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Judgment
16 paragraphs · 2,858 wordsM.R. Sharma, J.—This is an appeal against the judgment dated August 7, 1970, delivered by the learned Senior Subordinate Judge, Sangrur, exercising the powers of District Court under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter called the Act).
The facts giving rise to this controversy may briefly be stated as follows. Ranjit Singh appellant was married to Mst. Bhagwanti respondent on January 27, 1964, at village Dallanwala. After the marriage, the parties resided at the residence of the bridegroom at village Boolapur, police station, Amargarh, for about six months. The respondent gave birth to a male child who died a few months after his birth. It was alleged that in June, 1964, the respondent withdrew from the society of the appellant without any reasonable cause and went away to live with her parents in village Dallanwala. The appellant made repeated efforts and also took a Panchayat to bring her back but all these steps taken by him were of no avail. The respondent in her written statement did admit the factum of her marriage with the appellant, but submitted that the appellant gave her beating and turned her out of his house on many occasions making the life of the respondent extremely miserable. It was also stated that the appellant''s family possessed considerable property and wealth which had charged their outlook of life. She made consistent efforts to live with her husband in spite of the maltreatment meted out to her. Inspite of all this she was turned out by the appellant on October, 1968, after she was given a merciless beating. On earlier occasions she did not go to the police because she wanted to live with the appellant as a dutiful wife in spite of the cruelty meted out to her by the appellant and the members of his family. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court framed the following issues:-
(1) Whether the respondent has withdrawn from the society of the petitioner without any reasonable excuse?
(2) Whether the petitioner has treated the respondent with such cruelty as to cause reasonable apprehension in the mind of the respondent that it would be harmful or injurious for the respondent to live with the petitioner?
(3) Whether the present application is a mala fide one?
(4) Whether there is any legal ground for rejecting the present application.
(5) Relief.
The appellant produced two witnesses besides himself entering the witness-box. The respondent produced 11 witnesses besides giving her own statement as a witness. The learned trial Court discussed issues Nos. (1) to (4) together and came to the conclusion that the behaviour of the appellant towards the respondent made the latter to leave the house of the former. She had reasonable cause for withdrawing from the society of the appellant. He was of the view that the acts of cruelty alleged against the appellant though did not come within the purview of section 10(1)(b) of the Act but were of such a nature that the respondent was justified in separating herself from the appellant. As a result of these findings, the learned trial Court dismissed the petition for restitution of conjugal rights filed by the appellant.
The Learned Counsel for the appellant has taken me through the pleadings and the entire evidence led by the parties. He has stated that the view taken by the learned trial Court could not be justified on the basis of the evidence on the record and the incidents after the institution of this petition on October 23, 1968, could not have been taken into consideration for non-suiting the appellant. In order to appreciate this contention, it becomes necessary to give a brief resume of the evidence adduced by the parties. The appellant produced Harnek Singh P. W. 1 and Mohinder Singh P. W. 2 besides appearing as his own witness. Harnek Singh P. W. 1 has stated that he was responsible for bringing about the marriage of the parties. The respondent lived at her husband''s house for a period about six months whereafter she deserted him and left his house along with her ornaments. Several efforts were made to bring her back but they proved futile. He also accompanied the appellant on few occasions to the house of the respondent''s parents to persuade her to live with the appellant but she declined to come and live with her husband without any just cause. In cross examination, this witness has admitted that Bur Singh, father of the appellant, lodged a report in the police station to the effect that Gujjar Singh, father of the respondent, along with some others had come in order to murder the appellant who was not prepared to withdraw the present petition. Ultimately it was settled that the respondent would be sent to the house of the appellant and Bur Singh would not proceed with the complaint. This witness had assured the police that the appellant would not maltreat the respondent. It may, however, be stated that the incident which this witness is alluding to relates to the visit of the brother of the respondent to the house of the appellant. According to the version given by the respondent her brother had gone in a tractor to the house of the appellant with the idea of effecting a compromise when Bur Singh lodged a report with the police which took out proceedings u/s 107, Criminal Procedure Code. The correctness of this version can also be inferred from the questions which were put in cross-examination to Gujjar Singh R.W. 8, the father of the respondent. The learned trial Judge drew an inference from the statement of this witness that unless the appellant had been guilty of meting out cruel treatment to the respondent there would have been no necessity for this witness to stand a surety for good behaviour on the part of the appellant for