. v. Dhanwanti Devi and Ors. (1996 (6) SCC 44). A case is a precedent and binding for what it explicitly decides and no more. The words used by Judges in their judgments are not to be read as if they are words in Act of Parliament. In Quinn v. Leathem (1901) AC 495 (H.L.), Earl of Halsbury LC observed that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which are found there are not intended to be exposition of the whole law but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are found and a case is only an authority for what it actually decides.
Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid_s theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. V. Horton (1951 AC 737 at p.761), Lord Mac Dermot observed:
"The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima vertra of Willes, J as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished judge."
In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. (1970 (2) All ER 294) Lord Reid said, Lord Atkin's speech.....is not to be treated as if it was a statute definition. It will require qualification in new circumstances. Megarry, J in (1971) 1 WLR 1062 observed: One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of Russell L.J. as if it were an Act of Parliament. And, in Herrington v. British Railways Board (1972 (2) WLR 537) Lord Morris said:
"There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances made in the setting of the facts of a particular case."
Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper.
The following words of Lord Denning in the matter of applying precedents have become locus classicus:
"Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect, in deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cordozo) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive."
*** *** ***
Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the path to justice clear of obstructions which could impede it. "
In view of the aforementioned, the respondents submit that the current O.A. is without merit and is liable to be dismissed with cost.
I have gone through the facts of the case and considered the rival submissions carefully.
The applicants in the O.A. have requested to set aside the impugned orders dated 09.05.2017 and 17/26.04.2017, which places them in the New Pension Scheme and rejects their request for inclusion in the Old Pension Scheme. It is not disputed that the applicants in the current O.A. have all been appointed as Constables with the Central Bureau of Investigation in March, 2004. Vide its order dt. 30.07.2003. In Civil Appeal No. 5321/2003, the Hon"ble Supreme Court had directed the respondents that the appointment of the applicants should be made within 60 days from the date of delivering of the order. The case of the applicants is that had the respondents issued the orders within 60 days of the issuing of the directions, they would have got their appointment orders before 31.12.2003, which would have entitled them for getting the benefits available under the Old Pension Scheme (instead of the New Pension Scheme, which came into force w.e.f. 01.01.2004). They contend that since the respondents delayed the appointment process, hence, the applicants could only join the government service in March 2004 (i.e. after 31.12.2003) making them ineligible for inclusion in the Old Pension Scheme.
Rebutting these averments, the respondents, in their defence have stated that the applicants joined the government service in the year 2004 and are agitating the matter without offering any justifiable explanation for agitating their claim after a delay of almost 13 years. On merit, the respondents submit that since the matter involved appointment of nearly 134 candidates and the time granted by the Hon"ble Supreme Court for completion of all the formalities was rather short, hence, the stipulated time of 60 days was got extended by the respondents from the Hon"ble Supreme Court twice on 03.11.2003 and 27.02.2004 in Civil Appeal No. 5321/2003. The two orders vide which extension was granted are reproduced below:-
"Order dated 03.11.2003
Heard the learned counsel appearing on either side.
The application for extension of time is strongly opposed by the learned senior counsel for the respondents. Keeping in view the circumstances pleaded the time is extended by three months, as prayed for from Ist November, 2003. It is made clear that the directions already issued shall meticulously be implemented within the extended time.
Order dated 27.02.2004
Time is extended by two months to comply with the order dated 30.7.2003 and 3.11.2003.
I.A. No. 3 for extension of time is allowed accordingly."
It is true that had appointment letters been issued within the stipulated time frame of 60 days, the applicants in OA would have been governed under provisions of the Old Pension Scheme. However, the fact remains that the applicants joined the respondents department only in March, 2004 when the Old Pension Scheme had been replaced by the New Pension Scheme. The issue was taken up by CBI with Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances & Pension (Department of Personnel & Training), who opined that the CCS (Pension) Rules are applicable to Government servants appointed on or before 31.12.2003 only. It is also clear that the delay in offering the appointment letters to the applicants had been caused on account of genuine problems being faced by the respondents for completion of all the formalities etc. since the matter involved appointment of a large number of candidates (134). It was only after this aspect was brought to the notice of the Hon"ble Supreme Court that extension of time for appointment was granted to the respondents-initially for a period of three months from 01.11.2003, and, subsequently for a period of two months w.e.f. 27.02.2004 to comply with the earlier orders dated 30.07.2003 & 03.11.2003. The respondents, however, completed the appointment process before the two months expiry period, enabling the applicants to finally join the respondent department in March, 2004.
