High CourtsSingle Bench

Ranjit Singh vs The Financial Commissioner and others

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 28 September 1971 · Citation: (1971) 09 P&H CK 0006

HON’BLE JUDGES
Prem Chand Jain, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 — Section 14A(ii)
RESULT
Allowed
CASE NUMBER
Civil Writ No. 3104 of 1970
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Judgment

10 paragraphs · 1,910 words

Prem Chand Jain, J.—This order of mine will dispose of Civil Writs No. 3104 and 3105 of 1970 as common question of law and fact arises in both these petitions.

2.

The only point that requires determination in these cases is whether the time allowed for depositing the arrears of rent by the Assistant Collector, First Grade, would start running from the date when the order was passed by the Assistant Collector or from the date when final order was passed by the Financial Commissioner on revision. The determination of the above mentioned question is to proceed on the basis of the admitted facts which are being narrated from the petition filed by Ranjit Singh and are as follows:

2.

The petitioner is a tenant on the land in dispute under Smt. Sham Kanr, Respondent No. 3, who filed an application in the Court of the Assistant Collector, First Grade, Jagraon, Respondent No. 2, u/s 14A (ii) of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, (hereinafter referred to as ''the Act'') on 3rd April, 1963 on Form ''N'' prescribed under the rules framed under the Act, seeking recovery of a sum of Rs. 4500/- as arrears of rent from Kharif 1959 to Rabi 1960, Kharif 1960 and Rabi 1961, and Kharif 1961, and Rabi 1962. The Assistant Collector, First Grade, vide his order dated 26th December, 1963, directed that a sum of Rs. 1164.22 paise be paid to Respondent No. 1 as arrears of rent within one month from the date of the said orders failing which the petitioner would render himself liable for ejectment, Feeling aggrieved from the order of the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, the petitioner filed an appeal which was dismissed on 22nd June, 1964. His revisions before the Commissioner, Jullundur, and the Financial Commissioner, Chandigarh were also dismissed on 8th December, 1966 and 12th May, 1967 respectively. It may be mentioned that right upto the Financial Commissioner, the petitioner was granted stay with regard to his dispossession. After the dismissal of the revision petition by the Financial Commissioner, the petitioner made an application before the Assistant Collector, First Grade, seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent and as per order dated 27th May, 1967, Respondent No. 2, directed the petitioner to make the said deposit which he did on 27-5-1967. Notice of the said application was issued to the landowner Respondent No. 3. On the receipt of the notice, Respondent No. 3 raised an objection to the said deposit but the same was overruled by the Assistant Collector, First Grade, vide his order dated 22nd January, 1968. The said order of the Assistant Collector, First Grade, was affirmed on appeal by the Collector vide his order dated 30th September, 1968. Aggrieved from that order, the landowner-respondent No. 3, filed a revision petition before the Commissioner Jullundur Division, who vide his order dated 30th January, 1970 (copy Annexure ''C'' to the petition) made a recommendation to the Financial Commissioner, Respondent No. 1 for setting aside the orders of the Assistant Collector, First Grade, and the Collector. The Financial Commissioner accepted the said recommendation of the Commissioner, Jullundur, and set aside the orders of the Assistant Collector and the Collector vide his order dated 35th September, 1970 (copy Annexure ''D'' to the petition). It is the legality and propriety of the orders of the Financial Commissioner that have been challenged by way of this petition.

3.

It was contended by Mr. A.L. Bahl, learned counsel, that the petitioner had obtained a stay order and that he was entitled to deposit arrears of rent within one month from the date of the final order passed by the Financial Commissioner. According to the learned counsel, the petitioner after the passing of the order by the Assistant Collector, First Grade, filed an appeal against that order and had obtained stay with regard to his dispossession, that thereafter also before the Commissioner and the Financial Commissioner, stay with regard to his dispossession was allowed to continue and that in this situation it was not obligatory on the petitioner to comply with the other direction of the Assistant Collector with regard to the deposit of arrears of rent. It was also contended by the learned counsel that the order staying dispossession should be construed as an order staying the operation of the entire order of the Assistant Collector, First Grade. On the other hand, it was contended by Mr. Bali, learned counsel for Respondent No. 3, that the petitioner was bound to deposit the arreas within the time specified by the Assistant Collector and that if the petitioner was allowed to deposit the arrears the passing of the final order by the Financial Commissioner then it would result in extension of time to make the deposit of rent which according to the learned counsel was not legally permissible.

4.

After giving my thoughtful consideration to the entire matter and to the various judicial pronouncements on which reliance was placed, I am of the view that this petition deserves to be allowed.

5.

