Ranjit Singh and others vs Birinder Kumar and another

Teja Singh, C.J.—This revision petition has been referred by my learned brother to the Bench because of the importance of the question involved in the case and the conflict of opinion between the various High Courts. The suit out of which the petition arises was instituted by Birinder Kumar and Surrender Kumar, minor, sons of Ram Sarup, a Brahmin of a village in Fatehgarh District. They alleged that their father Ram Sarup, his brother Piare Lal and the plaintiffs were members of a joint Hindu family, that Ram Sarup and Piare Lal had alienated certain properties which belonged to the joint Hindu family, and since the alienations, were not made for a family necessity; the plaintiffs were not bound by them.

On these allegations they prayed for a declaration that the said alienations did not affect their interests and were not binding upon them. In addition they prayed for joint possession of the properties which were the subject-matter of the alienations. The suit was valued, both for purposes of Court-fee and jurisdiction, at Rs. 110/-. The contesting defendants raised two preliminary objections, one that the Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit, and second, that proper Court-fee had not been paid. The trial Sub-Judge held that the suit was governed by section 7 (4) (C) of the Court-fees Act and the valuation put by the plaintiffs upon the reliefs claimed by them had to be accepted and consequently overruled the defendants'' objections. This order is the subject-matter of revision.

Mr. Kidar Nath, counsel for the plaintiffs respondents, objected to the maintainability of the revision petition on two grounds: (i) that the order complained of does not amount to a "case decided" within the meaning of Section 115 Civil Procedure Code, and (ii) that the decision of the trial Judge on the question of Court-fees is final and this Court cannot interfere with it. As regards the second point, counsel relied upon section 12 of the Court fees Act which lays down that

every question relating to valuation for the purposes of determining the amount of any fee chargeable under this Chapter on a plaint or a memorandum of appeal shall be decided by the Court in which such plaint or memorandum of appeal, as the case may be is filed and such decision shall be final as between the parties to the suit.

There is. however, ample authority for the proposition that when the question to be determined is what is the nature of the suit and under what particular category it falls, section 12 has no application whatsoever and the words "every question relating to valuation" refer only to the actual assessment or appraisement of the value of a suit or appeal apart from any question as to whether the court-fee is to depend on the value of the suit or appeal or as to the principle according to which such value is to be assessed. Reference in this connection may be made, ''inter alia'', to ''BALKRISHNA BHIMAJI v. RAM KRISHNA GANADHAR", A. I. R. 1931 Bom 234 AIR 1931 378 (Lahore) and '' Rabindra Nath Chakravarty Vs. Girindra Mohan Bhaduri,

So far as Section 115 of the CPC is concerned, I am inclined to think that ordinarily the finding of the trial Court that the plaint is properly stamped does not amount to a "case decided" and no revision lies therefrom, but different is the case when the question of jurisdiction is involved. I am supported in this view by a number of decided cases. In Ramkhelawan Sahu Vs. Bir Surendra Sahi and Others, it was held by a Pull Bench of the Patna High Court that where a lower court has jurisdiction to decide question of law and fact as between the parties the superior Court will not exercise revisional jurisdiction against the decision whether it be right or wrong; but the superior court will interfere in revision where the Jurisdiction is derived from statute, e.g. the Court fees Act and the matter is one of construction of the statute e.g., the particular category into which the suit falls and the proper Court fee payable on it.

Chintalapati Murthiraju Vs. Chintalapati Subbaraju and Others, is a Pull Bench decision of the Madras High Court and it was held therein that a revision petition lies when a Court subordinate to the High Court has held that the plaintiff has inadequately stamped his plaint but a petition for revision does not lie when a defendant has unsuccessfully challenged the adequacy of the stamp affixed by the plaintiff, unless a further question of jurisdiction is involved.

In the present case, as many as ten alienations were the subject-matter of the suit and the plaintiffs not only treated all of them as one single transaction but valued the reliefs claimed by them at Rs. 110/- for purposes of court-fees on the plea that the case came within the purview of section 7 (4) (C). The contesting defendants urged that section 7 (4) (C) had no applicability and since the plaintiffs claimed joint possession of the various properties they were bound to pay ad-valorem court-fee on the value of these properties which was above Rs. 10,000/- and the value of the suit for purposes of jurisdiction was also the total value of all the properties. There can, therefore, be no denying the fact that the point involved not only the question of Court-fees but also that of jurisdiction and accordingly I would hold that the revision petition is competent.