The applicants have relied upon a large number of citations in support of their claim for getting the benefit of the Old Pension Scheme. However, I find that the facts of the cases cited by them are different from the facts of the present case and hence will not come to their rescue.
In view of the discussions in the foregoing paragraphs, I am convinced that there is no cause for the Tribunal to intervene in the impugned orders dated 09.05.2017 and 17/26.04.2017 under challenge. The O.A. is dismissed. No costs.
Briefly stated, the facts of the current O.A. are that the respondent No.1 Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) issued an advertisement in March, 2000 for filling up 134 posts of Constables [Male/Female (Exe.)] and 05 Male Constables (Motor Transport) in various branches of its offices all over India. The applicants applied and participated in the written test conducted on 24.04.2000 and interviews were conducted on 30.04.2000. Thereafter, the results of selection were declared and communications to this effect were issued to the selected candidates. Medical fitness tests were also conducted in June, 2000. In January, 2001 the candidates were informed that the said selection has been cancelled. The said action of the respondents was challenged by one of the selected candidates before Ernakulam Bench of CAT and was dismissed at the admission stage itself. Aggrieved by the said order, the said applicant approached the Hon‟ble Kerala High Court, which allowed the Writ Petition and directed the CBI in December, 2001 to correct the mistake in the selection by re-arranging the select list and completing the selection. CBI challenged the aforesaid order
of Hon‟ble High Court in Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.
5321/2003. Vide order dated 30.07.2003, the said Civil Appeal was dismissed and directions were issued to the respondents to make appointments within 60 days from the date of judgment, without any
further delay. In compliance thereof, in the last week of November, 2003, the candidates including the applicants were issued letters for their medical examination. It may be mentioned here that few of the applicants who were earlier not selected, were now selected as CBI had corrected its mistake. Medical examination was completed in the first week of December, 2003. Appointment letters were issued in March, 2004 by respondent No.1 in which it was not indicated that candidates would be member of the new contributory pension scheme.
The impact of issuance of this letter was that these applicants were deprived of the benefit of the earlier pension scheme which came to an end on 31.12.2003 without their fault and they are now making monthly contribution from their salary in accordance with the new scheme. It is stated in the OA that the respondent No.1 has not complied with the directions of Hon‟ble Supreme Court dated
30.07.2003 within the stipulated time frame. The Old Pension Scheme was discontinued w.e.f. 31.12.2003 and new pension scheme was introduced w.e.f. 01.01.2004. The undue delay in appointing the applicants deprived them coming under the purview of the old pension scheme for no fault of theirs. The applicants submitted representations to respondent No.1 for treating them as members of old pension scheme instead of the new pension scheme. The representation of the applicant was forwarded to respondent No. 2
(DoP&T) for its advise and consultation. Respondent No.1 vide impugned order dated 09.05.2017 intimated that DoP&T opined that CCS (Pension) Rules are applicable to government servants appointed on or before 31.12.2003 only. Since the applicants have joined government service after 31.12.2003, hence they cannot be covered under the old pension scheme.
The applicants further submit that the Hon‟ble Delhi High Court
in CWP No. 10028/2009 vide its judgment has held that where the delay in appointment is not attributable to the applicant, the applicability of the old pension scheme would apply to him, instead of the new pension scheme. Vide another judgment dated 03.02.2011 in CWP No. 5983/2010 the Hon‟ble High Court, acting on the principle that an order of Court cannot prejudice anyone, has granted relief in an identical situation. Similar is the position in Parma Nand Yadav & Ors. (CWP-3834/2013), P. Rajesh Kumar & Ors. Vs. UOI & Ors. (OA-724/2012 Ernakulam Bench), Sheeba B. & Anr. Vs. UOI & Ors. (OA-180/00020/2015 Ernakulam Bench), Sumant Kumar Baghmar Vs. UOI (OA-203/00290/2017 Jabalpur Bench) and in Special Appeal No. 330/2013 (Balwant Singh‟s). Furthermore, seniority of a direct recruit is required to be reckoned from the year of vacancy (reference N.R. Parmar and Surendra Narain Singh Vs. State of Bihar & Ors., which principle has not been followed by the respondents.