the period when the respondent lived with the appellant. As a matter of law, I cannot find any fault with the course adopted by the learned trial Court but prudence requires that a hurried inference of misbehaviour on the part of the husband need not be drawn on such a solitary instance, for otherwise people would be reluctant to intervene for effecting a compromise between the errant spouses. Of course, an incidence of this type can be utilized as a corroborative factor of the other evidence which shows cruelly or neglect on the part of the husband. The evidence given by this witness appears to be shaky. In cross-examination he has admitted that no person was associated by the Panchayat visiting the house of the parents of the respondent from village Dallanwala. Even though the evidence shows that Sher Singh, brother of the respondent, visited the house of the appellant on the tractor when Bur Singh lodged a report with the police, this witness attributed the visit to Gujjar Singh, the father of the respondent. The Panchayat is said to have stayed at the house of Zora Singh of village Dallanwala. Zora Singh has not been produced to corroborate the statement of this witness. I am of the view that the evidence regarding the taking of a Panchayat by the appellant to the house of the respondent''s parents is not worth any credence. Mohinder Singh P.W. 2 is another witness from the appellant''s village. He has stated that the appellant never maltreated the respondent who deserted him for the last time one year back. When questioned why the respondent exhibited such a behaviour he came out with an explanation that she wanted the appellant to get a mutation of his land registered in her name. He has, however, admitted that it was Sher Singh''s visit to the appellant''s house which led Bur Singh to file a report with the police. This witness belongs to the village of the appellant and has tried to set up a case for the appellant which I do not find in his petition.
Ranjit Singh appellant appeared as his own witness and has stated that the respondent withdrew from his company without any reasonable cause. She ran away with the ornaments supplied by him to her but he could not give the details of the ornaments. We have on record that the appellant''s father hastened to lodge a report with the police when Sher Singh, brother of the respondent, visited his village. It would be very unnatural for the appellant to desist from going to the police when the respondent ran away with the ornaments.
After having given my thoughtful consideration to the evidence produced by the appellant 1 am of the view that the evidence does not disclose that the respondent ran away with the ornaments supplied by the appellant or that the appellant took any Panchayat to the respondent''s village to bring her back.
The Learned Counsel for the appellant has, however, submitted that his client was ready and willing to keep the respondent at his own house. Under these circumstances, it was for the respondent to prove that she had reasonable grounds for withdrawing from the company of the appellant. According to him, the evidence adduced by the respondent does not give any such indication. I concede that in a case where the husband expresses his willingness to keep his wife in his house then it becomes the duty of the wife to establish that there were valid grounds which justified her withdrawal from the company of her husband. In this case, however, such justification can easily be inferred from the evidence produced by the respondent. Julli Ram R.W. 1 is the Chowkidar of the village of the appellant. He has stated that about 4 or 5 months back Bur Singh, father of the appellant, called him and directed him to leave the respondent at the house of her parents in village Dallanwala. The respondent complained to him that she had been beaten by her husband and agreed to be left at the house of her parents, which this witness did. This happened sometime after Lohri which would correspond to January, 1969. He denied the suggestion made in cross-examination that he had come to depose against the appellant because there was a demand of double Chowkidara by him from the appellant. The evidence given by him is simple and straight-forward. In my opinion, the learned trial Court rightly accepted the testimony of this wit ness. Chand Singh R.W.3 has stated that his house adjoins the house of Bur Singh, father of the appellant. The father of the respondent had left her at the house of the appellant in the month of Assuj last. In the following Kattak the respondent was beaten by the appellant, his father and his elder brother Bhira. At his request the beating was stopped. He then went to village Dallanwala and brought the father of the respondent to the village of the appellant. In his presence, Gujjar Singh, father of the respondent, asked the appellant and his father to keep the respondent in their house but they refused to do so upon which Gujjar Singh took her along with him to his village. When the respondent was again sent to the house of the appellant at the conclusion of proceedings u/s 107, Criminal Procedure Code, initiated at the instance of Bur Singh she was again beaten. At this time Bur Singh called the village Chowkidar and sent the respondent with him to her parents'' house. The evidence of this witness has also not been shaken by cross-examination. The only suggestion made to him was that he had made a false deposition which he denied. This witness lives next door to the house of the appellant and I see no reason either to disbelieve this witness. In my opinion, the statements of Julli Ram R.W. 1 and Chand Singh R.W. 3 clearly establish that the respondent was being continuously subjected to beating and the appellant was not pre- pared to keep her in his house.