Before I proceed to determine Whether the case was really governed by section 7 (4) (C) of the Court-fees Act, I wish to point out that even if it be conceded for a moment that it was so governed the finding of the trial Sub Judge that the plaint was properly stamped is erroneous. As I have already mentioned the alienations challenged by the plaintiffs were ten in number. They were not only of different dates but their natures were different and they were not all made by Ram Samp and Piare Lal. The following are the details of the alienations:

Five mortgages:

One by Ram Sarup dated 11-10-46 in favour of defendants Nos. 5 and 6 for Rs. 700/-; Two by Piare Lal, one, dated 142-1948 in favour of defendants Nos. 8 and 9 for Rs. 1500/- and second dated 5-4-1948 in favour of defendant No. 11 for Rs. 4,000/-;

Five Sales:

One by Ram Sarup dated 14-12 1946 in favour of defendant No. 7 for Rs. 4,000/-; One by Piare Lal dated 18-1-1949 in favour of defendant No. 13 for Rs. 7,000/-; Three by both, one dated 28-11-1941 in favour of Arjan Singh and Phuroan Singh, Defendants Nos. 3 and 4, for Rs. 1,100/-; second, dated 25-5-1948 in favour of defendant No. 10 for Rs. 250/- and third dated 24-S-1950 in favour of defendants Nos. 14 and 15 for Rs. 700/-

It cannot be denied that every one of these transactions gave rise to a separate cause of action and since the plaintiffs claimed declarations in respect of each of them and also wanted possession of all the properties, the case was hit by Section 17 of the Court-Fees Act and the Court-fee to be paid was the aggregate amount of the fees which the plaintiffs would have paid if they had brought separate suits embracing separately each of the transactions. This means that if the plaintiffs'' contention be upheld that it was open to them to value their relief u/s 7 (4) (c) for purposes of Court-fees separate value should have been assessed in respect of the reliefs claimed by them with regard to each transaction and pay (sic) Court-fee should have been paid on the aggregate amount. This aspect of the matter was altogether ignored by the Sub-Judge, and I cannot understand how he came to the conclusion that the reliefs claimed in respect of all the transactions could have been treated as one relief.

Now, as regards the question whether the case is governed by Section 7 (4) (c). The words of the sub-section are that in suits to obtain a declaratory decree or order where consequential relief is prayed the plaintiff shall state the amount at which he values the relief sought, and according to the opening sentence of the Section, court-fee was payable on that amount. It was argued on behalf of the plaintiffs that before they could claim possession of the alienated properties, it was necessary for them to obtain a declaration from the Court that the alienations were not binding upon them and the relief regarding possession was consequential one. The defendants'' counsel on the other hand argued that the alienations being void at the instance of the plaintiffs they could straightway sue for possession of the alienated properties, alleging that they did not affirm the alienations, and. in the circumstances the relief regarding declaration was unnecessary and a surplus age and that possession was the only relief that the plaintiffs could claim.

Now it may be mentioned that in a suit for declaration, the necessity for the plaintiff to claim consequential relief arises because of the provisions of Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act. According to that Section, when a person entitled to any legal character or to any right to any property institutes a suit against any person denying or interested to deny his title or right for a declaration that he is so entitled, the Court shall not make any such declaration if the plaintiff being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so. The operation of Section 7 (4) (c) of the Court Fees Act is limited to those cases where a consequential relief is claimed in addition to that of declaration and not to all kinds of cases which might come within the ambit of the proviso to Section 42, because though every consequential relief would be further relief within the meaning of the proviso, there may be other kinds of reliefs which can be regarded as further reliefs but they are not consequential.

The dictionary meaning of term consequential is "following as a result". So, when we talk of a relief consequential to the relief of declaration what we mean is that the relief of declaration is essential or it is the principal relief and the other relief flows from it and is incidental to it. Putting it in the other language, it means that no relief is consequential to a declaration unless it cannot be granted without declaration. For the sake of example, let us consider the case of a creditor and debtor. The creditor comes to the Court with the allegation that his debtor owes money to him and sues him for the realisation of the money. Instead of bringing a suit for money in the ordinary form he splits up his relief into two parts, one consisting of declaration that he is entitled to recover from his debtor the amount claimed by him and the second that the debtor be ordered to pay the said amount to him. Now can it be said that the second relief is consequential to that of declaration In my opinion, the answer can only be in the negative for the simple reason that the creditor could bring a suit for the recovery of the amount alleged to be due to him without suing for a declaration and that the relief for declaration was a surplusage and consequently the second relief was not a consequential relief.