Aggrieved by the action of the respondents, the applicants have filed the current O.A. seeking the following reliefs:-
"(a) Quash and set aside the impugned orders dated 09/05/2017 and 17/26.04.2017 placed at Annexure A/1 and A/2 respectively.
(b) Direct the respondent No.1 to induct the applicants into statutory pension scheme under CCS (Pension) Rules notionally treating them to have been appointed as Constables from the date of occurrence of vacancies/initiation of recruitment process in the year 2000 for the limited purpose of grant of pension under CCS (Pension) Rules only.
(c) Declare that the applicants are deemed to have been appointed as Constables Male/Female (Exe.) notionally and they are regulated by CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972.
(d) Pass any order/relief/direction(s) as this Hon‟ble Tribunal may deem fit and proper in the interest of justice in favour of the applicants."
Without disputing the facts of the case, the respondents have submitted that the O.A. may be dismissed being barred by law of limitation. They aver that the cause of action to the applicants arose in the year 2004 whereas their representation was filed in the year 2016 and the O.A. was filed in 2017.
The respondents contend that it is incorrect to state that the
directions of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court were not complied with by
respondent No.1 within the stipulated time frame. Since the matter
involved appointment of about 134 candidates, considerable time
was required for completion of all formalities. Accordingly, the
stipulated time of 60 days granted by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court
was got extended twice by the respondents through orders of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court on 03.11.2003 and 27.02.2004 in Civil Appeal No. 5321/2003 (UOI & Ors. Vs. Rajesh P.U. Puthuvalnikathu & Anr.).
The respondent further aver that after declaration of the result, appointment letters etc. were issued to the selected candidates, specifically mentioning that the applicant would be entitled to other allowances as admissible under the condition, rules and orders issued from time to time. They emphasize that the CCS Pension Rules are applicable only to those Government servants who were appointed on or before 31.12.2003 and as per the Gazette Notification dated 22.12.2003, New Pension Scheme was made mandatory for the Government employees, who joined the service from 01.01.2004. Since none of the applicants joined the service prior to 31.12.2003, hence their claim has been rightly rejected. It is submitted that the citations relied upon by the applicants are not relevant being distinguishable on facts. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 3911/2003 (Bihar School Examination Board Vs. Suresh Prasad Sinha) has held that:-
"The Courts should guard against the danger of mechanical application of an observation without ascertaining the context in which it was made."
Similarly, in the case of C.I.T. Vs. Sun Engg. Works (P) Ltd., 1992(4) SCC
363 it has held that:-
"39. It is neither desirable nor permissible to pick out a word or a sentence from the judgment of this Court, divorced from the context of the question under consideration and treat it to be the complete 'law' declared by this Court. The judgment must be read as a whole and the observations from the judgment have to be considered in the light of the questions which were before this Court. A decision of this Court takes its colour from the questions involved in the case in which it is rendered and while applying the decision to a later case, the courts must carefully try to ascertain the true principle laid down by the decision of this Court and not to pick out words or sentences from the judgment, divorced from the context of the questions under consideration by this Court, to support their reasonings."
Further, in the case of Government of Karnataka & Ors. Vs.
Gowramma & Ors. , AIR 2008 SC 863 with reference to precedential
value of decision, it was held by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court that:-
Reliance on the decision without looking into the factual background of the case before it is clearly impermissible. A decision is a precedent on its own facts. Each case presents its own features. It is not everything said by a Judge while giving a judgment that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a Judge's decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi. According to the well-settled theory of precedents, every decision contains three basic postulates (i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of facts is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct, or perceptible facts; (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and (iii) judgment based on the combined effect of the above. A decision is an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically flows from the various observations made in the judgment. The enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a Court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. (See: State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra and Ors. (AIR 1968 SC 647) and Union of India and Ors. v. Dhanwanti Devi and Ors. (1996 (6) SCC 44). A case is a precedent and binding for what it explicitly decides and no more. The words used by Judges in their judgments are not to be read as if they are words in Act of Parliament. In Quinn v. Leathem (1901) AC 495 (H.L.), Earl of Halsbury LC observed that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which are found there are not intended to be exposition of the whole law but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are found and a case is only an authority for what it actually decides.
Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are neither to be read as
Euclid_s theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. V. Horton (1951 AC 737 at p.761), Lord Mac Dermot observed:
"The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima vertra of Willes, J as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished judge."
