Ranjit Singh vs State of Punjab and another

V.S. Aggarwal, J.

PetitionerRanjit Singh seeks that proceedings under Section 182 of the Indian Penal Code pending in the Court of Shri S.P. Bangar, Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Moga be quashed to prevent an abuse of the process of the Court.

It is alleged that Ranjit Singh petitioner made a representation for registration of the case against Gurcharan Singh and others and on the basis of the representation, First Information Report was recorded with respect to offences punishable under Sections 467/468/471/420/120B of the Indian Penal Code. It appears that after investigation it is decided to take action against the petitioner with respect to the offence punishable under Section 182 of the Indian Penal Code.

The petitioner seeks that the police was mixed up with the persons against whom he had made a complaint and the investigation was totally unfair. He also asserted that the First Information Report on behalf of the petitioner against Gurcharan Singh and others is dated 5th June, 1988. The police completed the investigation on 25th September, 1990 while proceedings under Section 182 of the Indian Penal Code were filed against the appellant in April 1994. The proceedings against the petitioner are stated to be time barred because of the provisions contained in Section 468 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner as well as learned Assistant Advocate General, Punjab in this regard.

There is no much controversy that the Court cannot be utilized for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of Court chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the Court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceedings even though it may be at a preliminary stage. Taking advantage of this principle, it was urged that since the period of limitation contemplated under Section 468 of the Criminal Procedure has expired, the proceedings as such may be expired.

Indeed first plea could well be taken with the concerned Judicial Magistrate. The Court will take care of any such provision, including under Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. At this stage it would not be proper for this Court to exercise the inherent power because one cannot lose sight of the provision of Section 473 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Under the said provision any Court can take cognizance of the offence after the expiry of period of limitation, if it is satisfied on facts and the circumstances of the case that delay has been explained. These are matters to be taken care of and looked into by the concerned Judicial Magistrate. Therefore, it will not be appropriate for this Court to quash the proceedings on the basis of the assertion so made.

No other argument has been advanced.

For these reasons, petition fails and is dismissed.