Let us take another case in which the plaintiff alleges to be the owner of immovable property but instead of suing merely for possession of the property brings a suit for declaration of his title to the property and claims the possession as a consequential relief. In this case, possession cannot be regarded as consequential relief, because the declaration is not a necessary relief. This view of mine is supported by a Full Bench decision of Allahabad High Court ''KALU RAM v. BABU RAM'', 54 All 812. In that case one S.L. had executed a mortgage deed in favour of K.R. In the suit brought by K.R. on the basis of mortgage the plaintiff had also been impleaded as a party. The suit was decreed. The plaintiff then brought another suit for avoiding the mortgage deed and the decree passed on the basis thereof on the grounds that the mortgage deed was fictitious, without consideration and legal necessity and the decree had been obtained by fraud. The two main reliefs claimed were, (1) the mortgage deed be adjudged void and ineffectual against the plaintiff and it may be cancelled and (2) the compromise, the preliminary decree and the absolute decree passed in the mortgage suit be cancelled.

The Full Bench held that the suit did not come within the purview of Section 7 (4) (c) and defined the expression consequential relief as meaning some relief which would follow directly from the declaration given the valuation of which is not capable of being definitely ascertained, which is not specifically provided for anywhere in the Act and cannot be claimed independently of the declaration as a substantive relief. In ''SM. ANGURI DEVI V. GURNAM SINGH'', AIR 1951 Simla 238 it was held that Section 7 (4) (c) contemplates a suit in which the declaratory relief is the basic relief and the consequential relief is asked for as incidental to the declaratory relief. It was also held that in order to bring a suit within Section 7 (4) (c) the two reliefs are to be so connected together that if the Court in the exercise of its discretion refuses to pass a declaratory decree the claim for consequential relief also fails.

In view of what I have said above, what is necessary to determine is whether in this case it was essential for the plaintiffs to claim declaration that the alienations were not binding upon them and whether the claim in respect of the possession of the alienated properties was incidental to that relief. I have already mentioned that of the two alienors Ram Sarup is the father of the plaintiffs and Piara Lal is Ram Sarup''s brother. Which of them is the manager of joint family is not clear from the plaint nor is there any evidence on the point. If Ram Sarup is the manager, Piara Lal is only a co-parcener and accordingly the alienation made by him even as regards his own share would not be binding upon the plaintiffs.

Reference in this connection should be made to paragraph 260 of Mulla''s Hindu Law in which it is mentioned that according to Mitakshara Law, no coparcener can alienate even for value his undivided interest without the consent of the other coparceners, unless the alienation be for legal necessity or for payment by a father of antecedent debts. If, on the other hand, he be the manager alienation by him without family necessity would be voidable at the instance of other members of the family. The powers of a manager of a coparcenary property of a joint family to alienate joint family property are dealt with by Mulla in Section 242 of his book in the following words:

The manager of a joint Hindu family has power to alienate for value, joint family property, so as to bind the interests of both adult, and minor coparceners in the property, provided that the alienation is made for legal necessity or for the benefit of the estate.

It is mentioned in sub-section 4 of the above section that the alienation made by a manager of the joint family made without legal necessity is not void but voidable at the option of the other coparceners. Same is the case with an alienation made by a coparcener of his share. So, whether the plaintiffs'' father is the manager of the family or his brother, the effect is the same that is to say, if the alienations were made without family necessity and not for the benefit of the estate, and the plaintiffs'' case is that they were neither for family necessity nor for the benefit of the estate, they are void able at the plaintiffs'' option. Now when a transaction is voidable at the option of a person, it means that it is open to that person either to affirm it or to avoid it and, if he elects to avoid it, it becomes a nullity so far as he is concerned, and it is unnecessary for him thereafter to have it declared as void by a Court of law.