It is not necessary to examine in detail the other evidence produced by the respondent. Suffice it to say that Karam Singh R.W. 5 and Surjit Singh R.W. 6 are equally independent witnesses who have stated that they were instrumental in bringing about a compromise between the close relations of the parties in proceedings u/s 107, Criminal Procedure Code. This happened on December 15, 1968. Both of them have categorically stated that Bur Singh, the father of the appellant, indicated at that time that the parties should have a divorce but the panchayat did not agree to this suggestion. It appears that when the respondent was left at the house of the appellant after this compromise she was again beaten and seat off to her parents house with the village Chowkidar.
The learned trial Court on the basis of this finding has come to the conclusion that the acts of cruelty proved in this case are not such as would come within the purview of section 10(1)(b) of the Act. Section 9(1) of the Act entitles a party to apply for getting restitution of conjugal rights sub-section (2) of section (9) of the Act provides that nothing shall be pleaded in answer to a petition for restitution of conjugal rights which should not be a ground for judicial separation or for nullity of marriage or for divorce. u/s 10(1)(b) an application for judicial separation would lie if it is proved that the petitioner has been treated with such cruelty as to cause a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that it would be harmful or injurious for the petitioner to live with the other party. In my opinion, the respondent has clearly established by cogent evidence that she was being maltreated by her husband consistently. Even when her parents ignored the cruelty meted out to her by her husband and took her to the house of the appellant to live with him, she was again beaten and turned out of the house. On proof of these circumstances she would obviously be entitled to put in a petition for judicial separation and if that is so these grounds can be validly urged in this petition for restitution of conjugal rights filed by the appellant u/s 9 of the Act. Section 10(1)(b) of the Act postulates the existence of a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that it would be harmful or injurious for the petitioner to live with the other party. A reasonable apprehension can validly be entertained when beating is given on more than one occasion and the husband openly declares that he would not keep his wife at his home. In such a situation, the wife does not have to wait for the time till her bones are actually broken by her husband. In my opinion, the learned trial Court fell in error when it observed that the cruelty proved in this case did not fall within the ambit of section 10(1)(b) of the Act.
The other objection of the Learned Counsel for the appellant that the incidents which occurred during the pendency of the petition could not be taken notice of by the learned lower Court is equally untenable. Section 9 of the Act lays down that relief in a petition for restitution of conjugal rights would be granted by the Court on being satisfied about the truth of the statement made in such a petition. The comparatively more important and relevant statement in such petitions is that the wife had withdrawn from the company of the husband for no reasonable or probable cause. The dispute in such petitions is not of the type in which a Court is ordered to return chattel to the rightful claimant. When a decree u/s 9 of the Act is passed against the wife she is supposed to live with the husband. If before the passing of the decree and during the pendency of the proceedings a Court exercising jurisdiction under this Act comes to the conclusion that something has occurred which does not entitle the husband to get the decree then it would be failing in its duty if it insists on affording relief to an errant husband. Again, the scheme of the Act provides that the Court should make efforts to effect a compromise. This situation arises only after a petition has been filed and if at that stage it comes to the notice of the parties that the husband has himself been guilty of gross misconduct then it would be open to the Court to take notice of these facts. The only requirement of law is that when a new incident occurs during the pendency of the petition and which is being relied upon by either of the parties, then it should not be acted upon unless the other side has been given an adequate opportunity to rebut the same. It has not been suggested that the appellant in this case did not have a proper opportunity of leading his evidence.
For the reasons mentioned above, this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. The costs are assessed at Rs. 300/-.