In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. (1970 (2) All ER 294) Lord Reid said, Lord Atkin's speech.....is not to be treated as if it was a statute definition. It
will require qualification in new circumstances. Megarry, J in (1971) 1 WLR 1062 observed: One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of Russell L.J. as if it were an Act of Parliament. And, in Herrington v. British Railways Board (1972 (2) WLR 537) Lord Morris said:
"There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances made in the setting of the facts of a particular case."
Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper.
The following words of Lord Denning in the matter of applying precedents have become locus classicus:
"Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect, in deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cordozo) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive."
*** *** ***
Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the path to justice clear of obstructions which could impede it. "
In view of the aforementioned, the respondents submit that the current O.A. is without merit and is liable to be dismissed with cost.
I have gone through the facts of the case and considered the rival submissions carefully.
The applicants in the O.A. have requested to set aside the impugned orders dated 09.05.2017 and 17/26.04.2017, which places them in the New Pension Scheme and rejects their request for inclusion in the Old Pension Scheme. It is not disputed that the applicants in the current O.A. have all been appointed as Constables with the Central Bureau of Investigation in March, 2004. Vide its order dt. 30.07.2003. In Civil Appeal No. 5321/2003, the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court had directed the respondents that the appointment of the applicants should be made within 60 days from the date of delivering of the order. The case of the applicants is that had the respondents issued the orders within 60 days of the issuing of the directions, they would have got their appointment orders before 31.12.2003, which would have entitled them for getting the benefits available under the Old Pension Scheme (instead of the New Pension Scheme, which came into force w.e.f. 01.01.2004). They contend that since the respondents delayed the appointment process, hence, the applicants could only join the government service in March 2004 (i.e. after 31.12.2003) making them ineligible
for inclusion in the Old Pension Scheme.
Rebutting these averments, the respondents, in their defence have stated that the applicants joined the government service in the year 2004 and are agitating the matter without offering any justifiable explanation for agitating their claim after a delay of almost
13 years. On merit, the respondents submit that since the matter involved appointment of nearly 134 candidates and the time
granted by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court for completion of all the
formalities was rather short, hence, the stipulated time of 60 days
was got extended by the respondents from the Hon‟ble Supreme
Court twice on 03.11.2003 and 27.02.2004 in Civil Appeal No.
5321/2003. The two orders vide which extension was granted are
reproduced below:-
"Order dated 03.11.2003
Heard the learned counsel appearing on either side.
The application for extension of time is strongly opposed by the learned senior counsel for the respondents. Keeping in view the circumstances pleaded the time is extended by three months, as prayed for from Ist November, 2003. It is made clear that the directions already issued shall meticulously be implemented within the extended time.
Order dated 27.02.2004
Time is extended by two months to comply with the order dated 30.7.2003 and 3.11.2003.
I.A. No. 3 for extension of time is allowed accordingly."
It is true that had appointment letters been issued within the stipulated time frame of 60 days, the applicants in OA would have been governed under provisions of the Old Pension Scheme. However, the fact remains that the applicants joined the respondents department only in March, 2004 when the Old Pension Scheme had been replaced by the New Pension Scheme. The issue was taken up by CBI with Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances & Pension (Department of Personnel & Training), who opined that the CCS (Pension) Rules are applicable to Government servants appointed on or before 31.12.2003 only. It is also clear that the delay in offering the appointment letters to the applicants had been caused on account of genuine problems being faced by the respondents for completion of all the formalities etc. since the matter involved appointment of a large number of candidates (134). It was only after this aspect was brought to the notice of the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court that extension of time for appointment was granted to the respondents-initially for a period of three months from 01.11.2003, and, subsequently for a period of two months w.e.f.
27.02.2004 to comply with the earlier orders dated 30.07.2003 &
03.11.2003. The respondents, however, completed the appointment process before the two months expiry period, enabling the applicants to finally join the respondent department in March, 2004.
The applicants have relied upon a large number of citations in
support of their claim for getting the benefit of the Old Pension Scheme. However, I find that the facts of the cases cited by them are different from the facts of the present case and hence will not come to their rescue.
In view of the discussions in the foregoing paragraphs, I am convinced that there is no cause for the Tribunal to intervene in the impugned orders dated 09.05.2017 and 17/26.04.2017 under challenge. The O.A. is dismissed. No costs.