The leading authority on the point is, ''BIJOYGOPAL v. KRISHNA MAHISHI DEBI''. 34 Cal 329 (PC). The property in suit in that case belonged to one Chandra Bhushan Mukherji and on his death came into possession of his wife, who took a Hindu widow''s estate in the property. She executed a lease of portion of the property for sixty years in 1863, and, on her death in October 1893, the plaintiffs who were the reversionary heirs of Mukherji brought a suit for declaration that the lease was void and for possession and mesne profits. The High Court held that since the plaintiffs could not recover possession of the lease property without having the lease deed set aside and limitation period for having the lease set aside had expired, the suit was barred by time. Their Lordships of the Privy Council set aside the judgment of the High Court with the following observations:

A Hindu widow is not a tenant for life, but is owner of her husband''s property subject to certain restrictions on alienation and subject to its devolving upon her husband''s heirs upon her death..........Her alienation is not, therefore, absolutely void but it is ''prima facie'' voidable at the election of the reversionary heir. He may think fit to affirm it, or he may at his pleasure treat it as a nullity without the intervention of any Court and he shows his election to do the latter by commencing an action to recover possession of the property. There is in fact nothing for the Court either to set aside or cancel as a condition precedent to the right of action of the reversionary heir.

Adverting to the argument that the plaintiffs had brought claim for a declaration that the lease was inoperative against them, this is what they remarked:

It is true that the appellants prayed by their plaint a declaration that the ijara was inoperative as against them, as leading up to their prayer for delivery to them of ''khas'' possession. But it was not necessary for them to do so, and they might have merely claimed possession, leaving it to the defendants to plead and (if they could) prove the circumstances which they relied on, for showing that the ''ijara'' or any derivative dealings with the property were not in fact voidable but were binding on the reversionary heirs.

The appellants'' counsel tried to distinguish this case from the present case on the ground that that was a case relating to an alienation by a widow but this is a distinction without point, because whether an alienation is made by a widow or by a manager or by a coparcener of a joint family, if it is without necessity, it is voidable, the first at the instance of the reversionary heirs of the widow''s husband and the second at that of the other coparceners. Accordingly, the principle enunciated in the above case applies even to the case of an alienation made by a manager or coparcener of a joint Hindu family and all that a plaintiff has to prove before he can claim possession of the alienated property is that he has avoided the alienation and for this the mere bringing of a suit for possession on the allegation that he did not affirm the alienation, amounts to the exercise of the option on his part.

In fact, this principle was so applied by the Madras High Court in ''RAMASWAMI AYYANGAR v. RANGACHARIAR'', ILR (1940) Mad 259, a decision of five Judges. The suit was by the minor son of a Hindu father and was for partition of the family properties and for possession of his one-fifth share therein. The plaintiff''s allegations were that the suit properties, which belonged to joint family, had been sold or mortgaged by his father but the alienations were not binding on the family. He did not in terms ask for the setting aside of the alienations or for declarations that his father''s transactions which resulted into alienations were unenforceable against the estate but his prayers were for, (1) an account of the movable and immovable joint family properties, (2) the partition by metes and bounds of his one fifth share, (3) the appointment of a receiver to manage the properties and collect the rents and income till the disposal of the suit, (4) the costs of the suit and (5) such further and necessary reliefs as in the circumstances might be considered necessary and proper. He valued his share of the family property at Rs. 40,000/- but stamped his plaint merely with a court-fee of Rs. 100/- under Article 17-B of Schedule II of Court-Fees Act as amended in Madras. While dealing with the relief claimed by the plaintiff in respect of the properties alienated by his father, Leach C.J. with whom the majority of the Judges agreed made the following observations:

He is not bound under the substantive law by which he is governed, to sue for a declaration or cancellation in respect of any of them. The legal position has been correctly explained in UNNI v. KUNCHI AMMA'', 14 Mad. 26 at page 28 in the following words which were taken from an unreported decision of this Court:

(Then follows a quotation from the above judgments)

The same principle has been distinctly laid down by the Privy Council in ''BUOY GOPAL v. KRISHNA MAHISHI DEBI, 34 Cal 329 at page 333 (PC) where their Lordships point out the jural basis underlying such transactions.