From the facts narrated above, it is clear that the Assistant Collector. First Grade, directed the petitioner to pay arrears of rent within one month from the date of the said order failing which he would render him liable for ejectment. The petitioner filed an appeal before the Collector and obtained stay with regard to his dispossession on 1st February 1963. There is no gainsaying that if the petitioner had deposited arrears of rent, then the question of his ejectment would not have arisen. After depositing the arrears, the stay if obtained, would not have been of any use. The petitioner on filing the appeal before the Collector against the order of the Assistant Collector obtained stay with regard to his dispossession. The question that arises for consideration is whether he should have also obtained stay of the operation of the order of the Assistant Collector with regard to the deposit of the arrears of rent. In my view, the petitioner having obtained stay with regard to his dispossession, was not bound to deposit the arrears of rent and that the effect of the order of stay concerning dispossession would be that the tenant-petitioner was not bound to comply with the direction in the order of the Assistant Collector, First Grade, with regard to the deposit of the arrears. The petitioner was all along challenging his liability by to pay the arrears before the appellate as well as revisional authorities. After obtaining the order of stay, compliance of the direction with regard to the deposit of arrears was of no consequence. The real interim relief that the petitioner could ask on his filing appeal or revision was with regard to his dispossession and if that relief was given to him, then such an order should be construed as an order staying operational the entire order. A somewhat similar question arose before their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Dattatraya v. Shaikh Mahaboob Shaikh Ali AIR 1970 S.C 756, in a case relating to pre-emption matter. The question posed before their Lordships was whether the pre-emptor was bound to deposit the amount of pre-emption money within the prescribed period when the vendee-defendant who had filed second appeal, had obtained stay with regard to his dispossession and on that question, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed thus:

The first question arising in this appeal is whether the High Court was right in taking the view that the effect of the stay order dated March 23, 1955, was merely to stay the delivery of possession by the judgment-debtors and not a stay with regard to the deposit of purchase price by the decree-bolder. In our opinion, the High Court was in error in taking this view. The decree framed under Order 20, Rule 14, CPC requires reciprocal rights and obligations between the parties. The rule says that on payment into court of the purchase money the defendant shall deliver possession of the property to the plaintiff. The decree-holder therefore, deposits the purchase money with the expectation that in return the possession of the property would be delivered to him. It is therefore, clear that a decree in terms of Order 20, Rule 14, CPC imposes obligations on both sides and they are so conditioned that performance by one is conditional on performance by the other. To put it differently, the obligations are reciprocal and are interlinked, so that they cannot be separated. If the defendants by obtaining the stay order from the High Court relieve themselves of the obligations to deliver possession of the properties the plaintiff decree-holder must also be deemed thereby to be relieved of the necessity of depositing the money so long as the stay order continuous. We are accordingly of the opinion that the order of the stay dated March 23, 1955 must be construed as an order staying the whole procedure of sale including delivery of possession as well as payment of price. The effect of the stay order therefore, in the present case is to enlarge the time for payment till the decision of the appeal.

In my view, these observations of their Lordships fully support the view I have taken Mr. Bali, learned counsel sought to distinguish this decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court on the ground that in the pre-emption suit, an obligation is imposed on both the sides and that they are so conditioned that performance by one is conditional on performance by the other while in cases under the Security of Land Tenures Act, no obligation is imposed on both sides and that the obligations are imposed only on the tenant to carry out the directions of the Court and perform his part of duty. In my view, even this distinction would not affect the applicability of the ratio in Dattatraya''s case to the facts of the case in hand. The question of dispossession and that of the deposit of arrears are inter linked. It is not disputed that if stay with regard to deposit of arrears of rent is obtained, then that would automatically result in stay of dispossession. I do not see any reason why the same result should not follow in the case where stay with regard to dispossession is obtained and deposit of arrears of rent is not made. In such a case, evidently deposit of arrears of rent is of no consequence. Thus I hold that on order staying dispossession would also result in the stay of the order with regard to the deposit of arrears of rent. It was conceded by Mr. Bali that in case the. Petitioner had obtained an order staying the operation of the order with regard to payment of arrears of rent, then the petitioner could have deposited arrears of rent within one month from the date of the order passed by the Financial Commissioner. Accordingly I hold that the deposit made by the petitioner within one month of the passing of the order by the Financial Commissioner was legally valid and that he has not incurred the penalty of ejectment. The view taken by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained.

6.

No other point was urged.

7.

For the reasons recorded above, I allow these petitions and quash the impugned order of the Financial Commissioner, dated September 15, 1970 (copy Annexure ''D'' to the petition). In the circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs.