Ranjit Mishra & Anr vs State Of Odisha

Dr. Sanjeeb K Panigrahi, J

FIR No.

Dated

Police Station

Case No. and Courts' Name

Sections

14

17.01.2026

Tusura

G.R. Case No.14 of 2026 pending in the court of learned J.M.F.C., Tusura

Sections 103(1)/ 61(2)(a)/ 3(5) of BNS, 2023.

All the above-mentioned matters are taken up through hybrid arrangement.

Heard learned counsel for the parties.

All the above-noted bail applications are under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. The Petitioners seek release on bail in connection with G.R. Case No. 14 of 2026 arising out of Tusura P.S. Case No. 14 of 2026, pending before the learned court at Tusura, for the alleged commission of offences under Sections 103(1), 61(2)(a) and 3(5) of the BNS, 2023.

The prosecution case, in short, is that owing to a prolonged financial dispute, petitioner Naba Kumar Thanapati allegedly conspired with Kshetramohan Suna and others to eliminate his elder brother, Nataraj Thanapati. It is alleged that between 28.12.2025 and 02.01.2026, the conspiracy was hatched and, on 28.12.2025, a sum of Rs.60,000/- was paid by Naba Kumar Thanapati to Kshetramohan Suna to set the plan in motion. Thereafter, on 01.01.2026, Kshetramohan Suna is stated to have contacted Raja Kumbhar, and both proceeded to Deogaon Railway Station to meet Milan Bohidra, who allegedly assured them that the plan would be executed on the following day.

On 02.01.2026, Milan Bohidra allegedly contacted 6 to 7 other persons. In the night, all the accused persons are stated to have assembled near Dunguripali Petrol Pump in two cars and one motorcycle. As per the prosecution, Kshetramohan Suna then called the deceased at about 12:05 a.m. on the pretext of urgent work and brought him near Tel River Bridge. After asking the deceased to wait there for some time, Kshetramohan Suna allegedly moved ahead. Thereafter, the other accused persons allegedly arrived at the bridge and threw Nataraj Thanapati from it, causing his death on the spot.

Learned counsel for the Petitioners submitted that the Petitioners are innocent and have been falsely implicated. It was contended that, even on a bare reading of the materials on record, no case under Sections 103(1), 61(2)(a) and 3(5) of the BNS, 2023 is made out against them. It was further submitted that the investigation has substantially progressed and, therefore, further custodial detention is not necessary. Learned counsel also drew attention to the period of custody undergone, namely, that the Petitioners in BLAPL No. 2404 of 2026 have remained in judicial custody since 02.02.2026, whereas the Petitioners in BLAPL Nos. 3463 of 2026 and 3529 of 2026 have remained in judicial custody since 17.01.2026. It was further submitted that the Petitioners are local residents, have permanent roots within the jurisdiction of this Court, and have no criminal antecedents. It was also urged, so far as petitioner Ranjit Mishra is concerned, that the material against him is comparatively weak. On such grounds, prayer was made for grant of bail.

Learned counsel for the State, on the other hand, strongly opposed the prayer for bail. It was submitted that the allegations relate to grave and serious offences and that, if released on bail, the Petitioners may tamper with the prosecution evidence. On such submission, rejection of all the bail applications was prayed for.

The present applications are under Section 483 of the BNSS, 2023, which confers special powers on the High Court and the Court of Session to release a person in custody on bail. The said provision also requires notice to the Public Prosecutor before grant of bail in offences triable exclusively by the Court of Session or punishable with imprisonment for life, unless such notice is impracticable for reasons to be recorded.

Section 103(1) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 prescribes punishment for murder with death or imprisonment for life, along with fine. The First Schedule to the BNSS classifies an offence under Section 103(1) as cognizable, non-bailable, and triable by the Court of Session. Section 61 defines criminal conspiracy as an agreement by two or more persons to do an illegal act, or a legal act by illegal means, importantly, where the agreement itself is to commit an offence, the proviso does not require proof of any further overt act beyond the agreement. Section 61(2)(a) applies where the object of the conspiracy is an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life, or rigorous imprisonment of two years or more. Section 3(5) incorporates joint liability where a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, making each liable as if the act had been done by him alone. The First Schedule further shows that conspiracy under Section 61(2)(a) is classified according to the nature of the object offence; where the object is murder, the charge partakes of the same non-bailable seriousness.

The statutory scheme under the BNSS also distinguishes regular bail from statutory or default bail. Under Section 187(3), where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for a term of ten years or more, detention during investigation cannot ordinarily exceed ninety days; upon expiry of that period, the accused is entitled to release on bail if prepared to and does furnish bail. Separately, Section 479, which deals with maximum detention of undertrial prisoners, expressly excludes offences for which death or life imprisonment is one of the punishments. These provisions operate in different fields and must not be conflated with a merits-based request for regular bail under Section 483.

The law governing regular bail is also settled. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee [(2010) 14 SCC 496], the Supreme Court laid down the relevant considerations in serious criminal offences. The relevant excerpts are produced below:

"9.... It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are: (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail."

At the same time, bail jurisprudence is not punitive. Multiple judicial precedents have emphasized that the object of bail is to secure the appearance of the accused at trial, that detention before conviction must be justified by necessity, and that even in grave offences there is no mechanical rule that bail must invariably be denied. Yet the inquiry remains decisively case-specific. The Court is not expected to conduct a mini-trial or to weigh the evidence as if finally deciding guilt; still, it must assess whether the material discloses a prima facie case and whether continued custody sub-serves the criminal justice process.

In this regard the Supreme Court in the case of Sanjay Chandra v. Central Bureau of Investigation[(2012) 1 SCC 40] held as follows:

"21. In bail applications, generally, it has been laid down from the earliest times that the object of bail is to secure the appearance of the accused person at his trial by reasonable amount of bail. The object of bail is neither punitive nor preventative. Deprivation of liberty must be considered a punishment, unless it is required to ensure that an accused person will stand his trial when called upon. The courts owe more than verbal respect to the principle that punishment begins after conviction, and that every man is deemed to be innocent until duly tried and duly found guilty.

...

We are conscious of the fact that the accused are charged with economic offences of huge magnitude. We are also conscious of the fact that the offences alleged, if proved, may jeopardise the economy of the country. At the same time, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the investigating agency has already completed investigation and the charge- sheet is already filed before the Special Judge, CBI, New Delhi. Therefore, their presence in the custody may not be necessary for further investigation. We are of the view that the appellants are entitled to the grant of bail pending trial on stringent conditions in order to allay the apprehension expressed by CBI."

Tested on the above principles, I am unable to accept the submission that, even on a bare reading of the allegations, no case under Sections 103(1), 61(2)(a), and 3(5) of the BNS is disclosed. The prosecution story, taken at face value for the limited purpose of bail, is of prior planning, an alleged advance payment, coordinated contact among accused persons over several days, the alleged luring of the deceased to a fixed place at night, the assembly of multiple accused persons, and the fatal act at the bridge. If these allegations are ultimately proved, they are plainly capable of attracting the ingredients of murder, criminal conspiracy to commit murder, and common-intention liability. At this stage, the Court cannot insist on proof beyond reasonable doubt; a prima facie reading is the correct standard.

The accusation is of a very serious nature. On the prosecution version, this is not a case arising out of a sudden quarrel or an assault committed on the spur of the moment. The allegation is that the homicide was planned, with a stated motive, advance payment, telephonic coordination, and a deceptive call allegedly made to bring the deceased to the place of occurrence. The offence under Section 103(1) of the BNS is punishable with death or imprisonment for life, is non-bailable, and is triable by the Court of Session. The gravity of the principal offence also lends weight to the allegation of conspiracy under Section 61(2)(a). These circumstances, at this stage, weigh against the grant of regular bail.

The pleas of local residence and absence of criminal antecedents have been given due consideration. They are relevant considerations, but they are not decisive. The petitioners rely on their permanent roots in the same locality. That circumstance may reduce the risk of flight, but in a case of this nature it also raises a real concern that prosecution witnesses, many of whom are likely to come from the same local and social milieu, may be susceptible to influence if the petitioners are enlarged on bail prematurely.

I am equally unable to hold that the petitioners' custody, as stated in the applications, is by itself sufficient to tilt the balance in their favour. The period undergone is certainly relevant; however, in a prosecution for an alleged pre-planned murder, such custody cannot presently be described as so prolonged that it eclipses the gravity of the accusation and the prima facie material. Nor does the submission that the investigation has substantially progressed, without more, compel release. Progress or even completion of investigation is one relevant factor, but the Court must still examine the seriousness of the offence, the role attributed, and the potential impact of release on a fair trial.

There is one more aspect which requires caution. Since the alleged offence includes murder, Section 187(3) of the BNSS may become relevant if a plea for statutory/default bail is specifically raised and the necessary facts are established. However, no such plea appears to have been pressed before this Court. The record also does not clearly show whether the final report was filed within the prescribed statutory period or not. Therefore, this order is confined only to the prayer for regular bail on merits under Section 483 of the BNSS. It does not decide any separate right of the Petitioners, if otherwise available in law, under Section 187 of the BNSS. Likewise, Section 479 of the BNSS also does not presently help the Petitioners, as the said provision excludes offences for which death or imprisonment for life is one of the prescribed punishments.

So far as petitioner Ranjit Mishra is concerned, it was urged in substance that his implication is weak. I am not persuaded, at this stage, to carve out a separate result in his favour on the limited material now placed. The prosecution case is of a concerted plan and execution by multiple accused persons. Unless the record discloses some clear exculpatory circumstance, or unless a parity order in favour of a truly similarly situated co-accused is shown, this Court cannot transform the bail stage into a detailed comparative adjudication of evidentiary strength among alleged co-participants in the same conspiracy and execution chain. That would trench upon the domain of trial.

For the reasons aforesaid, this Court is not inclined to release the aforesaid petitioners on regular bail at this stage. Accordingly, BLAPL No.2404 of 2026, BLAPL No.3463 of 2026 and BLAPL No.3529 of 2026 are dismissed.

It is, however, clarified that the observations made herein are confined to the disposal of the present bail applications and shall not influence the trial on merits. If circumstances materially change, including but not limited to the examination of principal prosecution witnesses or undue delay in progress of the case not attributable to the petitioners, it shall be open to the petitioners to renew their prayer for bail in accordance with law.

Interim order, if any passed earlier, stands vacated.