K. Kalianna Gounder Vs. Balasubramaniam and Others, was a case in which the sons of a Hindu father brought a suit for a declaration that the sale deed executed by their father was not binding on them and for partition and for recovery of the property. It was held that the plaintiffs were seeking, in effect, partition of the joint family properties and possession of the lands which had been alienated by their lather during their minority and they were therefore entitled to ignore the alienation and claim possession of the shares due to them. It was further held that the suit was, in effect, one for possession, the prayer for declaration being a mere surplusage and came within the purview of Section 7(V).

The same view was taken by a Special Bench of five Judges (with one Judge dissenting) of the Patna High Court in Ramsumran Prasad and Others Vs. Gobind Das, . The plaintiffs claimed to be the reversionary heirs of one Benarsi Dass and sued for possession of the property which Benarsi Dass had gifted during his lifetime, their position being that the gift was ineffective against them. It was held that where the real relief which the plaintiff seeks is delivery of possession of the property by dispossession of the defendant, and he is not bound first to ask for a declaration before such relief can be granted, there is no reason to think that merely because he asks the Court to adjudicate upon the matters in issue, the suit should be treated as a suit to obtain a declaratory decree with consequential relief.

It was stressed by the counsel for the plaintiffs respondents that with a view to determining; under what particular provision of the Court Fees Act the case falls, all that has to be looked to is as to what relief the plaintiff claims. He has also quoted authorities in support of this proposition but on consideration of all the rulings cited before us, I am of the opinion that the better rule is that the Court must see what is the nature of the suit and of the relief claimed and in doing so due regard may also be paid to the frame of the suit. It was held in ''HAKIM RAI v. ISHAR DAS'', 8 Lah 531 that the substance and not the language of the plaint was to be looked at. This case was followed by Addison J. in AIR 1931 307 (Lahore) The same view was taken in Allahabad Full Bench Case, "KALU RAM v. BABU LAL'', (54 All 812) mentioned above. This is what the learned Judges observed:

The Court has to see what is the nature of the suit and of the reliefs claimed, having regard to the provisions of Section 7. If a substantive relief is claimed though clothed in the garb of a declaratory decree with a consequential relief, the Court is entitled to see what is the real nature of the relief and if satisfied that it is not a mere consequential relief but a substantive relief, it can demand the proper Court fee on that relief irrespective of the arbitrary valuation put by the plaintiff in the plaint on the ostensible consequential, relief.

This question was also considered in '' Ramkhelawan Sahu Vs. Bir Surendra Sahi and Others, referred to above, and it was held therein that "the valuation of a suit for court-fee purposes is to be determined by the question of whether the suit is really one for a declaration in the true sense of the word, or whether it is a suit for possession; and if there be a claim in the plaint for a declaration, the plaint should be examined to see whether it is a declaration properly so called or whether it is an unnecessary claim and the suit is really a suit for possession". While dealing with the effect of declaration in cases of this kind, this is what the learned Judges said:

It would seem that there is much misunderstanding in India as to the legal meaning of the word "declaration" as applied to a remedy to be granted by a Court. The habit has grown up of describing a suit for possession of property as being a suit for a declaration of title together with a decree for possession of the property in suit, and the word "declaration" has been used to mean what would more correctly be described as the finding of fact. In every suit for possession, the plaintiff cannot succeed unless he proves the facts necessary to establish his title, but the real remedy which he seeks is a decree for delivery of possession. The distinction between the remedy sought and the finding of fact necessary to justify the granting of that remedy may be simply tested by considering whether the plaintiff obtaining an order for possession but having been refused a formal "declaration" in the decree could come to the appellate Court with a complaint that he had not received the whole of the remedy for which he had asked. If the appellate Court is in a position to tell the plaintiff that the remedy of possession is all that the plaintiff is entitled to ask and that the so-called "declaration" claimed in the plaint is merely a finding of the Court set forth in the judgment as distinct from the decree, the jurisdiction for granting the remedy, then the so-called "declaration" claimed in the plaint is not a declaration at all.

As regards Section 7(iv) (c) they made the following observations:

Section 7 Para (iv) (c) has application to declaration properly so called, such for instance as declarations of public status, or a declaration that the plaintiff holds a public office, or a declaration as to the meaning of a will or a trust deed or other public document. It has no reference to the kind of declaration in the sense of a finding of fact as to the plaintiff''s title necessary for granting a decree for possession. It is not in the least necessary for a plaintiff in a suit for possession to claim a declaration. Indeed declarations in the true sense are rarely required. The plaintiff should only allege the facts necessary to establish his title and that the defendant is wrongfully in possession. If he goes on to claim, in the manner so beloved of pleaders, a declaration of title in addition to an order for possession, the court may and should treat the case as a claim for possession pure and simple, and ignore entirely the claim for a "declaration of title".

A contrary view was taken by a Bench of the Lahore High Court in AIR 1942 209 (Lahore) . This was a suit brought by the son of a Hindu father of a declaration that the sale made by the father not having been made for necessity and consideration, was not binding upon him and for possession of the property sold. Dalip Singh J. who wrote the judgment of the Division Bench accepted the principle that the Court has to look at the substance of the plaint in each case to determine whether the suit is really one for a declaration with a consequential relief or is merely a camouflage attempt in words to disguise a specific relief claimed in the garb of a suit for declaration coupled with a consequential relief but observed that when it was open to the plaintiff to bring a suit for possession or to bring a suit for declaration with consequential relief for possession, it was entirely for him to choose in which form he is to bring a suit and if he chose one form in preference to the other, court-fee had to be paid on the form in which the suit was actually brought. The observations made by the learned Judge read as below:

If the plaintiff brings a suit for possession of certain property then that suit would fall u/s 7 (v) Court-fees Act. If the plaintiff chooses to frame his suit which is essentially a suit for possession and asks that it be declared that he is the owner or a limited owner of certain property and then asks for possession as a consequential relief such a suit is in substance no more than a suit for possession and the plaintiff cannot merely by splitting the relief of possession into two distinct reliefs namely, one for a declaration declaring his right to possess and another for actual possession, convert the suit for possession into a suit for a declaration coupled with a consequential relief. But there may be other classes of cases where though the plaintiff may be entitled to bring a suit for possession pure and simple yet he is also entitled to bring a suit for declaration coupled with a relief by way of possession. Such cases are generally cases where the plaintiff alleges that he has a right to possess but a certain decree or other document whether by way of alienation or otherwise stands in the way of his right to possess which would arise from his title. In such a case, it may be open to the plaintiff to ignore the decree or document entirely treating it as a nullity and bring a suit for possession pure and simple. But there is no compulsion on him to do so and if he chooses to bring a suit in the form of a declaration that the document in question does not bind him and that, therefore, his title to the property gives him a right to possession he is entitled to do so, provided there is no other objection to the form of the suit.

With all deference, the second part of the observation is hardly consistent with the first part, the reason being that even when an alienation stands in the plaintiff''s way, according to law, he can ignore that alienation and bring a suit for possession of the alienated property on the mere assertion that the alienation is not binding upon him, if he still sues for declaration and possession and describes the relief for possession as consequential, it is plain that he is splitting up the relief of possession, which is the real relief, into two parts with a view to avoiding payment of proper court-fee. Accordingly, I would respectfully prefer the view taken in the previous cases to that of the Lahore case. It may be mentioned here that the plaintiffs'' counsel drew our attention to two other cases also AIR 1948 219 (Nagpur) and Banwari Lal and Others Vs. Madan Mohan and Others, but I have not considered it necessary to discuss them, because they are more or less on the same lines as the Lahore case.

For all these reasons I hold that in the present suit the declaration claimed by the plaintiffs in respect of the different alienations was a mere surplusage and the real relief being that of possession the suit fell within the purview of Section 7 (v) for the purpose of Court-fee and not Section 7 (iv) (c). In the result I would allow the revision petition, set aside the order of the Sub-Judge and send back the case to him with the direction that the plaintiffs should be called upon to pay ''ad valorem'' court fee on the aggregate value of all the properties the possession of which they claim.

It may be pointed out that though the plaint mentions the respective considerations of all the alienations, it does not give the value of the properties and this constitutes a serious defect inasmuch as the value of the suit both for purposes of court-fees and jurisdiction is the aggregate value of all the properties i.e., their value at the time of the suit, and it was necessary to give this valuation in the plaint. Obviously, the Court will have to call upon the plaintiffs to remove this defect by amending the plaint and giving therein the value of each property. In view of the difficult nature of the question involved and conflict of judicial opinion on the point, I would leave the parties to bear their own costs of this court. Parties'' counsel have been directed to cause their respective clients to appear in the Court below on 14-4-52.

Gurnam Singh, J.

I agree.